227. Retired CIA Director John Brennan: Why modernization is ‘never over’

People were telling me, why don't you just tell us to collaborate more or to work better together? You why do you have to go through this? You know, this whole process of of transformation and changing organizational structures. And I said, Well, a lot of times, those cultures remain deeply ingrained. And unless you change some of that structure and your daily business processes and activities, and, importantly, also the chains of command. I felt as though those stovepipes were always going to remain, irrespective of whatever type of exhortation I give them to to work more collaboratively together.

From McKinsey and Company, I'm Sean Brown and welcome to Inside the Strategy Room. That was retired Central Intelligence Agency director John Brennan talking about the challenges and benefits of undergoing organizational transformation. John embarked on an extensive and controversial modernization of the CIA's operations when he led it under President Barack Obama. Brennan has served three United States presidents during his career, which started at the CIA and included roles as station chief in Saudi Arabia and director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

In this episode, John spoke with our partner Megan McConnell, who is based in our Washington, DC. office and who specializes in large, complex transformations. Now here's Megan to kick us off.

Director Brennan, we are really excited for you to speak with us today. Thank you for joining us.

Well, thanks so much, Megan. It's great to be with you, and please call me John.

Okay, I will. So, John, could you give our listeners a little more background on your career and what you're up to now?

Well, I, I spent, uh, two stints in the government, um, well, I might say I'm a recidivist, uh, government employee. So for the first, uh, 25 years, from 1980 to 2005, I was a CIA employee serving in different parts of the agency. I started out in operations, went to analysis, did a rotation with the Department of State, served in different capacities and staff and management positions in the agency. I also had the great honor and privilege to be, uh, President Clinton's daily intelligence briefer in the mid 1990s.

And then went overseas, uh, for a 2nd time to Saudi Arabia and served as the chief intelligence officer, uh, for the U. S. government in Saudi Arabia from 96 to 99. And then, uh, served, uh, as the founding director of the National Counterterrorism Center before retired. Uh, and then went off to the private sector for 3 years, um, to see what it was like to earn a living outside of the appropriations of Congress, which was eye-opening.

Uh, but then when a young senator from Illinois, Barack Obama, decided to pursue the presidency, um, I was a long-distance, uh, advisor, uh, to his team. And then when he was, uh, elected president, uh, he invited me to join him. And so I served eight years, uh, in the Obama administration, uh, 1st as, uh, his homeland security advisor and deputy national security advisor for homeland security and counterterrorism. And then in the last 4 years, uh, of the Obama administration, I served as director of the CIA.

And so retired, uh, for the 2nd and final time on January 20th of 2017. And since then, I've been semi-retired. I do a s lecturing at, uh, my alma otters, uh, Fordham University in New York and University of Texas at Austin. Uh, also do some consulting work, uh, wrote a memoir, and, uh, do what I want when I want, with whom I want. And so it's. It's a nice opportunity to be able to spend, uh, a lot of time with my family and make up for the the time that I wasn't able to spend with them during my government career.

Thank you, that sounds, uh, a lovely way to spend the time these days. So, you know, we're talking all about transformation today. We think of that as a comprehensive, organization wide program where you're driving a specific objective to meet the organization's full potential. Private sector, that's often growth or revenue targets. In the public sector, there's a very specific kind of mission output that you're looking at. Could you describe a little bit of some of the transformations that you've been a part of or you've led over the years, and some of your reflections on those?

Well, I guess the 1st one I was when I was deputy executive director, and they called that position out the deputy chief operating officer of the agency. I was heavily involved in spearheading a change in how agency employees are compensated. It's called the pay for performance system. And we were limited in terms of what we were able to do because, you know, governed by the the the GS scale. Uh, but um, I was able to, uh, have a better understanding of how difficult such change is, particularly if you're affecting individuals compensation, uh, but how entrenched also a lot of the attitudes and practices are within a large organization like CIA.

And also found out that, uh, our overseers in Congress were not all that thrilled with our doing this, uh, you know, sort of on our own. And they expected to be able to, um, oversee it and, uh, decide whether or not we should go forward or not. So that was the 1st one. The 2nd one was a real major one. When in 2003, I was asked by, uh, President George W. Bush and the director of of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to stand up, uh, what is called the National Counterterrorism Center.

This was an effort by the Bush administration to address some of the shortcomings that existed in the intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security communities prior to 9/11 that led to those devastating attacks. So I was asked to, uh, set up a an organization. It's a it was a government startup, which was very unusual in the government. And to bring together the networks, the systems, the databases, the expertise, the authorities of the CIA, FBI, NSA, State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret Service, Coast Guard and others, and put it into a purple organization.

So that we really could combine those capabilities and the data and create new knowledge to give us insights into the threats, the terrorist threats we were facing. So it was a quite a a challenge, uh, but it really did open my eyes to the importance of systems integration. Uh, I'm a proud liberal arts major from Fordham University, but I I recognize that, uh, you really need to understand the constituent parts of the environment that you're working within or the ecosystem, and how you optimize the connections, uh, and the integration, uh, among them.

And so it. It gave me a great opportunity by, uh, being the founding director, uh, of the National Counterterrorism Center to see the power of that integration. And the the 3rd transformation initiative that I was involved in was when I became director of the CIA. I had long felt, based on my experience in the CIA, in all the different parts of the agency, that as good and as talented as the CIA was, uh, that it sub-optimized its capabilities because it wasn't integrated in a manner that really allowed us to take full advantage of those diverse capabilities and talents and expertise that we had.

So when I, uh, was appointed to be director of CIA, I felt that it was my responsibility, especially since I had served 25 years at CIA. I knew it very well. And I was when I was at the Obama White House. I was, you know, a daily recipient of the CIA's intelligence products and support. I really felt that I needed to help shape the CIA to deal with the challenges and opportunities of the future, rather than continue to have a structure and a system that was more aligned and geared to maybe past challenges.

And one of the things that really led me to that view was just the tremendous revolution in terms of technology that came into existence over the last several decades. When I started out in the agency in 1980, we didn't have personal computers, everything was, you know, hard copy it. And so I witnessed during the course of, you know, 30, 40 years, the tremendous advancement in technology that really the CIA had to take into account. In terms of what we needed to do ourselves, but also what we what we needed to do to defend ourselves and to thwart the, uh, efforts of our adversaries.

So when I returned to the agency, that's when I decided I was going to embark upon this, uh, modernization process, which is what I called.

And you've had a lot of experience with the transformations, and it seems like they've built on each other over the years and informed the subsequent ones. Maybe that last one on agency modernization, you know, you talked about part of the impetus being integration. You called it purple, right, where you're bringing various stakeholder equities together, not any one color. I know it's a term of art in the government, it also sounds like the modernization of the technology was a really, you know, big, important driver.

What were the various other perspectives you encountered on why, uh, it was important to modernize the agency, you know? And can you talk a little bit about where there was unification, where folks might not have agreed, and and how you thought about getting people to coalesce around a singular vision?

Well, it it took a lot of time and I took my time when I came back to the agency. Uh, I wanted to reacquaint myself with the current state of the agency. Because even though I had worked in it for 25 years and dealt with it daily from the White House, I still needed to understand the inner dynamics of it. Uh, so, uh, for the 1st year, I basically assessed and my impressions, uh, reinforced my view that change was needed because the agency structure basically had stayed the same over the last 50, 60 years.

There were individual components, uh, some people call them cylinders of excellence, I call them stovepipes. And I, I really felt it was so critically important, particularly given that technology allowed us to bring different parts of the organization together in ways that we could never do it before. That the agency's mission really depended on our ability to utilize all the resources we had in the most effective means possible. And, you know, one of the main missions of the agency is espionage, collecting intelligence.

And I want to make sure that we knew exactly what intelligence was truly secret, that we needed to uncover. Um, as opposed to something that might be available in open source environments. I didn't want to have to waste time, effort, energy and precious resources and put people's lives at risk to go after something that may be collectible through other means. And I talked to my senior leaders. I, I held various, you know, meetings with individuals within the organization.

I. I traveled overseas a lot and wanted to make sure that I ingested as much information as I could. And also, I think sprinkled the seeds early on of, you know, that I was wondering whether or not we were best arrayed and aligned, uh, in order to achieve our our mission. So, after the end of about a year or 16 months or so, I decided to pull together a group of people who I respected from different parts of the agency and took them off their full-time positions.

And they were from operations, analysis, support, the technological front and others. And I told them that you have 90 days to assess how well the agency's organizational structure is facilitating and enabling our mission. And I want you to come back and and then give me your report. I told them that I thought we were sub-optimized from a configuration standpoint, and I told them why. Uh, because I felt that a lot of times at meetings, different parts of the agency that working on similar issues would sit down at my conference room table.

And it was clear to me that they were not interacting and engaging with one another as as well or as much and as often as they should. So, uh, that 90 day team was pulled together, and these were people that I I knew and respected. And again, I wanted them to work full time on this. And during this 90 day period, they would go out, canvas the organization, hold interviews and, you know, meet with groups and individuals and senior leaders and others.

And I would regularly get together with them and and hear about what they had uncovered or what their findings looked like they were going to be. And again, I, I, I told them that, you know, you can come back after 90 days and tell me that the agency is optimally configured. But you're gonna have to prove it to me, because I didn't think that that was gonna be the case. Early on, when I that 90 day group was formed, I put out a message to the workforce saying I was going to be embarking on this.

Uh, because I want to make sure the agency was going to always remain the premier intelligence organization in the world. A And, uh, the the reaction to that was was varied. There were some people who really understood and welcomed that review, but there were others who were very wedded to the existing system and were very worried about what Brennan was going to do with this, uh, effort. During the course of those 90 days, I constantly tried to communicate with folks, uh, again, with messages that went out to the workforce, send out regular emails, um, and, uh, held meetings with a variety of folks.

And I could tell that there was a fair amount of concern and also a lot of opposition. And so there were, you know, pockets of opposition that were forming. But I also could see that, uh, some of the folks who were maybe skeptical or dubious about it initially, once they better understood what the objective was, I think they were open-minded as far as what this 90 day group might come up with.

So you started off, it sounds like, with a kind of a rapid diagnostic phase, and you had hand-selected senior folks with a variety of perspectives and credibility in the organization. To come back to you with the facts, right, to prove or disprove, or land somewhere in the middle on your hypothesis.

Yes, yeah, and I, I told them that, uh, this 90 day group, um, I told them that there were several experiences that really shaped my views. One was I was in the agency when the Defense Department went through its own transformation reorganization as a result of the Goldwater Nichols Act. When it brought together the services Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and put them into combined, a unitary commands, and it was much more effective way of getting the services to collaborate and to work together and be able to empower one another with their capabilities.

And I said, I always liked that model where you had that, you know, center construct. And then I told them that the National Counterterrorism Center experience for me, you know, it was, uh, indoctrination and a baptism for me in systems engineering and, w- you know, the importance of understanding the the various parts of the ecosystem. Uh, so I, I let that 90 day group know that I was leaning towards something that was going to be transformative and that my experiences told me that.

Particularly in this day and age, whether or not you're in government, um, uh, or private sector, and when I was at, uh, when I was standing at the National Counterterrorism Center, I did a fair amount of benchmarking against the private sector. Different types of companies, uh, that had a worldwide presence, or, uh, in the the media and press and other types of, you know, companies that had a, you know, the product was, you know, information. Or, uh.

So, although the intelligence mission and and business is rather unique, there are a lot of similarities in terms of how organizations, I believe, really need to have term matrix model. That you're able to bring together the capabilities that exist within your organization. And to make sure that those individual parts and the individuals in the organization understand that their responsibility is to pursue the enterprise objectives. But in doing so, they need to find ways to empower other parts of the organization, and they need to make sure that they seek out others to empower them.

And you're only going to do that through some type of integrated model, collaborative model, uh, which is what I really wanted to see the agency, uh, do.

It sounds like you also pushed them beyond. I know you talked about configuration and a bit of the org design, but much past boxes and lines to ways of working and people's mindsets, and just kind of how they view their job.

Yeah, there's a big culture issue. And, you know, the agency, you know, St started in 1948, so there was a long period of time, over 60 years, uh, 70 years, that the agency was used to a certain way of doing work. And people were were born into that organization. And people were telling me, Y- you know, why don't you just tell us to collaborate more or to work better together? You why do you have to go through this?

You know, this whole process of of transformation and changing organizational structures. And I said, Well, a lot of times, those cultures remain deeply ingrained. And unless you change some of that structure and your daily business processes and activities, and, importantly, also the chains of command. I felt as though those stovepipes were always going to remain, irrespective of whatever type of exhortation I give them to to work more collaboratively together. Uh, so, yeah, I, I, I felt that I I needed to do something radical and in, uh, the true fashion of government.

The task force came up with 3 proposals, a low, a medium and a high. So it's like every briefing I've been to in the White House Situation Room. If there was options, it would be low, medium, high, and and usually they put a very low one and a high one, and so everybody can choose the medium one. Well, I wanted to go for the high one, and they they knew that, and I decided, uh, and selected, it would be the high option where we would transform the agency and reconfigure it.

And that's when we put together what's called mission centers, where we would bring together the different expertise and capabilities of the agency analysis, operations, science, technology, cyber, digital. And have them work cheek to jowl on different regional areas, as well as, uh, issue areas, uh. So working in the Middle East, or working on terrorism, or working on counterintelligence, or they were going to be working together as opposed to within those other stovepipes. So once the this 90 day group came up with some proposals, uh, I think they knew that I was gonna choose the high one, which I did.

And then the the challenge was putting together an implementation team to be able to move forward. And I have to say that as talented as CIA officers are, we do not have the expertise in change management that was necessary, either coming up with ideas about how to change an organization or transform it and refine it, as well as how to implement that change. And so we had to go outside and and seek outside expertise from the private sector, uh, from those entities that have that experience that could help us through this.

And so we had a group that, you know, helped us facilitate the process of that, that transformation. And especially since the when it was announced what we were going to do, those, um, opposition groups formed. It was a a a rather sort of aggressive effort to try to undermine it. But I really felt that there was a very strong effort on the part of those who were involved in this to try to make things go as smoothly as possible, despite the dislocations that were being caused.

And, uh, you know, I, I kept the White House informed about this. I felt that, you know, my my boss was the President of the United States and President Obama. Since I had worked with him very closely for the first four years, I think he he trusted me. I informed Congress, who were, you know, our oversight committees, uh, so it. It was a a process where I knew that I needed at least 18 months or so to be able to put this in place before I was going to be gone.

So between 18 and 24 months, so I I timed the decision to allow us to be able to get this plane off the runway and it got off the runway. And it has survived, despite the fact that there were some folks, including who followed me at the agency, that wanted to revert back to the old system, but I cannot see it going back. So I believe that that modernization process was the most important contribution that I've made to the agency throughout the course of my career.

Because I really do think that it has better positioned the agency to deal again with the challenges of the future. One of the other things that we did was we, for the 1st time, we created a new directorate. So just like in the armed services, we had operations analysis, uh, science, technology and support, but we created a new directorate of digital innovation. It was one of the things that I recognized that this digital domain i is so profoundly impactful on all our lives.

And I wanted to have a a dedicated center of expertise to be able to take full advantage of our expertise, our knowledge, so that we could leverage the digital domain to advance our mission. But also understand what we need to do in order to counter the efforts of our adversaries in the digital domain.

So you went for the high option, right? Set up a new directorate, really large scale change, and you touched on this a little bit. Can you share a little bit more about how you built the team and organized? Those that were gonna drive that transformation for you over those 18 to 24 months? To make sure that it was done in a way which met the really high aspirational vision for change and kept out the opposition, or at least, uh, manage it effectively.

I hand-selected the individuals who were going to be on that 90 day team because I had worked with thousands of agency officers over the course of my career. And I selected a an operations officer to lead up that team. Because in the CIA, the operations Directorate director of operations is probably is the most influential, powerful, and the one who really is at the pointy end of the spear as far as overseas. And so I wanted to, and I knew that they were going to be, uh, the group that was going to be probably most opposed to it.

So I wanted to make sure that I had somebody at the helm that was going to be respected. So it was very deliberate in terms of who who I chose, not that any of them had a a sense of what I wanted to accomplish. I picked a bunch of people who were deeply, deeply familiar with the intelligence mission overall, and some of who I had served overseas with as well. And then, during the course of that 90 day period, and right before I announced to the workforce, uh, my decision, I told my senior executive staff, the heads of the different components, what my decision was.

And a very close colleague of mine, a very good friend who's headed up the, uh, director of operations, effectively, maybe the the 3rd most powerful person at the agency, um, was really not supportive of this transformation. And I I knew that he was pained, you know, when I when I told him about what my decision was, and I respected him deeply. And I didn't want to have to put him through this because also he was heading up a component of the agency that was also opposed to it.

A large number of them. A And so I, I told him that I was going to be relieving him of that command position. Because I thought it was important that I had somebody in that position who really was supportive and believed in it in order to accomplish it. And so one of the things that I had to do then, as we move forward with this process, was to make some changes in personnel. Because there were individuals either who were actively opposed to it, or people who just were were, uh, it was passive aggressive behavior.

And and I knew that if this was going to have any chance of being born, that I needed to have people who were really, uh, who understood and were going to help champion it. So making those personnel decisions, uh, was important.

I'm sorry. After those 90 days, you had a separate group that stood up.

Yeah, there was a a group that, again, we were working with our outside consultants who were able to pull together the task force that was going to be implementers of this proposal. And, uh, we would, and myself and my deputy would meet with them, um, a, and I would meet with the workforce. And frequently, I would get questions about what's what's broken that you're trying to fix? And I said, Well, that's really not the right question.

The question is, how can we optimize all the skills, capabilities, resource we have? And I and I told them I just didn't think that we were optimally configured. And I gave some examples of companies in the private sector that once were at the very top of their game and led their sector, but were not keeping up with the times. And I said, I always want the CIA to be in this process of continuous adaptation to the changes in the ecosystem.

Uh, cause people would ask me, John, when is this modernization process gonna be over? He said, It's never gonna be over. It's a process of continuous improvement, continuous refinement, adaptation. You have to remain agile as an organization. It it was a a an effort to try to ensure that people heard from me because there were a lot of rumors that were running around. And, you know, sometimes I heard what was being said. And I said, now, boy, you know, if Brennan's planning to do that, I'm opposed too.

Because there was just a lot of misrepresentation of of what we were trying to do. And so, y- you know, communicating with the workforce at all different levels on a regular basis is important, and it's so important for the senior leader of an organization to be involved actively in this effort. Because if it's just delegated and relegated to others, I think, you know, there's gonna be a lot of four corner stall that'll be played in the organization.

But I, I had regularly scheduled meetings with the task force, I had regular meetings scheduled with all different components in the agency, uh, trying to continue to push this. And it was really tough. It was prob- the toughest challenge that I ever faced in my government service, but I I found it also very, very rewarding.

And you mentioned how you dealt with what we will often call like your pirates, right? Those in opposition for those that we would call kind of your captains, or the folks that are right there in the thick of it with you. How did you keep them energized, uh, and motivated, or help them be energized and motivated? In the face of, you know, what was a really important but difficult set of circumstances as they drove the transformation forward?

There's the tactical and the strategic, and, you know, we would be having conversations in some form or fashion every day about, Okay, you know, what, what we're seeing today, what are we seeing this week, what do we have to do? And sometimes those tactical battles can be rather withering as far as, you know, you're subjected to constant fire. But we also had the opportunity to do some step backs and have, you know, offsites. And at the agency, we have a, a building's called Scattergood, and it's been reported in the in the press that this is a place where you have conferences.

And so bring our senior people over there and just say, Okay, you know, how has it been going the last several months, what are we planning the next several? And to me, I I, I found that if you can step away from some of those tactical challenges, you can better appreciate the, uh, the progress that you've made, and you can better appreciate then the impact that it's having. And to me, that gives one an an additional dose of of of adrenaline.

As long as the leaders are involved and there is an opportunity to air issues. And I, I tried to ensure that, you know, everybody in the organization, from, you know, senior leaders to others, felt that they had the opportunity to express themselves. And a lot of times I would hear it, and I might disagree with it, I might agree with it, or might be somewhere in the middle. But I I think it's important for there to be a sense within an organization that there is a sincere and genuine effort on the part of leadership to take into account the realities of change.

Because no matter how much you plan and anticipate, once the rubber hits the road on that transformation process, you're gonna encounter things that you didn't see coming. And there have to be some, you know, changes, and you, you have to be able to be willing to adjust and say, Okay, you know, uh, we didn't get that right, we need to do something different. I hear you

Well, a dose of humility,

more than a dose.

Hm, you know? Another thing we often see in transformations is the need to close some skill gaps. How did you think about some of the skill gaps that they had in making the big option a success, and how did you think about addressing those?

Well, I think there were a couple of areas. One is I, I knew that there were a lot of people in the agency who didn't work outside of their silo much at all. So this is gonna be a new experience for them. And so one of the things that we decided to do, um, is to initiate much more comprehensive and thorough joint training programs and courses and opportunities. So that they would start to interact with one another and have a better appreciation for exactly what they each do.

And so that, I think, was important. The biggest skill gap that I found was that while the agency had a lot of really, really talented individuals, you know, in the operations side or in the analytics side, or the science, technology or you name it side, uh, we. We didn't have that many individuals who had experience leading multidisciplinary units. That really takes a fair amount of of experience and training and and lesson learning. I had some opportunities to do that.

The National Counterterrorism Center certainly gave me the opportunity to lead a multidisciplinary organization made up of different types of people. And so when we set up our new structure and I had to put individuals in charge of these mission centers that were purple organizations, there was a very, very small bench of of people who had that experience or were were naturally inclined to it. So executive leadership training, and it's one of the things that I I should have thought about because it.

It was one of the deficiencies that I saw in the agency even before I embarked on this transformation process. That a lot of people, you know, grew up within their organization and they didn't have a lot of out-of-body experiences. You know, when I was director, I used to encourage as many rotations as possible inside and outside the agency to get that exposure. So, um, I think it it's almost a generational issue, and it's my understanding that's the agency now.

It does have more people who have that multidisciplinary experience that they can then tap into if they're if they're tapped to lead these organizations. Uh, so that was, I think, a a a skill gap.

So you you recognized that because of the way the organization had been set up and the incentive structure over 40 50 years, you didn't have very many people that could actually lead the the new mission centers that you were standing up. And so you had to kind of do a immediate intervention there.

Well, I had to select people because we set up 10 mission centers, and so I we had to tap 10 people to head up these organization, these mission centers. And it, it was, it was tough and and and some of them did better than others. But once we had that mission center construct, then people would serve in deputy positions and they would. There would be almost some on-the-job training for that multidisciplinary leadership, you know, requirement there.

Uh, but yeah, it's it's something that I think I see it, not just in at the CIA. You know, when I I consult for organizations now, you know, I see people in different parts of the organization that really are expert. And the best companies that I've seen out there are the ones that really, um, identify the future leaders and give them those out-of-body experiences. Because it's such, it's such a broadening opportunity for them, it opens their eyes, and it also allows them to better understand how the component that they had worked in for ten or 20 years nests within the larger organization.

That's that's so critically important.

You mentioned it's, you know, it's remained right through many administration transitions, through various people that may have even, you know, not been a fan at the outset. Why do you think, uh, this transformation kind of stuck?

Well, you know, there were again just people are used to, you know, what they're used to. And I think it's almost a a natural human tendency to be opposed to change. A And it's interesting because, uh, you know, yeah, a a lot of the criticism came from the retiree community, the ones who were outside, you know, because, oh, yeah, Brennan's, you know, blowing up the agencies, uh, but I I think it, it stuck for a number of reasons.

One is that just the thought of disaggregating different parts of the agency that are working on the same region or the same issue just seems very counterintuitive to to common sense. A And it was very disruptive, dislocating, putting that structure together. So I think there was a reluctance to put the workforce through a reversal of that, which was good. It gave us some time, but also over the last eight years, and now it's been in place for eight, nine years.

Um, a large portion of the agency workforce has joined since the modernization process began. It's it's the only thing they know. A And I've talked to some of, you know, agency employees, the new ones who have joined in. And, you know, they find it hard to believe that it used to be, you know, something, you know, separate or different. So I I think as M as it becomes more accepted and standard. Um, what I would caution, though, any organization, including the agency, to me, stasis is the recipe for failure.

Organizations need to be agile, they need to be dynamic, they need to be able to adapt to the new realities that are out there. And as I pointed out, you know, the digital domain basically exploded in the 1990s, you know, with the internet and and everything that's out there now. And there has to be adjustment made by all companies, organizations, departments, agencies to take that into account. It fundamentally and profoundly changes the way you do your work, and it certainly has profoundly changed the intelligence profession.

So, you know, who knows what the next turn of the wheel is going to be? We have AI, there's going to be quantum computing, there's going to be a lot. And I I think the agency and and other US. government departments and agencies need to always be aware that that ecosystem that they are operating within is under constant flux and change. And it is the responsibility of, especially the leaders of these organizations, to anticipate and to prepare their organization for, uh, that change that is inevitable.

Now, some they're not gonna know what's gonna happen. But keeping organization agile, keeping it adaptable, uh, and not creating, you know, rigid structures that, you know, is gonna be very difficult to change. Uh, to me, I think that's what leaders of any organization really need to be constantly aware of and thinking about for the future.

In some, in some ways, that was the transformation for the CIA. Is less about the ultimate structure you put in place, but more about building that muscle to to keep changing.

Yeah, that's a good way to put it, you know, I, I do think you have to have that, that adaptation muscle that is gonna be constantly flexed. A And there needs to be very, uh, honest reviews, uh, of how things are going. A And, uh, again, I think it's just a a part of of life that, you know, if people are are in a system, sometimes they will, they become hostage to it. And you really have to find ways that you can separate yourself out from that type of fealty or allegiance to a organizational structure.

I mean, given what a success it's been, I think, you know, our audience would love to hear, maybe, uh, kind of 2 final uh questions, which is, are there any things that you would have done differently? And maybe the the other side of that coin is, you know, what advice? Given us a lot to think about here. But are there 2 or 3 pieces of advice that you'd give? A leader that's either, you know, thinking about starting a transformation, or just embarking on it, or maybe is in the middle of one and wants it to accelerate, or kind of, you know, pivot for them to think about.

Yeah, I'm sure there are a lot of things that I could have done better or differently. I thought I was communicating regularly and effectively with the workforce, but looking back on it, probably could have done a better job. Um, y- you know, we were sending out a lot of, you know, messages and emails, and it was my understanding that people were just, you know, here's another message from the director about modernization, you know, delete, because they were just sort of ignoring some of the stuff that was coming out.

And having an effective communication system and effective communicators, I think is is critically important. And there are a lot of opportunities now, particularly with videos. And, you know, there's so much that can be done that can be attention grabbing and also help to clarify maybe some of the things that are ambiguous in people's minds, but also address some of the the misgivings as well as mischaracterizations that are out there. And so I'm, I'm sure we I could have done a better job on on that.

Uh, secondly, throughout my career, I think I could have done a better job, um, interacting with with Congress, cause they were the principal stakeholder. I tend to be a very apolitical person, nonpartisan, and when when politics would start creeping into the national security intelligence environment, and sort of got my back up. And so I, I, I probably should have done a better job of just being more proactive, uh, with my oversight committees and with individual members.

I, I wasn't as proactive as I as I could have been. 3rd, I mentioned that I had to relieve from command a very, you know, senior official and close colleague and friend. I had some good advice from, uh, one of my British counterparts early on, um, when I became CIA director, and he was speaking from experience. He said, John, if if there are senior personnel decisions that you feel need to be made, don't delay it because, um, you pay a price.

I If the members of your senior team are really not with you on a major, um, initiative and you think that they're not gonna get there, make the move earlier rather than later, because it's costly if you don't. And then finally, I, I guess, as I mentioned before, this this lack of multidisciplinary leadership experience and expertise in in CIA's ranks. Again, I should have anticipated that. And maybe while the before the modernization program actually was implemented and the centers were stood up, uh, probably should have pulled some people out and put them into, you know, leadership training courses and given them some more exposure.

And maybe sent them off for 60 90 days rather than parachuting them into these positions and expecting them then to just adapt to their new multidisciplinary role. So those are the things that I think I would have done differently, and so in some respects, that's the advice I would, I would give to folks. But I think more more fundamentally, as I think I alluded to before, and as I I said to some members of Congress when I had to testify in front of them.

As director of the CIA, uh, I felt I was the CEO of the CIA, as a chief executive officer, and it was really my, not just responsibility, but my obligation to ensure that whenever I would hand off the baton of leadership to my successor, I would leave the organization in a bit better shape than when I found it. Each director, each leader, should be thinking about that, that it's really their obligation to be thinking about the the health of the organization, the workforce that they lead, and what's important to come after them.

And, you know, I'm, I'm. I wouldn't encourage, you know, every leader to engage in a a reorganization or a transformation process. But I I do think it's important for leadership to have that, y- y- y- you know, the the strategic vision and to be thinking about how the organization that they lead is going to be able to improve its its performance, its standing, its capabilities, its effectiveness, its efficacy, you know, over time. And that requires not just in the private sector, you know, to me, it's not just, you know, the the quarterly financials, because quarterly financials are quarterly.

Um, it, it, it may may mask a deeper, longer term issue that needs to be addressed. And that's where I I really do think that, you know, cabinet secretaries, agency directors, CEOs, others, uh, presidents of organizations really need to be the one who ensures that the future is going to be even brighter for the organization. But also recognize that, as smart as they may be, they really need the insight, the assistance, the support, the advice, the, uh, the recommendations of of others.

That's why, you know, I, I knew that as much as I thought I knew about the agency, I needed to have those ten people work on this full time for 90 days, cause I needed the benefit of that. Uh, so to me, the heading up the National Counterterrorism Center and heading up the CIA were two of the most exciting jobs I had. Because what I did not just was so integral to mission accomplishment, but was so impactful as far as the workforce while I was leading them.

But as part of a legacy, the your impact is felt over time, and it damn well better be a positive impact. As opposed to leaving an organization and saying, okay, over to you. You should be doing what you can while you're at the helm to try to make sure that, uh, y- you know, uh, to me, uh, uh. The mark of a good manager and leader is someone who can leave an organization and the organization can function well.

Because they put in place the system that is not dependent on an individual, that it is configured in a way that, uh, again, takes full advantage and leverages the capabilities within an organization. And and to me, that's that's what leadership is all about.

Well, thank you, thank you for being with us today on the podcast, and also thank you for what you've done. You know, as an American, I know I sleep better at night with the CIA. You having left it better than you found it.

Well, thanks so much, Megan. I really appreciate this opportunity. It it brings back some fond memories, it brings back some some remembrances, also that, uh, you know, were were were challenging. But again, I think all the, uh, the time, effort, energy and blood, sweat and tears, uh, were worth it. Um, and, uh, to be honest, there were. There were times during it that I I said to myself, you know, maybe I should have just been on autopilot and just been a caretaker director.

That's, you know, those those thoughts, you know, went away pretty quickly when I, when I realized just how important the stakes were.

Well, thank you for doing it.

Thanks, Peter.

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