S2E54: Why the US dollar is so sticky Asian Insider · 18 Dec 2025 Source: https://omny.fm/shows/asian-insider-1/why-the-us-dollar-is-so-sticky Transcript: https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/asian-insider/s2e54-why-the-us-dollar-is-so-sticky-2bce1f/ (via OpenNash Podcasts, machine-generated) This is a podcast by The Straits Times. Hello and welcome to The Asian Insider. I'm your host, Bhagyashree Garekar, and we're recording this episode on Monday, the 15th of December, 2025. Our guest today is Dr. Mary Bridges. She's a fellow in history and policy at the Harvard University's International Security Program. She's also the author of an interesting book, Dollars and Dominion, U.S. Bankers and the Making of a Superpower. Our conversation today will look at the connections between finance, infrastructure, foreign relations and history, which are the core areas of Dr. Bridges' work. Welcome to the show, Dr. Mary Bridges. Thank you, Bhagyashree. It's wonderful to be here. Appreciate the invitation. Thank you. Well, your book is very interesting. You explain how the U.S. dollar came to be the king of currencies. And, you know, it is the world's primary reserve currency, the most widely used currency for trade and for international transactions. But you say that it was not at all inevitable that the U.S. dollar would come to dominate, you know, the global financial system. Could you explain why you say that? Sure. So my book takes a kind of a different entry point to understanding dollar dominance. I think often when I read about it in the media, it sounds like this one chunky thing, dollar dominance, like a switch that gets turned on and off in Washington. And what I look at in my book is a much messier set of institutions and relationships and And how that process and that configuration got built to enable the dollars to basically flow from the United States to other places. And so I look at this moment of great power competition, basically, in the early 19th century, in the early 20th century, when the United States is looking at Britain with a great deal of envy, in fact, to kind of with an eagerness really to change its status in the world. And this is a moment when the British Empire is kind of in decline. But that doesn't really tell us enough to say, you know, the sterling's in decline, so automatically the world needs a new currency, ergo rise of the dollar. And what I look at is the way that private banks become this middle layer to operate on the ground in different places and build relationships with traders and kind of establish the whole network of protocols and staffing and offices such that as the United States really becomes the world's major financial player after World War I, there is that kind of scaffolding such that those trades, those transactions can't actually play out on the ground. So I think we could have a macroeconomic argument about whether or not the dollar would inevitably replace sterling or become the world's largest currency at other points in the 20th century. And my point is less to kind of quibble about those kind of macroeconomic pieces and instead to understand exactly how that process plays out. And, you know, as a historian, that means looking at, you know, weird staffing decisions and, you know, briefcases full of money and a whole lot of really contingent practices that make this dollar universe that comes to define the 20th century in a lot of respects. Okay. Briefcases full of money definitely caught my attention. But, you know, in your study of how the U.S. banks, like you say, went global and the activities at their overseas branches, what surprised you the most when you were looking at their activities in Asia in particular? And I have to ask, of course, whether you came across anything interesting about Singapore during your research? Sure. So I didn't really expect, I think, to say at the outset, Singapore is not explicitly a case study. And really, my interest in the book is this very much to understand kind of U.S. infrastructure. And so that's definitely the approach. But I was really very much caught by surprise how foundational an Asian orientation was to the early activities of U.S. banks overseas. From other historians, I had read about the Caribbean as really a place where U.S. empire and U.S. banking kind of defined a lot of its early practices. And so my focus was on the nation's first broadly multinational bank, which is this very ragtag operation called the International Banking Corporation. And a lot of its early activities were, in fact, in China's treaty ports. So one of its first contracts is with the U.S. government to collect the U.S. portion of the Boxer Rebellion indemnity payment in China. And so it's really it's taking silver and, you know, crediting U.S. accounts. And so IBC opens a lot of branches in Asia. And this is in the moment, like really turn of the century on the heels of this well-known foreign policy memo in the United States called the Open Door Note, where the United States is really trying to elbow its way into a strong trade standing in Asia. And there's a huge interest from U.S., you know, this kind of Gilded Age wealth in the United States to finance railroads in China. It's such a big geographic expanse. And the U.S. entrepreneurs feel like they get that world of railroad finance. And so IBC is part of the outgrowth of these big names of U.S. railroad finance, Huntington, Hyde, Gould, you know, big Vanderbilt, Guggenheim, like a lot of really big U.S. 19th century wealth. And they're basically it's sort of like a special purpose vehicle to create a mishmash of funding to do things in Asia. So that's the sort of executive level story, the DC level, the kind of corporate story. And what's really interesting is on the ground, I wanted to really understand what that power looks like, what that banking looks like, what are people doing? And on the ground, it is a complete British copycat story. There is really no such thing as a U.S. international banker at this moment. And so IBC, in order to – it's got to staff its offices. So it basically hires anyone with British banking experience. So some State Department officials, basically U.S. consular offices, notice that IBC is hiring the castoffs of banks like HSBC, what became HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank. So they're not exactly, you know, poaching the cream of the crop of British banking, but instead hiring anyone who has exposure and kind of experience in this world. And in the process are creating this sort of mashup of banking practices down to the very handwriting. So I have this moment in the book where this early cohort of U.S. hires gets sent to London. And one of the first things they have to do is practice British penmanship. Because if you can't fill out a ledger and have other people read it, you can't be a banker around the turn of the century. And so the one guy who gets sent to Hong Kong actually goes alone because the rest of his cohort hasn't mastered penmanship fast enough. Penmanship? You mean actually filling out? Because obviously they'd be all hand-filled. Hand-written ledgers. And it's just the script in it, you know, these archival books. You open these big leather-bound ledgers and there's just this beautiful scrawl. And it's not an accident. That is the technology of banking of the day is this very specific penmanship. And, you know, that's just one of the very basic practices that's really foundational to U.S. banks. So if I may, like what starts as this British copycat project, you can also see evolve really quickly in Asia. So if the mode in like the 1905 is to do as the British, by the 1920s, these U.S. banks overseas are really working on some different things. This is a moment when the United States has kind of changed its global power after World War I, moved into space that Britain had occupied in a lot of places. And U.S. banks in New York, for example, are really experimenting in mass marketing and what they call thrift campaigns. So U.S. bankers are going out to try to enlist small-time savers, and the branches start picking up on these practices. So all of a sudden, what was a very posh British enterprise, U.S. bankers start going out to markets in India and, you know, recruiting pearl divers and retail clerks in the Philippines. And so this banking project kind of shifts gears over the course of a couple of decades to really diversify what it's doing and to kind of change its orientation in a lot of ways. Right. So, of course, in Singapore now, it's, I guess, the world of high finance. And Singapore, of course, is your, you know, you probably, did you visit Singapore in the course of your research? No, I would love to write another book that does that. Well, you're welcome. And Singapore, of course, figures very much in the world of finance and banking. So I'm sure there's lots of good stuff to uncover there. But now I guess we're in another, of course, your book looks at a very important turning point in U.S. banking history and eventually how U.S. comes to become a global financial superpower. But now, of course, it would seem that we are in another turning point because, of course, in Asia, we do use the U.S.-based finance systems. We use the payment systems. But, you know, just as you said, you know, it was the British pound practices that the U.S. banks were trying to use as a copycat model. You now have other countries which are looking to push their own currencies and reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar. So, for instance, commodity trade, oil and stuff, you're seeing that being denominated by currencies other than the dollar. Foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury brands is going down. And then you have cross-border trade settlement, which is now happening in the Chinese yuan. It's happening in Indian rupees. Countries are cutting down on forex reserves, which are in U.S. dollars. Most central banks are buying gold. China definitely is prominently, I guess, challenging the U.S. dollar. You also have Russia, you have Latin America, you have India, you have EU, almost all of them trying to diversify a bit from the U.S. dollar. I wanted to ask you, what strikes you about such efforts and how realistic is that threat to the U.S. dollar? I guess the biggest thing that's striking to me is how I'm just shocked that my story of, like, I spent most of the pandemic buried in ledgers from Philippines bank records from 1903. I was, you know, it was a very, very arcane topic. And it really blows my mind in some ways that these set of kind of these themes and these questions that were foundational to a moment of building U.S. superpowerdom in the early 1900s are again relevant. You know, these questions of dollar dominance and kind of currency power and monetary power, these are huge, longstanding political questions that become really major issues in times of great power competition. And that's what we saw in the early 1900s. And a lot of those themes are back today. So all of a sudden, questions of, you know, what are the foundational practices of a central bank? What does central banking independence mean? You know, what are the kind of the inputs? What are the credit practices? What is that? What's the architecture? Like those questions, you know, we spent much of the, you know, early 2000s, late 19, you know, late 20th century, not those questions weren't, you know, really in the mix in the same way that they are right now. And I think so the biggest thing to me is that that the kind of relevance of a lot of these questions again. So one thing that comes to the fore to me is the Belt and Road Initiative, for example. This is not – dollar dominance is not just a practice of a central bank or a single set of technologies. It's a whole – it's a stack, basically. It's a whole financial and technological stack and set of practices. And so when China is operating on a very explicit campaign of infrastructure statecraft, basically, of using large-scale construction activities to power its foreign influence, what I see are some real strong kind of resonances with the practices of the United States in the early 1900s in terms of railroad building and kind of this desire for technology. influence and attempts to ingratiate itself with businesses through on-the-ground practices. And with that, you know, whoever is dredging a port or paving a highway has a lot of clout in terms of determining the financial practices and the borrowing and, you know, the sort of banking relationships that get layered on top of that. And also, it's not just one-time construction. It's also a whole kind of set of maintaining relationships and, you know, supply chains and all of that kind of thing. So when I see these questions about dollar dominance, as a historian, what comes to the fore to me is to also think about what's embedded and what are the questions that enable that kind of that staying power and those institutions to take hold. So, you know, efforts like China's alternative to SWIFT, for example, an attempt to build an RMB-based system to move other currencies and to allow traders to use systems other than the dollar to settle transactions. You know, that seems really like a very different kind of financial moment. At the same time, from my perspective, it's not just having the technological connectivity. It's the layers of institutions and trust and kind of practices that give those payment rails, for example, meaning and staying power. And that's what we saw really make the rise of the dollar a resilient and robust set of not just about using one money. It's a set of practices and a set of relationships. So that's kind of the part as a historian that really comes to the fore from what I see in the early 1900s to today's debates. Right. So I guess in a way a deja vu for you. But would you be willing to bet that there will be a day when the U.S. dollar is not supreme? And how much would you bet? And which currency you think could be a candidate to replace the U.S. dollar? So it seems to me that what we're seeing right now is definitely a more diversified, more multipolar system. I am absolutely fascinated by stablecoins and the rise of stablecoins and this sort of friction or kind of paradoxical power of stablecoins. And so I would be very nervous to make huge amounts of money as bets. Other than to say, like stablecoins really expose what I think is so problematic or puzzling about dollar power right now is that in a lot of ways, it seems like stablecoins. So just to explain, stablecoins are a cryptocurrency, kind of, sort of seem like alternative to the dollar, but stablecoins are a cryptocurrency backed by largely U.S. dollars, although you could imagine a stablecoin for yen, for example, or for other currencies. But the bulk of stablecoins right now are anchored to the U.S. dollar. And so what's really interesting about stablecoins is that as traders adopt them, what ends up happening is that stablecoin issuers have to buy more treasuries, have to hold more dollars. So in some ways, the rise of stablecoins looks like a way to bolster the power of the U.S. dollar around the world. At the same time, it's a real different underlying architecture because of the way that it doesn't rely on these authorized regulated banks as the intermediaries. It's not the system that the Federal Reserve knows how to police or kind of regulate. So it really puts the Fed in very uncharted territory. So if the dollar continues and is anchored by this new set of intermediaries and technological connectivity, I see different power brokers basically rising to the fore. So that, to me, is probably where I do more of my betting, is the way in which a new infrastructural map creates new opportunities for companies, for players, for countries. For example, like Singapore, to play a role in a kind of different financial landscape. Right. So, of course, Singapore has pretty strict regulations around cryptocurrencies. currencies and and of course that's a field for I guess experimental regulation going on around the world even as the central banks try and push their own digital currencies and of course Fed and you would have probably remarked at how Fed seems to be a little more welcoming of crypto currencies as such but you don't see them replacing the dollar they will exist side by side? Is it something like that? Or am I? What I see for if we look at dollar dominance as an infrastructure story, infrastructures are sticky. It's really hard to just, you know, toggle off and take a different currency. Like there's a lot layered into that. And so I think any kind of transition is going to be a long process. And so what I see right now are people around the world, the United States is really, like, there are very different political messages around central banks and treasuries than we've seen in a while. And that uncertainty creates a lot of nervousness, and people are very interested in diversifying. But that's hard, and having the institutional relationships that enable that is very, very slow to build. So, yes, I do see some shift away from the dollar dominance that we know. I think it's very hard to say that another currency rivals the dollar in the way that we knew of dollar dominance. What seems more likely is that the whole infrastructure morphs. And I really don't know what that looks like, but I think we're living in the beginnings of that era. Right, exactly. President Trump, you know, we know him as a defender of the dollar. In fact, quite often in his press conference, which I follow regularly, there will be some point where he departs into the dollar. And in the past, he's kind of, you know, threatened to tariff countries which are attempting to de-dollarize. He said he'd put tariffs on them. And as such, actually, tariffs are a key component of his foreign policy. Do you think tariffs are, is there some linkage there? I mean, are tariffs actually spurring this de-dollarizing effort? So I think that there's a lot of short-term noise around what tariffs do and what effects they have economically. Fundamentally, money depends on trust. You have to trust in order to have any kind of credit relationship. And money is just a credit relationship. And if people stop trusting the dollar, I don't see the dollar occupying the same space that it used to. And to me, the changing kind of political messaging and the changes, potential changes in the way central democratic institutions operate in the United States raises a lot of real fundamental questions about who people trust. And so temporarily, yes, investors will flock to safe havens for assets, to store assets. So the demand for treasuries might increase. The dollar might become more robust seeming. At the same time, if it overlays a lack of trust, I think that it's inevitable that the relationships will change sooner rather than later. Okay, that's interesting. Reminds you, of course, of this idea that in, I guess, in U.S. dollars we trust. Yeah. Right, right. But also, if people don't have the same level of trust in the United States, what the dollar means becomes different, I think. And if I knew exactly what that looked like, I would probably be sitting on a Caribbean beach somewhere. I'll leave that to others. But I also think that's part of the thing of infrastructure. It unfolds. It's contingent. It depends a lot on who's sitting at the levers of power in the moment when there's a major reconfiguration or some kind of crisis or a moment of awakening when the whole system really proves itself open to change. Right. And have you had the opportunity to look at, I guess, in this area, the infrastructure building by, say, China? Do you have any insights or opinion on how they're going about building up, you know, I guess the muscling up their community? Yeah, it's such a – I'm fascinated by the Belt and Road Initiative. I'm not – I don't – and I guess to me, you know, I see the creation of the U.S. dollar as really being an infrastructure play. And so the Belt and Road Initiative to me looks like some very savvy, you know, political strategy to become a foreign policy and to become a foreign policy, you know, mega player in a very long term way. What I think is easy to forget about these big dollar or big financial amount investments is, you know, you build – for the most part, a contractor doesn't just build a port or a country doesn't just, you know, build a highway. You also become involved in a whole set of maintaining and operating relationships long term. So contractors go, you know, families sometimes stay. All of a sudden, this highway needs this particular type of asphalt or a particular type of crane at a terminal. And the relationships of suppliers and kind of knock-on effects is really deep. And so, to me, the Belt and Road Initiative really opens those questions about generational layers of influence and access and financial ties. So I've been hugely interested in it, and I think it's a real puzzle for ongoing questions of how the United States responds to that. Because in this moment, you know, if you want to build a road quickly, U.S. contractors are not the companies that you hire. And so how the United States responds to that, those types of activities and that manifestation of foreign power overseas, I think, is a real open question. It's a real challenging strategy question from the United States' perspective. True. And I have to say that we haven't seen the Trump administration kind of talking about that much. I think Mr. Biden did probably a little more in that area. And where the Trump administration is going, you know, forging ahead, I guess, is in the AI-related infrastructure building or trying to maybe sell its AI in Asia, certainly. And that's an example of a different way that maybe the United States is seizing on an industry, a set of innovations and practices that convey more of a strategic advantage for the United States. So in some ways that could be seen as a really savvy counterpoint to other strategies of construction and kind of engineering prowess that might define a more traditional infrastructure playbook. But, yeah, it is interesting because under the Biden administration was much more, there was a kind of a bigger portfolio of infrastructural considerations than what we've seen, at least recently. Right. So I guess much for you definitely to observe and think about. And I hope we can catch up again at another time to discuss more how things evolve. But on that note, I guess we can wrap up this session. Thank you so much for spending time with us, Dr. Bridges. Thanks so much for having me. This is Asian Insider and I'm Bhagyashree Garekar. This episode was produced and edited by Amirul Karim. Thank you for listening. Send your feedback to podcast at sph.com.sg. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify or within our Straits Times app. Thanks for listening. Thank you.