Berkshire Hathaway began as a textile company that Warren Buffett bought in 1965, and the textile business failed.
“It started off as a textile company, which Mr. Buffett bought in 1965. The textile company failed.”

29 Jun 2022 · 1h 14m · Chris Bloomstran, Patrick O'Shaughnessy · 23 quoted facts
Chris Bloomstran argues that Berkshire Hathaway's edge came less from picking stocks than from where its capital came from. Its insurance float (premiums collected before claims are paid) was invested in stocks, backed by underwriting discipline and a very large capital cushion. Rivals that tried to copy the model lacked that discipline and that cushion.
The central tension is between a one-time historical fluke and an enduring machine. Bloomstran says the mix of cheap stocks, early start and discipline cannot be repeated. Yet he thinks Berkshire is now a diversified, low-debt, tax-efficient compounder that becomes more predictable as it adds railroad, utility and manufacturing earnings. The open question is leadership succession and the board's role.
Berkshire invested insurance float in common stocks, while typical insurers hold mostly bonds. Bloomstran says it can do this because it holds about 40% of industry surplus while writing about 7% of premium.
Premium volume can fall 30 to 50% in bad pricing years without layoffs. Competitors such as Swiss Re and Munich Re keep writing and must repeatedly raise capital after bad years.
Using richly valued Berkshire stock to buy General Re tripled float and cut the stock portfolio from 115% to 69% of book value, with no capital gains tax. That freed cash for later purchases such as MidAmerican Energy.
Bloomstran says Berkshire retains profits and reinvests at 10 to 12%, while buying back shares at an 8.3% earnings yield. Few public companies have places to reinvest like that and instead overpay for acquisitions.
Inside Berkshire, Alleghany's insurers can keep more of their premium instead of passing it to other reinsurers, and can invest far more in stocks. Bloomstran estimates this adds roughly $600 million of investment earnings.
Float is money an insurer has collected in premiums but not yet paid out in claims. Bloomstran says Berkshire gets to invest about $150 billion of it, much of it in stocks, which gave it a big advantage over insurers that hold mostly bonds.
Bloomstran calls Berkshire's success a fluke of timing. It started 50-plus years ago when stocks were cheap and insurance was a smaller industry, and it paired that with underwriting discipline that copycats lacked.
Insurance is now under half of the business. Bloomstran estimates about $50 billion in annual earnings, with the railroad around $7 billion, energy about $4 billion, and manufacturing, service and retail about $11 billion.
Berkshire is paying $11.6 billion for about $9 billion of equity, around seven times earnings, per Bloomstran. Inside Berkshire, Alleghany can keep more of its own premium and hold far more stocks instead of bonds.
Bloomstran says the main risk is replacing the capital allocator, first with Greg Abel and later with his successor. He says the board must protect the culture and keep activist investors from forcing Berkshire to stop retaining profits.
Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.
Berkshire Hathaway began as a textile company that Warren Buffett bought in 1965, and the textile business failed.
“It started off as a textile company, which Mr. Buffett bought in 1965. The textile company failed.”
Berkshire's first big pivot was buying National Indemnity, a small Omaha insurer, in 1967.
“And his big first pivot was buying National Indemnity, small insurance company in Omaha, 1967.”
Buffett wound down his investment partnership in the late 1960s, stopped taking new deposits and returned the money in 1969.
“essentially having gotten out of the stock market in the late 1960s by stopping the inbounding of new client deposits in his partnership, and eventually in 1969, giving all that money back.”
Bloomstran says GEICO writes about $40 billion of Berkshire's roughly $70 billion of premium and needs only about $15 billion of statutory surplus.
“In GEICO's case, which writes $40 billion out of Berkshire's combined $70 billion, let's call it, of premium, it only needs about $15 billion of surplus.”
Berkshire Hathaway Specialty was seeded a few years before this episode with a group that came from AIG.
“They've got a specialty business, BH Primary, with a series of subsidiaries, Berkshire Hathaway Specialty, which they seeded a handful of years ago with a group that came out of AIG”
Bloomstran says the global reinsurance industry has about $650 billion of surplus, of which Berkshire holds about 40% while writing about 7% of premium.
“The whole industry has $650 billion in statutory surplus. Berkshire has 40 % of the surplus and they write 7 % of the premium volume.”
Bloomstran says Berkshire's insurance operations pay about $40 billion of cash losses a year.
“The whole entirety of the insurance operation pays cash losses every year of about $40 billion.”
Berkshire's float rose from about $7 billion to $22 billion with the General Re acquisition, which also brought a large bond portfolio.
“They went from $7 to $22 billion in float, but they also picked up an enormous amount of fixed income assets”
Berkshire bought the Burlington Northern Santa Fe railroad in 2009 for roughly $35 billion, which Bloomstran considers a bargain.
“They bought things like the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad in the wake of the financial crisis in 2009 and stole it, a business that they paid $35 or so billion for in its entirety”
Bloomstran says Berkshire has about $110 billion of debt, with about $75 billion in the railroad and utilities.
“Combined, you've got on the order of $110 billion in debt. 75 or so of that is in the railroad and the utility.”
Bloomstran says Berkshire's directors receive a $2,000 annual retainer, and committee chairs earn about $6,000.
“The board of directors paid $2 ,000 a year for a retainer. And if you chair a committee, you make six grand.”
Bloomstran says Berkshire overpaid for Precision Castparts and has written it down by $10 billion.
“they overpaid for a business that was already in trouble. They've written that asset down by $10 billion.”
Bloomstran says Berkshire repurchased over $60 billion of its own stock in the previous three to four years.
“Recently, here in the last three, four years, buying back over $60 billion.”
BNSF spent about twice its depreciation on capital expenditures during Berkshire's first decade of ownership, according to Bloomstran.
“The railroad was spending $2 in CapEx for every dollar in depreciation for the first 10 years that Berkshire owned it”
BNSF's route network has stayed at about 32,000 miles even as the infrastructure was upgraded.
“But the route network hasn't changed from 32 ,000 miles at all, but they've improved the network.”
Bloomstran says Buffett invested about $36 billion in Apple after deciding it was a consumer products company rather than a tech company.
“But when he was able to get $36 billion invested in Apple, he pointed out, I realized this really isn't a tech company anymore.”
During the financial crisis, Buffett removed Joe Brandon as head of General Re after government pressure over a retroactive reinsurance deal with AIG.
“And so Mr. Buffett let Joe Brandon go, sacrificed him as the head of Jen Reed.”
Bloomstran says Berkshire agreed to pay $11.6 billion for Alleghany, which had about $9 billion of equity and a $22 billion investment portfolio.
“Berkshire is paying $11.6 billion for $9 billion in equity. And again, but this big, big investment portfolio of $22 billion”
Bloomstran says Berkshire lent money at an interest rate in the 30s percent to Williams to keep it out of bankruptcy, and received the Kern River Pipeline.
“Berkshire made what some would call a usury loan to Williams to keep them out of bankruptcy of 30 something percent.”
Bloomstran says Berkshire's utilities have closed 16 or 17 coal plants and plan to close about 16 more by 2030.
“They've closed 16 or 17 of their coal-fired plants. They're in the process between now and 2030 of closing another 16.”
Bloomstran says the number of US refineries fell from over 250 to 127.
“We've taken the number from 250 something down to 127 refiners.”
Bloomstran began following Berkshire in 1996, when the company issued Class B shares.
“I started following the company in 1996 when they issued the B shares.”
CNBC maintains an archive of Berkshire annual meeting Q&A sessions, running about six and a half hours each year, going back to 1994.
“CNBC has this wonderful archive of the six and a half hours of Q &A that takes place every year at the annual meeting back to 1994.”
Defines insurance float and traces Berkshire's pivot from failing textiles to insurance, which let it invest in stocks.
“is simply a net liability reflecting premiums that an insurance company has taken in”
Explains how Berkshire's huge surplus lets it skip bad business while rivals keep writing it and must recapitalize.
“Berkshire has 40 % of the surplus and they write 7 %”
Shows how paying with overvalued stock tripled float and de-risked the portfolio, funding MidAmerican and BNSF.
“stock to buy general reinsurance, which effectively allowed them to acquire triple their float”
Breaks earnings into underwriting, investments and operating businesses, concluding the investment portfolio matters most.
“it's the investment portfolio that drives the bus”
Argues Berkshire's record was a fluke of timing and discipline that cannot be repeated.
“a fluke of the alignment of discipline and intelligent capital allocation”
Shows how Berkshire's capital lets an acquired insurer keep premium and invest more in stocks.
“can retain all of that premium volume they write, which makes it more profitable”
Covers Berkshire's regulated utilities, pipelines and Occidental investment, and the logic of buying scarcity.
“Berkshire has more renewable production when you take the collection of their three utilities”
Surveys railroad, energy, manufacturing and insurance as predictable earners, with the board's role as the key issue.
“the role of that board of directors is going to be increasingly important”
Bloomstran says Berkshire's lasting lesson is treating stakeholders fairly and running conservatively for shareholders.
“Berkshire goes out of its way to take care of its customers”
This is Business Breakdowns. Business Breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business. For each business, we explore its history, its business model, its competitive advantages, and what makes it tick. We believe every business has lessons and secrets that investors and operators can learn from. and we are here to bring them to you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns, check out joincolossus.com. All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions.
Hosts and podcast guests may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Today's business needs little introduction. Berkshire Hathaway is one of the largest businesses in the world and run by arguably the most famous investors of our time, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. To break down the business, I'm joined by Chris Bloomstran. Chris is the president and CIO of Semper Augustus and has gone as deep on Berkshire as anyone I've ever encountered, making him the perfect person to do this with.
Given the reams of excellent content already out there about Buffett and Berkshire, we focused our conversation on the specific elements that make the business so special. Please enjoy this breakdown of Berkshire Hathaway. So Chris, we are going to try to tackle one of everyone's favorite topics with a variety of little case studies rather than tell the whole history of Berkshire or try to describe it in its entirety, which so many great books and podcasts and other things have done in the past.
We'll try to focus on some very specific aspects of what make Berkshire so special and try to pull investing lessons out of the many activities of this fascinating company and set of investors, Buffett most specifically. And I thought an interesting place to start would be float. People talk about float a lot as it relates to Berkshire. It requires that we talk about insurance. It requires that we talk about the team behind all this and how it relates to the investing side of the business or the ownership side of the business.
Maybe you can begin by just describing what Berkshire has taught the world about float and why it is so interesting and versatile.
Flow, as you know, and I'm sure most of your listeners know, is simply a net liability reflecting premiums that an insurance company has taken in in advance of paying losses. And so you get the use of the capital for some period of time. Some lines of insurance are very short tail, like auto. Some lines, like workers' comp, are very long tail. And so you better underwrite intelligently up front because your losses can develop. In any event, Berkshire's got $150 billion afloat.
You're starting with a funny question because they've taught the world. The world clearly understands that Berkshire is Berkshire because of the insurance operation. It started off as a textile company, which Mr. Buffett bought in 1965. The textile company failed. Three of the first big businesses that Berkshire bought and used their stock for, the initial acquisition of the textiles, but diversified retail and blue chip stamps essentially all went to zero. So Mr. Buffett has this unique ability to pivot.
And his big first pivot was buying National Indemnity, small insurance company in Omaha, 1967. And with that insurance operation, the ability to incrementally invest portions of that float in common stocks over time, essentially having gotten out of the stock market in the late 1960s by stopping the inbounding of new client deposits in his partnership, and eventually in 1969, giving all that money back. But he had this insurance operation that was able to, throughout the 1970s, the high inflationary 70s, was able to pick off some outstanding stocks.
Washington Post, Gillette bought a number of things that worked out really, really well. And for that, throughout the 70s and through the 80s, really until the very peak in Berkshire's multiple to book and the stock portfolio in the late 90s, 1998, Berkshire ran effectively a levered operation, if you will, by having more invested assets in the insurance operation than Berkshire itself had in book value. So you had about 10 % to 15 % leverage in the portfolio.
And for that, Berkshire by 1998 had clipped along at a 28 % or 29 % return. Even if you net the leverage out that you got from having the insurance operation and the float in it, the stock picking was just superb, several percentage points ahead of the S &P 500 over decades. But you did have that leverage that you got from the ability to have float. And so So you've had all these copycats in the last 10, 15 years who have said, well, gosh, Berkshire's done so well having this insurance operation.
Berkshire itself is a great way to have permanent capital. If you've got an insurance company, you've effectively got captive permanent capital. What the world realizes is insurance. Berkshire's in the property casualty world, largely property casualty, insurance, and reinsurance. But even if you get into the life side of the insurance world, it's a terrible business. It is a horrible business. The aggregate of insurance underwriters, no better than break even over time. The average, the median, will lose money over time on an underwriting basis.
It was through Berkshire's discipline and also through generally successful operating. But ultimately, it was Berkshire's ability to walk away from business, insurance business, premiums, when it was badly priced, when it didn't make sense. You'd be hard-pressed to find many or any insurers that have that discipline. And what's evolved is Berkshire has an enormous insurance operation, biggest in the world, but by far the best in the world. They have effectively three subgroups of insurance entities, GEICO that everybody knows that writes about $40 billion in premium.
They've got a specialty business, BH Primary, with a series of subsidiaries, Berkshire Hathaway Specialty, which they seeded a handful of years ago with a group that came out of AIG, all of their workman's comp, business lines of insurance, a lot of excess and surplus lines. That group writes about $13 billion. And then you've got the reinsurance operation, the original national indemnity, and then general reinsurance, which Berkshire bought in 1998. And that group writes about $20 billion in premium.
The world is lost on the notion that you can't offset mediocre or a bad industry with investments until you have massive surplus capital that allows you to invest in common stocks. And Berkshire is the only insurance company in the world. And by that, digging a little into the numbers and the weeds, then I've talked about this before and it was in my letter that I've put it in my letter a couple of times. But if you think about how much capital is required to write business, which gives you the float to invest, start with the auto insurance business.
It's very simple, very understandable. It's a very brutal, tough business. In auto, which is admitted, which means the state insurance commissions bless you. You have to apply for the rate at which you can charge your customers. You have to be admitted into the state to write. You have to be approved by the insurance commissions. In private passenger auto, you can write $3 of premium volume for every dollar of statutory surplus, which is effectively book value for an insurance company.
In GEICO's case, which writes $40 billion out of Berkshire's combined $70 billion, let's call it, of premium, it only needs about $15 billion of surplus. I assign them 20 and assume they write it two to one. I've got another insurance company in my portfolio that writes two to one that has a whole bunch of surplus capital, but they're very, very conservative. And you can weather any kind of downturns in the insurance world where losses are developing quickly and inflation is high.
The good thing about auto is it reprices very quickly. It's six-month policies, 12-month policies. If you've got high inflation now, used car prices have been very high. You go back to your insurance commissioner and file for a rate increase. In any event, assign $20 billion of capital of surplus to the auto business, and then take that Berkshire Hathaway primary group, the specialty businesses. They write about $13 billion. You would give them about a buck in capital, but I'd go ahead and give them $20.
So that's $40 billion of surplus that's assigned. Berkshire in its entirety has almost $300 billion in insurance book value, in statutory surplus. The reinsurance operation has $260 billion of that. They write $20 billion in premium. The rest of the reinsurance industry globally, all the big guys, the biggest ones, Munich Re, I believe, just passed Swiss Re for the title of largest premium volume. Well, that's not really a title you ever want to have. Because again, if you're in a market where you're not getting adequate premium, you're losing.
So you've got the big Swiss Re, Munich Re, Manchester Re that write more premium volume than Berkshire. But that group collectively writes about a dollar in premium for every dollar in capital. Swiss Re writes more, Munich Re writes a little bit less. Manchester probably writes 50 cents on the dollar. The entirety of the insurance, reinsurance industry globally, writes about $300 billion in premium. So Berkshire writes, I said $20 billion. So that's 7 % of industry premium.
The whole industry has $650 billion in statutory surplus. Berkshire has 40 % of the surplus and they write 7 % of the premium volume. And you'll see at times when they know business is not adequately priced. It can be wind. It can be any kind of big cats. Berkshire is content to sit there, not lay off their workforce when they shrink down. We'll see premium volumes drop by 30, 40, 50%. And that's not the case. The Europeans, the Swiss, and the Munich Rees have never seen a premium they did not like.
And for that, because every cycle, when you have a big series of wind events, or you have a pandemic, you have losses develop badly for high inflation, those guys are always having to recapitalize. They're always having to go back and raise new equity capital. They blow themselves up when you have a really bad year. Well, Berkshire with that massive capital balance, never going to blow itself up. The whole entirety of the insurance operation pays cash losses every year of about $40 billion.
You're never going to impair the balance sheet. And for that, Berkshire has what's now a $320 billion stock portfolio. It's down about 20 % this year as of today, But they've got the majority of their $500 billion, let's call it, $450 billion of insurance reserves, investment assets, sitting underneath $150 billion in float, invested in common stocks. Swiss Re, Munich Re have 4%, 5%, even really well-run U.S. insurers, Alleghany, which Berkshire is buying. They've got a $22, $23 billion investment portfolio, only $3.5 billion at year end, as Weston Hicks had it invested, is invested in common stocks.
Markel, 30, 35%. Nobody has the majority of the capital, and that's the advantage. But so all of these cats come into the business and think, what a great way to get permanent capital. They come into an industry where it's really hard, if not impossible, to go get market share and make money, and they're all trying to grow and get bigger to get that float, but it blows up in their faces, and it just doesn't work. And I'm not sure anybody could do it today.
Berkshire did it in a simpler time, in a time when the insurance industry was much smaller. And they did it at a time where you had a series of years and even decades where common stocks were generally cheap. But because Berkshire is an entirety, it's an entity. The insurance operation and the businesses outside of insurance, there's always money coming in the door, which is shrinking the current assets in the portfolio. And they've always got money to spend.
And for that, and for the underwriting discipline that Berkshire exhibits that none of the others do, they've got this massive float that sits under a much more massive investment portfolio. And the ability to earn a common stock return on a portfolio versus the rest of the industry that's diminished to having to only earn a bond market return is night and day. You look at compounding at a three to four to five to 6 % premium compound annual return on an investment portfolio over decades.
And you're talking about just exponential differential in terms of the ability to grow your balance sheet and develop a fortress.
Nobody else has the Fort Knox balance sheet. There's so many interesting points there, maybe most central of which is how unique this story is. So before coming back to the specifics around insurance and Berkshire specifically, if we're writing Berkshire's history, let's say 50 years from now, for the period that Buffett was alive, let's say, and we were doing some sort of attribution exercise to say, okay, we've got 100 points to attribute here to sources of the reason for success for Berkshire's compounding success.
How many of those 100 points do you think get allocated to this part of the story, to the creation of this unique float and insurance story inside of Berkshire, not so much relative to others, which I'll come back to in a second, but is this one of the major explanatory reasons or is it even the most dominant explanatory reason that you think the history books will write when doing that 100-point attribution? It truly is. Is it 50 points?
Is it 70 points? Is it 30 points? Have fun with me.
In the late 90s, when Berkshire bought Genry, Berkshire was trading at almost three times book value. Today, it's trading at 130 % a book. It was only worth half of where it was trading, but they had been rewarded for that 29 % growth in book value per share for 30 plus years. The stock portfolio itself in the late 90s was massively overvalued. Coca-Cola, which was 40 % of the portfolio, Berkshire had made 13X on Coke in a decade.
It was trading at 50 times earnings. So Mr. Buffett knew he had this high class problem. So he used Berkshire stock to buy general reinsurance, which effectively allowed them to acquire triple their float. They went from $7 to $22 billion in float, but they also picked up an enormous amount of fixed income assets sitting on top of Genry's $6 billion premium book. By not paying capital gains taxes to shrink an equity portfolio, Berkshire actually buys another insurance company using its stock as currency, trading at 200 cents on the dollar a fair value, effectively paid $22 billion when Berkshire itself was only worth $11, and was able to take the stock portfolio from 115 % of book value.
And that's where that float was. The stock portfolio was about $37 billion. And they shrunk it down to 69 % of book value on the closing of the Genry deal. Genry brought 45 % of the combined assets to the merger, and it was an entirely a stock-based merger. Jen Reed got 18 % of the total shares outstanding. So Mr. Buffett knew that the float was not going to be a great thing at that point because it was trapped inside of an overvalued stock portfolio.
And so the genius of then diversifying the bonds allowed them to go the following year and buy MidAmerican Energy, which has now grown via acquisition, but largely through retained profit. You've got a collection of utilities and energy distribution assets that don't pay dividends to Berkshire. They don't upstream their dividends. They reinvest all of that money in capital. So that's going to wind up being the second biggest business. They bought things like the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad in the wake of the financial crisis in 2009 and stole it, a business that they paid $35 or so billion for in its entirety that's now worth $120, $130 billion.
All profits there have been upstream to the parent. So Berkshire has diversified slowly and surely away from insurance being the cog, the key inside of the business to where it's now less than 50 % of the business. 10 years out, 15 years out. If you think about where Berkshire's profitability comes from, and if you want to break down and get into the derivation of profits from the big moving parts, from the energy business and the railroad, we can do that from their manufacturing service group.
As I go through all the math, I get to about $50 billion in Berkshire annual profits. And I make a lot of adjustments to accounting to get to that number. But I think it's a very conservative number. If you take the insurance operation, and this gets back to where Berkshire can be more conservative with their underwriting because they've got this giant float balance, but they don't need it. Berkshire does not need to grow the premium volume, particularly in environments where it doesn't make sense.
Because if you're writing $70 billion, I presume they make about a 5 % pre-tax margin on that underwriting. So that's $3.5 billion. net after tax would be about $2.93 billion. The investment portfolio, because it highly tilts toward common stocks and not fixed income. You've got this $320 billion stock portfolio, what's now $22 billion in bonds. They bought about $5 billion in bonds in the first quarter. And you've got cash that got whittled down from $90 billion to $55 billion or so, because they bought Chevron when they bought the number of things in the first quarter, with net spent about $40 billion in common stocks.
You have this portfolio that when I think about where returns from the investments come from, from that common stock portfolio, I always presume that Berkshire is going to make the earnings yield. And I think those that follow the business understand the concept of what Mr. Buffett's called for years, look through earnings. And that's essentially Berkshire is going to get dividends. So on what's now a $320 billion stock portfolio, dividend yield, because the stocks are now down this year, is up from one and a half to 1.7%.
So your dividends are now $5.5 billion. But on the balance of that $320 ,000, you've got a portfolio that's traded down this year from over 19 times earnings to 15.5. And so collectively, between dividends and what I call the retained earnings that Apple keeps and reinvests, that Coca-Cola keeps and reinvests, you've got a total of $21 billion now of investments. But that presumes a 6.2 % or 6.3 % earnings yield. If you think the stock portfolio will earn more than that over time, and that's been about the average earnings yield on the stock market, on Berkshire stock portfolio over a lot of years, kind of a high teams, multiple to earnings, the six, seven, seven
and a half percent earnings yield. The stock portfolio has done 10. The stock market's done more than that. So if the stocks inside of Berkshire's insurance operation, and that's where 95 % of the stocks are, but if the portfolio does more than the earnings yield, which it has consistently over time, over longer periods of time, there's another $10, $15 billion in earnings that I don't capture in the 50. So even though Berkshire's intentionally not tried to grow the insurance book only in places where it makes sense, Geico's the second largest auto insurer in the country.
They're running neck and neck with Progressive. They're both going to pass State Farm sometime here in the next couple, three years. You just don't have to get a lot bigger. And so for that, you weigh 3 billion net profit from underwriting against at least $21 billion, maybe as much as 30, $35 billion, depending on how the stock portfolio does over time. And it's the investment portfolio that drives the bus. So when you look at where Berkshire's returns have come from over time.
They have largely, largely, largely, especially before they bought the energy operation and the railroad, it was really an insurance operation, less so today. But now you've got these other diversified, very predictable earnings streams of earnings coming into the business. So if I guess 10 years out, I would guess, depending on how the stock market does and how Berkshire stock portfolio performs, I don't think the insurance operation is going to shrink much. And the ability to invest float intelligently and not blow it up every time we have a bad period for underwriting, which everybody else tends to do, will allow Berkshire to compound and clip along at 10 plus percent returns on equity.
You break in the differential between earning 5 % or 6 % earnings yield and earning more on a stock portfolio return over time, and you can get the ROE up to 12%. Berkshire's total return on their stock is going going to match the return on equity of the underlying business. And it's a net unlevered equity on top of that. So they run the thing extremely conservatively. Where debt exists in the operation, it's largely in the railroad.
It's largely in the utility operations. Combined, you've got on the order of $110 billion in debt. 75 or so of that is in the railroad and the utility. That's not hypothecated to the parent. That's not Berkshire's obligation. But you've got a business where the right side of Berkshire's balance sheet, you've got $400 billion in change of shareholders' equity, call it $420 ,000, $430 ,000, depending on where stocks are on any given day. You've got $110 billion in debt, which bears interest at maybe 3%.
But that net float balance of $150 billion, the underwriting profits of the insurance business earning $3.5 billion pre $3 billion net completely offsets the interest. So you've got the right side of this giant conglomerate balance sheet with more than $900 billion in assets that on the right side have no net layout for expense. And that's just crazy. That's the flywheel that's going to persist, whether Mr. Buffett's at the tiller or Greg is running it or whomever is running it.
Very hard to blow this thing up. So it seems like you didn't put a point total to it, but it's a high number. And is it even fair to say that the average impression of the lessons to take from Buffett's life and career and letters is what stuff to buy, what criteria to use to buy stuff when maybe the real story is where to get the capital to buy that stuff with? Do you think that that's the fundamental misunderstanding of the key lesson of Berkshire?
I think it's really
well put. It is. Don't blow yourself up. When you buy assets, understand what you own. You look at the common stock investments, these things are not cute. You're not trying to find some Romanian pharmaceutical company that's got a couple of phase two trials where you might get something. You've got very known, predictable earning power that you're not going to expose the company to impairment. But it's this notion that by retaining profit in a place where you can retain it and invest it well over time, I think that's a huge advantage to Berkshire that most companies don't enjoy.
Very few public companies genuinely have the opportunity set to retain profit and have places to put the money. So what they do is they acquire badly, overpay. If the average CEO is on the job for four or five years, you've got a high motivation to get the stock price up. You've got a high motivation to have a higher, larger top line because executive comp is often driven on the size of the company. We had the big tax code change, for example, back at the end of 2017, and we lowered the marginal tax rate from 35 % to 21%.
We had all of these incentives in place to use accelerated depreciation where a business could spend CapEx and immediately write it off for tax purposes in year one. Eventually, you're going to pay the tax over time, but down the road, you've got a time value of money. You didn't see a lick of increase in CapEx. You've not seen a lick of increase in R &D because these businesses don't, in aggregate, find the businesses that can do this, but find the places that can retain profit intelligently at high returns on capital.
I look at Berkshire. If you've got $50 billion in economic earning power today on a business that now has a market cap of $600 billion, let's call it, and trading at 12 times earnings. On $50 billion, you're trading at $600. You're trading at 12. You've got an 8.3 % earnings yield. To me, the best way to explain Berkshire and the advantage of it is it's a bond where as an acquirer of Berkshire, as a shareholder buying shares today at an 8.3 % earnings yield, when Berkshire's buying stock back at today's price, they're buying it at 8.3%.
But the entirety of their profits that are retained after taxes are paid by Berkshire are being reinvested at 10 % to 12%. That's still the hurdle rate. That's own the 30-year bond. I did some math on the 30-year. I think I identified the worst performing bond in the history of the United States, government bond. They issued a 2 % in 2020 on 2-15-20. And it traded up as interest rates dropped during the pandemic to 120.
That thing's now in the low 70s. It's lost 40 % of its price. And so you bought that thing at the peak. You bought it at 120. You're making two coupon. You're going to lose 20 points to maturity. You're going to mature at par, but you're investing at two. But every time you get your coupon payments, semi-annual coupons, 1 % every six months, if you're going back into the bond market, you're buying whatever the current yields are.
So if interest rates average 2 % or 3 % or 4%, you're starting off at 2 % and you're buying at 2 % and 3%. In Berkshire's case, you're buying it at 8.3. They're reinvesting it at 10 to 12. And they have a durable set of places to go invest the money and not blow it up. And nobody does that. Nobody does that. There's just such a need to spend the media and these boo birds that watch Berkshire and lament over this enormous cash balance.
Why can't they spend it? Why can't they spend it? They'll spend it on their time and they'll lay it out on very attractive terms. And they're not going to put it in places that are going to blow it up. There's no incentive for the management of the company to get bigger without getting bigger on a profitable basis. Management makes $100 ,000 salaries. They have never given a single stock option or restricted share, not only to Mr.
Buffett and Mr. Munger, but to anybody. The board of directors paid $2 ,000 a year for a retainer. And if you chair a committee, you make six grand. There's no DNO insurance policy. I mean, you don't go to Berkshire's board to get rich. You go there to preserve the culture of a place that you've laid out a bunch of your own money to own the stock. Every one of the directors on Berkshire's board has big time investments in shares of Berkshire that they all paid for themselves.
And so you've got this culture that allows management to be intelligent and rational with capital. And frankly, when you make mistakes, and they've made plenty of mistakes over the years, precision cash parts being the most obvious front and center one, they overpaid for a business that was already in trouble. They've written that asset down by $10 billion. But the mistakes that are made over time because you're not distributing dividends to shareholders and this capital base continues to grow and it's growing in these very predictable, earnings streams, the mistakes become smaller and smaller.
They become rounding errors. A lot of people lament, you don't get any information on C's candy anymore, which is a great business, but it doesn't matter. They're the big levers of where the economic durable profitability comes from. And those are not in places that are at risk to disruption that are just generally not at risk. And so this thing will continue to march ahead. It'll drive forward like an aircraft carrier. Well, it'll turn very slowly, but it's about as indestructible of a business as you're going to find in scale.
And they're handicapped by large numbers. These are huge numbers we're talking about. It's the biggest company in the world by tangible assets, by fixed assets. Again, $900 billion plus. Look under the hood at the sources of earning power, which originally came from that float, which in part still come to the float. But now it's that float that's allowed them to diversify into these other very predictable, regulated, big businesses. And it's just going to wind up being a bigger business.
It's not going to deviate much from
the path that it's on. I think about it sometimes as the business or the story that launched a million holdcos. There's a siren song of, oh, I want to run a holdco and have some permanent capital and be a stock picker. And I think what history teaches us is there actually are a lot of really good stock pickers. There's plenty of people you can point to and say, they've out compounded the S &P, they've done whatever, done it concentrated, done it with great businesses, etc.
But there's basically no other stories like this one. I guess my question is, understanding how unique the float and insurance story is inside Berkshire and the importance of the discipline of the investment and how bad the insurance competitors are. And therefore, that creates the initial separation and then that separation compounds over time. It's an incredibly compelling story. It still strikes me as odd that we have a universe of stock pickers who are good, but we don't have a universe of hold codes where good stock picking inside of them would lead to a great outcome.
Any other thoughts on why that is the case, why that is the record, that disparity?
I think it's a fluke of time. It's a fluke of the alignment of discipline and intelligent capital allocation that nobody else had. Just this odd structure that even Mr. Buffett has said, if he could redo it, he would not have done this thing inside of a holding company. Wouldn't have bought the textile company. Could have done a lot better as a stock picker outside of this platform. The advantage is they did it 50 years ago, 55 years ago, and you can't do it again today.
Those that try just fall flat on their faces. Markell is a very good business. Alleghany was a very good business. but they're only in the early innings of being able to do this. And you just don't have the wild disparities in terms of the ability to pick stocks as cheaply as they were. You go back to 1982, the overall stock market traded at seven or eight times earnings on a 3 % profit margin. They were trading at 20, 25 % of sales.
You're 10x that today. The fluke of having float, underwriting discipline that nobody else exhibited. Berkshires had really bad underwriting periods where they bled underwriting losses, but there was always enough surplus capital because of the way they did it in the first 10 and 15 and 20 years that it never put the business at harm. They've never had to go to the capital markets ever and raise new equity capital. The only time Berkshires used its share is in acquisition and generally when it's expensive.
The only times they've bought back the stock in the late 1960s and portion of the 1970s. Recently, here in the last three, four years, buying back over $60 billion. They've only bought it back when it's trading at a material discount to intrinsic value. Very few have been able to do that. Singleton did it at Teradine to a degree, but they didn't have the culture and the durability of some of the businesses, some of the defense businesses that they own suffered.
You really didn't have the instinct and the know-how to when you lay capital out, you're buying things that are just durable within the stock portfolio and the wholly owned companies. And it doesn't mean they're all great inside of their manufacturing service retail group. You have a lot of businesses that don't have the ability to retain capital. And the premise had generally been when Mr. Buffett bought a Dexter or International Dairy Queen or NetJets or Executive Jet, any of those businesses, they would generally upstream their profits to the holding company for redeployment elsewhere.
Again, the railroad has never retained a dollar of capital because it really didn't have use for much more than adding in very low-cost debt capital would allow them to do. The railroad was spending $2 in CapEx for every dollar in depreciation for the first 10 years that Berkshire owned it because they had a lot of places to improve the infrastructure of that business. They've done that. They've blown out the tunnels. They've created corridors going into urban areas where you had three wide track.
Now you've got six and 12 wide. You've got the ability to run intermodal and containers stacked on your entire network. But the route network hasn't changed from 32 ,000 miles at all, but they've improved the network. But a lot of that's already run its course. And so now all of a sudden, the cadence of capex there has dropped from two times depreciation to one and a half. And in the railroad, for all kinds of reasons, maintenance capex is more than depreciation charges.
So you're really almost in a state of stasis now there. But again, with the energy operation that retains all $4 billion that Berkshire makes and the way utilities are capitalized, you generally have about as much debt in the capital structure as you do equity. So when they retain four, they add another four in debt. At very low cost terms, you're not paying dividends to shareholders. And they really do have a very long runway to spend what I'd call growth CapEx there.
So it's this knowledge at the headquarters of where money can get reinvested intelligently and where it can't. And maybe even to a fault, some of those businesses that were bought and reside inside that manufacturing service retail group, it's almost easy if you're 70 years old and you sell your business to Berkshire for all the reasons that you want a home for your people and your business. You don't want it to be disrupted. And that was very true for a long time.
But I think it was just very easy to send money to Omaha and not lean on this notion that if you're not growing, you're dying. I think it was too easy to send the profits and not look for intelligent places to make bolt-on acquisitions and to grow or to spend CapEx to grow the top line. It's all about the return on capital and the return on the price that was paid for the business. And if it's generating good, healthy profits, we'll send them all to Omaha.
My guess is with Greg Abel now involved and running effectively all of the businesses, overseeing, he's not running them, but he's overseeing all of the businesses that are not insurance. He's really rolled up his sleeves and gotten involved in the businesses. And a lot of the folks that I've talked to in the Berkshire world, rave about his comprehension of economics of their businesses. And my guess is, I think they're going to find places with which to lay out more of that capital that comes in.
It seems like so much of this idea of durability is the reinvestment capacity of the business. And I'm curious what you think Berkshire's lens and your own lens developed in your investing career is on that word durability. I guess that the answer was simple, everyone would just buy the durable businesses. So it's obviously by definition hard, but what do you think are the signposts of durability in a business that Berkshire respects or has come to respect?
And maybe that you've come to respect as you evaluate companies that were durable in the reinvestment capacity just seems like in addition to the float story that we talked about, those seem to be two pillars of success that are unavoidable in any way you tell the Berkshire story. So maybe just say a little bit more about evaluating for durability ahead of purchase. and monitoring that as you own?
A great example of that would be for decades, you heard Mr. Buffett say, we don't invest in tech because I don't understand it. And he genuinely was correct. I mean, he knows where his circle of competence is, understands the ravages of disruption. You're on the bleeding edge of technology. Probably didn't own Microsoft because he got too close to Bill Gates who sat on the board for a long time. tried IBM, thought that was the server business was predictable, burned his hand a little bit on the hot stove.
But when he was able to get $36 billion invested in Apple, he pointed out, I realized this really isn't a tech company anymore. It's really a consumer products company that has a moat because once you're in the Apple architecture and you've got your phone and your iPad and your notebook, your desktop, you're not leaving the architecture. It's just you're too wed to it. And so I think he realized, good Lord, not only is this a very predictable growing business, a non-tech, non-disruptible earning stream, it's not going to be a BlackBerry, but I can get it at 12 to earnings.
So it's also the discipline to only buy things when they're
very, very, very cheap. If you think about a recent example of what typifies Berkshire's process. Is Alleghany maybe a good, you've mentioned that name a few times now, a good case study to understand one, how the process works, how an asset might be evaluated, but then also two, how certain assets might be better inside of an ecosystem like what Berkshire has
built. Do you think that that's a useful case study? That's a great case study. The last thing Berkshire needs is to go layer on a bunch of new insurance premium. Again, they write what they They write it intelligently. They write $70 billion. Alleghany, between their collection of three insurance companies, Transree, which writes about five. You've got RSUI, which is a gem of a wholesale specialty underwriter, earns 15 points underwriting margin consistently over time. They've just been a phenomenal business.
A little thing called Cap Specialty, which writes specialty business for small and mid-sized businesses. But combined, they write about $7 billion. So Berkshire is going to wind up growing their insurance premium by seven. You think about how insurance companies outside of Berkshire work. If Swiss Re and Munich Re can write as aggressively premium volume relative to their surplus, you have to lay off a lot of business in the reinsurance world. You have to go to the retrocessional markets.
Berkshire has underwritten big insurance policies, Berkshire's reinsurance operation for Swiss Re and Munich Re. They have underwritten some reinsurance for Transree. By being owned inside of Berkshire, that collection of three insurers will not need to go to at all or as aggressively to the retrocessional market. Because of Berkshire's Fortress balance sheet, they can retain all of that premium volume they write, which makes it more profitable. When Berkshire bought Genry in 98, Genry had a history of about a 1 % underwriting loss over time, but they had to shed so much of the business that they wrote because they only had so much capital.
Inside of Berkshire, they've been able to retain all of that business and Gennari became immediately and durably more profitable being inside of the business. Alleghany operated with about $2.5 billion that operates since the deal's not closed yet, should be a fourth quarter this year deal. Operates with about $2.5 billion of net debt. Again, we talked about where the debt exists in Berkshire's operation, the portion on the right side of the balance sheet that's not in the railroad and utility.
It's none of it's in the insurance operations. Some of that debt sits at the holding company, but the insurance companies are run with zero debt on the balance sheet. So Berkshire will eliminate that $2.5 billion and they'll run it unlevered. I've gotten to know Weston Hicks, who just retired as Alleghany's CEO really well. He's become a very good friend of mine. And he was just a great CEO. For those that aren't familiar with Alleghany or Weston, his CEO letters to the shareholders from the last 15, 16, 17 years are absolutely worth reads if you're learning about insurance, learning how to invest.
If you like humor, Weston's were just great. But Alleghany was building a, I hate the term, but many Berkshire. Markell is doing the same thing. And so as they started developing surplus capital, as RSUI in particular was so profitable, but as TransRe was riding well, they were able to divert some capital to wholly owned businesses. Berkshire is famous for not only having the common stock portfolio, but all of these businesses that are wholly owned as operating subsidiaries inside of the conglomerate.
And so they had taken about $1.3 billion in capital and bought a series of private businesses that collectively have been good businesses. They were paying some guys, a couple of guys, finders fees, if you will, commissions that for the first few years would mask the profitability of one of those deals that they did. But that group here at year end was doing 11 points, 12 points on equity, generally unlevered. But Weston would lament having to now compete against private equity and all of this money that's sloshing around and even to compete against Markell and deals.
The control premiums required to buy a business in the last couple, three years have been so high that it's not worth doing it. Inside of Berkshire, there's no need for that function to exist. The capital exists at the holding company level. There's no need to grow the Alleghany capital book of private businesses. And that's an advantage. You think about the type of reinsurance operation that TransRe is, about three quarters, let's say of their businesses proportional or quota share, where you share a portion of, you pro-rata share the premium, but you also pro-rata share the losses as they develop with whoever's ceding the policy to you.
You can cap that, they can be uncapped. But in that world, about three quarters of the business, like I say, was proportional. And we've had a series of really bad years for losses, a lot of wind and a lot of fire. And then you had the pandemic where you had losses for the COVID. They were getting so much price, 20 % price on property that in proportional insurance, you tend to not see the profitability for 12 months, 18 months.
And so Mr. Buffett understands that that profitability is going to a near now for Berkshire's shareholders. And the price paid was very low for it. The huge advantage is this point about float and surplus capital, which Berkshire has that Alleghany did not have to the same extent. again, on a 22, $23 billion investment portfolio, that's probably now 20 because interest rates have risen and the bonds are down. Western only had $3.5 billion invested in stocks that you're at.
So small percentage of the total of 22 or 23. Berkshire over time will flip that and they'll have $16, $17, $18 billion of the reserves of the $13 billion in float. They'll have more than the flow invested in common stocks. And you think about the difference of earning a high single digit return on common stocks, again, versus a bond portfolio earning four on that size of operation, that'll add $600 million of investment earnings to Berkshire's benefit that Alleghany could not realize because of the limitations on owning common stocks, given the size of their operation.
That's huge. And then the real intangible is going to wind up being, I believe, A gentleman named Joe Brandon had run Genry following Tad Montrose. Joe's a really good insurance executive. He's phenomenal. I've gotten to know him a little bit, not near the degree that I know Weston. But back in the financial crisis, AIG and National Indemnity did a retroactive deal policy, a big insurance policy. When AIG got in trouble, the government insisted that this was not a legitimate investment insurance transaction.
It was really effectively a loan. They insinuated there was not a conveyance of risk. Well, the government put a lot of pressure on Berkshire. AIG really was in trouble. They got massively recapitalized, of course. The government took them into receivership. And so Mr. Buffett let Joe Brandon go, sacrificed him as the head of Jen Reed. Weston intelligently picked up Joe later to help run the collective insurance operation. Ultimately, Joe was absolutely vindicated. It was demonstrated there was conveyance of risk.
It really was a retroactive policy of asbestos losses that would develop over time. And so they've patched up the relationship, obviously, and I know they were meeting in 2019 to do a deal. Transree was doing a deal with Berkshire. And I think you talk about succession. We all know Greg Abel is going to run the operations of Berkshire and he'll be the CEO. Ajit Jain, for those that know Berkshire, obviously everybody knows Ajit. Mr. Buffett goes on and on about Berkshire wouldn't be Berkshire without his skill as an underwriter and his brain.
I think Joe ultimately at the point, if Ajit were to slow down or retire, I think he becomes a very, very good succession plan. And I think that was probably top of mind when the transaction was done, but Berkshire is paying $11.6 billion for $9 billion in equity. And again, but this big, big investment portfolio of $22 billion that you would do all the math on all the benefits of Alleghany being run inside of Berkshire versus not.
And Berkshire is paying seven times earnings thereabouts for the business. And it'll be a better business inside of Berkshire, even though in the grand scheme of $11 billion transaction, it's a rounding error for a business that's worth $900 plus billion and has book value of over $400. But the additive premium volume, profitably developing inside Berkshire is good for the company. And again, it gives them another $17, $18, $19, $20 billion to dedicate to the common stock portfolio, that just perpetuating
flywheel. If we think about energy and the role that it plays in Berkshire's whole story, especially today, I think it's a really fascinating story that I'd love you to pick apart for us. and especially because my impression of energy as a business is that it's very hard and maybe even very bad. In some ways, generally, like you said, insurance is very bad, especially in oil and gas. For example, you're a price taker, there's crazy swings, there's tons of cyclicality, there's tons of washouts, constant bankruptcies.
It's been a brutal cycle for energy businesses until very recently. Tell me what you've learned about energy vis-a -vis Berkshire, what kinds of energy businesses can be good, why Berkshire has assets in this space. Yeah, give us a crash course on the role that energy and energy assets play
today. Well, it's a big role and a growing role inside Berkshire. So Berkshire bought MidAmerican Energy again, right after the Gen Re deal. That was their first electric utility. They've since bought two big others, Nevada Power and Pacific Corp. So they've got a big footprint in the Midwest and in the West. Again, with the retention of all profits, which is totally different than the way an electric utility operates. Most publicly traded utilities distribute the majority of their profits to shareholders as dividends.
They're income animals. They were widows and orphans stocks because they're regulated utilities. Most electric utilities operate with a monopoly in their regions or in their states. They're highly regulated by their states. They're regulated by FERC. And so you're allowed to earn as an electric a return from your rate base on your equity capital. Kind of depending on where interest rates are in today's world, electrics are allowed to earn high single-digit returns on equity capital spend.
You think about it, the utility exists if it's a monopoly and it's highly regulated. They exist for public good. If we have a growing population and we need more power, We need more megawatts of power. Nobody's going to build in a commodity world unless they're assured of getting a reasonable return on any money spent. And so for that, they're benefited with things like the use of accelerated depreciation on the front end, where you get an immediate tax benefit for money laid out.
If you're going to spend three or four or $5 billion on a plant, a nuclear plant, you've got to get a return on it. And some regulators are kind of funky about these things as we've been transitioning to renewables. We're going to wind up with some stranded assets. But in Berkshire's world, on the power production side, between these three utilities, they have been making massive, massive investments in wind and solar and the grid that's necessary to distribute these geographically disparate, non-constant sources of power.
Huge investments, $18 billion in the middle of building the grid out for what they've spent so far, and it's an investment in wind of almost $35 billion. Berkshire has more renewable production when you take the collection of their three utilities than any other utility in the United States. They have half of their power production now coming from wind, solar, the hydro that exists in the Northwest with Pacific Corp, and big runways to spend continuous money. A lot of the wind will likely have run its course in part by 2024.
But then the solar production in the Southwest, where the sun shines a lot, you have a lot of desert and uninhabited land, solar is going to be a bigger footprint. Berkshire has taken a very clean, carbon-friendly approach to power. They've closed 16 or 17 of their coal-fired plants. They're in the process between now and 2030 of closing another 16. They'll have 14 left that They'll have finally closed by 2040. And so the size and the scope of the operation with $40 billion in equity capital earning 10 plus on equity capital, they've got a beautiful collection of assets.
They've got, again, a bunch of pipelines they've picked up. They bought a pipeline from Williams, Williams Companies, the big pipeline business distribution company got in big trouble before the financial crisis. Berkshire made what some would call a usury loan to Williams to keep them out of bankruptcy of 30 something percent. I think it was 37% loan. And oh, by the way, we'll take your Kern River Pipeline, which is probably the best pipeline in the country.
They bought several assets from Dominion a couple of years ago, spent $8 billion on a series of pipelines on the East Coast and running through the middle of the country, picked up an LNG distribution terminal. Some of these are in joint ventures. But on the power side and the distribution of natural gas side, a wonderful collection of assets. And then in the energy world, you have recent investments in companies like Chevron and Oxy. Anadarko was in the process of being acquired by Chevron.
Oxy entered a bidding war and came in and topped the offer. Chevron wound up getting a breakup fee, but to finance the deal, Oxy needed some cash. So Vicky Hollub, B of A kind of said, you ought to go talk to Mr. Buffett and he may be interested in doing a deal with you. Berkshire wound up investing $10 billion in a preferred, provided the liquidity that Oxy needed to do that deal, perhaps overpaid for the deal, perhaps not, but preferred you're sitting above the equity class and they got a 8 % premium on $10 billion or 8 % coupon on $10 billion.
So $200 million quarterly distributions. And this is going to be an example of the ability to change your mind. If you think at 91 years old, I know a lot of inflexible investors that get stuck on a mindset and they do things their way and they don't acknowledge when they've made mistakes. It's hard for them to go think outside the box and find new things. Well, I'm not sure post-pandemic that Berkshire had a lot of interest in having a big exposure in oil and gas.
To your point, on the oil and gas side of the energy world, terrible industry, historically, cyclical to all get out, classic capital cycle. You make a bunch of money, all these wildcatters come in, everybody spends money from 2012, 13, 14. Exxon and Chevron were spending on the order of $40 billion. And they overbuilt productive capacity, they were over drilling, and you created way too much equipment, service equipment, and you just had this orgy of spending. And all of a sudden, things blew up post-2015.
Oil traded below 100. And you eviscerated assets, you eviscerated capital, a lot of bankruptcies. And in the wake of that, Chevron and Exxon have ruled up a lot of independent power producers. Again, the Anadarko deal that Oxy got. You've now got a lot of concentration of land and assets in places like the Permian Basin and a much more rational approach to oil and gas. And so we have created some scarcities. Semper bought a couple of refiners in October of 2020.
Refining is very cyclical. It's a spread business. You take a barrel of crude oil, unrefined crude, run it through your refiners, and you create everything that comes out of the stack from kerosene to gasoline to all of your distillates. So diesel and jet fuel, all of your feedstocks that wind up in petrochemicals, so polyethylene, all the way down to things like asphalt and lubricants and waxes. We have been taking, we being the West, Europe has been closing refining capacity for 30 years.
In the United States, we've closed refining capacity. We've taken the number from 250 something down to 127 refiners. But in the United States, unlike Europe, as our population was growing, we were adding to refining capacity. So even though we were closing the net number of refineries. The current ones were adding capacity. They were adding stacks and crackers, what have you, until about four years ago. And the world has gone down the path of green. There's a lot of people that believe that we're just going to do without oil and natural gas.
Well, that's an impossibility. We may have more electric vehicles, but you're not going to do away with jet fuel. You're not going to do away with asphalt. You're not going to do away with plastics. You're not going to do away with almost everything that comes out of the stack. Globally, we've closed probably 3 million barrels of refining capacity net since prior to the pandemic, since 2019. And if the world does 100 million barrels of supply demand, closing three of refining capacity, now you wonder why gasoline prices are high.
You wonder why we have a lot of high prices. So I think Berkshire's realized that we have scarcities in a lot of places. And you cannot on a dime, build another refinery, you can't take the ones that are closed. And California has just closed three of them in the last two years, where they're front and center in creating the problems that we have. You're just not going to bring this stuff on anytime soon. So things are very, very tight.
This is not a Putin inflation that we've got. This is a scarcity of assets. You've also got a rationality of production, Because when you have elected officials in Europe and the United States pointing a finger at the oil and gas industry and saying, we are going to put you out of business, you might have an aversion to spending money on growth CapEx. And so we have a very real scarcity here. And I think Mr. Buffett got that.
So again, watching a guy change his mind, when Berkshire got the initial $200 million quarterly dividends from Occidental, Oxy had the option to pay those dividends in common stock or to pay those dividends in cash. Well, they were in the process of not knowing how low oil prices were going to go. They had taken on a lot of debt on the balance sheet to finance the Anadarko deal. And so they were a little bit handicapped in terms of flexibility on capital allocation.
And so it made more sense to distribute shares, $200 million quarterly shares to Berkshire. Berkshire sold those shares in the teens, in the 20s. And here we are a year and a half, two years later, and Berkshire makes a big common stock investment in Occidental in the high 50s per share. When they did the preferred, the $10 billion preferred at 8%, they also got a bunch of warrants to buy the stock at $58 or $59, 80-something million shares.
But here you are now adding to that position in the common. I think that goes to this belief now that even though you've got what are classically pretty bad industries, when you find places like scarcity, it's also the flexibility to lay money out, albeit perhaps not for a long-term permanent hold, and make some money. Now, some have asked whether Berkshire might buy all of Occidental, And I don't think they would, with one caveat. Oxy is developing a huge carbon capture operation.
Carbon capture done by all the big majors. We own Equinor, which is the old Statoil in Norway. We do own ExxonMobil. So when you have a field that you are depleting, now you've got effectively this giant hole in the ground. You can take carbon from things like the manufacture of cement, capture the carbon, inject it into the well and effectively create these solidified carbon reserves and take the carbon out of what would otherwise be going into the atmosphere.
It's kind of genius. It's very expensive technology, but we're doing it for tax reasons. Berkshire's investments in wind and solar are very highly tax subsidized. Their tax rate is a negative 40%. The benefits from that spending are a social good. We've determined that wind and solar are social good, just like building a coal-fired plant back in the day, building a natural gas-fired plant. These things exist for the public good. And for that, we have public policy that rewards companies that are willing to lay out the capital.
Berkshire is benefiting. If Oxy can do on the scale that they're talking a massive carbon capture operation, it will be highly tax subsidized. And if you follow the history of Berkshire, you'll find that a lot of the investments that they've made over the years come with a twist of being very tax beneficial. Berkshire pays a lot of taxes. They're one of the largest tax paying entities in the world, but they're also pretty savvy when it comes to understanding the underlying net of tax economics of making investments.
If you step back from all of this, I think this has been a really fun way to explore Berkshire in the specifics, not in the general, but maybe as we wrap up thinking a bit more generally, I have a two-part question. You can take them as one question. How do you think about then today the major pieces that Berkshire, the company is. We've talked about insurance and energy and Apple a little bit and the investment portfolio.
The Apple position is more than $100 billion, which is just remarkable. I don't know what their cost basis is, but that's an incredible investment. How do you think about the major pieces that drive it from here? And then there's the obvious necessary question, which is it's run by two very old gentlemen who at some point, sadly will no longer run Berkshire. And as a longtime investor in Berkshire, how do you then think about the nature of it as an investment with those parts that you'll outline in mind
moving forward? If you take the big moving pieces to your earlier question as well, that kind of ties into this question, this is very knowable. You can be more confident what Berkshire is going to look like 10 years out than you can be with most businesses. Consumer durables, staples are fairly predictable. But in Berkshire's world, the big moving parts now are some of these assets that they've bought after they diversified away from insurance with the Genry deal.
The railroad, you're doing $7 billion in profits. Nobody's going to displace the Burlington Northern Santa Fe. They exist in the West with Union Pacific. They're almost identical looking companies. They have the exact same number of route miles, nearly the exact same number of employees. The economics of the businesses are very similar. You've got $7 billion earning power there. All the profits going to the parent. That thing will grow in line with GDP, but you'd be hard-pressed to say the railroad's going to get disrupted by electric trucks.
I mean, that notion that we're going to have all these trucks driving around without drivers, maybe. But isn't that what a train is? I mean, we kind of invented trains 150 years ago, 200 years ago. You've got the The energy operation that does $4 billion, retains all that money, has a very long runway to spend on renewables, to spend on distribution assets. They will continue to make acquisitions in that space. And those are assets that are going to earn $10 to $11 on equity capital.
Very predictable. The ability to spend money on CapEx there on a durably long basis means that a decade from now, seven years from now, the thing will be doing $8 billion. It's going to be larger in the next few years than the railroad. Those two pieces are very noble. You can take a comp on the railroad for what it's worth and compare it to a Union Pacific that was trading at its highs at $160 or $170 billion.
I carry it at $120 to $130 billion value. The energy operation's worth $70 or $80 billion. It's going to be worth twice that within 10 years. You've got this vast array of manufacturing service retail businesses that are markedly improved in the last few years, I think, under the closer watch of Greg, but they throw off $11 billion in free cash. That group runs net unlevered. So it earns what's now a high single digit return on equity, but there's no debt.
And you take this collection of old businesses assets like Marmon and the Precision Cast Parts, Lubrizol, John's Manville, Shaw, a lot of housing assets. It's this wild collection of just disparate entities that have some retail. They've got some service aspects. But that thing does over $150 billion in revenues and throws off $11 billion in profit. And I think the ability to maybe sell some of those operations that are underperforming, find a few things that you can buy if we get some kind of pullback here in private equity and valuations come back down to reality.
But that's a very predictable $11 billion. And it's an acceptable, adequate return on unlevered equity. And then the insurance operation, we've covered fairly in depth here. It's just going to be bigger over time because they're just not at risk to blowing themselves up with the Fort Knox balance sheet they have. And so I sleep really well at night. And when you try to buy the thing for less than what it's worth and try to buy it at increasing discounts, I'm not sure you're going to find a better business.
The ability and the need of replacing the capital allocator that sits at the top of that company becomes incumbent. And I think Greg will do a great job. But then years down the road, you got to replace Greg. And so the role of that board of directors is going to be increasingly important. Under the guide of Mr. Buffett, he ran the business. He can be chairman and CEO. This proposal to separate the role of chairman and CEO was insane.
They're going to separate that role when he's no longer running the company. but you wouldn't remove it from this gentleman and the way that this organization has been run for the benefit of the shareholder and the benefit of the employees for all these years. The morality, the ethics, the accounting that's practiced, it's not aggressive. You don't hear about things like adjusted EBITDA. It's just going to be a bigger business. And so that board's role is going to be preserve the culture and keep these vultures of some of the activists out of the affairs because left alone, perpetuating the ability of Berkshire to retain its profits and find places to intelligently invest it durably and in places where you're not going
to light it on fire is really what'll sustain it. Trades at a remarkable discount to what you'd call intrinsic value relative to the overall stock market. And I think for that, it's been misunderstood, but it sits at a very, very high portion of the top of my portfolio because of all these things we're talking about. It's the most predictable earnings stream that I know is going to be managed with care and caution by Mr. Buffett and all of his successors.
If you just had to reflect back, obviously you've been a big shareholder, you've been a big learner, you've been one of the people that's explained Berkshire in more detail to more people than probably anybody else. And imagine a world in which Berkshire had never existed in your life and then compare that to this world where it did. what do you think it has taught you? I don't want to complicate the question more than that about investing in business writ large that is most important.
I think it's the golden rule, Patrick. And I put Costco in the same bucket, but Berkshire goes out of its way to take care of its customers, take care of its employees, take care of its regulators and these highly regulated businesses where they exist, work fairly with suppliers, work fairly with the other insurance companies that you're doing reinsurance business with, to treat your customers fairly at GEICO, take care of the communities in which you live. You've got this culture of a cult where the shareholders get it.
Costco has a similar cult. And at the end of the day, the shareholders taken care of. You just don't have a 57-year history of accounting abuses, of write-offs and write-downs. The decision-making that's taken place is extremely conservative. It's unique that it's not adopted by more companies, but it's a long time horizon. I use these types of businesses like Berkshire and Costco as the standard of how to behave. And we're looking for management teams that behave similarly, that run the business for the benefit of the shareholder.
A lot of times those are founders or owners, or it's folks that think that way. Berkshire is not about making a quick buck. Too many companies are. And when you run a thing without debt and you never expose it to the worst of economic downturns, you have thick enough skin to not chase high tech in the late 90s because a lot of your shareholders think you could, to not chase the next dollar of insurance premium because you have this need to be bigger every quarter and every day.
GEs had a big, big finance operation, obviously, and they had a big reinsurance company. And when your culture is you got to make the quarter and you spend all your time with the sell side analytical community, ensuring they understand how much you're making and ignore the leverage and ignore the off balance sheet liabilities, but we're going to make the number. Well, unconditionally, your charge was to get bigger. And so you would take the next dollar of premium volume.
And when you were writing bad business, whether you were writing it or not, you didn't want to face the wrath of Jack. Berkshire is the polar opposite. And I think if the folks that wind up running it down the road can maintain that discipline and maintain that culture, even though it's a giant organization, it can continue to be a more giant organization. And as long as the stock stays cheap, there's really no need to grow because the business can buy back the shares when they're cheap.
Again, the distinction of only buying them when they're cheap versus buying them to offset the dilution that comes on the front end of giving management boatloads of stock options and restricted shares. It's just a different culture. It's a different mindset. It really has been run for the shareholder. It's extremely tax efficient. Again, as a taxable investor for my taxable portfolios for myself, I've never paid a dime of taxes on dividends because I've not received them. And again, if I've paid earnings yields of seven, eight, nine at the times that I've bought it, the majority of my return has come from what Berkshire has managed to do with the retained earnings.
It's the return on incremental capital that's so important in our industry and our business that I think is oftentimes so underappreciated. And those that want to understand how it's done right, you've got this canvas that goes back almost 60 years. If you're a young investor learning how to invest, read the chairman's letters back to 1977. There's so much learning that's taking place. I learned so much about the right way to run a business and to think about capital from observing Mr.
Buffett and Mr. Munger over all the years. CNBC has this wonderful archive of the six and a half hours of Q &A that takes place every year at the annual meeting back to 1994. When I first started going to the meeting in 2000, my first meeting, we bought the stock for the first time in February after it had been cut in half following the Gen reacquisition. When Everybody wanted to chase tech. Berkshire was out of fashion.
They were getting a lot of heat from a lot of the shareholders for not chasing tech. And that really was just crazy. But I always wondered, why are these cameras on at the back of the room? What are they ever going to do with all that footage? Well, they turned it over to CNBC and they've got this wonderful archive now of transcripts and the video of the meetings that if you're trying to learn about how capital should work, Berkshire is a perfect proxy.
I spend so much time in my letter on my ongoing analysis In part, because the accounting adjustments that I have to make to get to what I would call economic earnings with Berkshire, the flipping, eliminating the realized and unrealized gains and losses from the income statement, and normalizing them with the earnings yield, which is conservative, eliminating the volatility in underwriting profits, and assuming what I think will be a normal long-term 5 % underwriting margin. You can use zero if you want, but you're eliminating the volatility there.
The treatment of intangibles back in the day until 2002, until FAS 142, companies were writing down depreciation. Well, if you'd made an acquisition that made sense and wasn't impaired, why would you write down the premium that you paid for the business? If the economics on what you paid were right, now we write down a lot of intangibles. Well, some intangibles decay, some do not. Berkshire is a great case study. how you account for and make assumptions regarding your pension fund.
You can see that in Berkshire. And so I go through this laundry list of adjustments to gap earnings that are just a great teaching tool. Berkshire has so many moving parts between all of these subsidiaries that almost every accounting adjustment that you'd make when you break down any company can be seen through the lens of Berkshire because it's just that diversified. Obviously, it's impractical,
But it sounds like a fun exercise for a 22-year-old would be to take two years of their life and do nothing but build a Berkshire model. And everything that that would entail, it'd probably be better than any NBA that you could go through education-wise and applied-wise. Such an interesting idea. I'm lucky.
I get to spend a lot of time on campus talking to the student funds, finance students. And I love it. I love this giving back. It's why I write as long of a letter as I do. I'm trying to give back if I've learned a few things and I can teach them in my letter a little bit. It's great. But yeah, read the chairman's letters, read the Berkshire enter reports, build the model. And I'm telling any young investor, buy some Berkshire a little bit.
To me, it's a better investment than the S &P 500 will be over time. Charlie and Warren go back and forth on that notion. And I think when Mr. Buffett talks about the S &P 500, he's never been one to puff his own stock. Charlie always pushes back and says, I think Berkshire will be better. I've got it down to all these years. I started following the company in 1996 when they issued the B shares. On the front page of the offering document, they had a four or five bullet point series of comments that said, neither Charlie Munger, our vice chairman, nor I would buy our stock at these prices.
We don't think they're sufficiently undervalued. Well, I mean, you will never, ever in the history of capital find an offering document that tells people not to buy the stock at this price. And that's the culture of the place. Start there and I've got it down to one week a year when I write my letter and it takes me six or seven weeks to write the letter. Of that week, I've got six to seven days that it requires for me to update all my models.
And I try to make all the subsidiaries tie out. I'm trying to figure out where the equity exists in each of the businesses. And it's a little bit like a jigsaw puzzle. And I love that process. But I can do it now in a week. And then I can put it away for the rest of the year. You're obviously going to read the cues when they come out and look at what's changing in the stock portfolio, but it's a battleship or a carrier.
It doesn't change that much. And all of my work on my largest holding is done in six or seven days. And there's just not a lot that changes year to year, but it is probably the best business to study if you want to learn how to invest and how to run a company morally and ethically, which really should be at the top of everybody's list.
I think that is a perfect place to close. Chris, I need to be the absolute perfect person to break down Berkshire with us. Thank you for joining us yet again. Thank you so much for your time.
Thanks, Patrick. Love the series and happy to do this with you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns ranging from Costco to Visa to Moderna, or to sign up for our weekly summary, check out JoinColossus.com. That's J-O -I-N -C-O -L-O -S-S -U-S dot com.