# Episode #2: Geron

- **Show:** Approved
- **Published:** 13 Mar 2026
- **Source:** https://share.transistor.fm/s/2bf0c1d9
- **Transcript:** https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/approved/episode-2-geron-63af64/
- **Provider:** OpenNash Podcasts (machine-generated)

## In brief

Geron was founded on the idea that aging is a disease and that its biological clock, telomerase, could be owned and drugged. The hosts argue the company was a scientific triumph and a commercial struggle. It pioneered telomerase and embryonic stem cell science, but its target-first strategy of owning everything about one enzyme spread it too thin across many drug types.

The central tension is hype versus execution. Bold, easy-to-explain science such as immortal cells and walking rats repeatedly raised money, while the clinical programs stalled. The stem cell, vaccine and solid-tumor efforts ended. A rare blood cancer drug was approved in 2024, yet sales and shareholder value then lagged, leaving a legacy that is academic more than financial.

## Key insights

1. **Owning a whole target proved strategically costly** Geron funded academic research to own telomerase patents, but that demanded expertise in many drug types at once. The hosts say the foundational patents ended up not protecting the final drug, and having no competitors denied it the buyout buzz rivals create.
2. **Easy-to-explain science raised money, not medicines** Old cells made immortal, paralyzed rats walking and a universal cancer target all drew investors, and the stock nearly quadrupled on one academic paper. But Matthew Pech notes that fundraising appeal and a viable drug pipeline are different things.
3. **The spinal cord trial was doomed by logistics** Fewer than 2 percent of new spinal injury patients were expected to qualify, and the FDA capped the starting dose at 2 million cells. Geron dropped the program in 2011 after dosing only five patients.
4. **Imetelstat's side effect became its therapeutic niche** Solid tumor trials failed, but the drug's low blood counts matched diseases where abnormal bone marrow cells overgrow. That led to approval in low-risk myelodysplastic syndromes, a bone marrow cancer, on June 6, 2024.
5. **Approval did not translate into commercial success** A rival drug, Reblozyl, is easier to use in community clinics and is reported at about $1 billion in revenue. Geron's market value fell from about $2.5 billion to about $860 million within 18 months.

## Questions this episode answers

### What was Geron trying to do when it was founded?

Michael West founded it in 1992 to find the molecular mechanism behind the Hayflick limit, the point where normal cells stop dividing, and build drugs around it. The idea was that switching on telomerase might reverse aging and switching it off might kill cancer.

### What is the Hayflick limit and why does it matter?

Leonard Hayflick showed in 1961 that normal human cells stop dividing after about 50 doublings, contradicting the belief that cells could live forever. Telomeres, protective caps on chromosomes, shorten with each division, which is why cells stop.

### Did Geron ever get a drug approved?

Yes. On June 6, 2024 the FDA approved imetelstat, sold as Rytelo (the transcript spells it Ritello), for low-risk myelodysplastic syndromes, a bone marrow cancer. The hosts call it the world's first approved telomerase inhibitor.

### Why did Geron's stem cell program for spinal cord injury end?

The program was expensive, losses were approaching $700 million, and the 2008 recession had hurt funding. In November 2011 new leadership refocused the company on cancer, after five patients had been dosed.

### Is Geron considered a success?

The hosts give it an A-plus for academic impact, roughly a C for financial impact, and a mediocre patient-impact score. They credit its science and persistence, but say investors saw little return.

## Facts

- **Alex Kesin** [0:01:15]: "1961, a cell biologist named Leonard Hayflick publishes a paper showing that normal human cells cannot divide forever."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:02:49]: "In 1912, Alexis Carell, a French surgeon at the Rockefeller Institute, a Nobel laureate and a eugenicist, claimed he could keep chicken heart cells alive in culture indefinitely."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:06:16]: "Hayflick's WI38 cells end up being the standard substrate for manufacturing human viral vaccines."
- **Alex Kesin** [0:07:09]: "The feds confiscate his cultures while he's away at a conference, and Stanford pushes him out and ends up, unfortunately, collecting unemployment."
- **Alex Kesin** [0:07:39]: "Congress ends up passing the Bay Dole Act, which for the first time allows researchers to profit from federally funded discoveries."
- **Alex Kesin** [0:10:55]: "West later told the New York Times that he took the word from a passage in the New Testament in which Jesus describes how a man who is old might be born again."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:14:01]: "Within 90 minutes, West had been promised $17 million."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:14:01]: "Genentech, when it went public in 1980, 10 years earlier, it raised $35 million"
- **Matthew Pech** [0:15:16]: "Geron formally launches a year later in March of 1992 with backing from Cream of the Crop Venture Capital, Kleiner Perkins, Venrock, and Domain Associates."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:25:47]: "On December 23, 1994, Geron scientists published what will become one of the most cited papers in cancer biology."
- **Alex Kesin** [0:29:35]: "In 1995, they passed the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, attached to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health and Human Services, and Clinton signed it into law."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:31:59]: "They end up selling 2 million shares at $8 apiece, raising $16 million in gross proceeds."
- **Alex Kesin** [0:41:03]: "When that paper comes out in January of 1998, Geron's stock nearly quadruples in a single day on leaked rumors."
- **Matthew Pech** [0:45:26]: "This is the final straw for West. feeling the betrayal he leaves in February of 1998."
- **Alex Kesin** [0:54:37]: "On August 9th, 2001, President Bush delivers an 11-minute televised address from his Crawford, Texas ranch."
- **Alex Kesin** [1:15:39]: "On October 8th of 2010, Timothy J. Atchison of Alabama becomes the first person in history to receive human embryonic stem cell-derived therapy."
- **Alex Kesin** [1:19:22]: "On November 14th of 2011, not even a year after the initiation of the stem cell study, Anna Krasowska from Geron's Investor and Media Relations Department sends a devastating email."
- **Alex Kesin** [1:25:51]: "In January 2013, which is a couple of years after the program is officially dead, a company by the name of Biotime swoops in and entirely acquires Geron's stem cell portfolio"
- **Matthew Pech** [1:42:48]: "On March 12, 2014, the FDA places a full clinical hold on all Amelstat trials."
- **Matthew Pech** [1:43:26]: "$35 million up front, up to $900 million in milestones."
- **Matthew Pech** [1:44:38]: "On September 27, 2018, they terminate the deal and lean the rights back to Geron."
- **Matthew Pech** [1:49:53]: "On March 14, 2024, FDA's Oncology Drugs Advisory Committee votes 12 to 2 that the benefits of the metal stat outweigh its risk."
- **Matthew Pech** [1:50:28]: "And on June 6, 2024, the FDA ultimately approves metal stat, now called Rotello, for its use in low-risk MDS."
- **Alex Kesin** [1:47:32]: "Geron gets $125 million up front in exchange for tiered royalty payments on U.S. Ritello sales."

## Transcript

**[0:00:00] Alex Kesin:** Welcome to The Approved Podcast, the stories and strategies behind life sciences breakthroughs. I'm Alex Kesin. And I'm Matthew Pech. And today we're telling the story of Geron Corporation, a company founded in 1990 by a former Young Earth creationist who raised $17 million in 90 minutes to cure aging, and then spent the next 34 years struggling to do that.

**[0:00:22] Matthew Pech:** What they did do is this, make old human cells immortal, fund the first ever isolation of embryonic stem cells, get caught in the human cloning scandal, nearly go bankrupt multiple times, publish scientific papers that got thousands of citations, and eventually, against all odds, get a drug approved by the FDA. The world's first telomerase inhibitor, a drug born from the science of immortality, now approved for a rare blood cancer that mostly hits people in their 70s. Not exactly the fountain of use.

**[0:00:52] Matthew Pech:** Not exactly. But Geron is genuinely the only company from the longevity field that's ever taken a drug from target discovery through approval. And despite that, the current generation of longevity biotechs barely claim Geron as its own. This one's going to be a wild ride. If you work in biotech, there are real lessons here about what happens when you try to own an entire biological target instead of getting good at just one drug modality.

**[0:01:15] Alex Kesin:** But before we get ahead of ourselves, let's start at the beginning, which means starting with a discovery about death. 1961, a cell biologist named Leonard Hayflick publishes a paper showing that normal human cells cannot divide forever. They hit a wall, roughly 50 divisions, and then stop. This is called the Hayflick Limit. It is one of the foundational observations in the biology of aging. And when Hayflick first reports it, almost nobody believes him. Why? Stephen Hall, who wrote the definitive book on early geron called Merchants of Immortality, describes the mid-century scientific world Hayflick entered as defined by two forces that would work against him.

**[0:02:20] Alex Kesin:** The first was hierarchy. In the 1960s, the glamour discipline in biology was virology. Virologists made the vaccines. They won Nobel Prizes. They even got invited to cushy conferences in Hawaii. It was looking like viruses were what caused cancer. Cell biologists, on the other hand, the people who grew cells in glass bottles so virologists had something to work with, they sat on a tier below. They were basically technicians with PhDs. and Leonard Hayflick was a cell biologist.

**[0:02:49] Matthew Pech:** The second issue was dogma. In 1912, Alexis Carell, a French surgeon at the Rockefeller Institute, a Nobel laureate and a eugenicist, claimed he could keep chicken heart cells alive in culture indefinitely. The culture was maintained over a 30-year period. He performed the work with bizarre theatrical rituals, black painted walls, technicians, and black gowns and hoods. None of that really mattered. The scientific establishment accepted his conclusion as fact. Cells, if given proper nourishment, are immortal. And that belief carried a corollary that acted like a trap.

**[0:03:26] Matthew Pech:** If your cells died in the lab, you blame your technique. You never blamed the cells. Hayflick is the wrong person to challenge this by every measure that matters. In West Philadelphia, born and raised, though not on a playground, he grows up in 1928 in a working-class family, builds a chemistry lab in his basement as a kid, bikes to the Penn campus to buy chemicals from a supply house, and spends his childhood blowing things up. He gets into Penn on the GI Bill, and he has a chip on his shoulder.

**[0:03:55] Matthew Pech:** To quote Leonard, I had an inferiority complex, I suppose, and never thought I had the brains to get a PhD. His job is to grow cells for the urologists. In 1962, using fetal lung tissue sent by airmail from the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, he creates a cell line called WI-38. And in the course of that work, he notices that his normal human cells keep stopping. After months of healthy growth, they slow down and simply quit dividing.

**[0:04:21] Matthew Pech:** Every batch, every time. To quote Leonard, I just thought everyone knew this. I thought everyone knew that normal cells could not divide indefinitely, and that only cancer cells were immortal. So to figure out whether he's seeing

**[0:04:33] Alex Kesin:** something real or really just has bad technique, he drives to Atlantic City for a national conference. He's not there to present. Rather, he's there to ask one question. Theodore Puck, the most prominent cell culture scientist in the world, is giving the keynote. Hundreds of biologists in the auditorium. Hayflick stands in the back and asks the following. Dr. Puck, in your experience with normal human cells, have you ever found that they stop dividing and you're unable to work with them anymore?

**[0:05:02] Alex Kesin:** Puck says yes. That happens. But it's not a problem. You just go back to the freezer and start a fresh culture. Hey Flick, vindicated with that answer, drives home. And quickly thereafter, he and his colleague Paul Moorhead write up a paper about this discovery, sending it to the top journal in their field, the Journal of Experimental Medicine. But to a surprise, it's rejected. The journal's editor, Peyton Rouse, writes back, it is a fact that cells inherently capable of multiplying will do so indefinitely if supplied with the right milieu in vitro.

**[0:05:34] Alex Kesin:** The inference that the death of cells is due to the so-called senescence at the cellular

**[0:05:38] Matthew Pech:** level seems notably rash. The paper is ultimately published in a less prestigious journal in 1961. It describes 25 separate strains of normal human cells, all of which stopped dividing after roughly 50 population doublings. It takes years for the Carell dogma to collapse. Eventually, scientists established that Carell's team had been inadvertently introducing fresh cells into the culture during feeding. The chicken cells weren't immortal, they were just getting accidentally replenished through sloppy technique. Hayflick was right, or at least more correct, but being right in this case does not translate into being rewarded.

**[0:06:16] Matthew Pech:** Hayflick's WI38 cells end up being the standard substrate for manufacturing human viral vaccines. Think polio, measles, mumps, rubella, varicella, rabies, hepatitis A. An estimated 4.5 billion people have received vaccines made using these cell lines. So many lives have been saved by this one set of cells.

**[0:06:40] Alex Kesin:** Crazy to put a number on that. 60 years out from that discovery. Just as wild as that, though, is that Hayflick didn't get compensated by either the Worcester or NIH for any of that work that he did. And so, frankly, deducted by the lack of reward, when he moves from the Worcester to Stanford in 1968, he ends up sneaking out all of those WI-38 ampoules with him, driving cross-country with them in the backseat of his family car.

**[0:07:09] Alex Kesin:** And from there, he begins to illicitly distribute them to researchers at cost, depositing the proceeds into a dedicated bank account. Eventually, the NIH catches wind of this undergone venture, and they accuse him of selling government property for personal gain. The feds confiscate his cultures while he's away at a conference, and Stanford pushes him out and ends up, unfortunately, collecting unemployment.

**[0:07:34] Matthew Pech:** You don't hear too many stories of professors collecting unemployment checks.

**[0:07:39] Alex Kesin:** Nope. So to clear his name, Hayflick sues the federal government. He is eventually exonerated, but the case takes seven years in the meantime, and every dollar that he'd made goes to legal fees. The bitter irony here is that while the settlement was being reached, Congress ends up passing the Bay Dole Act, which for the first time allows researchers to profit from federally funded discoveries. The thing that they tried to destroy Hayflick for ends up becoming just the law of the land.

**[0:08:09] Matthew Pech:** By the early 1990s, Hayflick has rebuilt his career. He is president of the Gerontological Society of America, part of the establishment, and he's combative. Hall describes his most prominent physical feature as, quote, almost a bone spurt of bitterness and resentment about the way he's been treated during his scientific career. In the summer of 1992, a young man from Michigan shows up at his house at Sea Ranch, California to tell him about a new biotech company he wants to start.

**[0:08:37] Matthew Pech:** They talk all day and into the evening. They go out to dinner at Sea Ranch Lodge. The young man is so excited he doesn't even touch his meal. The company is going to be called Geron. It wants to find the molecular mechanism behind Hayflick Limit, figure out what is winding in that clock, and ultimately build drugs around it. Hayflick joins the scientific advisory board. The young man goes back to Medlow Park to do exactly what he promised.

**[0:09:01] Matthew Pech:** His name is Michael West, and to understand him, you need to know that he used to be a creationist.

**[0:09:27] Alex Kesin:** Before Michael D. West is a biotech visionary raising money from Texas oil tycoons and Silicon Conn Valley VCs. He is a kid from a family of used car salesmen. Growing up in Niles, Michigan, he spends a lot of time in religious circles obsessed with the idea that the theory of evolution is wrong and that the world began 6 ,000 years ago, just like the Bible says. In his spare time, he teaches himself Greek and Hebrew so he can read the scriptures in their original languages.

**[0:09:56] Alex Kesin:** He studies at the Institute for Creation Research in San Diego. But slowly and painfully, after years spent weighing the evidence for and against, he comes to a conclusion that he doesn't want to reach. It's the scriptures that are wrong, not the science. Here's what he says exactly. Kicking and screaming every inch of the way, I ended up having to admit the truthfulness of the general theory of evolution, which, when you think about it, leads to the conclusion that aging and death have been around since, well, at least a billion years.

**[0:10:25] Alex Kesin:** And that as certainly before Adam and Eve. So picture this guy. He spent years building a worldview around the idea that death has a purpose, that's part of some divine plan, and now that worldview is gone kaput. Then in 1980, his father dies of a heart attack and something changes in his brain. He arrives at this new conviction and it's one that will define the rest of his life. He realizes that aging is not a facet of life ordained by God, but rather that it's a disease and that it's killing everyone.

**[0:10:55] Alex Kesin:** So he decides to do something about it. He ends up selling the family business and going back to school at the age of 29. First to medical school at UT Southwestern, then to Baylor for a PhD in cell biology. And while he's still earning his doctorate, he does something rather unhinged. He quietly registers a company name on a piece of paper, a Greek word. It means old man. West later told the New York Times that he took the word from a passage in the New Testament in which Jesus describes how a man who is old might be born again.

**[0:11:26] Alex Kesin:** That name is Geron. The company won't exist for another decade, but in the meantime, West has a plan. Man, that is a Babe Ruth level

**[0:11:36] Matthew Pech:** of calling your shot there. In the 80s, the concept of biotechnology and new company creation is really new. For Michael West as a grad student to think about commercializing what he's working on is quite audacious. What were you doing as a grad student? I was rock climbing around the world mostly doing a little bit of biochemistry. All right, let's fast forward now to November of 1991. There's a biotech venture conference in a hotel in Redwood Shores, California, basically a speed dating event for entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.

**[0:12:11] Matthew Pech:** Hundreds of companies are there making their pitches. As investor Alan Walton described it, the whole affair is a test version of the dating game for would-be biotech entrepreneurs. Whoever told the most convincing story was likely to walk away with a princely sum. Now, West's early backers knew something about him that the rest of the room didn't. This guy knew how to sell. Long before he reached the podium, West had already proven his ability to hunt for capital from unconventional sources.

**[0:12:39] Matthew Pech:** In the late 1980s, still a graduate student, West had spent his nights cold calling names from the Forbes 400 list, eventually securing $100 ,000 in seed money from a group of Dallas oil tycoons,

**[0:12:52] Alex Kesin:** including members of the Hunt family. Wow, 40 years later, it's still kind of the same story. I mean, you could literally today replace Texas oil tycoons with Silicon Valley tech people,

**[0:13:03] Matthew Pech:** and it's the same thing. West was clearly a fundraising genius, that's for sure. By the time West arrives at Redwood Shores, his backers are so worried about what will happen when he opens his mouth that they want term sheets signed before his presentation. One of them, Mendelssohn, actually warns Walton, if you put Mike West in front of that audience, he's going to have so much money poured on him that you're going to get excluded from the deal.

**[0:13:29] Matthew Pech:** You better get a signed term sheet, Prano. They are literally afraid he'll get swarmed by bigger firms. They are, in fact, right to worry. West gets up on the podium and delivers a pitch that Walton later describes as being like St. Paul, the most zealous of the apostles. And Wes's hook for the room, remember this is 1991, so the baby boomers are starting to enter middle age. His hook is, quote, in World War II, when the draft came, everyone was knocking each other down trying to get into the army.

**[0:14:01] Matthew Pech:** When the baby boomers were confronted with Vietnam, their response was, hell no, we won't go. And I think in regard to aging, you're going to see a similar response. Hell no, he won't grow old. Within 90 minutes, West had been promised $17 million. $17 million in 90 minutes in 1991. Incredibly impressive. Made me to contextualize that amount of money since in the land of AI raises, people are pretty numb to really big financing events. Genentech, when it went public in 1980, 10 years earlier, it raised $35 million.

**[0:14:41] Matthew Pech:** in its IPO. And that was considered an enormous amount of money. And here's West getting $17 million with sort of a hotel breakout chat. Biotech venture capital at that time was still a very small and cottage industry. And Jaren at that time was an idea stage preclinical. It was a PowerPoint. It was a PowerPoint. All right. So after the talk, people are writing checks directly in the room. Venrock, the Rockefeller's family venture arm, is fighting for every tenth of a percent of the deal.

**[0:15:16] Matthew Pech:** Geron formally launches a year later in March of 1992 with backing from Cream of the Crop Venture Capital, Kleiner Perkins, Venrock, and Domain Associates. Wes serves as VP of Science, while Alexander Barkas, the chairman of the board for Geron, serves as president and CEO. They find lab space in Hayward, California, 17 ,000 square feet in the East Bay, across the bridge from the more high-rent biotech zone of the peninsula. Even when they would eventually move to Menlo Park right near where the Meta Campus is today, they have an all-in cost that would be unrecognizable by today's Bay Area lab real estate standards, something like $1.50 per square foot.

**[0:15:57] Matthew Pech:** The company logo is an hourglass wrapped with a DNA double helix, which, looking at it today, was probably made with Microsoft Paint. As one observer notes, this logo leaves no doubt about the mission.

**[0:16:10] Alex Kesin:** So before we move on, let's pause for a moment and try to understand what Geron is actually working on here, and more importantly, what the business was. Let's walk through both, because at Geron, they were inseparable. First, we'll zoom into your cells. At the tips of every chromosome, there are these protective caps called telomeres. Think of them as the plastic tips on shoelaces. They keep the ends of chromosomes from fraying. Human telomeres are made of a simple DNA sequence, TTAGGG, repeated thousands of times, along with a cluster of associated proteins that fold the whole structure into a loop.

**[0:16:47] Alex Kesin:** At birth, you've got about 12 ,000 to 15 ,000 base pairs of this stuff on each chromosome. While that may sound like a lot, it really isn't. because every time a cell divides, and cells divide many, many times over the course of your life, those telomeres get a bit shorter and a little bit more worn down. And as it turns out, when telomeres get short enough, the cell receives a DNA damage signal and enters replicative senescence.

**[0:17:10] Alex Kesin:** It stops dividing and eventually dies. This is because of a phenomenon called the N-replication problem, a fundamental limitation of how DNA copies itself. This is also what Haefelich accidentally discovered in the 1960s, and today what we call the Haefelich limit.

**[0:17:26] Matthew Pech:** By the 1980s, two molecular biologists named Elizabeth Blackburn and Carol Greider at UC Berkeley discover an enzyme called telomerase. As the name implies, this is the enzyme that can rebuild those telomeres. They didn't know it at the time, but telomerase was an unusual enzyme, a ribonucleoprotein, part protein, part RNA. In the catalytic component, it carries its own little RNA template and uses it to synthesize new TTA-GGG repeats onto the chromosome ends. It's the reason certain cells, like stem cells, your germline, and embryonic cells, can keep dividing without hitting the Hayflick limit.

**[0:18:04] Matthew Pech:** Their telomeres get maintained. The bet that Michael West makes is that this all connects into a single, massive commercial opportunity. If you can turn on telomerase in healthy cells, Maybe you can reverse aging. If you can turn it off in cancer cells, maybe you can kill tumors. It's one target with two directions, and both of them are potentially worth billions.

**[0:18:25] Alex Kesin:** Man, I can't imagine being a scientist at the time, seeing a target like this be discovered. This would probably be a target that would have so much money thrown at it today. Right, Matt?

**[0:18:36] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I mean, at face value, a single target with that sort of market opportunity. in 2025, there would definitely be a company with a billion dollar seed round that's formed around it. Some crazy number like that. But yeah, as we'll find out, the promise and reality can sometimes diverge.

**[0:18:54] Alex Kesin:** That's right. Back to the 90s. Geron's strategy for capturing value on this target was genuinely unusual for the time. The typical playbook for biotechs and the venture firms that capitalize on them is to wait for academic labs to publish foundational discoveries and then to license the IP. In other words, patiently wait while government-funded research from underpaid graduate students and postdocs bear fruit and then purchase the rights. But Geron flips this idea on its head. You see, rather than licensing intellectual property after it trickles out of a lab, Geron would proactively fund the basic research itself through a series of public-private partnerships with academic labs and then own everything that came out of it.

**[0:19:35] Alex Kesin:** The gene sequences, detection assays, screening tools, essentially, it was an attempt to own this entire IP landscape around a single biological target. And in the earliest versions of their website, which we spent time trawling while researching for this episode, you can see how proud of the strategy they were. Geron was, as far as we know, the only biotech company that had a dedicated patents tab listing every piece of IP they'd assembled around telomerase. And by 2004, they claimed more than 60 issued patents and over 180 pending ones, covering all aspects of telomerase.

**[0:20:09] Matthew Pech:** This is what Hamilton Helmer would call a cornered resource approach to getting business power. And for a target as broad and exciting as telomerase, it was potentially the right bet. But it came with a problem that Geron never fully solved. When you own everything related to a target rather than a modality, you end up needing to be good at everything. telomerase touches, aging, cancer, stem cells, diagnostics. To exploit all of that, you need small molecule inhibitors, activators, oligonucleotide inhibitors, cell therapies, diagnostic kits, vaccines, oncolytic approaches, a dozen different drug modalities, a dozen different therapeutic areas, all under a single roof.

**[0:20:50] Matthew Pech:** For a small biotech with limited capital and headcount, that's not a strategy. Most biotechs ultimately succeed by picking one modality and getting world-class at it. Geron's target-first approach meant they could never really develop that kind of depth. They were, in a sense, a mile wide and an inch deep, owning the map but lacking the tools to mine any single vein. These pitfalls were, ultimately, years away. At the time, it turned out to be an extraordinary fundraising strategy.

**[0:21:19] Matthew Pech:** You have to remember the moment in history. The genome boom was ongoing, and people were expecting that there would be a huge amount of money to be made from figuring out human DNA sequencing. and owning the intellectual property associated with them. Think the BRCA gene on steroids. This was before the myriad genetics Supreme Court ruling that said genes were unpatentable natural phenomena. There was real enthusiasm for, and some degree of value capture from, quote unquote, patenting the telomerase gene.

**[0:21:48] Alex Kesin:** That's right. So while the hype isn't irrational, strictly speaking, Geron's problem is that the biology was never as clean as what they made it out to be in the beginning. At this point, West is hitting the road recruiting scientists. He gets a guy named Calvin Harley from McMaster University, who at the time had made the crucial discovery that telomeres shorten with age and dividing cells. And he gets another gerontologist named Brian Villabonteau from the University of Michigan, go blue, who leaves almost immediately when he hears the pitch.

**[0:22:18] Alex Kesin:** Quote, when Mike West came with the idea of not only doing telomeres, but with aging as the idea for the company, that was very, very exciting. He ultimately becomes Geron's first scientist starting on January 1st, 1993. And he gets another guy named Omayun Vaziri, also from McMaster, who later says of the company, the whole principle of putting telomerase into normal cells and making them immortal was a crazy idea. But Mike West and I were obsessed with these ideas.

**[0:22:44] Alex Kesin:** So we sort of brought it out of this impossible task and made it an experimental task. The pitch to Carol Greider, who would later win the Nobel Prize for her work on co-discovering telomerase, is another perfect snapshot. of how Geron operated at this time. Wes and his co-founder, Alexander Barkas, fly out to Cold Spring Harbor on Long Island and hold a taxi idling outside with the meter running just for a chance to take Carol Greider out for lunch.

**[0:23:08] Alex Kesin:** They tell her something really audacious, that they've already proven that lengthening telomeres extends cellular lifespan. Here's what Carol Greider said of that interaction. They said, well, we've done that experiment and it works. It turns out they hadn't really proven it. And that realization made it clear to me There was a culture of exaggeration beginning with the company's very first acts of recruitment. They didn't have any data and I should have been more critical, but I really felt strong-armed.

**[0:23:34] Alex Kesin:** This is a theme we'll see pop up in the story as it progresses. There's some very bold science that has some element of reality to it, but it gets promoted in a way that inflates people's expectations. This will have consequences on the stock ticker. It'll have consequences with the FDA. a lot of consequences with the leadership of the company. So ultimately, Greider declines to join full-time, but agrees to serve on the Scientific Advisory Board. That board will eventually include four Nobel laureates, James Watson, Gunther Blobo, and eventually Greider and Blackburn themselves.

**[0:24:09] Matthew Pech:** Be remiss not to say that David Botstein was on the board as well, a true genetics pioneer that I had the pleasure of working with many decades later at Calico.

**[0:24:19] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, it's really remarkable to think how many people they got on that board. Very high powered SAB, to say the least, for such a small startup. Here's a funny anecdote of the company at the time. In a meeting with Jim Watson, they were discussing some of the early science. And West is giving a presentation to Watson. And Watson asks Mike if any of this data is published. Mike says no. and Jim says, I don't believe a goddamn word of anything you just said.

**[0:24:52] Alex Kesin:** Despite the hiccups, though, the company's off to a fantastic start. Inside Geron, the culture is, to say the least, intoxicating. They throw monthly parties called Geronimos and give a sitting bull award to employees for their extraordinary service.

**[0:25:08] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, that doesn't fly anymore, to say the least. Right.

**[0:25:11] Alex Kesin:** William Andrews, the director of molecular biology, recalled at the time, Tremendous energy, just incredible. We knew that the things we were working on were something that could change the world. And another Geron executive boasted that all of our vice presidents are either marathoners or mountain bikers or whitewater rafters.

**[0:25:30] Matthew Pech:** Well, to be honest, what California company doesn't brag about this though? Right.

**[0:25:36] Alex Kesin:** So long story short, this is a company that really believes it's going to change the human condition. And for a while, science seems to justify that faith.

**[0:25:47] Matthew Pech:** On December 23, 1994, Geron scientists published what will become one of the most cited papers in cancer biology. They demonstrate that 98 % of all human cancer cell lines and 89 % of tumor biopsies test positive for telomerase activity, while normal somatic tissues show none. The immortality enzyme narrative is absolutely irresistible. Time magazine runs features, and Geron's mere existence is itself a scientific statement. Hall observes that it proves that aging and its treatment was no longer a matter of dubious nostrums and unproven herbals to drive the market.

**[0:26:24] Matthew Pech:** The paper introduces the trap assay, the first biochemical method for testing whether telomerase is active in a sample. You feed a synthetic telomere end to a cell extract and see if it gets extended, producing a beautiful and distinctive ladder pattern on a gel. While these are basic scientific discoveries, you can see why this would drive so much excitement. For one, you've discovered potentially an insanely good universal cancer biomarker, so you're going to be well-positioned in clinical development, in diagnostics, etc.

**[0:26:55] Matthew Pech:** For two, you've potentially discovered a target uniquely expressed in cancers and important for their proliferation, so you can immediately start thinking of small molecule inhibitors or even cancer vaccines. And then for three, you have a biochemical assay on hand that you fully own the rights to. And so you can think about starting to actually screen for those drugs. But here's what investors didn't know yet. While the company could measure the activity of the enzyme, they still had no idea what the identity of the enzyme was.

**[0:27:24] Matthew Pech:** Behind the scenes, Geron was in a frantic race to clone the actual human telomerase gene. And they were losing.

**[0:27:32] Alex Kesin:** to think that this is something you can figure out in an afternoon today and was as you'll see later in the story becomes this whole arc that they spend a bunch of money

**[0:27:46] Matthew Pech:** on is a little comic it used to be a lot harder to figure out what dna sequences are and as you mentioned it's it's gotten pretty trivial to do that in 2025 that's right as if mastering the

**[0:27:58] Alex Kesin:** biology itself around telomerase wasn't enough of a challenge. Geron is at this point basically envisioning itself as a company that wants to treat all cancers and extend human lifespan writ large. When he was at UT as a medical student, West encountered a teratoma in a pathology lab. If you're not familiar, teratomas are among the strangest tumors found in medicine. They're these disorganized masses that can contain fully differentiated teeth, hair, bits of bone, glandular tissue, even structures resembling rudimentary eyes.

**[0:28:31] Alex Kesin:** They are, in essence, a tumor's failed attempt to build a human body. Most medical students see them as grotesque curiosities. I've unfortunately seen one myself with my own eyes. The descriptions are true, needless to say, but Wes saw them differently. He reasoned that if a tumor can spontaneously generate all of these different cell types, it must mean that there's a cell somewhere in the human body with the capacity to become anything. And if that cell exists, it could theoretically be harnessed as a therapeutic tool for regenerative medicine.

**[0:29:05] Alex Kesin:** This insight is the conceptual bridge between telomerase and stem cells. Telomerase is one pillar, but West's grand vision for Geron is that it will own the foundational tools of cellular immortality, broadly defined, the enzymes, the cell lines, the culture methods, the IP. And embryonic stem cells, which are, by definition, immortal cells that can become any cell type in the body, they fit that vision perfectly. For Geron, telomerase will be the engine, and embryonic stem cells will be the chassis.

**[0:29:35] Alex Kesin:** Now, something important to know is that the political context around embryonic stem cells at this point becomes very, very relevant. In 1994, an NIH panel had recommended that the Clinton administration fund research on embryos left over from IVF fertility treatments and even on embryos created specifically for research. While Clinton partially agreed, before any money can flow, Congress intervened. In 1995, they passed the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, attached to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health and Human Services, and Clinton signed it into law.

**[0:30:09] Alex Kesin:** What this law did was prohibit any federal funding for research in which human embryos are created or destroyed, period, bar none. This effectively throws the most promising frontier in regenerative medicine at the time. Any scientist that wanted to work on human embryonic stem cells would have to find private money, set up a separate lab with separate equipment, make sure that not even an extension cord had been bought with viral funds. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Geron steps into the void.

**[0:30:38] Alex Kesin:** In 1995, James Thompson at the University of Wisconsin publishes the first isolation of embryonic stem cells from a rhesus monkey, a result that suggests human embryonic stem cells might be within reach. Mike West sees the paper and moves fast. Quote, and I think the next day I was in Wisconsin at Jamie Thompson's lab. Thompson had asked the university for $20 ,000 to pursue the human work. They said no. The political climate around embryonic stem cell research simply made all institutions way too gun shy.

**[0:31:11] Alex Kesin:** Mike West walked back into his lab with Geron's checkbook. Geron's initial investment in Thompson's research cost the company about $30 ,000. Even today, that's pennies. That's wild.

**[0:31:22] Matthew Pech:** Mike West definitely had a nose for interesting science, that's for sure. By 1996, Geron goes public. They're writing the momentum of the 1994 science paper, the telomerase assay platform, and a $30 million deal with the Japanese pharma partner, Kiyo-Yohaku, for Asian rights to telomerase-based cancer drugs. The company still has zero products and no telomerase gene in hand, but the vision is potent enough to attract investors. The IPO, in truth, is a modest success. Geron had hoped to sell 2.5 million shares at $11 to $12 apiece.

**[0:31:59] Matthew Pech:** The biotech market is in a downturn. They end up selling 2 million shares at $8 apiece, raising $16 million in gross proceeds. Geron's then-CEO puts a brave face on it. Quote, We're proud the company was able to break through in this environment. Even with extraordinary science, Wall Street demands more than a pitch deck. But the company's scientific advisory board is now a who's who of biology. Blackburn, Grider, Hayflick, Watson. And their IP position they've built around telomerase is unmatched.

**[0:32:30] Matthew Pech:** What they need now is the gene itself. The race to clone the human telomerase gene begins with a coffee break. At a scientific meeting in Hawaii in 1996, Nobel laureate Tom Cech has just given a talk. During the break, he and another telomere geneticist, Vicky Lundblad, started comparing notes. Lunblad is one of the pioneering women in telomere research and, crucially, a paid Geron collaborator. She's been working in yeast, identifying genes required for telomere maintenance. Meanwhile, Czech's postdoc, Joachim Ligner, has taken a completely different approach.

**[0:33:25] Matthew Pech:** Instead of using genetic screens, he's been biochemically purifying the telomerase enzyme from euplotes, a ciliated protozoan that happens to have thousands of tiny chromosomes and, therefore a boatload of telomerase protein to purify. What happens next is consequential. Tisha DeLong, a preeminent telomere biologist at the Rockefeller, watches it unfold. To quote, after Tom's talk, there was a coffee break and Tom and Vicky talked. They looked at each other and smiled because both had this nugget of gold in hand.

**[0:33:56] Matthew Pech:** Tom knew he had something you could tell. They realized their sequences matched. One of the yeast genes Lundblad had identified, ST2, is in fact the yeast telomerase catalytic subunit and is homologous to Ligner's protein. And crucially, Ligner had already discovered that this protein contains a motif for reverse transcriptase, the same family of enzymatic domains found in retroviruses, and intuitively the right sort of needed to elongate telomeres. They are on the right track. With this info, the idea is that you can now search human genome databases for similar looking reverse transcriptase like genes and look for those specifically in immortalized cells.

**[0:34:38] Matthew Pech:** I love how these things always happen in conferences over lunch. I can remember decades later at a conference in France, my advisor having discrete conversations with Czech about additional members of the telomerase complex. So yeah, some things never change. Wow. Well, at this point, Geron's been obviously trying to clone the human telomerase gene themselves, and they've been failing. Unlike Vicky and Joachim Lingner, they had been trying to use a different discovery to try to find human telomerase.

**[0:35:16] Matthew Pech:** Carol had cloned two telomerase-associated proteins in yeast, P80 and P95. And they were hoping to use that as a hook to fish out the human gene. And again, relying on the natural conservation of proteins that typically occurs between species. Unfortunately for Geron and for Carol as well, those turn out to be accessory proteins to the complex and not the catalytic subunit itself. In other words, a scientific dead end for finding human telomerase.

**[0:35:48] Alex Kesin:** interesting. But after Hawaii, it seems like the path forward is through ChexLab and not through the Geron team. What Geron does, and this makes sense, is that they pay around $250 ,000 for early access to his postdoc Lingner's sequence. And that quarter $1 million is literally just to get back on track for a few months head start against other rivals who are beginning to pop up. That sequence that catch isolated, unlike the yeast data, it could be used to blast search human databases because its reverse transcriptase motifs are conserved enough across species to pull up the human equivalent.

**[0:36:24] Alex Kesin:** And Geron reasonably throws all they can to isolate it. Bill Andrews, who at this point becomes Geron's head of gene cloning, later tells Hall he was sleeping on a couch in the office. And when that became too gamey for management, the company rented him a trailer outside in the parking lot so he can work around the clock with the rest of his team. But given the collaboration with Ketch, at this point, they together ultimately crack it.

**[0:36:51] Alex Kesin:** On August 15th, 1997, they publish a paper jointly in Science. Meanwhile, and this is crazy, Bob Weinberg's competing team at MIT, who at this point had taken the Langner sequence and run it against yeast data, submitted their paper on July 15th, less than a month earlier than the Jaren team. So Geron's $250 ,000 down payment for early access to Lingner's data basically bought them a lead of maybe two weeks. The finish is so close that people for the next couple of years literally didn't know if it was Weinberg or Ketch that had been the one responsible to isolate the human telomerase gene.

**[0:37:30] Alex Kesin:** But companies make sure. And as the story goes, the day before the science paper dropped, Geron had filed patents on the gene. By this point, Geron had spent close to $35 million in the 1990s to own telomerase, literally just to get to the starting point of drug discovery.

**[0:37:47] Matthew Pech:** I think in 2025, a lot of people are thinking about Eroom's law and this idea that pharmaceutical research and development has gotten progressively worse over time at turning dollars into new drugs. It's just funny to think that in the 1990s, Geron probably spent $100 million of today's dollars just to get a cDNA sequence.

**[0:38:13] Alex Kesin:** I guess that's the premium you have to pay if you want to own all of the IP in-house.

**[0:38:18] Matthew Pech:** Good for them. Yeah, they executed for sure. They owned all of the IP, and we'll talk later about whether that was actually worth owning. With the human telomerase gene cloned, Geron can finally ask the question, is this the fountain of youth? Will putting this gene into old cells make them young again? In the fall of 1997, a Canadian film crew is visiting Geron's offices. Leonard Hayflick, the legendary cell biologist, now approaching 70 years old, is there too, giving an interview.

**[0:38:48] Matthew Pech:** Someone asked him if he'd be willing to have his own cells cultured on camera. Hayflick agrees on one condition. They have to promise to actually use the footage. He isn't going to lop off a piece of his skin for nothing. So on camera, Hayflick tugs a hair from his knee, lifting the little pyramid of skin underneath. and Michael West slices it off with a sterile scalpel. West carries the cells back to his lab, and he inserts the newly cloned telomerase gene into Hayflick's 70-year-old cells.

**[0:39:17] Matthew Pech:** The experiment works. Hayflick's cells regrow in telomere length and are able to crash right through the Hayflick limit, and the cells keep dividing without end. West wants to call the paper the immortal Dr. Hayflick. Believe it or not, this discovery was a true marvel of biological serendipity. The reason this experiment works at all is that the expression of telomerase turns out to be rate limiting in telomere maintenance. The biology didn't have to work out that way.

**[0:39:42] Matthew Pech:** If the bottleneck had been something else, say telomere access, protein folding, substrate availability, simply adding the gene wouldn't have done anything. Geron gets lucky that the biology cooperates with the simplest possible experiment. Of course, there's an internal curse to doing ex vivo experiments. Whatever result you get, a skeptic can argue that it's an artifact of specific culture conditions. Remember the objections to Hayflick's initial discoveries. Cells in a dish aren't cells in a body. The media composition, the oxygen tension, plastic surface, everything on, all of it is quite artificial.

**[0:40:22] Matthew Pech:** Showing that telomerase immortalizes cells in culture is an amazing result. showing that it matters in a living organism or that it can be the basis of a drug embodiment are completely separate problems.

**[0:40:34] Alex Kesin:** When the actual landmark paper is submitted to science in December of that year, West's name isn't on it. A team of geron scientists, as it turns out, led by Andrea Bodnar, had done the same experiment simultaneously. And this experiment was with far more rigor and many more cell lines. As Woody Wright, the senior author of that paper, put it, quote, Mike is willing to do experiments with enough rigor to convince himself, but not necessarily with enough rigor to convince me.

**[0:41:03] Alex Kesin:** Wes' data amounts to, in his own words, a little graph posted on his door rather than a publication. And the paper, unfortunately, does not have as cool of a title as The Immortal Dr. Hayflick. It's called Extension of Lifespan by Introduction of Telomerase into Normal Human Cells. And it accumulates over 7 ,000 citations. When that paper comes out in January of 1998, Geron's stock nearly quadruples in a single day on leaked rumors. This is probably one of the largest stock movements in biotech history, and it wasn't even driven by clinical data.

**[0:41:38] Alex Kesin:** Not even preclinical data we're talking about. It's an academic publication in a basic science journal.

**[0:41:44] Matthew Pech:** Fortune says Geron has the highest buzz-to-equity ratio in biotech history. in the New York Times, writes, the study of aging is undergoing a possibly profound change and a handful of biologists whose hubris has not been punished with a thunderbolt from Mount Olympus are beginning to think about interfering with the mechanism that makes the body mortal.

**[0:42:04] Alex Kesin:** There goes the predictable waxing on about mythology. So that same year as this telomerase paper comes out, something else incredible also happens. On November 6, 1998, Jamie Thompson publishes a landmark paper in Science announcing the first isolation of human embryonic stem cell lines. The acknowledgement specifically thanks Geron Corporation. Geron issues a press release describing the work as a breakthrough. It is déjà vu all over again on Wall Street, where investors drive Geron's stock up 31 % in a single day, a Fox News commentator observed at the time.

**[0:42:43] Alex Kesin:** There's nothing like the promise of eternal life to give the stock price a little boost. But this is a big but. Just as immediate as the scientific community and Wall Street reacted to this news, so too does the political world. Within weeks, Senators Arlene Spector and Tom Harkin convened congressional hearings. NIH Director Harold Varmus justifies in December 1998 and again in January 1999. The core legal question here is where the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which, if you remember, banned federal funding for research that destroys embryos, also banned funding for research on cell lines that were derived from embryos using private money, Geron's money.

**[0:43:24] Alex Kesin:** And then there's the cloning question. In summer of 1999, several press reports, including a story in the Washington Post, suggested that Geron started creating human embryos for research purposes through cloning. The Geron executive categorically denies it to the New York Times. Quote, We are not now using, and not then, any kind of experimentation to do nuclear reprogramming with humans. Period. Full stop. But a silver lining. Later that year, in 1999, the top lawyer at the Department of Health and Human Services, Harriet Robb, issues a pivotal legal opinion.

**[0:44:00] Alex Kesin:** Because human embryonic stem cells are, quote, not human embryos in the statutory definition, the federal ban did not apply to them. But the debate is far from over and goes on for many more years to come, culminating in a tandem out decision made by George W. Bush in 2001. But for now, we'll leave this topic in the background.

**[0:44:20] Matthew Pech:** November of 1997, Geron hires Thomas Okarma as VP of Cell Therapies. Okarma is a former ER doctor, Stanford-trained, crisp, razor-sharp, aggressive to the point of abrasiveness. West, as we've come to learn, is the polar opposite, dreamy, philosophical, sometimes misses meetings. What one colleague calls, not a guy who gets things done operationally. This isn't an oil and water situation, exactly. It is, as Hall puts it, something more volatile and more explosive. The two men clash bitterly.

**[0:44:54] Matthew Pech:** One flashpoint, almost comically prescient in retrospect, is West's proposal to apply for a Department of Defense grant to fund research into the detection and treatment of anthrax. This is 1997, four years before the anthrax attacks that will follow September 11th. Okarna opposes the idea. West had also, at this point, been pushing the spinoff stem cell research into a separate Geron subsidiary, one that he would presumably lead. The board explores the idea. They eventually line up financing, and then they pull the rug out.

**[0:45:26] Matthew Pech:** Geron decides to keep the stem cells in-house under Okarna's control. This effectively removes West's reason for being there. This is the final straw for West. feeling the betrayal he leaves in February of 1998. The CEO's corporate repudiation of the Geron founder is, we have to say, genuinely stunning. When Hall interviews Okarma and mentions his name, Okarma says that West has no business talking about Geron. The journalist pushes back, surely you can't separate Mike West from Geron.

**[0:45:59] Matthew Pech:** Okarma says, surely he can, but he founded the company. So what? He came up with the name. Okama says, I don't care. We are not an aging company. You know, I think most people in the land of biotech and tech, they understand that different personality types are really required to have a company be successful at different maturity stages. There's the visionary who gets you from zero to one. And that person is rarely the sort of operator needed to scale the company from one to a hundred.

**[0:46:31] Matthew Pech:** And it's frankly, rarely the commercial guru needed to get a drug onto formularies and get physicians writing scripts. None of this is a character flaw. West had incredible gifts. He was a visionary biologist. He was an incredibly good fundraiser. His skills there were better than his skills as a scientist. He doesn't appear to have been a particularly good manager. Honestly, as we read about him, I sort of wonder whether he has ADHD or something. Clearly, he was the kind of guy who could cold call oil tycoons and raise money.

**[0:47:07] Matthew Pech:** And those are incredibly useful skills as someone trying to get a company off the ground.

**[0:47:12] Alex Kesin:** For sure. And thinking about the characters from our last episode in Ammo, and Ted Green was an amazing CEO for the beginning of the company. Ginger was an amazing CEO for Clinical Stage. In that way, the quote unquote ideal chief executive for a biotech or pharma company is kind of a misnomer. The ideal archetype really depends on the maturity of the company itself.

**[0:47:37] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, exactly. I don't think we ever see a corporate executive get so painfully slapped in public by his former company before. So many of you are probably asking what happens to Mike West. At this point in the story, he's got a big old chip on his shoulder. Within months, he lands at a small biotech called Advanced Cell Technology, or ACT for short, located in Massachusetts. And this is pretty much straight out of a Curb Your Enthusiasm episode.

**[0:48:07] Matthew Pech:** West starts running this new company as a spite startup, positioning it to compete directly against Geron. We'll catch up a bit more with Mike West again later in the story. But this is where his reign at Geron effectively ends. All right, Alex, we should probably take a moment here to recap where exactly Jeron was at

**[0:48:37] Alex Kesin:** the end of the 90s. Yeah. So at this point in this incredible feat of scientific taste, they have not one, but two bets on otherwise completely unheard of corners in biology. and both pay off in the same year, just to list off some of the things they have IP-wise under their domain. The gene sequences for both telomerase subunits, the biochemical assay to measure telomerase activity, the screening tools on telomerase biology, and all of the additional

**[0:49:07] Matthew Pech:** patent estates related to the biology of senescence. Yeah, really great IP coverage of all of the foundational know-how in the field. They had started to commercialize telomerase biology as well, right? So they had 13 research use only diagnostic kits that were based off of that trap assay. And they were working with Roche to see whether they could turn it into a clinical grade diagnostic. They had begun exploring how to weaponize the promoter of telomerase. So see whether they could use that to drive specific gene expression in cancer cells.

**[0:49:42] Matthew Pech:** You could imagine that being pretty useful for oncolytic viruses or maybe targeted gene therapies. Then again, you know, that was just telomerase land. They also had pretty nice patent estate for embryonic stem cells. So they had exclusive commercial licenses to the human ES cell lines that Thompson had made, which are literally the only ones in existence. So they really had a lock on two pretty foundational technologies and regenerative medicine. When we talk about this, I would be remiss not to talk about what it costs to actually assemble these sort of monopolies.

**[0:50:20] Matthew Pech:** Geron spent, by their own estimates, about $35 million, $1990 to clone the telomerase gene. And I think depending on your perspective, that's either an insane investment or something that's reasonable to do. The stem cell franchise by comparison was very cheap to accumulate, right? So they only paid 30 ,000 bucks to get the rights to the initial research from the Thompson lab in Wisconsin. Dollar for dollar, that's a very nice asymmetric return on investment. Yeah. Yeah. The $30 ,000 is insane.

**[0:50:59] Matthew Pech:** That's like the price of a used car. Yeah. As we mentioned before, most biotechs let academic labs do foundational work using public dollars and then collectively license what comes out of that to start building what's necessary for a drug. But Geron had gone upstream and they funded all of that early science themselves. The downside of that approach and that monopoly wouldn't become clear until later. But in 1998, you know, Geron was extremely well positioned in biotech.

**[0:51:31] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, I find it very hard to disagree with that. Let's also talk about that a little bit more, though, this ownership over so much IP, because at times in the company's history, it generally became a roadblock to collaborating with academics and other companies, specifically with telomerase. Trying to own all of the IP related to an enzyme found across the animal kingdom is pretty crazy. There's this little anecdote from Merchants of Immortality where Carol Greider, who again is the noble laureate who discovered telomerase and sat on the company's SAB.

**[0:52:10] Alex Kesin:** So you think that she deserved VIP access to Jaren's proprietary tools. Her lawyer at Cold Spring Harbor basically told her that they had never run across a company that was so difficult and pushed so hard related to IP. Believe it or not, though, the stem cell IP controversy is even worse. Another anecdote from the book that's really interesting is from a guy named Ali Brevenloo, who's this embryologist who works at Rockefeller University. And he has this crazy quote describing the kerfuffle at the time.

**[0:52:44] Alex Kesin:** He says, the MTA and licensing agreement they sent to us is absolutely a joke. The technology transfer person here was furious. Even though I would go out there to do it, They wanted Rockefeller to put up all the money. They wanted 100 % ownership of whatever I did, and they wouldn't let me take any of my materials back with me when I finished. No one in their right mind would ever sign an agreement like that. It makes me think of Hayflick back in the day with his IP-related issues.

**[0:53:12] Alex Kesin:** Here, Geron was supposed to be that company taking the wisdom of the prior generation, but here they are being the bridge troll.

**[0:53:20] Matthew Pech:** I think to defend Geron a little bit, I think their perspective would be, this is the science we paid for and that we owned. And we're in the position of power here. And if you don't like it, that's a you problem, not a me problem.

**[0:53:35] Alex Kesin:** I think that's fair. And really, the circumstances make that case a lot more strong, given that embryonic stem cell research was basically blacklisted from NIH and federal funding at the time. So it was like they were a loan shark. You get to work on this interesting science. But you don't really get to own or prosper off of it as much as you would have if you did it from NIH. All right. So let's get back to that embryonic stem cell controversy then.

**[0:54:04] Alex Kesin:** Right. So at this point, it's 2001, three years since Geron had denied efforts to do embryonic cloning. And as it turns out, that's not exactly true. The Wall Street Journal in this bombshell piece discovers that Geron had indeed supported a substantial effort to clone human embryos, specifically in a guy named Roger Pedersen's lab at UCSF. And that effort began in the first half of 1999, exactly when they had denied it. The uproar again at this news is pretty much immediate.

**[0:54:37] Alex Kesin:** On August 9th, 2001, President Bush delivers an 11-minute televised address from his Crawford, Texas ranch. His ultimatum is this. All federal funding will only be permitted for stem cell lines that already exist as of the current date. Approximately 60 lines. But here's the catch. When cell biologist Douglas Melton at Harvard actually examines what lines were listed as fair game, he realizes the administration, for the most part, wasn't referring to viable stem cell lines at all.

**[0:55:08] Alex Kesin:** Instead, they had collected every instance in which someone has dissected the inner cell mass of a blastocyst and thrown it in a freezer before the deadline. So most of those are completely unviable. They basically sent out President Bush on national television without vetting the status of what he's

**[0:55:26] Matthew Pech:** even endorsing. So the real great irony here is that Geron ends up being extremely happy about George Bush's decision because it turns out that the viable cell lines that actually exist, so the subset of those 60 that are actually able to be cultured, those are all controlled by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, and Geron holds exclusive therapeutic licenses for all of those. So essentially, Bush in his decision has reinforced an oligopoly over the existing embryonic stem cell lines, eliminating any potential competition and turning all of academic American research efforts into a farm team for either Wisconsin or Geron.

**[0:56:11] Matthew Pech:** So this restriction that's supposed to be a compromise based on moral grounds is in fact a windfall for a specific company.

**[0:56:19] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, it's ridiculous just to think of this controversy as something that Geron itself instigated how it ends up benefiting them. Definitely layers of irony there. But reasonably, as a reaction to this news, the patent battles after this declaration get ugly really, really fast. On August 13th of that month, just four days after the announcement, actually, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation files a lawsuit against Geron to renegotiate the agreement so they can share those lines with more researchers.

**[0:56:53] Alex Kesin:** And Okarma, the CEO of Geron, his response at this point is really to the point and honestly kind of smug. He says, patents are what patents are. We funded the work, you have the right. Meanwhile, Geron also at this time was just making crazy business decisions that seemed completely bizarre looking back in hindsight. In 1999, they acquired Roslyn Biomed. If that name rings a bell, it's because it was the commercial arm of the Roslin Institute, the lab where Dolly the sheep had been cloned.

**[0:57:23] Alex Kesin:** So their ambitions for this technology were just completely magnanimous. They wanted to do things like xenotransplantation, which is engineering genes of pigs so that their organs could be more compatible in human patients. This was back in 2001. They wanted to clone transgenic animals to produce therapeutic antibodies. And if that rings a bell, it's certainly how antibody discovery is done today in part. And they also wanted to clone animals to do livestock genetics related work.

**[0:57:58] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I think if there's anything that Geron knows how to turn the crank on, it's how to assemble preclinical science into their corporate umbrella that is exciting and sexy and easy to understand for a non-scientist. And all this work with the Roslin Institute is just another example of that. Again, it's one thing to own the IP and to have this sexy preclinical science is a completely different story to make a medicine. 100%. By 2001, Geron had stretched itself across telomerase, embryonic stem cells, cloning, and xenotransplantation, a platform so broad that it bordered on incoherent.

**[0:58:44] Matthew Pech:** It was a decade into the company and finally the time to turn that science into drugs. Over the next 10 years, two of those bets would come to dominate the company and very nearly tear it apart. On one side of the house, the stem cell programs. It's about to produce some very dramatic preclinical results in regenerative medicine, then grind through a decade of regulatory agony to turn those ES cells from scientific fascination into a clinical grade therapeutic.

**[0:59:12] Matthew Pech:** On the other side of the house, Geron's Helomerase Oncology Program, which has already spent years and tens of millions of dollars building an unusually aggressive IP position. It now has to turn that IP into a drug. We'll get to the stem cells a little bit later. Let's start with their cancer drug. This is where one of Geron's original bets finally meets the gritty reality of pharmaceutical chemistry. All right, so let's remember the thesis here, right? So telomerase is apparently activated in roughly 90 % of human cancers and essentially not expressed in normal adult human tissue.

**[0:59:48] Matthew Pech:** It's the enzyme that lets cancer cells maintain their telomeres indefinitely, get around the HClick limit, and if removed, eventually prevent cells from dividing. If you can inhibit the enzyme, in theory, you can cut off the tumor's escape route. The telomeres in cancer cells would eventually shorten, and once they hit the crisis phase, they would die off. So this is a really elegant idea for targeting cancer. The question is, okay, how do you actually build that drug?

**[1:00:14] Matthew Pech:** So by the late 1990s, Geron had cloned the sequences of the two minimal subunits of the human telomerase complex, and they built that proprietary assay platform to measure activity of the enzyme. And they're now at a place ready to do adult drug discovery campaigns. So normally, if you told a scientist or investor that you wanted to develop an enzyme inhibitor, most people would say, that's great. We know how to drug enzymes. Enzymes have catalytic pockets, which are deep, well-defined grooves in the protein where ostensibly you can get a small molecule to fit in and block activity.

**[1:00:53] Matthew Pech:** It's one of the better understood problems in pharmaceutical chemistry. What's the problem with telomerase then? Well, telomerase is not a normal enzyme. It's a ribonuclear protein, right? So it's this hybrid of protein and RNA working together as a complex. I would just highlight too, at this point, there was no crystal structure of telomerase. So they had no idea what this protein looked like. Making telomerase protein in a test tube turned out to be quite difficult as well.

**[1:01:23] Matthew Pech:** So a lot of the things that in theory were going to be straightforward in reality turned out to be quite difficult. That's funny. This is also in the pre-alpha fold world. So they had no idea what it looked like. Yeah, I mean, it took the field decades upon decades to get their first cryolium structures of telomerase. It was a heroic effort. So nothing is really published that we could find from Geron on how they prosecuted their initial small molecule screening campaigns.

**[1:01:51] Matthew Pech:** But we can sort of triangulate from what happened elsewhere. Bayer, the German pharmaceutical company, they developed a compound called BIBR1532. And they managed to successfully target the catalytic site of telomerase. And it ended up being a good tool compound. It worked in cell culture. It never had the right properties to make it into the clinic. Other companies most likely ran similar campaigns and they all failed. Geron scientists ended up taking a different route. Rather than trying to block the protein, they decided to drug the RNA component of the enzyme.

**[1:02:28] Matthew Pech:** They designed an oligonucleotide, so a short synthetic strand of nucleic acid, to directly hybridize to that RNA template inside telomerase active site, physically blocking the enzyme from extending telomeres. The compound they ended up with was called the GRN163, discovered by Geron in 2005 from their collaboration with the Japanese pharma company Kiyowa Hakko. When you look at this thing, it's not exactly the kind of drug anyone would design from scratch. You can't take it as a pill.

**[1:02:58] Matthew Pech:** It's going to have to be delivered intravenously. And then since it's an oligonucleotide, it looks like DNA. And there are real challenges in dosing people with a molecule that looks like DNA. This compound does seem to work, however. It seems to both potently and specifically inhibit telomerase in cell culture. And if dosed through pretty contrived methods, is able to inhibit telomerase in animal models as well. Interesting.

**[1:03:27] Alex Kesin:** This is 2005 when oligonucleotides are really coming on the scene as a modality at all.

**[1:03:33] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I mean, they're, God, what's the history there? They're definitely at the forefront of developing oligo-based therapeutics. I think in contrast to what Ionis and others were doing, this isn't an antisense oligo, right? They're not trying to decrease levels of that telomerase RNA. They're just simply trying to block the ability of the enzyme to work.

**[1:03:59] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, this is like a one-of-a -kind molecule that we're looking at.

**[1:04:03] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, so based off of that first tool molecule, Geron iterates on the design to try to make it more drug-like. One of the keys, and again, mirroring our previous episode on amylin, one of the keys is a lipid modification. And so they put on a bit of grease onto the oligonucleotide to help improve its cellular uptake and biodistribution. The new compound is called GRN163L, and we'll call that... A metal stat. We'll call that a metal stat.

**[1:04:36] Matthew Pech:** It's still intravenous. It's still a weird-looking molecule. It's definitely not what a medicinal chemist would draw on a whiteboard, but it's good enough to enter clinical trials. And by the mid-2000s, Metastat will be in phase one studies in solid tumors. So the first time Geron has put a telomerase inhibitor into human beings, almost a decade after Mike West first told investors he was going to cure cancer by targeting telomerase. For now, let's keep Metastat in the back of our mind and transition to the stem cell drama that's playing out on the other side of the company.

**[1:05:12] Alex Kesin:** And boy, there was drama. Let's go back to the Bush announcement in 2001. Three weeks after he signs an executive order, a young neuroscientist named Hans Kirstad walks into Geron's headquarters in Menlo Park. He has this meeting through a former college girlfriend who works there. It seems to be a recurring theme in biotech company development. There's always an ex-girlfriend involved. shows the team his PhD dissertation on spinal cord regeneration and makes a really wickedly cool promise, which is irresistible.

**[1:05:48] Alex Kesin:** He says, give me your stem cells and I'll make the world's first high purity population of any stem cell type. Basically pick a card, any card. So Geron, incredibly impressed by the audacity of the science, decides to sponsor his work at UC Irvine and they pay him $500 ,000 per year. Only a year later, in 2002, a breakthrough happens. Hristad and his team figure out how to coax human embryonic stem cells into becoming oligodendrocytes. These are the cells that wrap around neurons and produce myelin, the protective sheath that lets nerve signals travel.

**[1:06:25] Alex Kesin:** Without it, it's like having an electrical wire with the rubber coating stripped off. This is what happens in spinal cord injuries and also in multiple sclerosis. Many neurons survive the initial trauma, but eventually they lose their oligodendrocytes, the insulation, and co-silent. Kirstad, however, has developed a 42-day differentiation protocol for these cells, a period where stem cells are exposed to many different combinations of growth factors and hormones. At this point, it's the longest differentiation program in existence and the only one to produce a high-purity population from pluripotent stem cells.

**[1:07:00] Alex Kesin:** By 2006, they had moved on from in vitro work to preclinical and vivo studies with completely unbelievable results. They effectively showed that they can make paralyzed rats walk again. Reporter Ed Bradley puts the story on 60 Minutes. In the segment, they show a rat named Fighter with a spinal cord injury, dragging her belly, unable to coordinate her front and hind legs. But after Kierstad injects his stem cells into Fighter's spinal cord, she can subtly walk again.

**[1:07:30] Alex Kesin:** It's a stunning visual, to say the least. The broadcast generates over 380 ,000 letters to CBS News mailroom. HESC research finally feels removed from the secretive walls of laboratories and in the homes of millions of ordinary people.

**[1:07:47] Matthew Pech:** It's really impressive to me the nose that Geron had when it came to funding scientific results that could be immediately understood by the general community, so by non-scientists, right? Turning old cells that can't divide into young cells that can divide again. They had a rat that couldn't walk, and then they did something to make it walk again. I think that's really useful when you're trying to raise money as a preclinical stage company. Obviously less useful when it comes to actually making drugs out of those and making a viable pipeline, but definitely very useful from a financing perspective.

**[1:08:30] Matthew Pech:** For sure.

**[1:08:30] Alex Kesin:** It's almost like vintage biology clickbait. There are companies today that do this. And again, not necessarily a bad thing. It's like a colossal resurrecting the direwolf, but only kind of sort of. Yeah, exactly. Very understandable. Yep. So where are we at this point? We have this amazing preclinical glimpse into the promise of stem cells as therapy for a very serious injury. And now they need to put it into people. But getting from a rat walking into a lab to a human receiving treatment is completely a different ballpark.

**[1:09:07] Alex Kesin:** This is going to be the first embryonic stem cell derived therapy tested in people ever. So Geron at this point has to take CureStats protocol and industrialize it for human trials. They call this program GRN-OPC1. One of the best analogies for what this period of Geron's history was like comes from another book that we read in research for this episode called Inevitable Collision. It says, have you ever noticed how you can cook something very successfully for two or even five people, but when you try to make the same dish for a dinner party of 12 or 20, suddenly it just doesn't work out the same way or taste as nice?

**[1:09:44] Alex Kesin:** Basically, the reason I like this quote is that it's the first hint of what's to come for not just Geron, but all human cell therapies and the companies that are trying to build them. The scale-up problem, they've already spent $20 million at this point on a preclinical development. Again, this theme of throwing a boatload of cash on cool preclinical concepts. But this clinical program is just going to be a whole new money sink. To give you an idea of the numbers that we're playing with for clinical stage drug development here is $1 million just to produce the reagents for the study.

**[1:10:20] Alex Kesin:** That is far from the most expensive part, though. They find themselves having to design a proprietary injection device that attaches to an operating table so surgeons can control where the needle goes to inject the therapy into the patient's spinal cord. They end up spending half a decade preparing this work for human clinical trials. And this IND application to the FDA is simply enormous. It's like 22 ,000 feet is long. As far as I know, one of the longest and most extensive INDs in FDA history.

**[1:10:55] Matthew Pech:** I mean, you can definitely understand why, right? You're trying to convince the FDA that injecting live mismatched human cells that have the potential to turn into a teratoma, they're trying to convince the FDA the potential benefit of this outweighs the risk. So you can imagine that a boatload of documentation is required.

**[1:11:17] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, completely fair and timely of you to say that because just as they're poised to start recruiting for this study, the scientists that did the work on Little Fighter the rat, they discovered that some of these other rats that had been treated with GRNOPC1 had developed these small harmless cysts at the site of the spinal cord injury, which is really scary. Again, this is complete terra incognita for not only preclinical, but the clinical study that they're planning to start imminently.

**[1:11:47] Alex Kesin:** They proactively ask the FDA to hold the application so they can investigate. And it turns out that there's not really a problem and that it was benign, but this cost them a year of precious time. Finally, on January 23rd, 2009, this is just three days after President Barack Obama's first inaugurated, the FDA clears the study once and for all. And of course, Geron being Geron, the news breaks out everywhere. It's on the front of every major newspaper overnight.

**[1:12:18] Alex Kesin:** A little anecdote from this book, Inevitable Collision, that I like is when an assistant in the Kirstad lab, Michelle Goldman, reads one of these early headlines that come out from the IND clearance. She runs to tell him and Kirstad hands her a wad of cash to buy VovClico. Just complete exhilaration at the initiation of the study.

**[1:12:42] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, now the real fun begins, however.

**[1:12:44] Alex Kesin:** That's right. Despite the media buzz and excitement around this trial, it's worth holding your breath because realities concerning its operational practicality perk up very quickly. First of all, the enrollment challenge for this trial is monumental. They find out that less than 2 % of newly injured spinal cord patients are even expected to meet the eligibility criteria. Why? Because most spinal cord injuries happen in rural areas. We're talking motorcycle accidents, things of that nature. So the trial sites, being at major urban medical centers, are way too far away.

**[1:13:20] Alex Kesin:** They need the patients within 120 miles of a study center at most. On top of that, these patients need to have been recently injured enough that it fits within this 14-day, two-week window. If you wait longer than that, then the Geron team suspects that the scarring of the injury site makes treatment virtually impossible.

**[1:13:40] Matthew Pech:** Looking at the enrollment criteria on clinicaltrial.gov, you start to realize the practical realities of how difficult it's going to be to enroll people onto this trial. Here's the scenario. Someone suffers a catastrophic irreversible spinal cord injury within 14 days while they're still going through the acute trauma of becoming paralyzed. This patient needs to be A, identified as a potential candidate that meets the enrollment criteria. B, get transported to a hospital that's participating in this clinical trial.

**[1:14:16] Matthew Pech:** C, give full informed consent for taking part of a first in human experimental stem cell therapy. Since they're not matching any of these transplants, these patients are going to require a lot of immunosuppression and then finally be taken into surgery. So these are real difficult challenges to actually getting this study done.

**[1:14:38] Alex Kesin:** Needle in the haystack for sure. But this was not discouraging to the Geron team. The medical director at the time for the study, Dr. Edward Wirth, he had been preparing for this for six straight years. They had most of the early 2000s figuring these things out. So they had already spoken with all of the spinal cord injury centers, found nine sites, and even arranged an agreement to pay for these patients' ambulance transport, ground, or air. They did all they could to find people in need for this study.

**[1:15:12] Alex Kesin:** But unfortunately, despite the team's optimism, there just was so many difficulties with the study design. There would be patients who would make it to the final step only to withdraw their names hours before surgery. Given the nature of this injury, others would be disqualified last minute for various medical issues. And then there's this dosing debate that they have with the FDA. Because given the fact that this is a brand new therapy that's never been tested before in people.

**[1:15:39] Alex Kesin:** The FDA wants Geron to start with just 2 million cells. Geron believes this is the absolute bottom of the therapeutic range. They want 20 million, which is 10 times as much. To keep the trial moving, Geron accepts this low starting dose anyway for phase one, planning to escalate over following studies, but you can already see the tension of what the company wants and what the company can practically do. On October 8th of 2010, Timothy J. Atchison of Alabama becomes the first person in history to receive human embryonic stem cell-derived therapy.

**[1:16:12] Alex Kesin:** It happens at the Shepherd Center in Atlanta. 2 million cells are infused into his spinal cord in less than two minutes. Four more patients follow, and within a year, a safety data is clear. No cysts. There are no random tumors or additional spinal cord damage. There's effectively no serious adverse events. GRN-OPC1 is looking safe.

**[1:16:32] Matthew Pech:** While the stem cell story was consuming Geron's public narrative, the telomerase side of the company was amidst its aggressive buildout of a sprawling pipeline. By the mid-2000s, they were running programs across more drug modalities than most biotechs attempt in a lifetime. Their partnership with Roche on diagnostics was starting to produce real data. Clinical data suggested that a telomerase assay could sensitively and specifically detect bladder cancer, a significant finding since the standard of care at the time required patients to undergo an invasive procedure for screening.

**[1:17:06] Matthew Pech:** On the immunotherapy front, Geron was collaborating with Merix, Bioscience, and Duke University on a therapeutic cancer vaccine that used TERT RNA as a universal tumor antigen. In theory, this is a pretty neat idea, right? So since telomerase is expressed in essentially all cancers but not normal tissue, maybe you could train a patient's immune system to target any cancer type by teaching it to recognize telomerase. There was some initial phase one and two studies done in prostate cancer giving some hope of a signal and additional studies done in AML, again, giving glimpses of something.

**[1:17:45] Matthew Pech:** And Geron also played around trying to develop oncolytic viruses. In other words, viruses where activity of the virus was driven by the H-Trip promoter, and they pushed forward a variety of efforts there that were eventually licensed out to various collaborators. And then there was a MetalStat, their Oligo program. By the mid-2000s, it was starting to enter phase one and phase two clinical trials in solid tumors, originally metastatic breast cancer and non-small cell lung cancer.

**[1:18:16] Matthew Pech:** These are indications where the original cancer thesis seemed most promising and also had big markets, ion met need, and tumors that were overwhelmingly telomerase positive. But just as they ought to have been celebrating the progression of these programs, the floor falls out from underneath.

**[1:18:31] Alex Kesin:** Oh, and it's a bit sad, but also impressive to see how many interesting bets they had on telomerase biology. Yeah, I agree with you. It's some combination of like, what the hell were you

**[1:18:43] Matthew Pech:** guys thinking? And wow, this is impressive. Right. I don't know about the oncolytic virus

**[1:18:50] Alex Kesin:** program. Even though it's cool biology, therapeutic vaccines are making a comeback now with mRNA. Of course, it's a little bit different how they work under the hood, but the basic idea there is very similar. And we'll see what gets approved there. Yeah. But unfortunately for Geron, things are not looking so hot. Behind closed doors at this point, there's this internal war between management and the board of directors. This is because their stem cell program at this point is eating $25 million a year.

**[1:19:22] Alex Kesin:** They basically were accumulating losses approaching $700 million. And the 2008 recession had completely hammered biotech funding. So Geron's stock is flat, and the only realistic path to a commercial stem cell product is still easily five to 10 years away. And worst of all, CEO Thomas Okarma, this is the guy that was hired to work on the HESC programs. he's kicked out as well. And the new leadership has a completely different mandate. On November 14th of 2011, not even a year after the initiation of the stem cell study, Anna Krasowska from Geron's Investor and Media Relations Department sends a devastating email.

**[1:20:08] Alex Kesin:** Going forward, Geron will focus only on its oncology programs and will not be funding further development of its stem cell programs. Just like that, after 20 million in clinical development, 22 ,000 pages of IND filing, years of regulatory navigation, and Axel patients enrolled and dozed in the study, Geron abandoned their stem cell therapy program. The fifth and final patient of this first stem cell study, Katie Sheriff, is literally in the middle of being screened at a hospital center when this news breaks to her.

**[1:20:44] Alex Kesin:** There's this scene in Inevitable Collision where her doctor is explaining the surgery when a colleague comes into the room, pulls him out with the announcement and essentially tells her the news. Fortunately for Cherfi, she was grandfathered in and receives the injection. Only two days after this whole thing happens, but she's the last patient ever to be dosed. Just as sad, their telomerase vaccine program also, unfortunately, gets abandoned in the same period. At Duke, it had shown, again, pretty interesting data, but for all practical reasons, this was not a program Geron could continue to fund.

**[1:21:23] Alex Kesin:** The therapy was an autologous therapy, meaning these cells had to be isolated from individual patients' blood, pulsed with telomerase RNA ex vivo, and re-injected. This is still a problem today. Patient-specific manufacturing means that the cost for that

**[1:21:38] Matthew Pech:** program would have just been very hard to scale. So Geron owned pretty much everything related to embryonic stem cells and with that patent estate they decided to make a pioneering ES cell derived therapy for spinal cord injury recovery and five years later they gave up. It's interesting to think about whether this cell therapy program was ever going to make sense at least from a business perspective. I think, again, from a fundraising logic perspective, going into spinal cord injury made a boatload of sense, right?

**[1:22:13] Matthew Pech:** You could run a phase one trial and paralyze patients. This is a therapeutic area where there's tremendous natural variability in recovery. So some patients never walk again. Some patients walk again after a month or a couple months. So it was guaranteed that Geron at some point would have video footage of a stem cell treated patient that can walk again. And I could imagine that that would have been a sufficient catalyst to raise a bunch of money, right?

**[1:22:48] Matthew Pech:** Like that is a narrative with incredible emotional power. Again, though, the clinical logic was always a little bit shakier, right? So spinal cord injury is really hard to study. There's tremendous natural variability in recovery. And that variability is what gives you the compelling anecdotes, but it's also what makes it impossible to really run a placebo-controlled trial that proves to the FDA that your drug is doing something. As you can imagine, too, the regulatory bodies were really cautious about the first-ever embryonic stem cell therapy in humans.

**[1:23:26] Matthew Pech:** They restricted the starting human dose to 2 million cells. Geron was going to have to spend years and millions of dollars to get to a point where there might even be a hint of efficacy. That was a total gamble. For all these reasons, I think them getting approval here always seemed like a complete shot in the dark. I think you could have imagined that a sort of Sarepta-style outcome could have occurred where as data accumulates, there's so much pressure from patient advocacy groups that the drug gets approved independent of the data quality.

**[1:24:04] Matthew Pech:** But again, it's very risky to build your whole strategy around essentially some combination of long shots. 20 years later, no one still has figured out how exactly to make a commercially viable embryonic stem cell-derived therapy, right? The field has moved on largely to IPSC-derived approaches, which help with some of these tolerance issues. But again, even those that haven't cracked this commercial problem, Geron was the first hit this wall, but the whole field is still hitting that wall for the past two decades.

**[1:24:37] Matthew Pech:** For sure. So anyways, let's get back to the story here. So Geron kills the spinal cord trials. What happens next is the stock falls immediately 20%. that Geron has to repay some of the funding that it's received from governmental bodies to pay for

**[1:24:53] Alex Kesin:** these studies. And on the Geron side, I think there's also interesting commentary looking retrospectively at this period of their history. Ed Wirth, who is the director of this program there, talks about the difference between cutting edge and bleeding edge research, where cutting edge means novel breakthroughs that can be predicted and planned far out. But bleeding edge is this unpredictable work that faces constant stochastic setbacks, like not having enough money to finish. And GRN OPC1 is clearly the latter.

**[1:25:31] Alex Kesin:** A bleeding edge program ultimately, in most cases, cannot get a drug approved for a biotech company. There's already far too many risks in developing drugs.

**[1:25:40] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I think Edworth is being very kind in his euphemisms. I think most people would say that this was a scientific fantasy that they never should have embarked on.

**[1:25:51] Alex Kesin:** Alas, there's an interesting tidbit slash silver lining to this story. In January 2013, which is a couple of years after the program is officially dead, a company by the name of Biotime swoops in and entirely acquires Geron's stem cell portfolio, which is at this point over 400 patents, clinical trial programs, cell banks, etc. Who is the CEO of Biotime? Take a guess.

**[1:26:16] Matthew Pech:** Is this the Spite Company?

**[1:26:17] Alex Kesin:** It might be the Spite Company. It's Mike West.

**[1:26:22] Matthew Pech:** Oh my God, he's got a Spite stem cell therapy company. That's right. That's hilarious.

**[1:26:29] Alex Kesin:** And he comes back for his baby, but it gets even weirder because Thomas Okarma, who did not have many kind things to say about West, is also

**[1:26:37] Matthew Pech:** involved. So Tom gets fired. Yes. So Tom fires Mike West, gets fired, and then their roles essentially get reversed at the Spike Company. Yes. That's crazy. It reads like a telenovela.

**[1:26:54] Alex Kesin:** So a little bit of color on what ACT was doing under Mike West. They were completely in parallel alongside trying to push forward their own stem cell therapies. And as it turns out, they end up getting a bit further. So the chief scientific officer of ACT, Robert Lamza, was pushing forward a program, also AGS-based, but for retinal pigment epithelial cells for a rare disease called Starkard's disease and dry AMD.

**[1:27:25] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, so this clinical development approach makes 100 times more sense than spinal cord injury. We don't have to go into the details here, but like this is something that I can visualize as coherent.

**[1:27:36] Alex Kesin:** For sure. I will indulge a little bit. They eventually have a study come out and classical Mike West, they get featured on a bunch of news headlines for improving patients' vision. But although this program is nominally still existing and eventually ACT would get acquired for a nice sum by Estellus Pharma. It doesn't seem like there was much of a continuation of this program.

**[1:28:04] Matthew Pech:** Got it. Yeah, but that's a very interesting vignette that it all comes back to Mike West. It does.

**[1:28:11] Alex Kesin:** The early story of ACT is even more nutty, involving things like human animal chimeras to dodge the federal ban on funding for embryonic stem cell research. But I implore curious listeners to read the two books that we mentioned earlier if you're curious about that. Expect nothing less from Mike West.

**[1:28:57] Matthew Pech:** All right, so at this point in the story, let's go back to Metalstat. While all this sort of strategic reprioritization was playing out, Jeron was in the process of running Metalstat through some phase two trials in solid tumors. Put salt in the wound of the company's problems. The TLDR here is those trials didn't look too hot either. The breast cancer trial was halted in 2012. looked like when they took a look at progression-free survival that the treatment arm was doing even worse than the placebo arm.

**[1:29:31] Matthew Pech:** It's never a good sign. Lung cancer study was showing only a modest, statistically significant trend in favor of the drug, as is often the case when you get that sort of whiff of a signal. Geron tried to salvage the lung cancer program by looking into a pre-specified subgroup of patients whose tumors started off with short telomeres. A year later, the full analysis came out and it killed it. The treatment effect in the short telomere subgroup just couldn't be reproduced.

**[1:29:59] Matthew Pech:** So with that, Geron's program in inhibiting telomerase, its solid tumors were all dead. Let's recap here about what a bad two-year period it was for Geron, right? So in two years, no more stem cell programs, no more cancer vaccines, and their universal cure for cancer didn't seem to be doing anything in solid tumors.

**[1:30:21] Alex Kesin:** Did they have anything else in store? It seems like this was all of their bets, right?

**[1:30:26] Matthew Pech:** Well, so they did have one indication where metal stats seemed to be showing some activity. That was hematological malignancies. And they were starting to get an early-ish clinical stage signal there and a little bit unexpected, but definitely intriguing. But ultimately, Geron's pivot to blood cancers is driven by three different practical realities. One, a fundamental challenge with turning telomerase inhibition into a drug is that when you inhibit telomerase, you don't expect anything to happen right away.

**[1:31:02] Matthew Pech:** That's because telomerase inhibition shouldn't kill cells directly. It just prevents them from maintaining their telomeres. the cells still have whatever telomere length they started with. They have to go through many rounds of division, shortening their telomeres each time before the telomeres become critically short in order to then go through a telomere crisis and trigger cell death. The lag time between inhibition and cell death ultimately depends on how long the cancer cells telomeres are to begin with, how fast the cells are dividing, and how complete the telomerase inhibition is.

**[1:31:33] Matthew Pech:** So you can imagine that some cancers with very short telomeres High telomerase activity could have a very fast cytotoxic effect because these cells are already teetering on the edge of telomere dysfunction. But for cancers with longer telomere reserves, it could take weeks or months of sustained treatment before you see really anything. This creates all sorts of clinical trial design problems. We are in an era where oncology drugs are evaluated with how quickly they can shrink tumors and patients enroll into studies with difficult relapsed refractory disease that is growing really quickly.

**[1:32:11] Matthew Pech:** Given all that, a drug whose mechanism inherently requires patients to have a slowly progressive proliferative disease is just really tough to study. This is getting into the weeds here, but you can imagine even measuring a pharmacodynamic effect, meaning like proving that the drug is actually hitting its target, it starts to be a lot harder than if you have a drug that is a conventional cytotoxic agent. So Geron was aware of this in their initial clinical development strategy.

**[1:32:41] Matthew Pech:** They tried to prospectively have cohorts of patients that had short telomeres in studies that they ran in CLL and in others in patients with relapsed for factory solid tumors, they were doing combination therapies where the tumor was initially supposed to be debulked with a actively cytotoxic chemotherapy regimen first, and then the metal stat was added on afterwards as a sort of maintenance therapy to prevent regrowth. You know, it's a strategy that's coherent and acknowledges that there should

**[1:33:18] Alex Kesin:** be a phenotypic lag. Are there any successful examples of that strategy that, you know,

**[1:33:23] Matthew Pech:** off the top of your head? Just curious. I think some of the DNA methyltransferase targeting therapies are arguably in that world where you need some amount of time for the methylation status of the DNA to change before you actually see an effect. There's probably others as well, but everything in oncology is biased towards speed, right? Often the initial studies that you do in cell lines are three-day assays. You don't often do a screen that takes a month, right?

**[1:33:53] Matthew Pech:** For a lot of different reasons, the field has been polarized to agents that work quickly. So the second piece about why they're in blood cancer land now relates to the specifics of the drug embodiment that they have. So a metal stat is a lipid conjugated oligonucleotide that you got to administer via infusion. In other words, this does not have very good drug-like properties. I think when you look at the pharmacokinetic data for this, it's only able to actually achieve adequate target coverage in the blood.

**[1:34:27] Matthew Pech:** And that's one of the easier places to achieve high concentrations of a drug. In other words, simply getting enough of the drug into blood cancers seems a lot more realistic than getting it into solid tumors. My suspicion here of what happened at Geron is that the metal stat was never actually designed to be a drug. It was supposed to just be a tool compound used just to study things in preclinical models and that through some twists of fate, they ended up going into the clinic with this thing and that a metal stat represents what happens when you try every conventional approach and you just decide to go into the clinic with the compound you have that works.

**[1:35:12] Matthew Pech:** That might be my new favorite conspiracy theory. Nothing wrong with it. And then the final piece here is when Geron was running their initial clinical studies with a mental stat, they were seeing a side effect profile that was telling them something. Their drug was causing cytopenias, low blood cell counts. That was the major toxicity of treatment. For most cancers, this is a liability and something that you don't want. But there are certain bone marrow diseases where that, in fact, could be useful.

**[1:35:43] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, let's talk about those because to understand how a metal stat is positioned today, we need to understand what these diseases are. So the more granular kind of blood cancer that a metal stat should promise in treating, I believe is called myodysplastic syndromes, MDS for short. This is a family of bone marrow cancers in which these mutated hematopoietic stem cells are gradually taking over bone marrow and they disrupt normal blood cell production. About 50 ,000 new cases are diagnosed each year in the U.S., which is not a trivial number and is certainly a big enough market for a drug to be approved on.

**[1:36:24] Alex Kesin:** And what's interesting about this disease is that it strikes people mostly in their 70s, so older in age. Mechanistically, it's their bone marrow that is failing because, again, this mutant clone of cancerous cells is crowding out the healthy cells. So patients come to the hospital literally not able to make enough of their own blood. A similar disease to this is called myelofibrosis, which in metal stat is also, as we're going to learn, trident. And in that disease, the bone marrow is progressively replaced by scar tissue, which again causes this change in composition of a patient's blood.

**[1:37:04] Alex Kesin:** And it is also driven by a malignant stem cell clone. So let's talk practically about what this drug means for patients. The standard of care goes something like this. Every couple of weeks, you go to a hospital for blood transfusions. Each transfusion session means you're sitting in a chair for hours. They're getting progressive iron overload damage, which has implications for the health of their heart and liver. There's scheduling burdens involved for these patients

**[1:37:31] Matthew Pech:** and their caregivers. What else is there, Matt? Well, it would seem like naively, okay, they're not making enough blood cells. Don't you just give them epigen or something like that? Yeah,

**[1:37:42] Alex Kesin:** it's a good question. As it turns out, there is a therapy that attenuates part of this disease, theroporiasis stimulating agents, drugs that stimulate the production of red blood cells. But for a lot of patients, they are not even responsive to EPO because simply their blood cells are too malformed at this point for them to positively respond to therapy. So for this subset of MDS patients, what really matters for quality of life is transfusion independence. So not spend the rest of your days needing to go into the hospital every couple of weeks and sit in a chair tethered to an IV drip.

**[1:38:23] Matthew Pech:** So we talked a little bit about how they were seeing these anemias in their initial cohorts of cancer patients. What was the biological insight that told them to go all in on these myeloid cancers?

**[1:38:37] Alex Kesin:** That's a great question. As it turns out, in MDS and myelofibrosis, these malignant stem cell clones are incredibly dependent on telomerase to sustain their proliferative advantage over normal, healthy hematopoietic stem cells. Because those mutant cancerous cells are dividing more aggressively, burning through tons of telomere length incredibly quickly, they are highly dependent on telomerase to avoid senescence. So if you can selectively knock out telomerase activity in those cells, then in theory, those cells should hit the Hayflick limit before normal cells do, making the bone marrow reset.

**[1:39:16] Alex Kesin:** So emetostat, which was shown to have the side effect of cytopenias in solid tumor therapy, also called myelosuppression, actually might be the mechanism of action in terms of how it could be efficacious in these diseases. the toxicity basically becomes the therapy for MDS and myelofibrosis.

**[1:39:38] Matthew Pech:** Geron has an investigator-sponsored trial at the Mayo Clinic run by Dr. Ayolu Teferi to test some of these hypotheses. And the results are intriguing. They see good remission rates in myelofibrosis, which is a really nasty disease. And it's the first hint of a signal that telomerase inhibition might actually be useful in humans. Very clearly, this is pretty far from the universal cancer target that they had originally hoped for, but Imetostat was starting to find a specific biological niche where the drug's mechanism, its pharmacology, its toxicology, we're all starting to align.

**[1:40:20] Matthew Pech:** Yeah. Something I still struggle with and I don't think has been fully resolved is clearly you're getting these cytopenias with ametal stat. Are these a on-target effect of inhibiting telomerase or are they instead a general class effect of what happens when you've administered almost a gram and a half of a lipid conjugated oligonucleotide? In other words, something that would happen regardless of what this specific oligo was targeting. Huh. So you're saying that this tool compound might not even work?

**[1:40:56] Matthew Pech:** Well, no, I'm not saying it doesn't work. I'm saying what is specifically the mechanism of action that makes it work? And if you're trying to treat a cytopenia, I don't think that answer is an intellectual question that you don't need to worry about. It is one that matters for the future of the franchise in the sense that if the cytopenias are an on-target phenomenon, meaning other modalities of telomerase inhibition

**[1:41:22] Alex Kesin:** which share that side effect?

**[1:41:23] Matthew Pech:** So if the cytopenias are an on-target phenomenon, what it means is there's potentially a world where it makes sense for Geron to think about making next generation best-in-class oral telomerase inhibitors that have better drug-like properties, slightly different volume of distribution, better tissue selectivity, work a standard medicinal chemistry, multi-parameter optimization problem and try to turn this franchise into something more valuable. In contrast, if the value of Immetalostat is just this sort of useful off-target activity, then there's really no path to investing in a best-in-class drug through better chemistry.

**[1:42:07] Matthew Pech:** And the right thing to do is to just support the program you have. As I've looked at the data, I'm not really sure which one of those two scenarios is actually true. For a long time, I thought this was all a class-specific toxicity effect. But one thing that has influenced my thinking is new human genetic biobank data. From studying the genomes of hundreds of thousands of people, we now know that there is, in fact, a strong genetic link between the propensity to have longer telomeres and the risk of developing these malignant stem cell clones and ultimately a disease like MDS or MF.

**[1:42:48] Matthew Pech:** And there's good data on this for both common variants that slightly increase telomere length as well as these hyper-rare variants that dramatically increase telomere length. Because this is Geron and nothing is ever easy in the land of drug development, disaster strikes once again. On March 12, 2014, the FDA places a full clinical hold on all Amelstat trials. The reason? Liver toxicity. Patients are showing persistent low-grade abnormalities in liver function. The stock crashes over 60 % in a single day, from $3.60 to $1.42.

**[1:43:26] Matthew Pech:** The company's sole remaining asset is frozen. The hold is finally lifted on Halloween 2014 after follow-up data shows the liver abnormalities are reversible. Just two weeks later, on November 13th, Geron announces a deal with Janssen Biotech, Austin Johnson's biotech subsidiary. $35 million up front, up to $900 million in milestones. The stock jumps back up 40%. This Janssen collaboration begins as a conventional pharma partnership. J &J's biotech arm takes over clinical development of a metal stat in specific chematologic indications in exchange for upfront payments, milestones, and royalties.

**[1:44:06] Matthew Pech:** For Geron, this is oxygen, non-dilutive funding to keep the program alive when the company is running on fumes. Janssen funds two major trials. EMBARK, a phase 2 in myelofibrosis, begins enrolling in 2015. And in 2016, the first patient is dosed in EMERGE, a two-part phase 2-3 trial in low-risk MDS patients who have failed prior rounds of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents. The phase two portion of the merge enrolls 38 patients. The results are striking.

**[1:44:38] Matthew Pech:** 42 % achieve at least eight weeks of transfusion independence. 32 % achieve 24 weeks. Median duration of transfusion independence is nearly two years. And critically, patient analysis shows that metal stat is reducing the variant allele frequency of the malignant clone. Direct molecular evidence that the drug is doing what theory had predicted, selectively targeting the malignant MDS clones. Janssen never gets there. On September 27, 2018, they terminate the deal and lean the rights back to Geron. They cite, quote, strategic portfolio evaluation and prioritization of assets.

**[1:45:15] Matthew Pech:** Here's what makes this deal an interesting but not unique case study. When Janssen walks away, Geron gets their program back, all of it. The clinical data, manufacturing know-how, the regulatory filings. In biotech, this is sometimes called rent-a -program. Your pharma partner effectively funds years of your most expensive clinical work for free, then hands it all back to you when they lose interest. It's possibly the best version of a failed partnership. I love that juxtaposition.

**[1:45:43] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, good news, bad news for sure. Geron's stock collapses 68 % in pre-market trading. After years of it recovering, it's wiped out overnight. They are left with around $200 million in cash and trials that need hundreds of millions more to complete them. Analysts note that the company had passed on raising capital when its shares were above $6, a decision that now forces some pretty difficult decisions. It's hard to overstate how dire the situation is. A company that's already lost its founder, Stump Cell Program, two decades runway, is now losing its pharmaceutical partner too.

**[1:46:18] Matthew Pech:** By any reasonable measure, Geron should have

**[1:46:20] Alex Kesin:** died here. But it doesn't. At this point in the story, Geron has a CEO named John Scarlett, who had been preparing for something like this. And he also had been CEO during the stem cell shutdown, the FDA hold, and the Janssen deal, and the Janssen abandonment. What he says about the Janssen deal falling through is telling, Geron is quote unquote very excited to have 100 % ownership of a metal stat, a phase 3 ready asset. This sounds like bravado, and quite frankly it is bravado, but even with this subsidized clinical development, Geron needs a lot more money.

**[1:46:53] Alex Kesin:** The company raises $230 million in follow-up offerings in January of 2023 and another $150 million in March of 2024, just months before the FDA approves the drug. That's nearly $400 million in dilutive equity, painful for existing shareholders, but necessary to fund Emerge and build a commercial organization from scratch. But the financial story doesn't end there. After Immetelstat, now brand named Ritello launches. In November of 2024, they strike a deal with Royalty Pharma, a firm that essentially buys slices of drug revenue the way an investor might buy rental income from a building.

**[1:47:32] Alex Kesin:** Geron gets $125 million up front in exchange for tiered royalty payments on U.S. Ritello sales. Yeah, I

**[1:47:39] Matthew Pech:** think we should double click a little bit on this form of financing because it's something that is pretty unique to the world of drug development.

**[1:47:46] Alex Kesin:** Right, yeah. So the mechanics are as follows. Unlike equity, it's a non-dilutive source of capital, but unlike debt, there's no performance covenants that could blow up the company if the launch goes sideways. But perhaps most useful from an accounting standpoint, the royalty is attached to a metal stat, a molecule, and not to Geron's balance sheet. So to make that more concrete, if Geron gets acquired someday, royalty pharma will keep getting paid and their end of the deal looks something like this.

**[1:48:17] Alex Kesin:** The math pencils out to around a 14 to 15% annual return if the launch goes well, which is pretty attractive for a firm whose own lenders expect around six to 7% back. This is a kind of structure you really only see in biotech and pharma. And it's a fascinating example of the kind of desperation and creativity that small biotech companies use in trying to commercialize drugs, of course, without the cash flows of big pharma behind them.

**[1:48:44] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, exactly. This is a single

**[1:48:45] Matthew Pech:** asset company with zero revenue coming in and tremendous yearly costs. And it's cool to see all the different levers they pull to fund the phase three trial and eventually the commercialization. All right, so let's go back to the eMERGE trial and how that ultimately played out. On January 4th, 2023, Sharon announces the results of the trial. Nearly 40 % of the patients on a metal stat achieve at least eight weeks of transfusion independence versus 15 % on placebo.

**[1:49:16] Matthew Pech:** At the 24-week time point, which is ultimately a more difficult time point, it's 28 % versus 3.3%. The side effects, however, are significant. Severe thrombocytopenia and neutropenia, in other words, low platelets and low white blood cells in over two-thirds of patients. These are really serious cytopenias that require active management. These are grade three, four adverse events when, for context, a grade five adverse event means that you're dead. I think luckily for generon, cytopenias only last a couple of weeks and most of them reverse all women a month.

**[1:49:53] Matthew Pech:** Despite this adverse event profile, the regulatory body seems open to the idea of approving a metal stat. As one advisory committee member put it, transfusion independence is a quality metric here. If you're 75 years old, running the hospital every two weeks for transfusions, dealing with fatigue, iron overload, scheduling, etc., trading that for a manageable blood count is a deal that you'd seriously consider. On March 14, 2024, FDA's Oncology Drugs Advisory Committee votes 12 to 2 that the benefits of the metal stat outweigh its risk.

**[1:50:28] Matthew Pech:** The stock surges nearly 93 % in after-hours trading. And on June 6, 2024, the FDA ultimately approves metal stat, now called Rotello, for its use in low-risk MDS. So there we have it. The world's first FDA-approved telomerase inhibitor. Validation of the science that Carol Greider and Elizabeth Blackburn discovered in 1984, so 40 years ago, and won the Nobel Prize for. the culmination of a 34-year corporate journey from a creationist in Michigan registering a Greek word on a piece of paper to an actual drug that you can purchase on pharmacy cells.

**[1:51:05] Matthew Pech:** John Scarlett, who has steered the company through 14 years of crises, says the approval brought tears to his eyes. That celebration lasted about three weeks. Come on.

**[1:51:39] Alex Kesin:** An FDA approval is not the finish line of drug development. Even though drugs typically have very high gross margins and patents plus regulatory exclusivity keeps out competitors, a huge amount of work and money goes into the commercialization process, and success is far from assured. You have to build up a team to convince patients, physicians, and payers that your drug should get prescribed and reimbursed by insurance. Jaren launches Rotello on June 27, 2024, with a list price of approximately $365 ,000 per year.

**[1:52:12] Alex Kesin:** Oncology drugs, despite often very small eligible patient populations, are known for supporting very generous price levels. The initial sales ramp is decent, $28 million in quarter three of 2024, $47.5 million in quarter four of 2024, totaling $76.5 million for the partial launch year.

**[1:52:32] Matthew Pech:** All right, so why are we focusing in on this initial launch? It all comes down to trying to get a sense of what the peak revenue profile of this drug will be, which in turn will give them a sense of whether this drug is selling well enough to survive as a company. So is Geron going to be in a situation where the drug is barely selling, They're barely covering commercialization costs and in this zone of purgatory where they're not dying but not getting bought out.

**[1:53:08] Matthew Pech:** Or will they be able to achieve a level of market penetration where the company is doing quite well, they're covering all of their administrative costs, and they're in a real position to get bought out by a pharmaceutical company. So there's a rough rule of thumb that you can use in biotech is that you can estimate peak annual revenue by multiplying the first full quarter of sales by about 12 and then applying a growth factor for market penetration.

**[1:53:36] Matthew Pech:** So by that logic, Rotello's early trajectory suggests peak revenue somewhere in a range of about $500 million to maybe a billion. Again, if everything goes right here, Geron's guidance in 2026 was revenues of around $230 million, suggesting a steeper ramp than the initial quarters implied. But again, everything going right there is doing a lot of work in that sense.

**[1:54:02] Alex Kesin:** That's right. And in fact, cracks appear almost immediately in the company after Ritella launches. The chief commercial officer, Anil Kapoor, departs in July 2024, pretty much exactly when the drug is approved. He left to pursue other interests, which is a bit of a euphemism for things aren't going well. Oof. Yeah. And worse than that is ICER, which is the arbiter of whether a drug gets paid for or not in the UK. They vote 15 to 0 unanimously that there's no evidence Ritello is better than standard of care plus Reblozil and that EmetlStat's price is far out of line with the modest short-term benefit.

**[1:54:49] Matthew Pech:** What does Reblozil mean? So Reblozil is Bristol-Myler Squibb's competing therapy that was approved a few years before EmetlStat and 2026. It has a broader label. It has less monitoring requirements and definitely has fewer side effects. Beyond competition from other treatments for low-risk MDS, I think the challenge of getting patients to take this drug are pretty clear. The uncomfortable truth is that getting a blood transfusion or getting a metal stat both require the patient to come into the doctor's office for an infusion.

**[1:55:30] Matthew Pech:** You have to go a little bit less frequently with a metal stat, but also costs almost $400 ,000 a year. The only real potential differentiator that you could hope for is that unlike a blood transfusion, that a metal stat is actually disease-modifying, meaning that it's directly killing that malignant MDS stem cell clone and that you're not just managing the symptoms of anemia but you're attacking the underlying disease. Got it. There's some arguments to be made that MetalStat cannot do that.

**[1:56:05] Matthew Pech:** I would highlight that the drug has not managed to actually demonstrate that it has that activity in clinical trials here. I see.

**[1:56:12] Alex Kesin:** And when you mean the benefit compared to standard of care going into clinic to get blood transfusion, that 33 % number from emerge of transfusion independence around six months, you think that is not super competitive?

**[1:56:29] Matthew Pech:** I think that's real, but the counterfactual is going in every two weeks to get red blood cells put in versus going in every four weeks to get a really expensive drug that has a serious adverse event profile, right? Those are the counterfactuals. I can understand why a country like England that has a more centralized form of healthcare thinks that there's no reason to be giving this drug to their patients. That makes sense.

**[1:56:57] Alex Kesin:** And I suspect that Replozil was not a predictable competitor in the market when MetalStat was in clinical trials. Is that right?

**[1:57:10] Matthew Pech:** That's an interesting question. I think Geron must have known that it was being developed. as a single asset small biotech company. I think they had no choice but to keep pushing forward and hoping that the drug has some disease-modifying activity that ultimately lets them sell this drug. And as we'll get to as well, they're hoping to expand into other hematological malignancies as well, hoping that will be their saving grace. Got it. So we've heard a little bit about Ametalstat.

**[1:57:44] Matthew Pech:** We've heard a little bit about the competitor, ribozole, what has been the take-home of physician choice in the last year

**[1:57:52] Alex Kesin:** between those two drugs? Yeah, between the two, ribozole is by far the more favorable option for patients. It's able to be adopted in community oncology practices to help those low-risk MDS patients, and as a result, it's doing easily $1 billion in revenue. In comparison, and the Metalstat prescriptions are mostly concentrated at academic medical centers, and they're limited to hematology specialists who understand MDS and the nuances of administering

**[1:58:22] Matthew Pech:** this drug, which are many. Yeah, and I think with the Metalstat, we're seeing a pretty standard thing that happens when you try to launch a drug that has modest incremental benefits over established therapies. That's one of the most difficult situations to launch a drug into. You think back to some of the initial launches of the PCSK9 inhibitors, they faced lots of payer pushback, lots of problems with pricing. It took them a long time to eventually achieve meaningful uptake.

**[1:58:54] Matthew Pech:** There's been a variety of oncology drugs that had dubious efficacy data associated with them. So thinking of Zaltrap, Rovenge, there was enough signal to get approval, but not enough signal to really convince physicians to prescribe this meaningfully. So I guess we'll see whether the metal stat eventually breaks through or whether it'll just sort of struggle along. Yeah. It's interesting that Geron is nearly 30 plus years old now. And on one hand, that's quite a track record of persistence for a corporate entity.

**[1:59:31] Matthew Pech:** On the other hand, I think the path Ford is still super uncertain. They have been missing their quarterly revenue estimates. March 2025, their CEO, after 14 tumultuous years at the helm, he's out and replaced by a commercial execution specialist to lead the company, Harut Surmergian. He was involved in the launch of Gleevec and Quiscali at Novartis. Very successful drug launches. It was interesting to see his assessment of what the state of play was for Geron. Yeah, he said the following,

**[2:00:08] Alex Kesin:** one day you wake up, you get an approval, and then you slap on a field force and call yourself a commercial company. It doesn't work that way. That's a bit of a callback to our earlier chat about Mike West's role in the company, right, where he was the visionary and then they needed someone that could do the clinical stage, all of the chaos that really happened in between. Here's where we stand today with Geron. The market cap has collapsed from approximately $2.5 billion to around $860 million, which is a destruction of a little over $1.5 billion in shareholder value in 18 months after their FDA approval.

**[2:00:45] Alex Kesin:** Looking out from a bird's eye view, the stock ticker history looks something like peaking at the dot-com bubble in March of 2000, which it closed around $65 per share. And today it's a little bit over a dollar.

**[2:01:02] Matthew Pech:** It's just crazy to think how much more valuable a stock can be perceived when you have nothing close to a clinical trial compared to when you have a commercialized drug that's making real money every quarter. This is a difficult business.

**[2:01:17] Alex Kesin:** It really is.

**[2:01:41] Matthew Pech:** All right, so we've made it through 30 years of Geron, and it's time to start thinking about what its legacy is. Yeah, what do we make of all of this? There's this framework that I like to use that comes from Tillman Gerngross, founder of Atomab and a bunch of other companies. He says that every life science company can be measured along three distinct dimensions, patient impact, financial impact, and academic impact. And I really like this because this is a framework that you can really only apply to life science businesses.

**[2:02:14] Matthew Pech:** And it's also a framework that uniquely highlights how difficult it is to succeed on all of those different dimensions. Geron is a fascinating case where the scores on those three dimensions are pretty wildly different.

**[2:02:29] Alex Kesin:** Yeah. Do you want to start on financial impact? What do you think?

**[2:02:32] Matthew Pech:** Yeah. So on financial impacts, maybe a C? I think that's fair. Why do you hesitate? I'm just wondering if it should be lower than that.

**[2:02:41] Alex Kesin:** Okay. We disagree a little bit. I want to hear your reasoning.

**[2:02:44] Matthew Pech:** Well, it's just, okay. At the end of the day, 34 years from incorporation to a single approved drug, The stock price has been flat forever. The internal rate of return for early investors is essentially zero. I think the least generous way to look at it is that they spent approaching $1 billion to get to the point of an approved product. And going into 2026, they're only making $240 million a year in revenue from their drug.

**[2:03:13] Matthew Pech:** They have about $400 million in cash on hand. And at those sales levels, they're not even breaking even, right? So like operating expenses are essentially the same level as revenue.

**[2:03:25] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, they're about, I guess, where I am a little bit more glasses half full is that they still have a financial future from the start of their launch. The sales have overall grown faster than expected. Maybe they haven't done too rosy as of incredibly recently, but I say the jury is still out.

**[2:03:46] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I think that's fair. The jury's still out. They're running a phase three trial in myelofibrosis that's fully enrolled and there'll start to be some data prints there. And if this drug does something useful in myelofibrosis, that's a big commercial opportunity with less competition than an MDS. Yes. Again, though, I still think that from a financial perspective, there's no Geron billionaires out there. I'm not even sure there's any Geron millionaires out of there. This is not a company whose success made investors or people rich, really.

**[2:04:20] Alex Kesin:** Yeah. It's funny you say that because other longevity biotech companies of yesteryear have had it the other way around, right? What are you thinking about? Well, I'm thinking of Sertris in particular. This was a company that had a really big financial splash. They got acquired by GSK for $600 million. But do you know any products approved that came

**[2:04:45] Matthew Pech:** from Sertris? Approved? No, but you can definitely go to a corner store and get resveratrol for making your skin look younger or something. Yeah, I guess that was a big financial success in the sense that four years from funding to a $600 million exit is a pretty nice payday for everyone. But yeah, not a lot of academic or patient impact.

**[2:05:09] Alex Kesin:** Sure. And I mean, there's still, of course, this narrative that aging is the biggest TAM to ever exist in pharma. And there will be opportunities in the future. Maybe not via telomerase as the target that unlock that market. We've seen a hint of that with GLP ones, right?

**[2:05:27] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, exactly. All right. So patient impact score, what do you give Geron?

**[2:05:32] Alex Kesin:** I think it's a B minus. This is not a cure to cancer, but it is increasing the quality of life for patients. And again, the metric of success here for this kind of patient demographic looks a lot different than, say, a younger, relatively healthy person's options on the table, right?

**[2:05:52] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I guess I'm less generous than you are here. I'd probably give a score lower than B minus. I would say as it stands today, this is a modestly useful addition to the armamentarium that exists to manage low risk MDS. and I'll change my score if something happens in myelofibrosis or as the data evolves. But that's my sense is right now it's like a modestly useful drug in a pretty small indication. But yeah, the story is not finished there.

**[2:06:27] Alex Kesin:** Yeah. Even though there are 50 ,000 overall MDS patients, low risk seems to be a fraction of that, right?

**[2:06:33] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I think 50 ,000 is the number of new low risk MDS patients a year. But again, it's like the subset of those that are now don't respond to epigen and of those, which ones actually get ML stat and of those, which ones actually respond. We're starting to get in small numbers here. Got it.

**[2:06:50] Alex Kesin:** Okay. I'm willing to adjust down to like a C or C plus. But here's where I think I am going to stand firm. And I hope you agree. The academic impact of Geron is phenomenal. I say A plus.

**[2:07:04] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, this is a clear A +, one of the best track records of any small startup, I would argue.

**[2:07:12] Alex Kesin:** In full agreement then, I say top tier in the history of biotech. We're talking landmark papers in science on telomerase detection, telomerase-mediated cell immunization, all of the work done for HESCs, their discovery and isolation. They cloned both components of the telomerase enzyme. They are literally responsible for helping define one of the hallmarks of cancer. The academic impact is huge, even by numerical count. We're talking thousands of citations.

**[2:07:42] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, maybe to give some context on the academic impact here. Most biotechs do not treat publishing papers as a big feather in their cap. It's something that typically happens as a consolation prize when programs don't go well. So to have a company that has a single paper that has 7 ,000 citations, that's insane. They really did either make or fund fundamental observations in the field of telomerase and ES cells. Those are incredibly important fields, right? Those are not niche boutique areas of biology.

**[2:08:20] Alex Kesin:** Yeah. And the cascade effect certainly from that research is remarkable.

**[2:08:24] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, so let's talk a little bit about that cascade effects and try to enumerate everything there. Do you want to kick it off then? All right. So I think the first thing I would say is the infrastructure for developing embryonic stem cell therapies. They filed the first IND for an ES cell-derived therapy, the 22 ,000 pages. They walked away, right? They spent money for nothing, but every cell therapy company they're on has benefited from the regulatory innovations that they did.

**[2:08:56] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, they walked so others could run, certainly. This is probably my favorite of the cascading effects is the connection to the discovery of IPSCs. So Jamie Thompson at the University of Wisconsin is first to isolate embryonic stem cells in humans. But then that work kicks off this cascade, some of it highly political, right? because they have this monopoly on the cell lines that aren't banned by George Bush. But that inadvertently leads to the discovery of iPSCs, induced pluripotent stem cells, which has nothing to do with the controversy of embryonic stem cell research.

**[2:09:33] Alex Kesin:** They literally paid $30 ,000 to unlock this huge terra incognita of biology. Gave Yamanaka the Nobel Prize, but also led to the current generation of longevity biotech companies. Altos Labs, New Limit, Retro, billions of dollars in investment. Yeah, for sure.

**[2:09:51] Matthew Pech:** The work they did on telomerase cancer immunotherapy, that wasn't something that went anywhere, but I think that was relatively novel and definitely one of the earlier cell-based immunotherapies. Along those lines of being cell therapy, Pioneer is doing some of the first protocols ever to differentiate ES cells at an industrial scale and working through all of the complexity of how you do that. There's still plenty of unsolved problems there, but it definitely helped contribute to the field.

**[2:10:28] Alex Kesin:** For sure. I have to touch on one of the more negative sides of their history as a company, but that had an unexpected effect on the cell therapy field today. Remember that monopoly that they had on those lines from Wisconsin? Yep. Well, as it turns out, it pushed some researchers like Doug Melton, for example, at Harvard to privately fund the creation of their own stem cell lines. That led to the creation of Sema Therapeutics, which was acquired by Vertex for $1 billion.

**[2:10:57] Alex Kesin:** And that led to the amazing readout that happened relatively recently, showing potentially remission in type 1 diabetes. Really incredible stuff. To rattle off a couple of others, we're talking about Viacite, Blue Rock, almost $3 billion in acquisitions from the cell lines that Geron funded through Jamie Thompson. Yeah, that's an interesting point. They also played

**[2:11:21] Matthew Pech:** around in cultured meat land. They played around with mitochondrial replacement therapy. Yeah. They had ethics boards that were relatively novel. I think one of the more interesting things that they pioneered was this concept of using private money to fund forbidden science, right? So very cleverly stepping into the void of science that the federal government wouldn't touch and trying to get exclusive licenses in exchange. They were some of the first to do this with telomerase and ES cells.

**[2:11:53] Matthew Pech:** It ended up being replicated by companies like Celera Genomics in the human genome race, and then California's CIRM funding agency coming in to try to supplement some of the defects of NIH funding. They probably also pioneered the concept that longevity science should be something that's well-funded by the private sector, and that's

**[2:12:15] Alex Kesin:** too speculative for federal funding. For sure. Both of us chatting about this in San Francisco with our own history in longevity biotech. Looking at the landscape of companies today, there's definitely a lineage from Geron intellectually, stylistically from the start to today. We'll get to that in a bit, but do you want to close off with some other thoughts about their legacy?

**[2:12:39] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, I think related to academic impact is this concept of value capture versus value creation, which I see a lot of scientists struggle with in the biotech industry. Geron was a company organized initially around a biological target as opposed to organized around an initial drug. So in the history of Geron, you can see what the pros and cons are of taking that approach to company formation. They were very busy trying to fully extract all the value around telomerase, going from diagnostics to therapeutics to cell therapies to every single drug modality.

**[2:13:20] Matthew Pech:** And had this insanely broad vision. If you're ungenerous, you call it incoherent. If you're generous, you say that they were really visionary and aggressive ahead of their time. And I think what's undeniable is that approach to biotech company formation was incredibly successful at catalyzing fundraising on preclinical data. Cells that became young, Paralyzed rats, throat lock again, universal cancer vaccine, universal cancer diagnostic. I mean, it's just ultimately impossible for a single company to push all those programs forward, right?

**[2:13:58] Matthew Pech:** It takes too much money. There's too much specialized know-how. You're spread super thin

**[2:14:04] Alex Kesin:** across modalities and therapeutic areas. Right. And I think Geron is a fascinating case study, really, of what it looks like for a company to have complete ownership over a target, for better or for worse, right? So nobody can compete with them in telomerase. If I recall correctly, reading in Merchants of Immortality, one of the founding scientists associated with Geron said that their MTAs were so strict that it probably turned away other companies from competing in the space.

**[2:14:34] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, so you should double click on that and say like Geron's early strategy, was it actually useful for them? Did they actually get something out of it? So they had these huge battles stone, everything around telomerase, I think at the end of the day, it ended up not being that valuable to them. I agree. And one way to illustrate this is with Imolstat, a commercial product now, you can see what are the patents that cover that drug now.

**[2:15:02] Matthew Pech:** And first of all, the original composition of matter patent for Imolstat has expired already just because it took them so much time to go through clinical development. So they're being covered right now based off of method of use patents covering the use of this drug in MDS and myelofibrosis. They have other patents related to formulation, indication, dosage, etc. They will have patent coverage of this drug in the 2040s. But what you'll notice there is like none of the foundational patents are helping them at all, right?

**[2:15:38] Matthew Pech:** It's all sort of the standard two waves of patent coverage that every biotech does to protect their drugs. I think the other piece to mention here, what the downside was of fully owning this target was that a lot of M &A activity in biotech is driven by buzz and by social proof. And when you fully own a target and you have no competitors, there's no ability to have a competitor get purchased and then that ends up being a proof point that ultimately gets you purchased.

**[2:16:12] Matthew Pech:** I see their strategy is ultimately shooting themselves in the foot because the right

**[2:16:17] Alex Kesin:** amount of competition in this business is definitely not zero. I'm with you there. I think there's a lot of commentary today about target crowding, but Geron is the perfect anti-example of how complete isolation on a target isn't necessarily a good thing. Maybe if they were competitors, they would have found out that working in solid tumors was not the move before

**[2:16:39] Matthew Pech:** Geron funded those studies. Yeah, for sure. They could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars by learning from their competitors. I agree. All right. I think the final thing to really discuss here is Geron's legacy as a longevity pioneer. Yep. I think it's adequate to read this quote

**[2:17:00] Alex Kesin:** from the Nobel Prize-winning scientist, Gunter Blobel, who worked alongside with Geron. He said, and this is the response to their portfolio when it was at its biggest size, it may be too big for Geron. It would be good for a very big company to dump $1 billion over 25 years and do it in a very systematic way. It's something that should be done very systematically and in my opinion, on a large scale. Geron did not listen ultimately to Gunter Blobel.

**[2:17:29] Alex Kesin:** try it anyway. And after 35 years, they have this one drug approved for a niche blood cancer. But in all fairness, most companies attempting anything this speculative go to zero. Geron's still here. I think objectively speaking, whether that's a success story or not depends entirely on what version of Geron you're measuring against. Yeah, that's a good point that for a

**[2:17:52] Matthew Pech:** company to go from literally cloning the cDNA of a target all the way through clinical trials and commercializations, that is incredibly difficult to do. And Geron should be given a lot of credit for doing it. If you're getting judged based off of, did you find the cure for aging and chronic disease? Like, obviously Geron came up short on that vision, right? Yep. Something a little bit

**[2:18:18] Alex Kesin:** poetic about how they followed this target throughout its entire lifespan from discovery to commercialization.

**[2:18:24] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, and like, again, what did Geron do? The idea that aging has specific molecular mechanisms that you can therapeutically target and that you can finance a company around that. They did that, right? Like they did that successfully. Like it's kind of amazing that they did that. And a lot of the most sexy longevity approaches now in a very abstract way are trying to do exactly what Geron did 30 years ago, which is stick genes into cells and see if they look younger.

**[2:18:54] Alex Kesin:** Yeah, something very cyclical about that. Before telomeres, it was free radicals, and there was a whole era of eliminating senescent cells. And now cellular reprogramming seems to be all the rage. Of course, aging seems to be a lot more stochastic, layered, stubbornly complicated than making cells look young again. Something interesting to think about.

**[2:19:18] Matthew Pech:** Yeah, maybe I want to reemphasize that. We've been talking about Geron as a longevity pioneer, and I feel like that title is 100 % deserved. What's really ironic is if you go into various well-known lists of longevity companies, Geron isn't even on the list. They're not even considered an engine company. In many ways, they pioneered the whole field, and they're not even on the list. The granddaddy. Um, it's, it's just funny to see them not seen as the intellectual forebearer of everything

**[2:19:52] Alex Kesin:** that happened afterwards. I think it's a tragedy. And for any people working within this space, I sincerely hope you pay it forward and tell people not aware of this company about it because it's such a fascinating case study and hubris among other things, but also the invention of an entire field from scratch. Yep. Yeah. I think one little parable I'd like to close off on is the story of the featherless biped. Are you familiar with it, Matt?

**[2:20:21] Alex Kesin:** No. Okay. So it's a fable from ancient Greece. And I believe Athens, there was this philosopher named Diogenes. And he's a funny guy. He was a cynic, but not in the modern sense, more of a smart ass, I guess. In this story, there's a philosopher who claims to have found the simplest definition for a human being, which is featherless biped. And Diogenes, being this crass, kind of troublesome figure, comes in to the Agora the next day with a hairless chicken.

**[2:20:57] Alex Kesin:** He says, behold, a featherless biped. And the reason I say this is Geron saw these opportunities at the beginning. telomeres immortalizing cells, embryonic stem cells potentially regenerating the human body. And they did really wild extrapolations on them. I think they're a really fascinating case study in the map not being the territory, right? Where these aesthetic things that they raised a lot of money on ended up not translationally looking the way that they actually turned out to be.

**[2:21:29] Matthew Pech:** coming out the other side scathed but with a drug in the market which is more than most longevity startup stories can say alright is that a wrap? that's a wrap this has been approved thanks for listening thank you for listening see you next time see you next time you
