# Interview with Howard Marks: Masters in Business (Audio)

- **Show:** Masters in Business
- **Published:** 17 Feb 2017
- **Source:** https://omny.fm/shows/masters-in-business/interview-with-howard-marks-masters-in-business-au
- **Transcript:** https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/masters-in-business/interview-with-howard-marks-masters-in-business-audio-cb5d3c/
- **Provider:** OpenNash Podcasts (machine-generated)

## In brief

Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital, argues that investing success depends on the price you pay, not the quality of what you buy. Because the future cannot be predicted, he says investors should read the market's current mood, avoid forecasts, and build portfolios that survive many outcomes. He says real outperformance requires uncomfortable, contrarian positions that look wrong for a while.

The central tension is between the comfort of consensus and the discomfort needed to profit. Marks shows it through his decade of unanswered memos, his heavy buying after Lehman failed in 2008, and his warnings about indexing and fees. He also worries that low interest rates push investors and underfunded public pensions into more risk than they realize.

## Key insights

1. **Price paid matters more than asset quality** Marks says Citicorp's "Nifty Fifty" investors in top companies lost about 80 to 90 percent because they overpaid. He concluded no asset is too good to be overpriced, so investing is about buying things well.
2. **Marks prepares for the future instead of predicting** He argues the future is unpredictable and cites Galbraith's line about forecasters. Oaktree builds portfolios that do acceptably in many scenarios and refuses to base decisions on macro forecasts.
3. **Market sentiment shows when to buy aggressively** Marks asks how much optimism is baked into prices. In late 2008, with almost no optimism left, Oaktree called 58 percent of an $11 billion fund in 15 weeks.
4. **Active managers must differ from the index** Marks says index exposure costs about six basis points while the average active manager charges about 94 more. To justify that, a manager must dare to be different and accept being wrong for a time.
5. **Low interest rates push investors into risk** Marks says people may not feel bullish but act that way because yields are near zero, making them "handcuff volunteers". Public pensions assuming 7.5 percent returns face a gap, since the five-year Treasury fell from 6.5 percent to 1.5 percent.

## Questions this episode answers

### What does Howard Marks mean by second-level thinking?

It means not just judging what is good, but judging what everyone else believes and what is already in the price. Marks uses Keynes's beauty contest, where you pick the faces the average reader will find prettiest, to show it. He says different thinking only helps if it is also right.

### Why does Howard Marks say he does not make predictions about the future?

He believes the future is not predictable, and he agrees with Galbraith that forecasters either don't know or don't know they don't know. So Oaktree builds portfolios that do reasonably well across many possible scenarios and doesn't base decisions on macro forecasts.

### What did Oaktree do during the 2008 financial crisis?

Marks says Oaktree bought aggressively after Lehman Brothers failed on September 15, 2008, investing over half a billion dollars a week. It called 58 percent of an $11 billion fund, about $6.5 billion, in 15 weeks.

### Is passive investing better than paying for an active manager, according to Marks?

Marks says the average investor earns average results before fees and below average after them, so many people are moving to index funds. He adds that active managers who hug the benchmark waste their fees, and real active managers must dare to be different.

### Why is Howard Marks worried about public pension funds?

He says many state and local pensions are woefully underfunded and still assume high returns, when safe yields have dropped sharply. He points to Illinois, where pensions are constitutionally guaranteed, and says taxpayers may eventually bear the burden.

## Facts

- **Howard Marks** [0:03:36]: "I took Japanese and I loved it. And so I turned that into my minor and I took 15 credits in the graduate, what was then called the Oriental Studies Department."
- **Howard Marks** [0:04:41]: "I was director of research for equities from 75 to 78. The bank was what was called the nifty 50 investor."
- **Howard Marks** [0:04:41]: "That corrected in the 70s. The investor in these great companies probably lost 80 to 90 % of his money."
- **Howard Marks** [0:06:06]: "So I moved over to the bond department in May of 78, started the fund in August. And in August, I got the phone call to change my life."
- **Howard Marks** [0:11:13]: "So I published the first memo called The Route to Performance, 1990."
- **Howard Marks** [0:13:01]: "On the first day of 2000, I wrote a memo called bubble.com about the possible fragility of the tech bubble."
- **Howard Marks** [0:14:11]: "I wrote a memo called The Race to the Bottom, which talked about the fact that when investments are in short supply and people are in heat to make them"
- **Howard Marks** [0:17:40]: "But they all start from the base rate. And the central banks said back in 2009 or 2010, let's make the base rate zero."
- **Howard Marks** [0:25:55]: "Oaktree invested extremely aggressively between September 15th of 08, which was the day Lehman went under."
- **Howard Marks** [0:28:12]: "Keynes hypothesized a beauty contest in which the newspaper ran the pictures of 20 young women."
- **Howard Marks** [0:30:57]: "John Bogle at Vanguard invented the index fund, I don't know, probably 30, 35 years."
- **Howard Marks** [0:35:12]: "the average manager is charging 94 basis points more, which is a straight subtraction from the performance of their funds."
- **Howard Marks** [0:45:28]: "we had the first close of that in March 07. We had the last close in March 08 and by that time it was 11 billion"
- **Howard Marks** [0:46:31]: "So we called 58 % of $11 billion, which is $6.5 billion, over 15 weeks."
- **Howard Marks** [0:51:03]: "most pension funds have switched to 7.5%. But if you think about it, the five-year T-bill, Treasury note, used to pay 6.5%."
- **Howard Marks** [0:53:13]: "like in Illinois where the pension fund is a right that's guaranteed in the Constitution and you can't play with pensions."
- **Howard Marks** [0:54:54]: "But there is no provision for state bankruptcies in the bankruptcy code."
- **Howard Marks** [0:55:04]: "There was no provision for bankruptcy. That was one of the challenges in resolving that issue, and it had to be done consensually."
- **Howard Marks** [1:00:22]: "We don't have a general research pool. We have research teams assigned to every strategy. We have a refusal to base investment decisions on macro forecasts"
- **Howard Marks** [1:02:42]: "We get paid at Oak Tree on how the firm did, how the team did, what we believe of your contribution and your potential."
- **Howard Marks** [1:04:51]: "Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Nicholas Taleb talks about the fact that the future is indeterminate and that events are unpredictable in large part because the world is subject to randomness."
- **Howard Marks** [1:05:41]: "I wrote a memo called Risk in 06. and updated it, risk revisited in 14."
- **Howard Marks** [1:09:44]: "I went into investment management primarily because I had had a good summer job at Citibank in 1968, and I enjoyed it. And all those jobs offered about the same pay."
- **Howard Marks** [1:14:10]: "my book the most important thing has 20 chapters and each chapter says the most important thing is and then it's a different thing"
- **Howard Marks** [1:15:05]: "And in 2010, I got an email from Warren and he said, if you'll write a book, I'll give you a blurb for the jacket."
- **Speaker 5** [0:03:11]: "17 distressed debt funds have averaged 19 % after fees for the past 22 years,"

## Transcript

**[0:00:00] Howard Marks:** At KKR, we've spent 50 years understanding what matters to our clients and companies. From pioneering private equity to investing across credit, real assets, insurance, and sports, KKR has built the experience to navigate complexity, the judgment to recognize opportunity, and the conviction to create lasting value. Because when people and institutions are counting

**[0:00:20] Speaker 5:** on us, understanding what matters isn't just important, it's everything. KKR, Understanding what matters. Visit kkr.com slash what matters. Congratulations! You've built a dashboard.

**[0:00:33] Howard Marks:** But now comes the follow-up question. And the follow-up to the follow-up. And the dashboard for that.

**[0:00:39] Howard Marks:** Meet Hex. Give everyone the power to ask their own questions,

**[0:00:43] Howard Marks:** explore data, and build with AI. All in natural language. Because every answer should spark another question. Limited only by your curiosity, not your data team's bandwidth. Go deeper than dashboards. Visit hex.ai.

**[0:01:25] Barry Ritholtz:** This week on the podcast, I have the one and only Howard Marks of Oak Tree Capital. Dear Lord, this was a master class in everything from investing to valuation to cycles to managing your own emotions. This is one of those podcasts that I guarantee you will listen to two or three or four times. times my job was to just push Howard a little bit in one direction and then stay the hell out of his way he is so experienced knowledgeable smart insightful full of wisdom charming and and he also has a bit of a devilish sense of humor which I don't know if you'll hear it but in the things we discussed off camera, so to speak.

**[0:02:19] Barry Ritholtz:** I just find his insights and his perspective delightful. I could go on at great length of all the things we discussed. I won't. I'm just going to say with no further ado, my 90 minutes with Howard Marks.

**[0:02:37] Howard Marks:** This is Masters in Business with Barry Ritholtz on Bloomberg Radio.

**[0:02:42] Speaker 5:** My special guest today is Howard Marks. He is the co-founder and chairman of Oak Tree Capital

**[0:02:54] Barry Ritholtz:** Management, and he has a long and storied history on Wall Street. Rather than go through all of the details, we'll discuss it as we get to it. I am compelled to mention that Oak Tree's

**[0:03:11] Speaker 5:** 17 distressed debt funds have averaged 19 % after fees for the past 22 years,

**[0:03:20] Barry Ritholtz:** far outpacing their peers. That's about as much of an intro as I think we really need. Let's jump right into this. I find your history really fascinating. You minored in Japanese studies.

**[0:03:33] Speaker 5:** Ever plan on doing something besides finance?

**[0:03:36] Howard Marks:** No, I never did. I was a Wharton kid. But at those days in the mid 60s, you were required to have a non-business minor and also to have one semester of the literature of a foreign country. Really? Most people took English or French. For some reason, I have no recollection of. I took Japanese and I loved it. And so I turned that into my minor and I took 15 credits in the graduate, what was then called the Oriental Studies Department.

**[0:04:04] Barry Ritholtz:** And you had always wanted to go into finance, and I think that's reflected. You ended up graduating from Wharton with a major in finance, an MBA from University of Chicago, and then you move over as an equity analyst at Citicorp. Eventually, you become the director of research there before you find your way to the trust company of the West. and there you end up focusing on distressed debt, high yield bonds and convertible securities before you became their CIO for fixed income.

**[0:04:37] Barry Ritholtz:** How do you transition from equity analyst to fixed income analyst?

**[0:04:41] Howard Marks:** Well, it was a real life story, not a dream story. As you say, I was director of research for equities from 75 to 78. The bank was what was called the nifty 50 investor. We've invested in the 50 best and fastest growing companies in America. And it was a disaster because the official dictum was it didn't matter what price you paid. The prices paid were highly excessive. That corrected in the 70s. The investor in these great companies probably lost 80 to 90 % of his money.

**[0:05:14] Barry Ritholtz:** Haven't we heard that expression? It doesn't matter what price you pay. You just have to own this.

**[0:05:19] Howard Marks:** Well, we do hear that. And of course, that's exactly the wrong thing to say. What I say is there's no such thing as a good idea or a bad idea in the investment world without reference to price. It's not what you buy, it's what you pay. And finally, investing is not a matter of buying good things, it's a matter of buying things well.

**[0:05:38] Barry Ritholtz:** Meaning at the appropriate valuation.

**[0:05:41] Howard Marks:** Right, or less. And people who don't know the difference shouldn't be in the business.

**[0:05:46] Barry Ritholtz:** Well, that seems to be an issue that comes up every 20 years.

**[0:05:50] Howard Marks:** Anyway, the bank faltered with its nifty-fifty. They thought it would be great if they had somebody other than me as director of research.

**[0:05:58] Howard Marks:** And I asked my boss, Peter Vermilier, what's next? He said, I'd like you to start a convertible bond fund.

**[0:06:06] Howard Marks:** So I moved over to the bond department in May of 78, started the fund in August. And in August, I got the phone call to change my life. The head of the bond department said, there's some guy named Milken or something in California, and he deals with something called high yield bonds. And can you figure out what that is? A client had come in and asked for a high yield bond fund, and they asked me to be the manager.

**[0:06:34] Howard Marks:** And that put me in the right place at the right time. So it was pure luck.

**[0:06:38] Barry Ritholtz:** Just serendipity. He happened to invest you,

**[0:06:41] Speaker 5:** and this client had come in with that issue.

**[0:06:42] Howard Marks:** My only contribution, Barry, is that I was smart enough to say yes.

**[0:06:46] Barry Ritholtz:** I'm going to challenge you on that a little later. So that leads to an interesting question. How did your experience with both being an equity analyst and the obvious problems with buy it at any price of the nifty 50, how did that affect your approach to either high yield or subsequently distressed assets?

**[0:07:09] Howard Marks:** Well, what I would say is number one, you learn nothing from success. You only learn from failure. You learn from experience. Experience is what you got when you didn't get what you wanted. And so the experience of buying top quality assets and losing 80%, 90 % was very instructive. And as I say, it convinced me that the key is the price you pay. There's no asset which is so good that it can't be overpriced. There are few assets which are so bad that they can't be underpriced.

**[0:07:43] Howard Marks:** So when I switched into the high yield bond field that everybody thought was disreputable and unseemly and non-fiduciary, and they called it junk, you know. And I said, well, maybe if it's so disparaged, maybe you can find a bargain. And in fact, that was the case. The common thread between working in equities and working in high yield bonds or distress is that in most of the fixed income world, high grade fixed income, treasuries, and that kind of thing, the only thing that matters is the direction of interest rates.

**[0:08:17] Howard Marks:** Interest rates up, price down. Because everybody assumes there's no credit risk. When you get down into high yield bonds and distressed debt, there is credit risk. I describe it as fixed income where what the company does matters. So you had better be able to judge the future of the company just like you do as an equity analyst. So it was really the right skill set applied to the right asset class.

**[0:08:43] Barry Ritholtz:** I'm still taken by the phrase, experience is what you get when you don't get what you want. Do we credit you for that? Or has that been around longer than you have?

**[0:08:52] Howard Marks:** Well, I'm too old to remember where I got it.

**[0:08:56] Speaker 5:** So you may. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

**[0:09:02] Barry Ritholtz:** My special guest today really needs no introduction. He is Howard Marks. He is the co-chairman and co-founder of Oaktree Capital, which is now a publicly traded company and has done extremely well for its long-term clients. Let's talk about what you're probably best known for, the chairman's memos, which you put out every quarter. And I will quote no lesser an authority than Warren Buffett, who said, when I see memos from Howard Marks in my mail, they're the first thing I open and read.

**[0:09:36] Barry Ritholtz:** I always learn something new. But that's today. And when you first began these a few decades ago, that really wasn't what the response was like.

**[0:09:47] Speaker 5:** Tell us about what happened in the early. When did the memos begin? I started in 1990.

**[0:09:52] Howard Marks:** I'm not, again, I don't exactly remember why. but I remember the events. I went to the Midwest. I met with the head of the pension fund of General Mills. And he explained to me that over the 14 years he had run the fund, he was never above the 27th percentile or below the 47th percentile. And as a result, solidly in the second quartile for 14 years, the funny math about it in our business is if he can do that for 14 years, you end up in the fourth percentile for the entire 14-year period because most people who do well for a while shoot themselves in the foot.

**[0:10:26] Howard Marks:** They're either top 10 or bottom 10. Exactly. So I was very impressed by that. And then I came home and some famous value management firm had had a really tough time

**[0:10:39] Howard Marks:** because they were heavy in the banks and the banks suffered terribly. And the president comes out and he says, well, you know, of course, if you want to be in the top 5 % of money managers, you have to be willing to be in the bottom 5%. And that was not correct. I said, how wrong can you be? My clients don't care if I'm in the top five and they're absolutely unwilling to be in the bottom five.

**[0:10:58] Howard Marks:** I like the other approach where you're steadily just above the middle and that puts you at the top for the long run.

**[0:11:05] Speaker 5:** Second quartile over long periods of time leads to top 5%. If you never have that terrible year to pull you down.

**[0:11:13] Howard Marks:** So I published the first memo called The Route to Performance, 1990.

**[0:11:18] Howard Marks:** The road to performance. The route to performance. The route. And the interesting question, what kept me going? Because as you say, the response was thundering. I never had a response for the first 10 years. I never had one response. Nobody ever said good memo and nobody said I got it and I wrapped the fish in it.

**[0:11:39] Barry Ritholtz:** I have to stop here and emphasize this. This is pre-Twitter, pre-Facebook, pre-email. you were literally spending time writing a memo, printing them out, folding them, addressing envelopes, stamping them, inserting paper into envelopes and taking them to the, they used to have this thing called the mail, the post office and you could mail envelopes that way. So you're doing this for a decade.

**[0:12:06] Howard Marks:** And I might as well have thrown them in the drain because I never heard back. Not a call or nothing. But of course to hear back, somebody would have had to either write me a letter and put a stamp on it and put it in that thing called the post office or pick up the phone and nobody did.

**[0:12:22] Barry Ritholtz:** So it's a solid, so the question that that naturally leads to is you have to be very self-motivated

**[0:12:29] Speaker 5:** to express your views if you're sending this out to deafening silence. Right, and I was writing about stuff I believed in. And this was, it was quarterly then? Is that right?

**[0:12:41] Howard Marks:** No, no, there was only one in 90 and one in 91 and then it started to pick up a little bit. I don't remember, I never did it with a regularity in mind. And by the way, during the crisis, I probably did 10 a year because there was so much to write about. Sure.

**[0:12:56] Barry Ritholtz:** So that's amazing. You kept going. And then something changed in 2000.

**[0:13:01] Howard Marks:** On the first day of 2000, I wrote a memo called bubble.com about the possible fragility of the tech bubble. And that had two virtues. Number one, it was right. And number two, it was right quick. It was timely. So, because if you're right, but it takes three years to happen, they don't remember you. You know, there's a saying in our business.

**[0:13:26] Howard Marks:** That's not really right. Well, that's right. There's a saying in our business that being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong. But this was right quickly. And so I think I said in the introduction to my book that that made me, after 10 years, I became an overnight success. Right.

**[0:13:43] Speaker 5:** That's right.

**[0:13:44] Barry Ritholtz:** And I remember that memo, Barron's picked it up and the Wall Street Journal picked it up. It made the rounds and it was suddenly, that's exactly right.

**[0:13:54] Howard Marks:** Just like Playboy magazine at summer camp.

**[0:13:56] Barry Ritholtz:** Right. It made the rounds to say the least. So you don't recall what motivated you to start it. And aside from that dot com memo, the bubble dot com, what other ones really are memorable and stay with you?

**[0:14:11] Howard Marks:** I think two indicate the process for taking advantage of extremes of the cycle, which is very important to me. And in March of 07, I wrote a memo called The Race to the Bottom, which talked about the fact that when investments are in short supply and people are in heat to make them, they will bid to an extent that makes them bad investments. and then in, of course, then we had the crisis and then in mid-October, 08, which was the depths of the crisis, I wrote one called Current Developments

**[0:14:53] Howard Marks:** and another, well, maybe the better one,

**[0:14:55] Howard Marks:** called The Limits to Negativism in which I said, you know, everybody knows that investing requires skepticism and most of the time skepticism consists of saying, no, no, no, that's too good to be true. But in the depths of a crisis, skepticism requires you to say, no, that's too bad to be true. And people were telling such horror stories and nobody could imagine any assumption

**[0:15:24] Howard Marks:** which could not be exceeded on the downside. And I said, hey, people are just being too pessimistic.

**[0:15:29] Barry Ritholtz:** We actually heard people say stocks are going to zero.

**[0:15:32] Howard Marks:** Well, and the financial world is gonna melt down. And, you know, most of my, I don't think these things up in my head, Barry. Most of these things stem from some experience.

**[0:15:45] Howard Marks:** Externalities? Experience. And so I had a meeting with the pension manager. I was trying to talk that pension fund into investing in a levered loan fund, a fund of loans that had leverage. And the levered return on the fund, senior loans, was in the 20s. I think 26%.

**[0:16:04] Barry Ritholtz:** And he looks at you like you're crazy.

**[0:16:05] Howard Marks:** Well, not only that, but he said, well, what about if there are defaults? And every default scenario that I assumed, the CIO said, well, what if it's worse than that? What if it's worse? What if it's worse? And eventually I ended up saying, do you have any equities in your pension fund? And the CIO said, yes. I said, well, then you better run out and sell them because the environment you're pushing me to assume everything is valueless.

**[0:16:32] Howard Marks:** And so I ran back to my office and I wrote this memo, The Limits to Negativism, which says sometimes you got to say, no, it can't be that bad.

**[0:16:40] Barry Ritholtz:** I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Howard Marks. He is the founder and co-chairman, co-founder really, of Oaktree Capital Management, which is now a publicly traded company specializing in distressed debt, convertible securities, a whole run of different fixed income-related investment. And let's talk a little bit about distressed debt. I look at the high yield market rates now, and they're as low as they've been since 2014, which is kind of surprising.

**[0:17:15] Barry Ritholtz:** What should we take from that?

**[0:17:17] Howard Marks:** Well, Barry, people ask me, are we in a high yield bubble? And my answer is no, we're in a bond bubble.

**[0:17:23] Speaker 5:** Generally speaking, across the board, doesn't matter.

**[0:17:25] Howard Marks:** The central banks have pulled the interest rates so low that the yields on all fixed income instruments are calibrated relative to each other. That's why we have what's called a yield curve.

**[0:17:40] Howard Marks:** So if the maturity is longer, the yield is higher. If the quality is lower, the yield is higher. If the liquidity is lower, the yield is higher. But they all start from the base rate. And the central banks said back in 2009 or 2010, let's make the base rate zero.

**[0:17:55] Howard Marks:** to get this economy going. And so the incremental return you get for taking time risk, credit risk, illiquidity risk is still about the same as history, but you were starting from such a low rate. So the yield on all bonds is extremely low, including high yield bonds. So you referenced the

**[0:18:15] Barry Ritholtz:** Fed taking rates to zero. Should they not have done that? Should there have been a fiscal policy instead of a monetary policy? What options presented at that time?

**[0:18:24] Howard Marks:** I think it would have been good to have, well, in fact, we did have some fiscal also. But relatively small, right. It would have been good to have some of that. You know, we had, you know, deficit spending, the famous shovel-ready projects and that kind of thing.

**[0:18:40] Howard Marks:** You know, it would have been a good idea, were a good idea. But I think that the monetary was essential. And I think that, you know, So basically, you can't quibble with results. We went through the worst financial crisis in 80 years, and we pulled out of it very quickly. And here we are in 2017. And I would say for most people, it is a distant memory.

**[0:19:04] Barry Ritholtz:** That's true. And especially when you look around the world, if you look at Japan or Europe, if you don't like this economy, well, don't look overseas because we're by far the cleanest shirt and hamper.

**[0:19:14] Howard Marks:** So people, that's a good one. And so people say to me, you know, how do you grade Geithner and Bernanke and Paulson and company on their handling of the crisis? And I said, you know, I don't know if I give them an A, but if you mark them on a curve, they get an A plus.

**[0:19:32] Howard Marks:** Because clearly they did far the best job in the world. And we are out of the crisis. We have had a modest recovery, but there are a lot of bad things that could have happened that didn't to money market funds, to commercial paper and so forth. And here we are in a very healthy environment. So I don't quibble with the people who pulled us out of the crisis. And in fact, I think they did a hell of a good job.

**[0:20:03] Howard Marks:** I would not have liked to have had that job at that time.

**[0:20:06] Barry Ritholtz:** I'll quibble a little bit in saying you can give Paulson the A+. Bernanke and Geithner were part of the team that helped create the crisis, so I have to

**[0:20:16] Speaker 5:** dock them a few points.

**[0:20:17] Howard Marks:** But it certainly is Paulson who gets unmitigated credit.

**[0:20:23] Barry Ritholtz:** To say the least. Let's get back to distressed debt. And the issue you raise here about us doing fairly well, I noticed that credit spreads are the favorite weapon of the perma bear. When they get too tight, the answer is, well, investors are so complacent. And as soon as they start to widen, it's, OK, here comes the next disaster. What is going on with credit spreads and why is it used as that double-edged sword?

**[0:20:55] Howard Marks:** Well, credit spreads are to some extent an indicator of psychology. But I don't believe in taking my instructions from the market.

**[0:21:08] Howard Marks:** I put out a memo about a year ago as a result of a conversation I had here at Bloomberg

**[0:21:15] Howard Marks:** where people were, remember the markets got off to a terrible start last year. January, yeah. And everybody was bugging me. Isn't that a sell signal? If the market's falling, is it a sell signal? As goes January. Right. So I ran back to my office again. And this time I wrote a memo entitled,

**[0:21:29] Howard Marks:** What Does the Market Know? And I think it doesn't know much. But I do think that the credit spread is an indicator of the values that are available. And when credit spreads are wide, that means for the benefit of your listeners, that the interest on low grade bonds is much higher than it is on

**[0:21:48] Howard Marks:** high-grade bonds, then I think you have substantial incentive to invest in low-grade instruments.

**[0:21:56] Howard Marks:** It also is an indicator of fear. That's why spreads are wide. When spreads narrow, it means

**[0:22:03] Howard Marks:** people are less afraid, as you say, more complacent. I would say more risk tolerant, and that the reward for bearing incremental risk is on the decline, which is not a good thing.

**[0:22:14] Barry Ritholtz:** I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital. Let's talk a little bit about volatility and uncertainty. You have a number of delightful quotes about the future. And one of my favorite is investing concerns exactly one thing, dealing with the future, yet it's clearly impossible to know anything about the future. you can't predict, you can only prepare. Discuss that.

**[0:22:49] Howard Marks:** Well, everybody who wants to engage in investing has to reach a conclusion as to whether the future is predictable or not. If you believe it is, you'll behave one way. You will reach a conclusion about what the future holds and put together the perfect portfolio for that eventuality. If you don't believe it, you will think about different possibilities, and you'll put together a portfolio that will sub-optimize, that will do well under many of them, and not badly.

**[0:23:26] Howard Marks:** And that's a difference of approach. I don't believe the future is predictable.

**[0:23:33] Howard Marks:** I'm from the believers in what John Kenneth Galbraith said. He said, we have two kinds of forecasters, the ones who don't know, and the ones who don't know, they don't know. Well, I know I don't know. And so I try to put together portfolios that will do well in a variety

**[0:23:48] Barry Ritholtz:** of environments. But without trying to make a prediction about here's what's going to happen to interest rates. Exactly. Here's what the Fed's going to do. Here's where's the recession.

**[0:23:56] Howard Marks:** Exactly. So you can have a portfolio which is prepared for a variety of eventualities without insisting that any one of them is going to be the case.

**[0:24:11] Barry Ritholtz:** And that leads to another quote of yours. We can make excellent investment decisions on the basis of present observations with no need to make guesses about the future. Essentially what you just said.

**[0:24:22] Howard Marks:** That's right. You know, let me make clear one thing, Barry. It would be great if we knew what the future held. It's not like I don't care. We would be great investors if we knew what the market was going to do tomorrow and which stocks would do best. But if you reach the conclusion that you can't know, then you look

**[0:24:42] Howard Marks:** for another avenue to deal with the future. And I'm in that category.

**[0:24:47] Barry Ritholtz:** And that's figuring out what's happening today and adjusting accordingly.

**[0:24:50] Howard Marks:** So I do something I call take the temperature of the market.

**[0:24:53] Barry Ritholtz:** Okay. How does one take the temperature of the market? In fact, when we look at the market today, let's talk about stocks. The VIX is pretty much as low as it gets for any extended period of time. what does that tell about market risks? What does that tell us about the temperature of the market?

**[0:25:11] Howard Marks:** Well, you want to know what kind of thinking is being incorporated in investment decisions. If I was considering an investment, I could know only one fact. I'd like to know how much optimism is incorporated in the price. Because if there's a lot of optimism, then there's a lot of possibility of disappointment.

**[0:25:31] Howard Marks:** And if the truth turns out to be less good than the expectations, then the price will fall.

**[0:25:39] Howard Marks:** If there's no optimism, as there was back in October of 2008 at the depths of financial crisis, then I know we can buy risky assets aggressively because there's no possibility of disappointment.

**[0:25:55] Howard Marks:** or the assumptions that are factored into the price are as negative as possible or more. And so, you know, Oaktree invested extremely aggressively between September 15th of 08, which was the day Lehman went under. Right. And the end of the year, we invested over half $1 billion a week. Wow. Over that period. And that turned out to be -

**[0:26:20] Barry Ritholtz:** Mostly fixed income or was it a mix?

**[0:26:23] Howard Marks:** Well, most of what we do is what we call credit, non-government fixed income, and most of it was distressed debt. So the point is,

**[0:26:33] Howard Marks:** the temperature of the market was frigid, which meant there was no enthusiasm and we could buy. Buffett says, the less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own affairs, which means if other people are unworried, we should be terrified. If other people are terrified, we should be aggressive.

**[0:27:00] Barry Ritholtz:** So you've talked a lot about second degree thinking. I think a lot of people, if I were to ask them, if I could share with you one aspect of a stock or a market, they would say, tell me valuation. You're taking that a step further and saying, tell me sentiment and what is already reflected in valuation. So let's talk about second degree thinking. It's a phrase you've referred to repeatedly.

**[0:27:27] Howard Marks:** Well, I actually call it second level.

**[0:27:29] Barry Ritholtz:** Second level. Right. I think in terms of degrees, because it's been so cold out, but what is second level thinking?

**[0:27:37] Howard Marks:** Well, you agreed with me earlier when I said, if you think like everybody else, you'll take the same actions as everybody else.

**[0:27:45] Howard Marks:** If you take the same actions as everybody else, you'll have the same results of everybody else. So, and by the way, it seems mathematically unarguable. Right. Well, if that's true, then in order to be a superior investor, you have to think different from everybody else. And, but different is not enough. You have to be different and right.

**[0:28:09] Barry Ritholtz:** So to some degree, this is Keynes' famous beauty contest.

**[0:28:12] Howard Marks:** Yes, this is absolutely. Absolutely. Keynes hypothesized a beauty contest in which the newspaper ran the pictures of 20 young women. It was a very chauvinist time. And he offered a prize, or the newspaper offered a prize, to the reader whose entry, ranking the girls in terms of prettiness, was closest to the average entry. The first level thinker says, I'm going to figure out which girls are the prettiest. The second level thinker says, I'm gonna figure out which girls the average reader will say are the prettiest.

**[0:28:47] Howard Marks:** That's how you win the contest.

**[0:28:49] Barry Ritholtz:** Now, don't you run into the next digression, which is the next person thinking, I'm gonna think how the second level thinkers. At what point do investors start to outsmart themselves? Can you take that thinking too far?

**[0:29:03] Howard Marks:** Yeah, well, you can go to third level and fourth level, but I think second level is good enough. You know, I mean, when you get into the question of trying to figure out which girls the average reader is going to conclude the average reader is going to say is the prettiest, it gets very complex. And so with the niceties, you have to kind of factor in the realities of can you do it?

**[0:29:28] Howard Marks:** So if you can merely come up with a better sense of value and right price than others on a consistent basis, I think that's good enough without going to third and fourth levels.

**[0:29:46] Barry Ritholtz:** I like the way that sounds. Let's talk a little bit about the opposite of trying to guess how other people are going to guess and bypass it and talk a little bit about the shift towards passive investing and indexing. Some people have said we don't want to try and guess what the best stock is or what other people are going to think what the best stock is. Just buy the whole thing and not worry about it.

**[0:30:12] Howard Marks:** Well, and in fact, Barry, some people are observing that most people who try to do that don't do it well.

**[0:30:17] Howard Marks:** and that the average mutual fund doesn't add value. Well, it's obvious that on average, the average investor does average before fees and below average after fees and trading impact. So now there's a groundswell

**[0:30:37] Howard Marks:** toward what's called passive investing or indexation. You buy an index fund. You buy a fund that buys a little bit of everything. By the way, this theory was advanced 50 years ago when I started at the University of Chicago. So it's nothing new.

**[0:30:51] Howard Marks:** It's a sign of how thinking goes that it took 50 years for it to take hold.

**[0:30:57] Howard Marks:** But the point is John Bogle at Vanguard invented the index fund, I don't know, probably 30, 35 years. Yeah. Okay. 40 years ago. And it's been creeping up. but the movement toward passive has become a groundswell in the last year or two because a lot of people are throwing in the towel and basically this stems from university of chicago work on something called the efficient market hypothesis which said that so many people are out there trying to make money in the market and they're all intelligent computer literate with access to databases, highly motivated, objective, and clinical, and that their efforts to find bargains and overpricings cause prices to converge with something called intrinsic value so that there are no bargains.

**[0:31:50] Howard Marks:** And if there are no bargains to be found or overpricings to be avoided, then you can't beat the market. That's the theory.

**[0:31:57] Barry Ritholtz:** We've been speaking with Howard Marks. He is the co-founder, co-chairman, and co-CIO. Are you still co-CIO?

**[0:32:05] Howard Marks:** Co-dishwasher.

**[0:32:06] Barry Ritholtz:** Co-dishwasher of Oak Tree Capital Management. Be sure and stick around where we keep the digital tape rolling and continue to talk about all things valuation. Be sure to check out my daily column on Bloomberg.com or follow me on Twitter at Ritholtz. We love your comments, feedback, and suggestions, write to us at mibpodcast at bloomberg.net. I would be remiss if I did not say you can find all of Howard's really delightful and beautifully written memos at oaktreecapital.com or his book.

**[0:32:43] Barry Ritholtz:** We didn't even get to The Only Thing That Matters. His book, The Only Thing That Matters, The Most Important Thing. The Only Thing That Matters is the book, which is The Most Important thing, and you can find that at Amazon or at fine bookstores near you. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. If you're having a business dispute, the process can be slow and drawn out, especially if you rely on litigation in the courts.

**[0:33:11] Barry Ritholtz:** You can wait for years before your case is resolved, and the longer your case proceeds, the more your case can cost. Not with the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration or mediation with the American Arbitration Association is faster. In fact, nearly 50 % of our cases settle prior to hearings. ADR.org. Resolve faster. Welcome to the podcast. I don't know why I do this every time. Howard, thank you so much for doing this. I always find it delightful and instructional anytime we get to sit down.

**[0:33:41] Barry Ritholtz:** Someone said to me the other day, we were just in Toronto, I guess before winter at at a CFA event, and someone said to me, you know, I've either listened to or seen you interview Howard multiple times. You've become the Howard Marks whisperer. And my response was, I'm pretty sure he doesn't need a whisperer. He's pretty articulate on his own. So let's keep talking about the market because there's so much stuff we didn't get to and so many things.

**[0:34:11] Barry Ritholtz:** We were last speaking about indexing, Bill Miller had a really fascinating quote. He said, the problem with active management isn't active management. The problem with active management is most of those managers are essentially high cost closet indexers. What do you think of something

**[0:34:34] Howard Marks:** like that? Well, I do think that most people tend for maybe career purposes to hug the benchmark. Sure. And to have a portfolio which is not very different from the benchmark,

**[0:34:51] Howard Marks:** in which case you're wasting your money by paying him or her fees. You can get the benchmark for probably six basis points. That's six hundredths of a percent. And active managers probably get

**[0:35:07] Barry Ritholtz:** close to a percent. On average, I think those numbers are about right. Okay. So that means

**[0:35:12] Howard Marks:** the average manager is charging 94 basis points more, which is a straight subtraction from the performance of their funds. And if they don't add at least 94 basis points to the return per year, you might as well go into an index.

**[0:35:32] Barry Ritholtz:** And that was his point. He said if you want to do active, then really do active. Don't waste your time with deposit.

**[0:35:38] Howard Marks:** Well, that goes to what I mentioned before, my memo, dare to be great.

**[0:35:41] Barry Ritholtz:** Dare to be great.

**[0:35:42] Howard Marks:** In order to outperform, you have to dare to be different from the index, which means you have to dare to be wrong.

**[0:35:49] Barry Ritholtz:** You have to be willing to either accept a drawdown or a significant underperformance in any given year.

**[0:35:55] Howard Marks:** Exactly. There is no, the interesting thing about investing is that there is no approach which is guaranteed to work. There can't be, given the nature of markets. Markets abhor certainty.

**[0:36:09] Barry Ritholtz:** Right. I'm so glad you said that because this has been a peeve of mine forever because I want to repeat what you said. Markets abhor certainty. Every time I flick on the TV, some clueless ponder is saying markets hate uncertainty. And if you think back, the only time there's certainty is at extreme tops or extreme bottoms. 2000, when you did the dot-com bubble in January of 2000, markets were sure, they were certain. Valuations didn't matter.

**[0:36:43] Barry Ritholtz:** Trees grow to the sky. Everybody loves it. And back in 2009, March 2009, markets are going to zero. There is no value that is cheap enough. It's all terrible. So I like your quote better. Markets abhor certainty.

**[0:36:59] Howard Marks:** Well, you know, maybe, Barry, I should rephrase.

**[0:37:02] Barry Ritholtz:** No, no, you're stuck with that one. I'm keeping that one. How would you want to rephrase that? Because that's pithy and perfect.

**[0:37:10] Howard Marks:** I think that investors like certainty. Okay. It's just that it's usually wrong and wrongest at the extremes.

**[0:37:21] Barry Ritholtz:** Okay. That's a good.

**[0:37:25] Howard Marks:** It's less of a soundbite.

**[0:37:26] Barry Ritholtz:** It's less of a soundbite, but it explains exactly. Markets abhorrent certainty because investors... Listen, if you're comfortable, then it's probably not a lot of outperformance because... That's right. To get to that point, you have to do something that is intuitively uncomfortable and countervailing to what the crowd is doing.

**[0:37:48] Howard Marks:** Well, Dave Swenson, who runs the endowment at Yale, which has been a great...

**[0:37:52] Howard Marks:** He's been performing endowment for decades. He's been doing it for 30 years, and he has great, great results. He said in his book, Pioneering Portfolio Management, that investment management requires the maintenance of uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions, which in the light of so-called common sense or conventional wisdom, appear irrational. In other words, what everybody believes, common sense, common wisdom, is factored into the price of the stock.

**[0:38:30] Howard Marks:** If you're going to find a bargain, you have to find the times when consensus is wrong. You have to diverge from consensus, which can only be uncomfortable.

**[0:38:43] Speaker 5:** Makes sense.

**[0:38:44] Howard Marks:** Yeah. You have to be idiosyncratic and people will look at you and you say, who is that not selling out of his tech stocks in the first quarter of 2000?

**[0:38:54] Barry Ritholtz:** Which raises a question. You're not just in an ivory tower penning notes and sending them out and not caring if people are responding. Oak Tree is now running 40? 4,000. No, 100. 100 billion. Yes. In 2000, you guys were still running tens of billions of dollars. So you have real clients with real assets at risk, real money at risk, and their jobs on the line because your clients are primarily institutional. How do you handle when something looks idiosyncratic?

**[0:39:31] Barry Ritholtz:** People say, Howard has finally gone off the deep end this time. And the phones start lighting up in the office. hey, what are you guys doing? How do you manage that as a company? How does the organization handle it?

**[0:39:45] Howard Marks:** Well, I think one of the money managers' most important jobs is client education. And hopefully we've convinced our clients by now that you have to be contrarian

**[0:39:55] Howard Marks:** and you have to look wrong for a while and so forth. And it's our job to hold their hands when we do extreme things. You know, I wrote this memo, Current Developments, back October the 8th of 08, probably the low point of credit. And I mentioned that I was talking to a reporter at that time. He said, what are you doing? I said, we're buying. He said to me, you are? Like that, with an exclamation point.

**[0:40:20] Howard Marks:** Well, everybody else he spoke to was selling. That's right. And so when everybody, if there are 100 money managers and 99 are selling, what do you want to do? Do you want to buy or sell?

**[0:40:32] Barry Ritholtz:** You want to be the – Well, actually, the answer is most of the time the crowd is right. It's at those extremes where I want to be on the opposite side of that trade.

**[0:40:40] Howard Marks:** But only at the extremes are 99 out of 100 selling. Right. That's right. And if 99 out of 100 selling, then there must be no optimism in prices. Prices cannot be high relative to intrinsic value. Right. You can't lose by buying. So what about the process?

**[0:40:56] Barry Ritholtz:** We've seen this happen over and over again, especially with value stocks. I assume it's similar with distressed assets or anything credit related, which is just because something is cheap doesn't mean it's not going to get cheaper. There's a famous quote. David Einhorn said a stock that's down 90 % is a stock that was down 80 % before it got cut in half. So how do you know? I love that line. How do you know when you're early?

**[0:41:26] Barry Ritholtz:** You're not necessarily going to tick the bottom. you're prepared to buy something and keep buying it as it continues to fall out of bed?

**[0:41:34] Howard Marks:** You never know when you're at the bottom. It is logically impossible because what is the bottom? The bottom is the price below which things never went. You went. That's a past tense word. You can only assess the bottom in the past tense. So if you can't find the bottom,

**[0:41:59] Barry Ritholtz:** what can you do? You can buy that smile at the bottom of the car.

**[0:42:03] Howard Marks:** Well, what I would say, you can buy when it's cheap. That's all you can do. Even if it's quote unquote early. Even if it's early, because you don't know if you're early or

**[0:42:11] Howard Marks:** not. But if you're really no value, then you know when things are cheap. By the way, and you have to bear in mind, everybody who wants to be a successful investor has to bear in mind that cheap and going up tomorrow are not synonymous.

**[0:42:30] Barry Ritholtz:** Right, very different.

**[0:42:31] Howard Marks:** And so if you buy because it's cheap, it goes down, you buy more.

**[0:42:37] Barry Ritholtz:** It's still cheap, you keep buying.

**[0:42:39] Howard Marks:** No, it's cheaper. It goes down more, you buy more.

**[0:42:43] Barry Ritholtz:** If you liked it at nine, you're going to love it at eight and at seven.

**[0:42:47] Howard Marks:** And then you run out of money and you raise more money.

**[0:42:50] Barry Ritholtz:** Really?

**[0:42:51] Howard Marks:** And you keep doing it, but eventually you have to be proved right.

**[0:42:57] Barry Ritholtz:** So at what point does, well, that's me buzzing. At what point do you say to yourselves, I'm out of money, I need more capital and you go back to the client base? What do they say in response to that?

**[0:43:13] Howard Marks:** Well, sometimes they say, we have faith in you, here's some more money and sometimes they say, you know, you're obviously a moron. Do they actually say that to you? Well, not that word. But I mean, I described that experience in October 2008 when I went out to get people to invest in a levered. You raised a lot of money for that fund, didn't you? Well, not the levered loan fund. We reached a point where on the levered loan fund, where we needed money and we couldn't get the clients to put it up anymore.

**[0:43:46] Howard Marks:** Really? We had a shortfall. The irony is I felt that it was my responsibility and I put it up myself. Your own cash because the clients didn't. The last dollars. It would have been unfair if I would have stepped in front of them and put my money in the bottom

**[0:43:59] Howard Marks:** in place of them. But if they refused, I put it in. It was one of the great investments I ever made.

**[0:44:05] Speaker 5:** What were the returns of that from 08? Well, certainly more than 100%.

**[0:44:10] Howard Marks:** Really? Yeah.

**[0:44:11] Barry Ritholtz:** Not too bad.

**[0:44:12] Howard Marks:** Not too bad.

**[0:44:13] Howard Marks:** But the point is the degree of faith in you that your clients have tells you how long they'll stick with you when things go tough.

**[0:44:24] Barry Ritholtz:** That makes sense.

**[0:44:25] Howard Marks:** But every client is probably going to reach a point where he says, I'm out of money.

**[0:44:29] Howard Marks:** I'm fatigued. Go away. I love you, but, you know, maybe you're not right.

**[0:44:36] Barry Ritholtz:** Mm-hmm. I recall you were raising one of the distressed funds. I don't remember if it was in the housing bust in 06, 07 or later, but it was a substantial, substantial fund that did really well. Which fund am I thinking of?

**[0:44:53] Howard Marks:** Well, we had a very big fund in 0102, which did very well because we were able to invest in the telecom meltdown and the scandals of Enron and Delphian WorldCom. The market snapped back in 03.

**[0:45:10] Howard Marks:** We raised more funds in 04, 05 and no fund in 06. On the first day of 07, we went out and we said to clients,

**[0:45:18] Howard Marks:** you know, we think we can use $3 billion.

**[0:45:20] Barry Ritholtz:** $3 billion.

**[0:45:21] Howard Marks:** And within a month, we had eight. Oh, really? And we said to the clients.

**[0:45:26] Barry Ritholtz:** So you really have trained your clients well.

**[0:45:28] Howard Marks:** Well, hopefully, educated. and we said to him, we can't use eight. We'll take three and a half. We closed that fund. We said, but we'd like to have the rest of your interest in a standby fund. So the first fund, 3.5 billion was seven and we said we'd like to have money for 7B and we started, we had the first close of that in March 07. We had the last close in March 08 and by that time it was 11 billion and we told people it's a standby fund.

**[0:45:59] Howard Marks:** We're not going to spend it until the time is right. We're not going to charge any fees until we're into the investment process. So from March 07 until June 08, we didn't charge any fees. June 08, we started to spend the money very gradually. June 08. So that's fairly early in the class. Well, that's right. And Lehman went bankrupt on September 15th. We were 12 % called. By the end of the year, we were 70 % called.

**[0:46:29] Barry Ritholtz:** So pretty fully invested.

**[0:46:31] Howard Marks:** So we called 58 % of $11 billion, which is $6.5 billion, over 15 weeks. That's all you had to do. All you had to do to make money in the crisis, in retrospect, was have money to spend and the nerve to spend it. You didn't need caution, conservatism, risk control, patience, selectivity, discipline, any of those things. All you needed was money and nerve.

**[0:46:54] Barry Ritholtz:** Money and nerve. Money and nerve capital is a new hedge fund coming out.

**[0:46:59] Howard Marks:** And, but not all the time because sometime money and nerve will get you killed. Right. And one of the - Most of the time. Well, and money, and so one of the keys in investing is to know which is which.

**[0:47:10] Barry Ritholtz:** Mm-hmm. That's really fascinating. There's another quote of yours that's relevant to exactly what you just said. I have to bring up. Rule number one, most things will prove to be cyclical. Rule number two, some of the greatest opportunities for gain and loss come when other people forget. Rule number one. Why is it that people do not understand that this too shall pass, that it's all cyclical?

**[0:47:39] Howard Marks:** Because of the rule of emotion rather than logic. Emotion is a great enemy of all investors. Sure. Back in 1975, probably, 42 years ago, I learned one of the greatest lessons. Somebody said to me, there are three stages to a bull market. The first stage, when a few bright people believe that there could be improvement. The second stage, when most people understand that things are actually getting better. And the third stage, when every idiot believes that things can only get better forever.

**[0:48:11] Barry Ritholtz:** So where are we today? It's February 2017.

**[0:48:15] Howard Marks:** You know, Barry, I don't believe that most people are thinking very optimistically. I think most people have reservations. Most people understand that economic growth is uncertain. Most people understand that we don't know how the central bank experiment with zero rates is going to end up or how it gets reversed. And of course, most people are concerned about the geopolitical developments in the world today. So I believe that enthusiasm is not unrestrained.

**[0:48:43] Barry Ritholtz:** It's tempered? Is that a fair?

**[0:48:45] Howard Marks:** I believe it's tempered. On the other hand, people may be thinking in not a bullish way, but I think they're acting in a bullish way. What accounts for the difference? Rates near zero. And when you live in a low return world, you have to take risk to get return. People are willing to take risk because my late father-in-law would call them handcuff volunteers. People who do things not because they want to, but because they have to.

**[0:49:13] Barry Ritholtz:** They have no choice. That's right.

**[0:49:15] Howard Marks:** There is no alternative. And so people are taking more risk than they used to take to get the returns they used to get.

**[0:49:25] Barry Ritholtz:** At one point in time, I recall in the early 2000s, the rule of thumb for foundations and endowments and any charity to maintain their tax-deferred status is they're giving out 5 % a year. Yes. And that's a pretty easy bogey to hit most of the time. But when you have rates rising rapidly and stocks not doing especially well, that becomes a real challenge to hit. We saw that in the early to mid-2000s. Absolutely. How much of what takes place, in direct reference to what you were just saying, comes from foundations having no alternative?

**[0:50:10] Barry Ritholtz:** comes from endowments, charities, all the big nonprofits having to hit that 5 % bogey because they're so loath to go into the corpus of their trust. How much of that handcuffed volunteers comes from that segment of the investing world?

**[0:50:28] Howard Marks:** Well, I think a good bit, although foundations and endowments are not a large proportion of the money, but the same is true of pension funds. You know, the management of a company puts in an amount of money and then that amount of money is supposed to be invested and grown so that by the end or in the future, there will be enough money to pay pensions. And the connection between today's dollars and the dollars you need in the future to pay pensions is called the actuarial assumption, the rate you need to make the math work.

**[0:51:03] Howard Marks:** And for a long time, that was eight, as you say. Now, in the interest of conservatism, most pension funds have switched to 7.5%. But if you think about it, the five-year T-bill, Treasury note, used to pay 6.5%.

**[0:51:21] Barry Ritholtz:** So how hard is it to make 8 % at that point?

**[0:51:23] Howard Marks:** And today it pays 1.5%.

**[0:51:25] Barry Ritholtz:** Now it's harder.

**[0:51:26] Howard Marks:** And stocks returned 20 % in the 90s, and it was assumed that they would return at least 11 % forever.

**[0:51:34] Howard Marks:** and today it's assumed that they'll make five or six.

**[0:51:38] Howard Marks:** So if the prospective returns have come down so drastically and the expectations of institutional investors have not, then I think that they all have a real challenge.

**[0:51:53] Barry Ritholtz:** So I don't know if you can really talk about state pension funds, but they seem to be somewhat underfunded and wed to these high return expectations. What does this tell us about the future obligations that taxpayers may find themselves on the hook for?

**[0:52:12] Howard Marks:** That's really one of the great questions today, Barry, that very few people are talking about. But the pension, the state or municipality puts in a certain amount of money, and then it assumes a rate of return, which will enable it to pay.

**[0:52:31] Barry Ritholtz:** But I've noticed if you assume a higher rate of return, you have less money you have to put in today, but more money down the road and appreciably more.

**[0:52:39] Howard Marks:** What that assumption should be and what I think it used to be is what we can make. Now I think more often it's what we need. But that's not right. It should be what they can make and what you can make in this low return environment. has come down quite a bit. Regardless of the assumed rates being too high, lots of funds are

**[0:53:02] Speaker 5:** underfunded anyway. Regardless, no matter what it is. That's right. And - In other words, if you ratchet down your return expectations, then you're even more underfunded. That's right. I think that

**[0:53:13] Howard Marks:** most public funds are woefully underfunded. And many of them are working with their unions to renegotiate the pensions so that the funds can be returned to viability. In some cases, you can't do it like in Illinois where the pension fund is a right that's guaranteed in the Constitution and you can't play with pensions.

**[0:53:39] Speaker 5:** You can't mess with it.

**[0:53:40] Howard Marks:** So it's unknowable how these funds will deal with the future. You look at Illinois. It's a mess. It just doesn't seem that it's possible for insolvency to be avoided.

**[0:53:58] Barry Ritholtz:** Really? Yes. For the state or for the individual pension fund?

**[0:54:02] Howard Marks:** You know, well, it requires—

**[0:54:04] Speaker 5:** Is the state on the hook to make up the shortfall? Yes, it is, because it's a constitutional right.

**[0:54:09] Barry Ritholtz:** So if that's the case, does the state—is the state looking at either a renegotiation or a default?

**[0:54:15] Howard Marks:** Well, it may do. We've had some small municipal bankruptcies around the country. Here and there, sure. Yes. Stockton was one. Stockton, for good memory. But, you know, nobody wants to experience these things until they have to.

**[0:54:36] Howard Marks:** Nobody says, you know, if we go on this track, we're going to be broke in 10 years, so that's X, Y, Z, unless they have to.

**[0:54:43] Barry Ritholtz:** What's the famous Hemingway quote? It was very gradual until it was very sudden at the end.

**[0:54:48] Howard Marks:** Well, I don't know that, but I take your word for it.

**[0:54:52] Speaker 5:** How did he go bankrupt? It was very gradual.

**[0:54:54] Howard Marks:** But there is no provision for state bankruptcies in the bankruptcy code.

**[0:54:59] Barry Ritholtz:** What about a territory like Puerto Rico?

**[0:55:04] Howard Marks:** There was no provision for bankruptcy. That was one of the challenges in resolving that issue, and it had to be done consensually. But I think that if you look at the math, you look at the funding status, and you look at the assumed returns, a lot of public pension funds are going to have big problems down the road. And I'm not talking about the 22nd century.

**[0:55:30] Barry Ritholtz:** You mean a decade or so from here?

**[0:55:33] Howard Marks:** I'm not an expert on the numbers, but I believe that it's more imminent than infinite. And I just don't think that the average citizen understands the risk. And let's say that we did begin to have states going under. Would the federal government bail them out?

**[0:55:55] Barry Ritholtz:** Depends on who's running the government at that time.

**[0:55:57] Howard Marks:** That's right. And by the way, if you look at the states which are most troubled, you'll find out that many of them -

**[0:56:09] Barry Ritholtz:** New Jersey, Illinois, who else is on that short list?

**[0:56:13] Howard Marks:** Well, I shouldn't really go into depth where I'm above my depth.

**[0:56:20] Speaker 5:** California has seemed to get its fiscal house in order. Well, I think they're on the way. They've taken some steps.

**[0:56:25] Howard Marks:** But the point is I think that the expectation that the states will be bailed out by the federal government, which means transferring money – I mean the federal government has no money. It is not a money-making organization. It is only an intermediary. It collects money and it gives it out. And it prints a little on the side. Well, it prints a little. But it doesn't earn any money. It's not like you and me going to work in the morning.

**[0:56:54] Howard Marks:** Right. More you than me. So the federal government redistributes money amongst the states. It's hard to see a massive trend of taking money from the states that have been economical and prudent and giving it out to the ones that have been profligate. So that complicates matters. And I just think that the precarious state of public pension funds is an issue that has received very little attention, but will get more in the future.

**[0:57:38] Barry Ritholtz:** In the coming years. I want to jump to my favorite questions. But before I do, I have to reference something you described. I believe it was at the CFA event in Toronto, which for lack of a better phrase is called organizational alpha. You were describing the way your firm, more than just asset selection, the way your firm processes information and creates a mechanism for identifying opportunities for investment. So let's talk a little bit about that. You referenced some of your colleagues.

**[0:58:17] Barry Ritholtz:** You referenced Bruce Kovner. Karsh. Bruce Karsh. Yes. Bruce Kovner, different person. The other gentleman. Sheldon Stone. Sheldon. And who else are running different portfolios in the office?

**[0:58:30] Howard Marks:** John Brady runs the real estate, and Matt Wilson and Jordan Cruz run the control funds. Caleb Kramer runs the European control funds. You know, we have a lot of strategies. We have a lot of great guys running them, and even some women.

**[0:58:43] Barry Ritholtz:** And so you, which is relatively rare these days in institutional asset management, but that's starting to change.

**[0:58:50] Speaker 5:** um so you are co-chairman co-CIO is that correct no I'm co-chairman and co-founder co-founder you

**[0:59:00] Barry Ritholtz:** were CIO for a while no I was never CIO really I'm misremembering that edit that out that we'll we'll leave that in um so how so where I'm where I'm getting to with this is how is the decision making process about where to allocate capital how aggressively to portion how are those decisions actually made? Sure.

**[0:59:22] Howard Marks:** Well, number one, for the most part, Barry, we don't allocate capital. Clients, institutional clients, don't go to a firm like Oaktree and say, here's $100 million, do what you think is right. Right. They go into a specific fund? They go into a specific fund or strategy. So we don't have the allocation decision. Our job is to manage the money within the assignment. When you use the term organizational alpha, which I think is a good one, Alpha means personal skill, the ability to add value above what the market gives in any given niche.

**[0:59:58] Howard Marks:** Where does it come from? And the answer, I think, is it's personal or it's organizational. Personal means hiring great people, and of course we try to do that. But organizationally, I think that you can be constructive or destructive. We have a very explicit investment philosophy, which tells everybody who works at Oak Tree

**[1:00:20] Howard Marks:** what our game plan is

**[1:00:22] Howard Marks:** and how we're going to go about adding value for the clients. An emphasis on risk control and on consistency, not on top decile, bottom decile. An insistence that we will only be active in inefficient markets. A desire for a high degree of specialization. We don't have a general research pool. We have research teams assigned to every strategy. We have a refusal to base investment decisions on macro forecasts, which shouldn't come as a surprise to you, and a reluctance to raise and lower cash to time the markets, which we think is very difficult to do most of the time.

**[1:01:06] Howard Marks:** So everybody knows the game plan.

**[1:01:08] Howard Marks:** We think it's an effective game plan, especially that everybody knows that the way to succeed at Oak Tree is not by being some cowboy and swinging for the fences, but rather to control the risk and drive out the negative surprises. So the investment philosophy gives everybody a creed to live by and a way to pull together. And we don't have, you know, I've seen investment organizations torn apart by battles between the cowboys and the chickens. You know, in the good markets, the cowboys say the chickens are holding us back.

**[1:01:52] Howard Marks:** And in the bad markets, the chickens say the cowboys are getting us killed. And it's very bad. It's also bad for the clients. Our clients want to know what kind of an organization they're hiring.

**[1:02:02] Howard Marks:** And then they want to get what they came for. And an explicit creed like we have enables that to be the case. So I think that the common creed, the investment philosophy is extremely important. Then the other thing is that at Oak Tree, we have a structure which is designed to encourage team behavior, not individual behavior. So nobody at Oak Tree, we don't have the philosophy that exists in some places, you eat what you kill. You know, everybody gets paid on their own performance and you can quantify it down to the basis point.

**[1:02:42] Howard Marks:** We get paid at Oak Tree on how the firm did, how the team did, what we believe of your contribution and your potential. We don't keep records of who gave which recommendation

**[1:02:57] Howard Marks:** and how much money did it make us or lose it. We don't pay people based on their quantitative

**[1:03:02] Howard Marks:** results in the prior year because quantification isn't everything and the prior year isn't everything. You know, Albert Einstein said, not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts. There is so much more in assessing the contribution of an individual to the performance of the

**[1:03:25] Howard Marks:** team and the organization than just whether his recommendations worked last year, that we insist on an organization that functions as a team for the benefit of the clients. And it sounds like

**[1:03:41] Barry Ritholtz:** it's certainly been working over the years. Let's jump to some of our favorite questions while I still have you. You mentioned some folks who influenced you at Citi. Who were some of your

**[1:03:54] Howard Marks:** early mentors? I don't really have the mentors to talk about. My philosophy was shaped mostly

**[1:04:09] Barry Ritholtz:** about reading. So who affected you? Well, I mentioned John Kenneth Galbraith earlier.

**[1:04:14] Howard Marks:** For sure. And I think he was terrific. And he talked about the fact that forecasts don't work, and he talked about the fact that people in the financial world have very short memories, and that's why cycles tend to repeat. There's a great book called A Short History of Financial Euphoria, which talked about the extremes of cycles, and that was very impactful on me. I read that one a long time ago.

**[1:04:44] Barry Ritholtz:** So Galbraith, what other books have you read that have been very influential to your philosophy?

**[1:04:51] Howard Marks:** Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Nicholas Taleb talks about the fact that the future is indeterminate and that events are unpredictable in large part because the world is subject to randomness. And in a world of randomness, you can't have events that are predictable. And I think he makes very, very sound arguments on that subject. So there's another example. Against the Gods by Peter Bernstein. One of the best. On the subject of probability and risk and so forth.

**[1:05:27] Barry Ritholtz:** I not too long ago had Meyer Statman in here, and he said one of his early advisors was Peter Bernstein. Yeah. Demanding guy, but he said whatever he worked with on him was so much better when it was done.

**[1:05:41] Howard Marks:** And, you know, so I wrote a memo called Risk in 06. and updated it, risk revisited in 14. And then in 15, I found a memo from Bernstein on my desk,

**[1:05:54] Howard Marks:** an 07 memo from Bernstein who had passed away in 09. And it was entitled, Can Risk Be Reduced to a Number? He didn't think so.

**[1:06:03] Howard Marks:** I don't think so. I don't think that risk can be quantified. I think it's just a matter of subjective judgment. And it had a profound influence on me as he did in general.

**[1:06:15] Barry Ritholtz:** His writing was just so dense with thought and so clearly structured. And his prose was, I find anytime I sit down, I have his book on gold on my desk. And I'm looking forward to diving into any of the books you want to mention. You previously mentioned Graham and Dodd. Is there anything else you want to reference? What are you reading now?

**[1:06:42] Howard Marks:** I'm reading Tim Geithner's autobiography. Oh, really? Stress Test. And how is that? It's very interesting. Really? It's not exciting reading. It's not fun reading, but it's very, very illuminating.

**[1:06:59] Barry Ritholtz:** Oh, you get a lot of insight as to what was going on behind the scenes? Absolutely. I have not read either Bernanke or Paulson's autobiographies, biographies, but they are sitting on my shelf and I'm just one of these days I feel obligated to get

**[1:07:15] Howard Marks:** to them. Well, I think we should because if we don't study crises, then we are bound to repeat them quicker. If we study them, it'll take longer. Of course, they'll always repeat. They'll come back. But you know, it was Santayana who said, those who are ignorant of history are bound to repeat it. And reading the books of people like Paulson will help us to delay their repetition.

**[1:07:49] Barry Ritholtz:** What do you do outside of the office to relax? What do you do for fun?

**[1:07:55] Howard Marks:** well i read okay and uh i uh play some tennis and i uh like houses and architecture you like

**[1:08:08] Barry Ritholtz:** architecture i had no idea about that what do you do how does that express itself do you go on architectural tours i'm assuming you've been to oakbrook and done the whole i i do visit right

**[1:08:20] Howard Marks:** I do visit standout examples of architecture. And the great thing about it is that when you go on a business trip, you can find the best one or two examples. Always. And you can go visit them. It doesn't take very long.

**[1:08:37] Barry Ritholtz:** You're kind of bi-coastal. You're in L.A. part of the year. So you have plenty of Frank Gehry buildings and other such stuff.

**[1:08:44] Howard Marks:** Well, your references are to modern. I didn't say modern.

**[1:08:48] Speaker 5:** Okay, that is my bias coming out. I actually prefer classical architecture. Okay, such as?

**[1:08:55] Howard Marks:** Well, when you go to Berlin, you should visit Potsdam. Potsdam has great examples of 18th century architecture. And when you go to, when you're down south, you should go to Mount Vernon.

**[1:09:17] Howard Marks:** and Monticello and so forth. And it's really a highlight to be able to take a little bit out of your day to go see a great building.

**[1:09:26] Barry Ritholtz:** That's fascinating. I had no idea. You occasionally bump into a millennial or a recent college grad. What sort of advice do you give to a young person just starting their career if they said, hey, I'm interested in finance? What advice would you give them?

**[1:09:44] Howard Marks:** I think the most important thing, Barry, is that, you know, when I got out of grad school, I applied for six different jobs in six different fields of finance. I didn't know what I wanted to do. And I went into investment management primarily because I had had a good summer job at Citibank in 1968, and I enjoyed it. And all those jobs offered about the same pay. They all offered between $12 ,000 and $14 ,000.

**[1:10:15] Howard Marks:** dollars. And that was a year, not a month. And then sometime in the 80s, God looked down and he said, I'm going to let those people who manage money make more than everybody else.

**[1:10:27] Howard Marks:** Okay. And so there's a tendency for people to go into investment management, hedge fund management in particular, because they want to get rich. And it's not a good reason. And what I always counsel

**[1:10:45] Howard Marks:** young people is that they should try to find something that they will enjoy and if you're doing something every day for your life which is hopefully a long time and you're not enjoying it then you're wasting your life and and doing that the pile up money that you'll have left at the end it seems so uh futile so uh you know christopher morley you're a great one for quotes christopher

**[1:11:13] Howard Marks:** Morley, the English writer, said my favorite one. He said, there's only one success, to be able to live your life your own way. And so what that means is, number one, to follow the convention of society into whatever all the cool kids think is great at a given point in time is an obvious mistake. You should not let society set your goals. And number two, the challenge is really, in my opinion, to figure out what will make you happy and then to pursue it.

**[1:11:50] Howard Marks:** But that's what I tell people. Try to do something you'll love. There's nothing like spending your day doing something you love. You know, I always say to people that investment management is great. I would do it for nothing if I had to. Fortunately, I don't have to.

**[1:12:08] Barry Ritholtz:** My wife says I'm gainfully unemployed, which is pretty much exactly what you're saying.

**[1:12:15] Howard Marks:** Well, there's – you know, we only get one life. You get to be my age. You're getting there one of these days. But at my age, you realize that it's not finite.

**[1:12:23] Howard Marks:** My wife says none of us is getting out of this alive.

**[1:12:25] Barry Ritholtz:** Right. Right, that's right.

**[1:12:27] Howard Marks:** So the only thing that makes sense is to try to maximize our satisfaction with our lives. You get to be 70, 80, 90 years old, you look back, you say, damn, I should have X, Y, Z. It's unfixable. Right. That's what you must think about. How will I feel about my life at the end?

**[1:12:51] Barry Ritholtz:** And you have to behave in accordance to not having regret at the end.

**[1:12:58] Howard Marks:** And from what I'm told, very few people say, I should have spent more time at the office.

**[1:13:03] Barry Ritholtz:** Very few. And our final question, what is it that you know about investing in any of its guises that you wish you knew when you began low back in the 1960s, 1970s?

**[1:13:18] Howard Marks:** Well, I think that I've learned a lot of lessons through experience as we discussed. Getting what you didn't want. That's right. And those are the things that have shaped my philosophy to be what it is today. The futility of trying to guess the future, the importance of understanding cycles, the essential character of value. That it's not what you buy, it's what you pay. The essential character of value. Yes. I mean, the relationship between price and value determines your success.

**[1:13:57] Howard Marks:** Not buying high-quality assets. Not shunning low-quality assets. But buying assets of any quality when they're available cheaper than they should be.

**[1:14:10] Howard Marks:** so i i think that these are the kinds of the the the importance of controlling emotion the importance of contrarianism in fact i got great news barry okay my book the most important thing has 20 chapters and each chapter says the most important thing is and then it's a different thing and i've tried to distill the important lessons of my career into that book and uh and And I'm satisfied with the job I've done.

**[1:14:39] Barry Ritholtz:** And as have everybody who's read the book, I can't recommend it enough. The blurb on the cover is Warren Buffett, who is essentially the person who you tell a lovely story about him saying, why don't you write a book, Howard? That's right.

**[1:14:54] Howard Marks:** He wrote me.

**[1:14:55] Howard Marks:** I always figured that when I retired, I would pull the memos together into a coherent book.

**[1:15:05] Howard Marks:** And in 2010, I got an email from Warren and he said, if you'll write a book, I'll give you a blurb for the jacket. And that was all the motivation I needed to get going. And the book came out a year later.

**[1:15:18] Barry Ritholtz:** And by the way, I love the fact that Warren Buffett says, you know who I'd like to read a book from? That Howard Marks guy. Send him an email telling him I'll give him a blurb. And a year later, I'll get a book from him.

**[1:15:29] Howard Marks:** Well, I mean, the amazing thing is that somebody like Warren, despite the respect he enjoys and the success he has enjoyed, is still reading. He's a vociferous reader. And by the way, he doesn't read his own writing. He reads from other people and gleans what is to be gotten. And, you know, he's 87, I think. He's not done learning.

**[1:15:57] Barry Ritholtz:** he just said if you've seen the HBO documentary on him it's fascinating he describes himself as he goes I'm just a cigar butt there's nothing left anymore but he still goes to the office him and Charlie Munger Munger is 90 something and they read three or four hours a day yeah that's just astonishing Howard thank you so much for being so generous with your time it's always a delight uh an instructional one chatting with you we've been speaking with Howard Marks of Oak Tree Capital.

**[1:16:28] Barry Ritholtz:** Be sure to go to oaktreecapital.com. You can see the entire collection of chairman's memos. Each one is a lesson in itself. The most important thing at Amazon and find bookstores near you. If you have enjoyed this conversation, be sure and look up an inch or down an inch on Apple iTunes and you can see any of the other. I want to say we're coming up on 140, 130 such conversations. I would be remiss if I did not thank Medina, our recording engineer, Taylor Riggs, our booker, Michael Batnick, our head of research.

**[1:17:03] Barry Ritholtz:** We love your comments, feedback, and suggestions. Write to us at mibpodcast.bloomberg.net. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. American Arbitration Association, the global leader in alternative dispute resolution for over 90 years. Learn more at ADR.org. Underdog already has team picks, player props, money lines,

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