S2E53: Inside the secret Albatross file on Singapore’s Separation from Malaysia Asian Insider · 7 Dec 2025 Source: https://omny.fm/shows/asian-insider-1/aist-s2e52-v2rx Transcript: https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/asian-insider/s2e53-inside-the-secret-albatross-file-on-singapores-separation-from-malaysia-5d71aa/ (via OpenNash Podcasts, machine-generated) This is a podcast by The Straits Times. Hello and welcome to Asian Insider, I'm Sumiko Tan. In this episode, we are exploring one of the most dramatic periods in Singapore's history, the months leading up to separation from Malaysia in 1965. It was a time of political clashes, racial tensions, British manoeuvrings and Indonesia's confrontasi. My guest, Janadas Devan, is Senior Advisor at MDDI. More importantly, he coordinated the new book, The Albatross File, Inside Separation. The book was launched by Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong on December 8, together with an exhibition at the National Library. Before we start, a quick disclosure. I heard Straits Times Press, which co-published the book together with the National Archives of Singapore. It's a pretty massive book, nearly 500 pages and more than 800 footnotes, but thoroughly gripping. We have the links to the book in our show notes. Janadas, welcome to the show. Very glad to be here. Now that the book is finally over, are you as relieved as I am? Well, not yet because, you know, there's still a question of, you know, selling the book and distributing it and talking about it to many people. And of course, we had to prepare for the exhibition. But I'm glad that it's done after many, many years. I didn't realise there were 850 footnotes. Yes, many, many footnotes. Yeah, you know, for those who haven't picked up the book, you know, what is the albatross file and why should we care? The albatross file refers to a file that Dr. Goh Keng Swee, at that time the Minister for Finance, kept personally. It was a file that he kept personally because, you know, it was very badly organized. It was, in fact, disorganized. And he put in there all sorts of material, cabinet papers, memorandums, newspaper clippings, transcripts of Mr. Lee Kwa's new speeches in the Malaysian parliament and so on. a manifesto for the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, and most importantly, his handwritten notes of his conversations with Tun Abdul Razak, at that time the Deputy Prime Minister in Malaysia, and other Malaysian leaders in the weeks leading to separation. And he quote-named the file Albatross in an allusion to the dead bird that a sailor, in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poem, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, was cursed to wear. So the albatross was around our neck. So the albatross, he said, at one stage, the albatross is Malaysia. Right. It was the merger. It was the merger with Malaysia. He kept the file, must have started the file sometime in 1964. We don't know when precisely, but the oldest document in the file is a cabinet memorandum written by the prime minister then, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, before the race riots in July 64, a couple of weeks perhaps. Perhaps he put in the file, placed in the file all sorts of material right up to the last note, the last piece of paper in the albatross file was the separation agreement. Right. So why is this a good time to come out with it? Well, the albatross file, we first learned about it because the great man himself told the world. In 1995, he was interviewed by Dr. Melanie Chu for her book, Leaders of Singapore. I think the book appeared the next year in 96. And that was the first time we all knew that there was such a file and he had named it Albatross. And that he had, more importantly, he revealed then that it was he who had suggested to Tun Razak that we go our separate ways. And since then, there's been much speculation as to what was in the file. And it was the former prime minister, S.M. Lee, who decided that the contents of the Albatross file should be made public. The delay is because we wanted it out in the fullest possible context, which means including the oral histories of the key figures. And those did not become available. All of them did not become available to the last five years because there are agreements that the various interviews had to sign and you could only start seeing them a few years after they had passed. We are republishing excerpts from 10 oral histories. and this was done in the early 80s and begun in the early 80s and the oral histories were of Singapore's political history up to separation. So that's why we have their remembrance or their recollection of what happened. We could not have told the full story without the oral histories. Okay, so let's dive into the world that these documents describe. Could you explain what was the political climate like? Well, we merged with Malaysia in September 1963, 16 September 1963, because that was fundamental to the belief of the political leadership at that time. When the People's Action Party was formed in 1954, actually the first clause in the manifesto was, in fact, merger with Malaya. At that time, it was Malaya. And it was a fundamental belief that all of them shared. We all assumed that we had to have a hinterland and Malaya was our hinterland. We forget this now, but actually for much of our colonial history, we were part of the strait settlement. The strait settlement included Singapore, Malacca, Penang. And after the war, we were separated from Malaya. The strait settlement came to an end. The British proposed something called the Malayan Union, which the Malays in Malaya objected to. Why? Because the Malayan Union, Malaya by itself, with Benang and Malacca included, but not Singapore, it was 2.1 million Malays, 1.9 million Chinese, and 600 ,000 Indians. So even without Singapore, the Malayan Union would have made the Malays a minority. So UMNO was formed to resist the Malayan Union. And they didn't want Singapore to be part of it because if Singapore had been part of the Malayan Union, it would have completely overwhelmed the Malays in Malaya. And therefore, Singapore became a separate crown colony. And it was an article of faith by almost everybody that we had to re-merge with Malaya. So actually, the first separation of Singapore from Malaya happened after the war. We weren't allowed into the Malayan Union. And then we re-merged with Malaya in 1963, quite forgetting that actually the Malayan Union was rejected by UMNO. UMNO was formed to resist the Malayan Union precisely because we were a Chinese majority city. And you would have upset population balance in Malaya. You can understand why they felt that way. And therefore, the second re-merger included Sabah and Sarawak to balance the Chinese majority that Singapore would have added to Malaysia. I think young Singaporeans would find it very strange. Nobody understands now why they felt that way. But it's very difficult to understand, recreate this sense because it's taken as an article of faith now. Assume, well, how does Singapore survive? Because we're hooked up to the rest of the world. that our hinterland is not however many people there are in peninsular Malaysia, but the world, right? Rajaratnam's global city speech was only in 1972. So even when we became independent, our leaders were unsure as to how they would survive because they all believed with every fibre in their being that we were part of Malaya and that was our hinterland. Did the Malaysians feel the same? I doubt very much, But the Tunku finally agreed to merger only because the British had persuaded him that he had to accept a greater Malaysia with Singapore because if not, Singapore might well have become communist and you would have been a Cuba at the feet of Malaya. And in any case, by then they had arranged not only for a merger between Singapore and Malaya, but a merger of Sabah and Sarawak. And for a while, it seemed as though Brunei also would have been included, but the Brunei Sultan, the final analysis refused, and Singapore. Right. But the marriage was problematic from the start. There was trouble almost from the beginning because the Singapore government held general elections in Singapore immediately after we merged with Malaya because they weren't sure they were going to win the PAP. There was always a risk that the Barisan Socialists would have won and they wanted the elections when we were already part of Malaysia. There was a kind of gentleman's agreement between Mr. Lee on the Singapore side and the Tunku, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime Minister, that they won't interfere with each other's politics. But they broke their promise by contesting the Singapore general election. And what was worse, UMNO Singapore lost all the seats they contested. At that time, there were three Malay majority constituencies in Singapore, Geylang Serai, Kambung Kambangan and Southern Islands. And they were all UMNO seats before, 59 general elections. They were won by UMNO, 63 general elections to their shock. They lost all three Malay majority seats to Malay candidates from the PAP. And almost immediately, the agitation began that the Singapore government oppressed Malays. This was a Chinese majority city. And within weeks, there were demonstrations in various parts of Singapore. Mr. Lee's effigy was burned. And that was the beginning of the long period of agitation that led finally to the race riots in 1964. That was one series of events. The other series of events is the PAP, tit for tat, they decided to contest the Malaysian general elections. That was in April 1964. And Mr. Lee held rallies up and down the peninsula, all the urban centers. And they were huge rallies, Massive rallies. And actually attended one rally in Kuala Lumpur. And it was the largest group of people I've ever seen in my life. Huge. The center of Kuala Lumpur, I think must have been near Bangsa. Streets were all filled. People were hanging out of the windows, you know, the shop houses and so on. Massive, huge rally. And it rattled the Malaysian leadership. Though, actually, the PAP lost all but one seat. Yes. They went in and they looked at all these rallies and they thought they might well win all of them. In the final analysis, they only won one. But despite that, the fact that Mr. Lee had this pull, they themselves probably never saw crowds like this. They got rattled and the agitation and the campaign continued. In fact, that seat was won by your father. Unfortunately, as he says, he won. Bangsa. In Bangsa. Right. And you were there. I attended one rally. I wasn't there continuously when the election results came over the radio. I was in Singapore. But yes, they didn't allow us, the children, to stay there for long because actually it was quite a rambunctious election campaign. I mean, people were throwing stones and so on. How old were you? 1964, I was 10. Right. So, I mean, back to the relations, the rocky relations. For a while, there was the idea of a looser confederation between both. Why didn't that happen? You see, I'm going to read you something from Dr. Goh's oral history. And he says here, it was only after the riots when we were cornered. He was referring to the July 64 riots. And then there was another riot in September. He says, only after the riots when we were cornered, really cornered because the Malaysian government could at will switch on this riot and get people killed, that Lee decided on a counter-offensive to make life intolerable for them. I think it was Lee's policy that if we were to get good terms out of them, either total separation or a new working agreement, they must find existing arrangements intolerable. And he knew that it had to be done at great risk to himself, but there was no other way because we were at the receiving end all the time. So this was the strategy that Mr. Lee adopted. Their side creates riots in order to intimidate the population in Singapore, in order to intimidate the leadership in Singapore. Immediately after the riots, Dr. Goh describes a meeting with Tun Razak in Malaysia. He went up to see Tun Razak and Tun Razak says, look, we can have you part of the government. We can have a coalition government on two conditions. Number one, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew steps down as prime minister. Number two, you must leave the Malay ground, even in Singapore, to UMNO. In other words, you must accept how politics is arranged. In Malaysia, we have communal-based parties. You cannot, even in Singapore, appeal to Malays. Well, they refused. And Mr. Lee decided on a counter-strategy. Bring pressure to bear on them. You organize yourself, both in parliament and without parliament. And actually, that strategy worked. The Tunku's first reaction to that strategy was, in fact, to propose a looser federation, which is what he did. In fact, he publicly spoke about it, the possibility of a breakaway if Singapore leaders did not behave. He said it in a speech in Singapore on, I think, December 9th in 1964. Already then, it was already in his mind, you know, if you chaps continue to make these problems, cause these problems, there may be no other way except a breakaway. And then privately, he told Dr. Goh and then later Mr. Lee, let's have a looser federation. It was not exactly the form of words he said, he used, but you know, he basically wanted to get back to the old arrangement. Between 1959 and 1963, Singapore was self-governing. we looked after everything, the Singapore government, except foreign affairs and defence, which were in the hands of the British. So essentially, Tunku's plan was go back to status quo ante and in place of the British, he, Palo Lumpur, will look after defence and foreign relations. And so the negotiations proceeded. Mr Lee, the albatross file, you can see documents he had drafted proposing how a confederation or a looser federation could function. But those negotiations failed for a few reasons. Number one, the Tunku himself was not clear as to what he wanted. He wanted Singapore out of the Malaysian parliament. So all this trouble that Mr. Lee was causing and the PAP was causing in the Malaysian parliament would disappear. But he also wanted Singapore to pay taxes, especially for defense. And Mr. Lee had made a fundamental point. He said, look, we cannot, there can be no taxation without representation. So that was one reason. The other reason and more important reason was the British objected. So the British put a stop to the confederation idea, a looser federation idea, because they were fearful that, you know, here they were defending Malaysia against Sukarno's confrontation. And there in the rear, the rear was disintegrating. That's how they put it. And so they objected and they maneuvered and they essentially convinced Tunku not to go ahead with it. So we came this close to one country, two systems before Hong Kong. So, well, but it doesn't mean that it was inevitable. The talks on Lusa Federation or Confederation, it was never clear which they wanted, went on from sometime around mid-December or end of December 64 to March 65. And then, of course, it failed. And political agitation resumed on both sides. What did Mr. Lee mean by make life intolerable? In other words, I bring to bear political pressure on you. You know, I am not going to be, you know, shunted aside and cornered and... kept imprisoned on this little island, right? You know, you want to create trouble for me, you want to turn this riot switch on and off, I will also organize up and down the peninsula. So the PAP branches expanded, they organized across Malaya, they were making forays into Sabah and Sarawak, though they did not actually establish branches there. And then they formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, which brought together all the multiracial parties, not all, but a sizable number of the multiracial parties, not only from Peninsula Malaya, but also Sabah and Sarawak in a coalition. The Malaysians had never dealt with somebody who was as skillful and as aggressive and as strategic in his political organization as Mr. Lee and the PAP. He didn't mean violence. No, no, no. I mean, it was, you know, you start this, I will organize here and I'll put political pressure on you, both in parliament as well as on the ground. And you could see the movement growing because the minorities in Malaya in particular, but also the minorities in Sabah and Sarawak suddenly saw hope. Here was a leadership that was articulate, that was very able, and that every time there was a debate in parliament, they clearly won the debates, as the British themselves noted. And it became, as Dr. Goh put it, life became intolerable for them. Reading the book, Mr. Lee was clearly not very popular with the Malaysians. Yes, he got along very well with the Tunku in the early days and it helped in negotiating merger. They all got along very well with Tun Ismail, who was the Malaysian Home Affairs Minister, but he did not get along well with the others in the Malaysian leadership. Fortunately, Tun Razak was more comfortable with Dr. Go because actually they knew each other from before from London. They organised the Malayan Forum together in London. It was a student organisation. And fortunately, he also got along very well with Mr E.W. Barker, who was our law minister at that time, and the person who drafted the separation agreement. They played hockey together. Right. So do you think the unhappiness was personal, actually? There was a personal element there. You can see, I think Dr. Goh, somebody mentions mentions that it got very personal. And in one stage, Razak said, you know, this Mrs. Lee is such a nice lady. I don't understand how she can be married to that man. So it got that personal, right? At least with some of them. Right. Where did the British figure in all this? The British were defending Malaysia against the Indonesians during confrontation. And so were the Australians and the New Zealanders. And therefore, they had a considerable influence. A good part of albatross actually consists of quotations of British and Australian declassified documents, diplomatic cables, reports, and so on from that era. They were heavily influential. As I said, because of the pressure Mr. Lee decided to bring to bear, first response it worked. The Tunku wanted a looser confederation. He was prepared not to have as much oversight over the state government as the merger agreements provided. The merger agreements only gave us autonomy in two areas, the labour and education. Everything else, you know, was run out of Kuala Lumpur. There were a few other things like broadcasting and so on that was left to the state government. But he was prepared to have a looser federation. That was his first response. Then I think the pressure became so intolerable. There was this famous speech that Mr. Lee gave in the Malaysian parliament, May 27th, 1965, when in the middle of the speech, he broke into Malay. And he spoke Malay very fluently. The gallery was filled with Malays from the kampung and so on. All of them were listening very intently. Here was somebody who was supposed to be a Chinese chauvinist, and he spoke better Malay than many UMNO leaders. Othman Wok, then Minister of Social Affairs, in his oral history in Albatross, remembers Saeed Jaffa Alba, who was the chief rebel rouser, you know, who organized and whipped up sentiments among Malays in Singapore and probably contributed, not probably, actually did contribute to the riots here in 1964. Jaffa Alba himself saying, I didn't know your prime minister spoke such good Malay. And the Tunku himself says in his own memoirs, Looking Back, which appeared many years later, 1977. But he wrote the first articles in 74, 75. He says, referring to that speech, that was the last straw that broke the camel's back. And he was furious, livid. Three days after that speech, the British High Commissioner, Lord Anthony Head, goes to see Tunku and says, worried, worried, because they had heard rumours that they were preparing a case for Mr. Lee's arrest, which we know, Mr. Lee knew about it and in fact they spoke about it publicly and Tunku confirmed that yes, they are preparing a case and it was, if not for the British intervention because even the Prime Minister Harold Wilson personally sent a message to the Tunku that if you were to arrest Mr. Lee we would have to reassess our relations and our defence of Malaysia So even the Tunku, a moderate, was sorely tempted to arrest Mr. Lee and may have gone ahead if the British had allowed him. So faced with this pressure, his first reaction, loser federation. That did not work because the British stopped him. Then pressure continued in parliament. Malaysian Solidarity Convention rallies up and down the peninsula. And he seriously considered arrest. That was prevented both because the British objected and you remember actually on July 10th, there was a by-election in Singapore. There was an opposition leader at that time by the name of Hong Yang Guan, who was a former PAP minister, in fact. There was a split. He left the party, formed his own opposition party and he won in Hong Lim. He was a sort of very popular figure in Hong Lim. he won it twice in a by-election in 61 and then again in 63. The by-election in 61, he won by 75%. The PAP candidate only got 25%. So suddenly he resigned at the end of June 1965 and there was a by-election. The PAP leaders at that time all assumed that this was arranged because the federal government wanted to test how much support Mr. Lee and the PAP had. Fortunately, they won against the Barisan Socialist candidate, 60%, 40%. If they had lost, then I think the faction in the Malaysian government that was agitating or pressing for Mr. Lee's arrest may well have got their way. So we came very, very close. So of the two options, either arrest Lee and rule Singapore directly or let Singapore go, the Tungku says, actually, he later admits as much, he decided to let Singapore go. When did Mr Lee sort of reconcile himself to separation? I think it took some years because actually, and the Albatross documents make it very clear, his oral history makes it very clear, that when he decided on this strategy, his first option was a loser federation. It was only if a loser federation failed, that separation was an option. So, as he says in his memoirs, and as explained in his own oral history here in 1981, he did not know that Dr. Goh had not pressed Tun Razak for a loser federation. He did not know until he read Dr. Goh's oral history in 1994, in preparation for his own memoirs, which the first volume appeared in 98. So he didn't know, and he was surprised. So Dr. Goh didn't debrief him? Dr. Goh later said that he did not pursue this option simply because he said it was clear the Malaysians wanted us out, which was at that time true because Tung Koo had decided by the end of June 65 to get rid of Singapore. As he put it, to cut off Singapore. He says, a gangrenous lake, you cut it off. Right. But among the Singapore leaders, there wasn't a consensus view. No. I don't know when Dr. Goh decided that separation was the better option. Sometime between March, I suppose, when the Confederation talks failed. Mr. Rajaratnam and Dr. Toh. Dr. Toh, Chin Chai and the rest of the cabinet did not know what was going on. The negotiations were kept to a very small circle. Mr. Eddie Barker, who was Minister for Law at that time, was directed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee, to begin drafting the separation agreement. Mr. Lim Kim San seems to have known. So the rest of the cabinet had no idea. So they were only informed on August 7th. Right. And some were very upset. They were very upset. Mr. Rajaratnam, Dr. To Chin Chai, Mr. Ong Pangun. These were the staunchest in favour of carrying on. And Dr To and Mr Rajaratnam only agreed after the Tunku wrote a personal letter to To Chin Chai saying that he was not strong enough to ensure peace if Singapore remained. So essentially he was saying there'd be bloodshed and I won't be able to prevent it. So Mr Lee said he would not sign if they won't agree but they would have to accept big responsibility if there was bloodshed. It was only because of Tunku's letter that they signed. Right. Could there have been a revolt among the PAP ranks? Well, they didn't. They all have very strong feelings, but they held together. Though, according to British documents, Mr. Lee did worry of a possible split in the party because it was the first item on the PAP manifesto when it was formed. But they held together, fortunately. I personally think that Dr. Toh and Mr. Rajaratnam and Mr. Ong Pangun probably agreed to sign out of loyalty to the movement and out of loyalty to Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee himself was completely torn. Right. Why did he cry? Because he was completely torn. He felt responsible for all the people who had been left behind. He had mobilized them. That was a strategy. The counter-offensive was I mobilized all these people. And so he felt responsible for all the people he had abandoned. And from the beginning, I mean, his first option was, in fact, a looser federation or even a confederation, but with Singapore remaining in Malaysia. So separation was option two, right? I mean, on the one hand, the counter-offensive was his. On the other, even up to August 7th, 1965, when he met the Tunku, after the agreement had already been agreed and settled between on the Singapore side, Dr. Goh, and Mr. Barker on the Malaysian side, Tun Razak, Tun Ismail, and a couple of other ministers. He asked Tunku, is there no way we can have a looser federation? Can we go back to what we were talking about earlier? And it was Tunku who said, no, it's over. In fact, the book contains an observation from Mrs. Lee on Mr. Lee. Yeah, Mrs. Lee says that the closest her husband came to a nervous breakdown was August 9th. And she doesn't say it once, she says it three times. He was distraught. Very, very distraught. So, I mean, it is because of the people he felt he had abandoned. So, Janadas, the common narrative is that Singapore was kicked out by Malaysia. Well, yeah, that was the common narrative in large part because that's what Tunku said, right? straight sign, straight line, Singapore out. But then even then, it should have been obvious there were signatures on both sides. The entire Singapore cabinet signed the agreement, which means there would have been an agreement that would have, you know, it was a mutually agreed outcome. But, you know, now you go back and you cannot now say, oh, we didn't get kicked out, therefore we sought separation. Actually, it's not as simple as that. Unless the Tunku had agreed, separation would not have taken place. He was the key figure. Why was he put in a situation where he had to consider separation? Well, that was Mr. Lee's counter-offensive. The counter-offensive worked. So Tunku's first attempt at releasing himself from the pain was lose a federation. Didn't work. Then he was in London, got shingles. And he says in his memoirs, Looking back, 1977, he was in pain, tossing and turning, and he couldn't figure out, he couldn't decide whether the shingles or Mr. Li was causing him greater pain. And then he decided, because at that point, it was quite obvious that you couldn't have arrested Lee Kuan Yew. And there would have been a revolt if you had done that. The Hong Lim by-election was a clear signal that the Singaporeans were not going to, they won't react passively if you had done that. And in any case, the British one couldn't allow it. And therefore, separation. If he had not decided that, that Thun Razak would not have felt that he could consider the option that Dr. Goh offered. But if there had been anybody else other than Dr. Goh who had handled the negotiations, still separation may not have occurred. And when you read the account of his negotiations, he took handwritten notes, very full handwritten notes of the negotiations. and you can read the full account in the oral history. If he had not handled the negotiations, we may not have achieved separation because he was masterly in the negotiations. He avoided all the controversial issues. He plumbed straight for separation. He refused to be baited into considering any other option. And every time Tun Razak wavered, he reminded him of all the pain that Mr. Lee and the BAP could cause if they remained in Malaysia. And I think that is how we achieved separation. So separation, number one, Tunku had not decided, it wouldn't have happened. Number two, Tunku was forced to decision because of the counter-offensive that Mr. Lee mounted. And number three, if Dr. Goh had not handled the negotiations, if there had been somebody else who was prepared to consider all these other options, it may not have happened. But my own conviction is, even if it had not been achieved on August 9th, 1965, separation would have come sooner or later because the contradictions between the two societies were such that there was no way you could resolve it. That's the reason why the Malayan Union failed. It was fundamental, right? And I think Tunku was right in one great respect and you have to give him credit for that. He says, look, tomorrow when we are two different countries, we'll get along better. What was Dr. Goh motivated by, you think? Dr. Goh, it's fascinating reading the oral histories. When you read, I found Mr. Lee's oral history in particular riveting. Riveting because actually he read like a novel because his emotions were incredibly complex. Even 17 years later, you could see that he was completely torn. He relived the thing. Then you read Dr. Goh's oral history. It's a completely different tone. He had come to a decision. He says the political cost was too great and the economic benefits negligible. So why are we remaining part of Malaysia? He came to the decision and he was decisive and he just didn't consider any other option. If it had considered some other option, I think the negotiations may have gone awry. But as I said just now, I don't think separation could have been postponed forever. It would have happened under far more cataclysmic circumstances, perhaps violently. But in the event, we achieve separation peacefully. Right. Did Mr. Lee regret separation? I think all of them, quite clearly, not only in the albatross documents or the oral histories, I think within a few years, all of them probably concluded that separation was the best thing that ever happened to Singapore. Right. Even Mr Rajaratnam. Including Mr Rajaratnam. Because Mr Rajaratnam in the oral history says we had to spend the rest of our political lives proving ourselves wrong. So, I mean, we were talking earlier, you had a sort of a personal view on this thing. Literally, you were in Malaysia. Because I remember my father refusing to accept separation. I mean, he wasn't in the cabinet, so he didn't have to sign. Unfortunately, as he puts it, he was elected. He was the sole candidate in the 1964 elections to be elected to the Malaysian parliament. They contested nine, only won one. And so when separation came, he was the only PAP MP representing a constituency in Malaya. And he refused to come back. And the albatross documents will make plain because, you know, there was long an assumption that he was asked to remain behind in Malaysia by Mr. Lee and therefore, you know, form the DAP. The PAP in Malaysia became the DAP. Actually, it wasn't. It wasn't? It was his decision. It wasn't Mr. Lee. It wasn't anybody in the PAP. He just refused to come back. And he resigned as a NTVC Secretary General. And it took many years for Mr. Lee to convince him, at least three years to convince him. Number one, because he wanted him back for the trade unions here. And number two, he said, look, so long as you remain there, our relations between Singapore and Malaysia would remain bedeviled. Right. Because they know that you're close to us. You know, they will think that, you know, we are still directing politics or involving ourselves in your politics in a foreign country. But that was his decision. And I was thinking about it the other day. He actually, among the senior leaders of that time, the political PAP leaders at that time, he probably spent the most time in Malaya. He was born there. So were many of the others. But he spent a considerable portion of his childhood there. He only came to Singapore maybe when he was seven or eight, eight or nine or something like that for school. And then everything without when there is no school, it was there. And then most significantly during the war, he spent it there, not here in Singapore. and then got mixed up with the Malayan peoples and the Japanese army and so on in the underground. And so I think emotionally he was much more tied up with events in Malaya. So in 65, 66, he was Malaysian. He became a Malaysian, yes. He only became a citizen in 1969 when he was, how old? 1969, he would have been 46. When he returned to Singapore. 46, he became a citizen in 46. Right, when he was in Malaysia after separation, you were in Singapore? The family was in Singapore. The irony was, my mother was a Member of Parliament in Singapore. So I had one parent who was a Member of Parliament in Singapore and another parent who was a Member of Parliament in another country. And what were you? I mean, you're Singaporean. You've always been Singaporean. Yeah, we've always been Singaporean. He was the only one who wasn't for a period. Was his life ever in danger when he was in prison? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Actually, he was friendly with good relations to Tunis Ma. And actually, Tunis Ma helped ensure that he was safe. But Mr. Lee was very, very worried that he would be assassinated. Someone would somehow find himself with a crisp behind his back one day. Yeah. So what did separation mean for your father? How does he reconcile? As he says in the oral history, his oral history, he was deeply hurt by separation. He accepted that Mr. Lee intellectually felt that separation was necessary. But he was in greater sympathy with Dr. Tho, Mr. Rajaratnam and Mr. Ong Pangun in how they felt. And he just continued to campaign. And as he says, it took him a while to realise that this vision they had was impossible. Like Humpty Dumpty just fell off the wall. You couldn't put Humpty Dumpty back together. Yeah. But I think he probably felt that to his dying day that Malaya was very much a part of his identity. And for yourself, do you ever feel that? No, I don't feel that. But I understand that generation. I mean, I understand it's impossible for Singaporeans today to understand this. I mean, why did Mr. Lee Kuan you cry? It's obvious that we should be separated. It is inconceivable for Singaporeans today to understand why a whole generation, we call them our founding fathers. Well, your founding fathers never thought that Singapore should be independent until we realised that merger couldn't work and we became independent. When Mr Lee in 1965 was 42 years old, he became a Singaporean at the age of 42. Do you think Singaporeans like today underestimate how fragile a country is? Yeah, you just look, consider, go back, unwind. September 1963, the PAP Malay candidates beat UMNO Malay candidates in the three Malay majority constituencies. July 1964 was only 10 months away. Within 10 months, the whole thing unraveled and you had riots. And then again in September, we never had riots between Malays and Chinese in Singapore at that time, right? We had riots in our history. Well, the most deadly riot before the 64 riots was the riots between Teochews and Hokkeians in, I think, early 20th century. So it was so easy to unravel. And I think that was the experience of Malaysia which led Singapore's founding generation to become so obsessive about interracial relations. Almost the first thing they did after independence was the creation of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. And then later you had all the other laws, you know, MRHA and EIP and all the rest. What was it like for you working on this book? I think it is a very important book to both read and experience. You see your leaders, your founding leaders, as you would probably not see them in any other format, be driven by emotions. What made Singapore was not pure logic. It was passion. And the story is a very complex, very moving and very dramatic story, very human story, right? It wasn't the case that, you know, between 1954, whenever the PAP was formed, and now you had a straight line, an obvious path. Our history could have taken many turns. We could have had one country, two systems, as I said. Even after the last minute, separation need not have occurred. They were sorely tempted to arrest the Singapore leadership and perhaps rule Singapore directly. And if they could have got away with it, they probably would have tried that. We avoided that fate. How do we avoid that fate? Well, if the British weren't here restraining the Malaysian leadership of that time, perhaps they would have taken this cause. So there was absolutely nothing about that history that was predictable. could have gone different directions at any, so many different points, right? So you cannot assume that this is an inevitable trajectory, that our path will be ever upwards into brighter and sunlit uplands. It's not that. And don't assume that the kind of harmony you have will always be there. We are in a far better shape than we were before. The younger generation of Singaporeans of all races feel much more Singaporean. and actually to an extent that I would have been surprised by if you told me 50 years ago or 60 years ago. But don't forget, all it took was 10 months between September 1963 and July 64. That's all. So Janadas, thank you very much for this very, very interesting discussion. To our audience, the Albatross File Insight Separation is now out at bookstores and stbooks.sg. So please pick up a copy. And this has been Asian Insider. I'm Sumiko Tan see you again send your feedback to podcast at sph.com.sg find us on Apple Podcasts Spotify or within our Straits Times app thanks for listening