S1E113: How a savvy Asean has helped prevent wars in region: Kishore Mahbubani Asian Insider ยท 19 Sep 2024 Source: https://omny.fm/shows/asian-insider-1/veteran-diplomats-career-a-front-row-seat-to-the-asian-century Transcript: https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/asian-insider/s1e113-how-a-savvy-asean-has-helped-prevent-wars-in-region-kishore-mahbubani-38dd47/ (via OpenNash Podcasts, machine-generated) This is a podcast by The Straits Times. Welcome to Asian Insider, a podcast series by The Straits Times. I'm your host, Nirmal Ghosh. Today I have with me the irrepressible Kishore Mahbubani, currently a distinguished fellow at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore. His resume is otherwise yards long. In his diplomatic career, he has had assignments in Cambodia, Malaysia, Washington, D.C., and New York, where he was twice Singapore's ambassador to the UN and president of the UN Security Council in January 2001 and May 2002. He has also been permanent secretary at Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, founding dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and he is a prolific writer. His latest book out just a few weeks ago is a memoir titled Living the Asian Century and subtitled An Undiplomatic Memoir, which is quite apt if you know him. Kishore, welcome back to Asian Insider. My pleasure. Glad to be back. Good to have you. I remember, I think four years ago, you were last with me when you did your book, Has China Won? That created a bit of a stir, I remember. That book did extremely well, you know, in terms of sales. Congratulations on the new book, a very honest book, even raw in some places, I would say. Very interesting. But looking back, can you pinpoint any particular epiphany or two, a moment or moments that gave you a particular insight, that taught you a particular truth about international relations? Well, see, what I try to do in the book is to explain how I managed to learn a lot about international relations. And one of the key messages is that I learned an incredible amount from three geopolitical geniuses, you know, Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, and S. Rajaratnam. And their minds were absolutely amazing, you know. and it's only in the course of my life as I began to interact with leaders in other countries and slowly it began to dawn on me that Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and S. Rajaratnam were not just great by Singapore standards, they were also great by global standards. They were probably better in their analysis and understanding what was going on globally than most world leaders were which is why they were enormously respected in the rest of the world. So it's a question of the intellect and the vision and the minds. Intellect, vision, minds and a brutal realism in their understanding of international relations. They had absolutely no illusions and they were incredible realists in their understanding of how international relations work which is why they were able to navigate Singapore so well, you know, because they understood all the currents that were going around Singapore and they knew how to maneuver around it. So talking about one major current right now, more political scientists, analysts and so forth are calling the US-China competition a new Cold War. And whatever one may choose to call it, and we know academics love labels, the US loves labels. Where do you think this competition is headed? Well, you're right in suggesting that the Cold War is not an appropriate label because in the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union lived in two distinct universes without any sort of direct contact with each other. By contrast, both United States and China trade enormously with each other and have lots of links in many, many spheres. So it's not the same. But at the same time, the competition is also more fierce. It's more fierce because the United States actually never really worried that the Soviet Union would become bigger than the United States in terms of the size of its economy. I mean, they were terrified of Soviet nuclear weapons. And many Americans actually genuinely believe that the Soviets were mad enough to use them. And so it was a fear of the nuclear weapons that gripped the Americans when they dealt with the Soviet Union. By contrast, Americans are not frightened of China unleashing its nuclear weapons because China has got so much fewer nuclear weapons than the United States does. But China has the capacity to overtake the United States and become the world's biggest economy. Now, it is already the world's biggest economy in purchasing power parity terms, PPP. But it can also become bigger in nominal market terms. And that's what worries the United States more than anything else. Do you think Southeast Asia has any agency in terms of moderating this competition, this confrontation between these two superpowers? What can Southeast Asia do? Well, Southeast Asia has enormous agency because it has the world's, in theory, second most successful regional organization, although I could argue it is probably the world's most successful regional organization, more successful than the European Union because we didn't have a Brexit. No one's left ASEAN. And also, we have helped to prevent wars in our neighborhood. By contrast, the European Union has failed to stop the war in Ukraine from emerging. So ASEAN has shown itself to be, in geopolitical terms, more savvy than the European Union. And it has been able to do this by being very inclusive in its extra-regional arrangements. So every year when we have the ASEAN Summit, the East Asian Summit, leaders from the United States, Russia, European Union, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, all come. I mean, you know, these leaders are very busy. They have choices to make. They got to decide which meetings to attend. The fact that so many of them come regularly to the annual ASEAN summit shows that ASEAN has some degree of convening power and some degree of geopolitical savvy. and that's why the ASEAN region has been amazingly successful. Now, let me give you another statistic to illustrate how, two statistics to illustrate how successful ASEAN is. Number one, in the year 2000, Japan was the world's second largest economy, right? Far ahead of China, far bigger and eight times bigger than ASEAN. But now Japan is only 1.2, 1.3 times bigger. And by 2030, ASEAN will be bigger than Japan. Now, that's an amazing turnaround by ASEAN. And then in the decade 2010 to 2020, even though ASEAN's combined GNP is about one-fifth that of the European Union, ASEAN added more to global economic growth from 2010 to 2020 than the European Union did. So clearly, ASEAN is doing something right on the geopolitical front, on the economic front, and also on the regional cooperation front. But he does this without blasting it out and saying, hey, we are so special, we are so superior. In fact, ASEAN is remarkably modest about its achievements, which may not necessarily be a bad thing. Interesting. How do you see India's place, the other rising power, how do you see India's place in a multipolar world? I should mention for those listening that Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Singapore quite recently. And India-Singapore ties were elevated to a strategic partnership. But beyond that, also India has been sort of flexing joint naval exercises in faraway seas, security in the Arabian Sea, plans to beef up with bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and so forth. What are your thoughts on India? Well, I'm extremely bullish about the prospects of India. so bullish that I published a column in the Financial Times on August 12th last month, exactly a month ago actually, saying that it is time for the United Kingdom to give up its permanent membership seat in the UN Security Council to India because the founding fathers of the UN wanted the veto to be given not to the great powers of yesterday, but to the great powers of today. And clearly the United Kingdom is a great power of yesterday. It can never ever build a British empire on which the sun never set. It can never ever again have a GNP that will be among the top five in the world. Never. because lots of middle powers are emerging. And by contrast, India, which is already the top five economy in the world, is going to become number three by 2030. So clearly the time has come for UK to cede its permanent membership cede to India. And it is, I think India has had, as you know, a remarkable 10, 20 year period of growth. and this will continue. And, you know, I've been to many places around the world. I travel frequently. But when I was in Mumbai late last year, I was just bowled over by the incredible optimism of the young Indians. And frankly, India today is probably the most optimistic place on planet Earth. That's very interesting. Okay. Now, talking about, you know, powers of yesterday and today and the future, a lot of analysts and commentators have been saying the United States is in decline. You yourself, I think, have said there are signs. But is that not premature? I can't help thinking, you know, it was Lee Kuan Yew who remarked that historically the U.S. has a great capacity for renewal and revival. The U.S. sort of barges on regardless. And it does remain a massive engine of creativity. partly, I should say, fueled by its openness to immigration. I was just reading the other day that Chinese and Indian inventors are apparently responsible for 20 % of all US patents. And around half of all international students come from China and India and are disproportionately concentrated in STEM fields in the US. So is all this talk about US decline premature? Oh, it's definitely premature. That's why, you know, you mentioned my book, Has China Won? As you know, in the first chapter, I begin by, I have in the first chapter a fictional memo from a colleague of Xi Jinping to President Xi saying, President Xi, we're now in the middle of a geopolitical contest against the United States. Of course, China will win. But, but, but, China must never underestimate the United States of America. And, you know, I've been to the United States four times just this year alone. And I was a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, an Ivy League school in March this year. And I can tell you when you spend time in an American university, and I also met some of the leading scientific minds there in UPenn, you get bowled over by their creativity and their innovation and their complete confidence in their ability to excel in the fields of science and technology. And you saw even in the most important area now in artificial intelligence. I remember three to four years ago, everyone would say China will definitely win the race for AI because China's got much larger pools of data, less restrictions on the use of data. So China will emerge as the AI superpower. And lo and behold, it's the United States that made the critical breakthroughs. So there's a degree, you're absolutely right when you say there's a culture of innovation that is amazing in the American body politic. And I would say it would be a huge mistake for China or anyone else to believe that the game of the United States is over. Absolutely. So do you think, since we're talking about the US and we're in the middle of a contentious presidential election out there, and this is somewhat speculative, of course, but do you think the United States will plunge in if China invades Taiwan? A big if, of course. A number of people I speak with in the US says it likely will not. given the enormous cost of military invention. What are your thoughts on the Taiwan issue? Well, I think I'm very confident that China will not invade Taiwan, unless, of course, Taiwan does the silly thing of declaring independence. But yesterday I was in Taiwan. I spent a day there and met many of the Taiwanese people. and even the DPP leaders realize that the Taiwanese people are sensible enough not to wish for independence. They don't want to change the status quo, they don't want to be part of China, but they're not going to declare independence and as long as they don't declare independence, China will not declare war and the reason why China won't declare war is because of what Henry Kissinger said in his book on China, and if you read chapter one of Henry Kissinger's book on China, he points out that the Chinese have always accepted this maxim of Sun Tzu, which is that the best way to win a war is to win it by not fighting. And if you have to actually fight battles, then you have lost something, which is why the Chinese scratch their heads and wonder why the United States constantly engages in new wars because wars are draining. And China believes that time is on its side. And as more and more countries do more trade with China, as more and more countries get engaged with China, you saw what happened a few weeks ago when all the African leaders turned up in Beijing. You'll find that if you force a country to choose between China and Taiwan, of course they will choose China. And I warn the Taiwanese people, I said, listen, you guys are so lucky that even though you're not a member of the United Nations, your passport is accepted in, I don't know, 180, 190 countries in the world. Just imagine if you move towards independence and you change your passport to Republic of Taiwan. You know, very few countries will accept a passport of Republic of Taiwan. You'll be completely isolated. It would be like you locking yourself up in a jail and throwing away the key. Because who's going to accept the Republic of Taiwan passport? So I think it's important, therefore, for those of us who are friends of the Taiwanese people, to tell them that this flirtation with independence is both dangerous and also self-defeating for the people of Taiwan. Coming back to China and the US, in your book, you mentioned the groupthink in DC prior to the invasion of Iraq. And we have been seeing a bit of that with regard to China in DC. But looking ahead, how do you expect the approach to differ under Kamala Harris White House or under Donald Trump White House? How different would they be? Well, in one area, there'll be no difference at all. the pressure on China will increase. Because there's, as you know, a near universal consensus in Washington, D.C. that the U.S. has about 10 years to stop China from becoming number one. And the United States establishment, they've already tried tariffs on China, which haven't worked. They tried CHIPS Act. Let's see whether it works. But they will try all kinds of measures to stop the rise of China. And, you know, I co-authored an article with the president of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology and an American investor in China saying that all efforts to stop China's technological development will fail. Indeed, even The Economist has come up with this cover story a few weeks ago saying that China is now a scientific superpower. So the pressure on China will be there. But I think Kamala Harris will probably be more careful in what she does. I think having been part of the Biden administration, and as you know, the Biden administration started in a very gung-ho basis, saying, hey, we will isolate China. We will isolate China. But I think after two, three years, they realized they were not going anywhere. And there was a mood of realism that took over the Biden administration's policies. And then Xi Jinping and Joe Biden began to have relatively sane and sober conversations and relations stabilized by the fourth year of the Biden administration. So I think there's some of the learning of the Biden administration that is futile to try and isolate China may actually spill over into the Kamala Harris administration. And so she'll definitely be more careful. Now, Donald Trump, you cannot predict what Donald Trump is going to do because Donald Trump himself cannot predict what he's going to do. He can go to either extreme. He can either support Taiwanese independence, and this is not a hypothetical gesture because his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, after he stepped down as Secretary of State, went to Taiwan and gave a speech saying, United States should recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Now, that's a very dangerous statement. And Mike Pompeo is coming back, probably into the administration. So he could do that, or he could go to the other extreme and say, Taiwan is a liability for United States. I have more important things to do with Xi Jinping. Move aside Taiwan. So that could also happen. So with the case of Donald Trump, you cannot make any kind of intelligent prediction at all. Okay. What would you say are the two or three biggest challenges of the next 20 or 30 years? I know you can probably talk for an hour on that, but how would you put it? Well, I think it's important for us to understand that there have been bigger structural shifts over the last 20, 30 years than there have been in probably 1 ,000, 2 ,000 years of human history. Let me give you just one example. You know, 100 years ago, the Europeans could run the world effortlessly. They colonized every corner of the world. and in fact 300 million of your ancestors, my ancestors in India, were effortlessly ruled by 100 ,000 Englishmen. Now can you imagine today, maybe 300 ,000 Englishmen coming to run India. They'd be massacred, right? Massacred. But it's amazing that that happened 100 years ago. Europe was so powerful, and we always assume that Europe will be a major power in the world. Guess what? In the year 1980, Europe's economy in combined EU, GNP, was 10 times the size of China, 10 times. Today, they're about the same size. By 2050, Europe will be half the size of China. Now, when these sorts of big structural shifts happen, the world order has got to adapt and adjust. So the Europeans are going to have a very hard time giving up the privileges of the past. I mean, they still insist that the head of the IMF should be a European. Now, that's a joke. You don't have the fast-growing economies in the world. In fact, the European economy in relative terms is shrinking, as I've documented already. So the Europeans need to adjust to a place in the world where they learn to share power with other Asian countries. And the British have got to give up, as I say, their permanent membership seat to India. Now, all these consequential adjustments as a result of structural shifts that ever taken place are not easy. There'll be lots of resistance. But at the end of the day, if these European countries are wise, they will learn it's better to work towards creating a stronger multilateral institutions in the world, which will create a common set of rules for everybody. And that's what I think the Europeans should be working towards. And if you can do that, create stronger multilateral institutions, whether it's the United Nations, the Bretton Woods, or the new institutions G20, or bricks and so on and so forth, then I think we can have a better world. But we have to readjust the world to take into consideration that enormous power shifts have taken place. Okay. Kishore Mahbubani, always a pleasure. Thank you for coming on Asian Insider. My pleasure. That nicely wraps this discussion up for the Asian Insider podcast. I'm Nirmal Ghosh. Join me and my expert guests on the third and fourth Friday of every month. Send your feedback to podcast at sph.com.sg. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or within our Straits Times app. Thanks for listening.