Costco: Relentless Focus on the One Thing - [Business Breakdowns, EP. 04] Business Breakdowns ยท 14 Apr 2021 Source: https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes/61922194/bloomstran-relentless-focus-on-the-one-thing Transcript: https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/business-breakdowns/costco-relentless-focus-on-the-one-thing-business-breakdowns-ep-04-ee87c6/ (via OpenNash Podcasts, machine-generated) This is Business Breakdowns. Business Breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business. For each business, we explore its history, its business model, its competitive advantages, and what makes it tick. We believe every business has lessons and secrets that investors and operators can learn from. and we are here to bring them to you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns, check out joincolossus.com. All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions. Hosts and podcast guests may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Today, we'll be diving into Costco. Costco is a favorite business story and model for many operators and investors. It was founded in 1983 in Seattle and has grown into a juggernaut with over $169 billion in sales and almost 60 million members globally. To me, Costco is the best example of doing one thing for customers and getting better at it constantly for decades. To help me break down Costco, I talked to both Zack Fuss and Chris Bloomstran. Zack is an investor at Continental Grain, a 200-year-old family-owned business that is focused on investing and operating businesses throughout the food and agriculture ecosystem with assets across the US, Latin America, and Asia. Chris is the president and chief investment officer of Semper Augustus Investments Group and longtime shareholder of Costco. In this breakdown, we'll start with Zack by diving into the Costco business model, examining the relentless focus on efficiency that separates Costco from its peers, and exploring the secrets behind its private label, Kirkland. I'll then talk to Chris about the growing international opportunities for Costco and the lessons that operators and investors can take away from studying the business and founder, Jim Sinegal. I hope you enjoy this breakdown of Costco. So Zack, I think a neat place to start with Costco is the fundamental equation of the business. It's a somewhat straightforward business at the surface level. Everyone's familiar with the stores. Maybe give us what you view as the simplest version of the equation of what makes the business go. Yeah, Costco is an interesting one because on the surface, it's a retail business, But the primary differentiator or the economic mode of Costco is really the combination of its brand, its company culture, its systems, and its supply side economies of scale. So the business at its core, it's a network of 800 warehouses across 12 countries, does about 180 billion in sales. It's the second largest retailer in the US behind Walmart at $550 billion. But it's recognized for being maniacally obsessed with its customers, its members, and providing them with the lowest price is possible, which results in a highly loyal customer base. And the operating philosophy is simple. It's keep costs down and pass the savings on to the members. The shared scale economies piece of this has become, I think Costco is the symbol of that concept that actually what you're trying to do is actually get your margins as low as possible, not as high as possible. Can you just talk through that dynamic where unlike most retailers that are making money on the sales of the products, Costco is instead making money through its membership and that inverts the typical goal. So in many ways, Costco is the original consumer subscription business. So before cohort analysis and CAC to LTV equations were common speak in investor parlance, the founder, Jim Sinegal and his team were reaping the benefits of a contractually recurring fee stream, which is their subscription. So as subscriptions have become more broadly adopted by a wide range of consumer-focused businesses. It's become more commonplace, but it was allegedly the original inspiration for Amazon Prime. So Costco has 55 million members who pay $60 a year for the privilege to shop the warehouses. It's a retailer in the traditional sense, but the reality is it doesn't take much margin on its product sales, as you kind of referenced. And you can kind of think about it as analogous to a group purchasing organization where the 55 million paying members pool their capital and buying power together, and they extract the best deals from their vendors. Customers literally pay for the right to shop the stores, and Costco then negotiates on the behalf of its members and is able to offer them really the best value in retail. So they leverage their bargaining power as one of the top three largest buyers of consumables to get the best prices, and then any savings are then passed on to their customer. And so simply put, they buy packaged goods in mass quantities and mark everything up at a standard 12 to 13%, which is back solving really for an 11 % gross margin. And if you compare that to a typical retailer at 25 to 35 % gross margins, to them that would imply a 35 to 50 % markup at cost. So Costco acquires something for $10 and sells it to you for $11 and change. The same food item at Walmart or a parallel item at TJ Maxx would be sold to you at $13 to $15, assuming the same specifications, which it's not. Costco generally gets a better product. And so the feedback loop is really, they offer low prices that attract members to sign up. As member counts increase, they get higher total sales numbers. And with that larger revenue base, that gives Costco better negotiating leverage with its vendors. And as such, they get better pricing. And that pricing is then passed on to the consumer in that scale economic shared model that you referenced. So really what Costco does is it takes all the benefits of its negotiating leverage and it gives that savings back to their customer and keeps them coming back. And so the value proposition continues to strengthen over time, which furthers that feedback loop. Can you say a little bit about Jim Sinegal, its very famous founder and this idea, this slavish devotion to, I'll call it the one thing. What's amazing to me about Costco is those 800 warehouses started much smaller, but basically they've been perfecting this same concept for decades without straying outside of that operational excellence. When I think operational excellence on behalf of the true customer, the member in this case, I think Costco is probably the best example in the world. Can you say a bit about the philosophy and the founder behind this concept? Yeah. I mean, they emulate process power in every sense of the word. If you take the store model itself as an example, every year they formulaically open up anywhere from 20 to 30 stores. Each store generally starts with $200 million in sales and grows over time. And every single aspect of the purchasing evolution for the customer is completely engineered and thought about by Jim and his team. So if you consider shopping in a Costco store, you look at the warehouse structure, the bulk packaging that everyone's familiar with. Those are highly intentional, right? So by shipping its goods and ready to display packaging, it reduces the touches. and those items can be moved into the store onto their pallets, stored in higher density, both when being trucked and slotted into the store. So you're not paying for essentially shipping air. There's less time spent unboxing and stocking the shelves or moving the product and touching the inventory. This allows them to directly stock the shelves in that warehouse-like format. Really, the only other store I've seen with a similar structure is a warehousing model like IKEA in that there's no back room. Everything is displayed in the selling space. And so for the consumer, you see 10-pound bags of sugar and massive racks of ribs and enormous size bottles of condiments. I mean, frankly, the size of some of these things are comical, but the customer is benefiting massively. And that's really the ethos of the business because buying in bulk is way cheaper on a per unit basis. And it leads to larger basket sizes. And it also has the added benefit of items being harder to shoplift, which reduces the shrink. And all of this saves the money, whether it's on working capital or it's on capital investment. Stores are strategically located in lower cost industrial type areas that people drive to have the privilege of shopping. And then again, that savings is reinvested. It's this constant theme of reinvesting savings and passing that along to the customer and strengthening the value proposition. They turn their inventory over 15 times a year, and that affords them the ability to pay their vendors after their customers pay them. And so you have this virtuous working capital model as well, where because of the combination of the membership fees and the negative cash conversion cycle for a significant portion of their store, again, you're giving more fodder to fund the investment in the customer experience. And in all of this, because the customer experience is so strong and the square foot productivity is so strong, he can pay best in class wages. And by taking care of their employees, by paying them well over $20 an hour, providing health care benefits, 401ks, their employees really enjoy the experience. They enjoy working there. They wear badges on their lapel that show how many years they've been with the store. And it's this amazing virtuous cycle of just being maniacally focused on costs and passing that along to the customer. or there's that great story about them trying to increase the cost of the hot dog and excuse my language, but Jim told him they better not fucking change the cost of it. And I think that really idolizes how he thinks about managing his business. Can you say a little bit about even like the, how this starts to creep further outside the warehouses? So one of my favorite concepts is like the rotisserie chickens that are in the back of the store that I think they sell for $5 or something. And that price hasn't changed forever. And apparently there's something about the size of the chickens from Tyson getting too big. And so they're like, hell, we'll just invest hundreds of millions of dollars and grow our own chickens from egg all the way through to Spigot so that our customers can keep their value prop. Are there other examples like that that you've seen in Costco that you find compelling as examples of how far they're willing to go for their members? So I think the most important aspect when it comes to vertical integration and merchandising, clearly there are examples like the rotisserie chickens where they vertically integrated, which is not really seen throughout retail. But it's really on the way they think about their private label business. So about 25 % of their sales is their own Kirkland store brand. Standalone, it'd be probably the largest consumer packaged good business in America. And the reason that private label is so important is because you can charge a lower price but have a higher margin because you're essentially disintermediating the brand. Now, why it's even more important for something like Costco is if you were to compare the quality of what they're providing to you relative to that of your normal Kroger or Walmart private label brand. Generally, the quality is of or better than the highest rated brand. So there's this myth that hasn't been confirmed that, for instance, the store brand vodka is Grey Goose. The golf balls that are constantly sold out are the same quality as a Pro V1 Callaway golf ball. And there are countless examples of offerings that Costco provides that the actual quality of the product is better than that of its branded competitor. And then the other thing I would add in context of that is they only have 4 ,000 SKUs and they're very well known for that. And so every single item that's brought into the store is intentional. If you compare that to a typical grocer that has 40 ,000 or so SKUs or a Walmart super center at 100 ,000, you kind of get a sense for the focus that they have on actually procuring items that their customers are going to want and need. And there are countless examples of amazing value propositions, like $20 ,000 diamonds that people will buy at a Costco just because the value proposition is so strong. Can you say a bit more about private label? And maybe we could talk about this as its own section here. They're obviously not the only company to have private label. Tell me a little bit about what you've learned about that concept. What makes it go? You've talked already about why do it, cheaper price, higher margin, but what makes it work well? Where does it fail? Kirkland's an incredible story. Say a bit more about private label as a strategy? Over the course of the last couple of decades, store or owned brands, which are commonly referred to as private label, have been growing share. The reason for that is typically retailers can charge a lower price on the goods that they are selling, but provide comparable quality. And if you consider the business model of a typical retailer, really food retail in particular, most of their vendors are forced to pay slotting fees. And what that is, is a payment directly from the consumer packaged good or personal care business to the retailer to place the items in a highly strategic place in the store. And so while they may realize a lower merchandise margin, they have a really high margin trade spend that's coming in to tell them, hey, I want my Oreos to be at eye level in the cookie aisle and have a 10 by 10 display. And so what the retailers started to realize is that they can get that trade spend for the highly marketed branded items, but in the shoulders of the aisle, put their private label brands. And if you look at a store brand Oreo as an example relative to that of a Nabisco Oreo, it's probably somewhere from half to two thirds of the cost of retail. But the margin that they're realizing on that is so much higher. That's really compelling for retailers to lean into private label. The other thing about private labels, it tends to be counter cyclical. Sometimes of economic distress or uncertainty, people are likely to drift towards lower ticket items. And so they do really well. And over time, search costs have been really important. And people used to only go for the brands that they recognize. But more and more store brands themselves are standing out. And so the Whole Foods brand means something and they have their 365 brand. And Costco, Kirkland means something and they stand behind that. And because Costco has such high brand equity and Kirkland in particular, consumers are willing to trial the Kirkland product and in many cases will choose it over a branded peer knowing that they're getting an equivalent or a better product. And I think a lot of that has to do with the price transparency of the internet and quality assurance standards that have been implemented over time. And so if you think about back to 75 years ago when people were dealing with retailers, the brands themselves were what made sure that the items they were getting were fresh, that they were made in hygienic backgrounds and environments that were safe. Now the stores themselves stand behind their products. And so they're in a very advantageous position to lean into their private label brands. And if you take it a step further, especially in grocery, you have concepts like Trader Joe's or Olive or Lidl that have flipped the script. And instead of being 20 % private label, 80 % branded, it's the opposite. Costco is still at that 25 % to 30 % private label mix, but it's growing over time. And the brand is so important to their success because people tend to gravitate towards it. Sometimes the easiest way to understand a business like Costco is in contrast to other businesses. So versus say a Walmart or a Target or some other relevant competitor, what do you think are the other most interesting or surprising differences in the business model? The key differences as we have spoken to is the membership model itself and the limited SKU count. And so the reason that the membership model is so important is because of that negative working capital benefit that you get from that. 75 % of the operating income that Costco generates is from its membership model. People pay $60 a year, 50 million paid members that makes up 100 million store members. Retention rates are in the 90 % range. These are super loyal customers. The shopping experience and event is unique. You consider that in relation to a Walmart. They have the concept of everyday low prices, but the reality is that at 25 % to 35 % gross margin that's common in consumer discretionary retail, Costco at 10 % already has an inherent competitive advantage because by definition, their prices are going to be lower. beyond that because they have bulk size packaging. And so if you consider at Kraft Heinz ketchup, likely you're buying it in bulk packaging of five. So you're paying less per unit, but higher ticket at a way more attractive margin to the customer. And so the feedback loop associated with that continues to provide a ton of value to the customer itself. The size of the stores, Walmart has back of house, which probably comprises about 30 % of the entire store footprint. whereas when you walk into a Costco warehouse, the entire warehouse is a store. There's no incremental inventory and so not a single square foot is wasted. Because the items are bigger, they have less theft. With less theft means that you have lower shrink, which reduces the working capital needs of the business. It's very similar, I think about it in that Amazon analogy where every cost item or every line item becomes a revenue opportunity. And while it's not as explicit in the case of Costco, where they focus is on relentlessly reducing costs out of the business in order to reinvest it into the customer experience. And they're welcome to run at a lower margin. So for instance, at Costco, you're looking at like a 1 % merchandise margin because the membership margin is so strong. So that $3.5 billion a year they realize for membership fees flows through to the bottom line, 80%, 90 % incremental margin. Walmart and Target and their peers only make money on the merchandise itself. And so that added dynamics of the Costco model really presents it with almost an impenetrable mode in the world of retail. Can you talk a bit about this concept of, I think they call it open source retailing. And this is really a supplier relations story. I was with a friend the other day who used to be a huge supplier to Costco, ran a company that produced healthy chips. And Costco was 30 % to percent of his sales typically. And even though he made a 30 instead of 38% margin, they were by far his favorite supplier because the people were the best to deal with. But one interesting thing that he brought up was if he had a new product, sometimes it would only be like three months to get a meeting with Costco. And then often if they like it, it would be like six months until it was literally on the floor as a trial. Whereas with any other retailer, it would take way, way longer. Can you talk about Costco and the way that it uniquely treats its suppliers? So if you consider the size and scale of Costco, which I think some people are surprised by, it's the second largest brick and mortar retailer in the US behind Walmart. And as a function of that, they are the largest customer to a number of their vendors. And so the way that Walmart does that is they try to extract as much value from their vendor as possible. Whereas Costco has always viewed their relationship with their vendor partners as a true partnership, realizing that if they can provide them with visibility into what they want, how much they want it, and where they want it, that they can both create more value than they capture, but also deliver a disproportionate amount of that value back into their store shopping experience. So for instance, for every product vertical, they have a dedicated merchandiser who's responsible for maintaining their relationships with the brands, with the vendors, trialing new products. And once a year, they're going to have a show where new vendors can come and sample their products. So for instance, during holiday, the toy buyer may be responsible to meet with a long tail of 50 to 100 different producers of toys. And then they'll choose the 10 to 20 hottest items that they think that they want in their stores. And they can present a purchase order that day for a number that will be probably 30 to 40 to 50 % of what that vendor is going to sell. And to your point, have it on the shelves ready for holiday in the next four to six months. and it's the certainty with which they work with their vendors that's so important. And if you compare that to some of the largest multinational retailers they compete with, many of those actually fine their vendors if the items don't arrive at the store within a certain time window so they can get the things from back of house to the shelves. Because Costco has customized packaging and pallets to go straight to the store floor, they can work in a more flexible manner with their vendors in making sure that the expectations are set for everyone well ahead of time and there are no last minute changes. And because they only have 800 warehouses, as opposed to the thousands of stores that their competitors have, it just makes it way easier for everyone to manage the supply chain and both the vendors, the customers, Costco, and its employees benefit from that directly. One of the craziest charts that I saw looking into the business was the per square foot sales chart over time. It was high at the beginning, but it's gone up from, I can't remember the exact numbers, but a few $100 to $1 ,300 per square foot or something like this. What do you attribute that to? Because the model has been, you've mentioned process power before, the model has been the warehouse model, but it's just incredible how the per square foot sales has grown just inside the business over time. Why do you think that's possible? Yeah. I mean, it really is remarkable. When I started analyzing the business, I think that sales per square foot were likely in the 800 to a thousand range and they're closer to 1 ,500 today, which relative to Walmart, I think is still two and a half to three times as high of square foot productivity. A lot of it is attributable to that feedback loop. I mean, this is a business that comps positively just about every year in and year out. And it's because they're providing more and more value to their customer. And if you consider the percentage share wallet they continue to go after, there are markets where two thirds to 75 % of the local demographic has a Costco membership. And so a lot of it is attributable to traffic. A lot of it is attributable to volume. And so that means that people are coming more often and they're building their basket sizes bigger. And then on top of that, Costco is starting to complement their stores with value-added services like travel or auto insurance or home insurance. They have so many items that they continue to complement to build the basket. And as the fixed leverage in the stores helps to fund new investments, they can provide their members with better and better products. So a TV that may normally retail for $3 ,000 at a, call it 50 % margin, Costco is happy to send to their customers at $1 ,500, which is close to breakeven. And it's those types of offerings that they continue to build on that help them to further the square foot productivity in such an exceptional way. And I think for all those reasons, there's no reason that that won't continue over time as they move up the value chain of value-added services and then just better value propositions on their core consumables for their customers. Can we talk about the warehouses on an individual unit basis a little bit? Because you and I have talked before about the concept of cost to build a warehouse or a store or whatever it is, a Domino's, a Dollar General, and the payback period on those build-outs and how long it takes the per store ramp to happen from entry to full saturation in a given market. And I think Costco is very different from some of the other ones that you and I have talked about in the past on a per warehouse basis. Can you walk us through the life cycle of a warehouse and how it's unique? What they lose in cash on cash returns, they make up for it in scale. And the reason I mentioned that is, if you consider a restaurant concept, for instance, you may be putting 1.5 million in the ground and receiving it back in two years. But you have to do it so many times for the economics to be strong. And then you, on the other side of the spectrum, think about something like a Costco, right? Where a new store costs them anywhere from 75 to $100 million to build, including the land, the property and equipment needed, and the inventory for that store. And then it ramps up over time from that low $100 to $25 to $150 million level to well over $200 million in sales, but each store only contributes like a 3 % -ish margin. And so you're looking at best case scenario anywhere from $8 to $10 million in free cashflow per store on a per year basis. And so on an $80 to $100 million investment, you're getting $10 million in cashflow per store, which is a return on capital kind of in that low teens percentage, which is attractive, but not as astronomical as some other unit-based concepts we think of. But what's so important is the duration of those cash flows. And referring back to your last question, the ability to continue to build your basket and build your same sort of sales comps that drive really attractive return on equity. And because they have this recurring revenue stream, this is a business that hypothetically could support a fair amount of debt, although they've chosen to maintain a very conservative balance sheet. And the way that they continue to improve the model is by just getting their inventory to return quicker. By building the store's basket over time, they're hoping that inventory turnover of 12 to 15 times a year goes to higher and higher numbers, which means the returns on capital for that particular store are going to continue to get better. I heard a not confirmed, but that some companies will revisit their store design strategy, if you will, quarterly or annually, and that Costco does it monthly. And so just yet again, like this incredible constant process improvement around the same core model driving the results. With that improvement, it's surprising to me somewhat that the balance sheet is so conservative that they use basically no leverage. What are your thoughts on just leverage in these unit concept stores, restaurants, et cetera? And why do you think Costco doesn't apply leverage to the business to make it go faster? Frankly, these are pretty conservative guys. Charlie Munger has been on the board of this business forever. So they have that Berkshire ethos connected to the business. There's something about Seattle-based businesses and leverage. Look at the balance sheet of Microsoft. Look at the balance sheet of Amazon, recognizing that they're tech businesses. They're conservative. And the reality is that when this business was started 20, 25 years ago, debt cost of capital was in a markedly different environment than it is today. And they're happy to self-fund their growth. They, every couple of years, take a price increase on their membership. When the cash builds on their balance sheet, they pay out a special dividend. they're just starting to open stores in China. And so to the extent that they ever want to borrow capital to do something strategic, I think they like the optionality of that cash, but it's not too dissimilar from a Berkshire balance sheet in that if you consider the diversity of businesses that they're in and the cashflow durability of their business, they also maintain a rather conservative balance sheet. And I think that cost goes the same. Even if you want to stress test the business, look back to the great financial crisis, look at the more recent pandemic, the business grows in just about any environment. And so it could support a very robust capital structure if they so chose to, but they are formulaic in what they do. They know they're going to open 20 to 30 stores a year. They know the cost needs of that capital spend. And they have with a pretty high degree of certainty know what their membership retention is going to be and what that membership fee stream is going to look like. And they're happy to return that cash to their shareholders via special dividends, but they don't see any reason to put the business at risk in any way, shape or form because their vision is to continue to grow the business for decades. But I think that by any typical financial analysis, you could definitely support a fair amount of leverage on this business. You mentioned perhaps the legend is that Bezos learned from Sinegal, and this is the inspiration for the Amazon Prime model. And I love that with Bezos is just stepping down, they still own relentless.com. Seems like almost Costco should own relentless.com as much as Amazon does. And if I think about the business, the major lesson I take away is this idea of the one thing or keep the main thing, the main thing that they've been doing the same thing forever and just constantly getting better at it. Are there other lessons beyond that major one, this relentless focus on the member that you think are most interesting to take away from your time studying Costco and apply to other businesses? So I think at its core, Costco is a best-in-class business. It's maniacally focused on keeping costs low and passing those savings on to the customer and improving the shopping experience to drive membership growth and tension. And if we consider retail in the US, the best-in-class retailers, whether it be a Home Depot, a TJ Maxx, an O 'Reilly Auto Parts, they all have that maniacal focus on the customer. And I think what we've started to realize is that retail in many ways lost its way over the course of the last 10 to 15 years as it faced competition from online players. And now we're shifting back to a place where retailers are focused on customer service above all else. I think we talked about it briefly, but the way that they take care of their employees, if you have happy employees and they're willing to take care of the customers, that's going to drive the customers to spend more in the store and to rely on their Costco or their Walmart or their Target. And I think that we can now apply that broader to a number of different store concepts where consider the evolution of something like Best Buy and the Geek Squad. In stores where the merchandise itself is somewhat commoditized, it's really the service and the store experience and the customer experience that's going to help to strengthen the economic mode of that business. And so that's clean stores, low prices, and happy customers. And I think being concerned with all stakeholders is a function of that. And taking care of your employees is part of that feedback loop that will continue to strengthen that retail model. Not all businesses are really primed or positioned for a subscription model, but they definitely can do better to take care of their customers in the Costco way. And I think rather than being focused on unit expansion and Home Depot and Best Buy did a great job with this and that they slowed down or stopped opening units, the customer and the employee come first and everything else will fall into place. Zack has always been one of my favorite people to talk business with and has a wonderful way of distilling the core concepts of any business. When studying Costco, I also spoke with Chris Bloomstran, CIO at Semper Augustus, about the lessons we can take away from Costco founder Jim Sinegal and to explore the approach Costco is taking to expand internationally. So Chris, can you walk us through how Costco is approaching international expansion? Well, they've been growing outside the United States. And so of their 800 stores, something like 550 or US. There's another 100 Canadian stores, but they've been growing in 11 or 12 global markets. They're in the UK with a pretty big presence. They've got some Spain stores, then they've got one in France. But then in Asia, they've got a big presence in South Korea. They've got a big presence in Japan. They just launched in China and Shanghai, lines around the store. People were camping out overnight. But four years ago, they opened a store, and I'm not sure many people know this, but they opened a store in Iceland, in Reykjavik. And so I thought, how in the hell are you going to make that work? I mean, how are you going to make that $1.50 hot dog and soda work in Reykjavik? It's Hawaii at some level, it's an island. And so the grocery stores can't sell things for the same prices if they've got to be shipped in on container ships or they've got to be flown in. So you just run on a higher price scale. Now that how in the world is Costco going going to go in and sell things at the prices at which they sell them and win. So they open the store and the whole population of Iceland is 350 ,000 people. And if you do the economics of how many stores a Costco can have in St. Louis, and you do the population of St. Louis, you know, 2 million people, they have three stores and you get a certain density, you get a certain number of the population that signs up as members and you make it work. What do you think? Well, you got to get every damn family in Iceland to sign up as a member. And why would they do that? And then you realize, oh my God, they're not going to sell the hot dog for $1.50. They're not going to sell at the same price points at which they would sell in a warehouse in the United States. All they have to do is beat the three or four grocery stores in Iceland. All they have to do is beat the company selling gasoline at the convenience store on price. And so when they came in at the price points at which they came in, goods on a per unit basis, when you convert the local crone currency to the dollar, are a hell of a lot more expensive in Reykjavik, suburbs of Reykjavik, where they're one store than they are. Everybody in the country has signed up, and it's destroyed the rest of retail because they've taken the scale. So they can take up, so you think about how do they distribute there? They took a pallet, ship it in, however they ship it in, drop it on the floor. So all of the same blocking and tackling that they go through, except those goods are obviously not going through the depots, the pseudo distribution centers. They're having to put pallets on a plane, a lot of it being brought in direct ship from the suppliers, but they're getting it to Iceland and they're selling at a price point that kills the rest of the competition. And so for that, the whole concept lends itself to international growth. And I think that's why When you're selling something in whatever market you're in at a lower price than any of your competitors can match, be it online, internet, Amazon, down to grocery stores, down to convenience stores, down to the Walgreens, CVS world, nobody sells at a lower price point. You win the game. Those lost leaders are cemented. Any closing thoughts on Jim Sinegal specifically as a business leader and maybe even as a business thinker or philosopher. Is there anything else that you think stands out and is important about him and his leadership and his ideas? Jim Sinegal, in my mind, is maybe the best CEO that I've ever seen. He's the best business leader. And what he really understood was culture. I mean, he understood that the culture of the place will feed on itself and it drives into the flywheel. He understood that happy employees would be permanent employees, that happy customers would come back and renew. And I think the lesson is, instead of this rat race that public companies find themselves in, which is the quarterly earnings hurdle, which is the compensation hurdle for how they get rich. The average CEO works in that position for four or five years. And they tend to be heavily compensated with stock options and restricted shares and with all kinds of ridiculous metrics to where they often have to drive the stock price up for them to get rich because so much of their comp is awarded that way. Well, if Jim Sinegal founded Costco with Jeff Brotman and Sinegal was the only CEO. Brotman was the chairman and they paid themselves identically. They paid themselves reasonably. They had bonus structure that was tied to growth in sales and growth in pre-tax profit, but they were paid reasonably. I think at the highest, Sinegal probably made 6 million bucks a year. And he, for the last 10 years he worked, he never raised his salary. He was making like a $350 ,000 salary. And they never bothered themselves with short-term profitability, with beating the number. They created this private company mindset where we're going to drive the profitability way up. I mean, nobody would even get into this business. You wouldn't even open your first Costco store as a public company unless you had this very long-term mindset. If you think about the economics at the store level, those stores don't mature for eight to 10 years. A new store in today's dollars, the class of 2020 stores will do $130 million in revenues. A mature store that's been in the system for 10 years will do over $200 million. When you think about it, you have to sign up members. You don't go to full subscription on day one unless you're opening a store in Reykjavik. It takes time for the throughput of the store to get up to scale and to drive those sales per square foot to north of the $1 ,400 on the mature stores. And so when I first understood the business, I think in the first 10 years that they were public, they got a knock from Wall Street for not taking care of the shareholder. You looked at the thing and go, this thing doesn't make enough return on equity. They don't use any debt in the capital structure. Who would put all the money into the land and buildings when you can borrow it? Who would open a store that's not going to reach full profitability for us for 10 years, for eight years. And if you peel the layers of the onion back, you realized that if they had 350 stores in 2004, they've always opened 20 to 25 stores a year. They're methodical. They've never figured out a way to open any more. They've never needed to open any more. They do better on real estate than anybody. And so the return on capital was being masked by the half of their stores in the system at the time, more than half of the stores that weren't mature, that were under earning on their potential returns on capital. So when I paid 20 times earnings for it, I really wasn't paying 20 times when you assume that the business would seize. It's that long-term perspective that a guy like Sinegal had that was so unique in the world of public companies that allowed them to scale up. And they've opened no more than 20, 25 stores a year. So now they've got 800. It's a far more mature concept than it was. So when I was buying, if you run that growth in store count and growth in square footage, they were going to grow square footage at six and a half, 7 % a year, seven and a half percent. Today they're growing at two and a half percent. So it's a system that because of these efficiencies and changing the SKUs and keeping things fresh and working with suppliers that allows them historically to grow same store sales at a way higher rate than all the retail competitors. I mean, they're still growing same store sales at six, 7%. I bake in that they're at least going to grow at two or 3 % over the inflation rate, but off of a base that's only growing units square footage at two and a half percent, it's not going to grow near at the same rate that it had. And so here's Sinegal. I mean, he gets it. He got rich. They award restricted shares. They've never really used stock options to incentivize management. They don't want managers to have the downside of the stock going down for some period of time, but they want their managers to have skin in the game. So anybody that works in corporate management inside a public company that is being groomed to be the CEO of a business or top executive or anybody that's taking on a board role at a publicly traded company. Auto study, Jim Sinegal, the profound long-term ability to think about what really matters in a business. And it ain't quarterly profits. It is not getting rich in a hurry. It's getting rich long-term, side-by-side with your shareholders, letting the entire universe that surrounds you win. Let your employees win. Let your customers win. Let your suppliers win to a point. And for that, I think the guy ought to be studied. And if you ask the average business leader, if you ask the average director of a public company, who's Jim Sinegal, very few have heard of him. He ought to be studied. There ought to be books and books written on the guy. And there's not. I think it's a great place to end. My favorite quote of his, which sums up a lot of what you've talked about is retail is detail. And I think he He really lived that philosophy through the way he built the business and the stores are run. And thanks, Chris, for sharing so many interesting lessons on Costco. I think hard to replicate model, but it highlights the importance of operations, of keeping the main thing, the main thing, as people say. And I appreciate you breaking down Costco with me today. I hope you've enjoyed this breakdown of Costco with Zack and Chris. After talking with them, it makes me realize how important it is for businesses to relentlessly focus on their one key thing and that a decades-long pursuit of optimizing that one thing can yield incredible results. To find more episodes of Breakdowns ranging from Costco to Visa to Moderna, or to sign up for our weekly summary, check out JoinColossus.com. That's J-O-I-N-C-O-L-O-S-S-U-S.com.