In brief
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a 1990s hedge fund run by math-minded traders, including Nobel Prize winners Myron Scholes and Bob Merton. It showed that even a brilliant model fails when it treats markets as purely rational. The fund piled huge borrowing onto tiny price gaps. Journalist Roger Lowenstein argues no formula built on past prices can justify that much leverage.
The tension is between a fund that looked perfectly safe on paper and the panic, copycats and rivals the models left out. The collapse of 1998 was contained when the Federal Reserve got banks to buy the fund. The hosts and guests argue that this rescue taught the market the wrong lesson, and they link it to the bigger bailouts of 2008.
Questions
What was Long Term Capital Management and why did it matter?
It was a hedge fund started in 1994 that used math models to find small price gaps between similar assets and bet on them. It matters because its 1998 collapse threatened the wider financial system and is one of finance's best-known cautionary tales.
What is leverage and why did it sink the fund?
Leverage means borrowing money to make a bigger bet than your own cash allows, so gains and losses are both magnified. LTCM borrowed over $100 billion, so when every trade went against it, it could not survive.
What is a relative value trade?
It is a bet on a price gap between two similar assets, buying the cheap one and betting against the pricey one, expecting the prices to come back together. The hosts gave the example of betting on Russian debt in rubles while betting against Russian debt in dollars.
Was LTCM bailed out with taxpayer money?
Victor Hagani says no. He says the Federal Reserve only hosted a private rescue in which 14 banks put in about $3.6 billion and bought the fund's assets cheaply. Roger Lowenstein agrees no taxpayer money was used but says the precedent was similar.
What did the episode say we learned from LTCM?
The hosts and guests argue we learned very little. Lowenstein says no formula based on past prices can guarantee safety, and Hagani and Lowenstein both suggest the rescue left markets unprepared for 2008.
Facts
Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.
Long Term Capital Management's group included Myron Scholes and Bob Merton, who had worked out how to mathematically derive prices for stock options.
“A group that included Myron Scholes and Bob Merton, the guys who'd figured out how to mathematically derive prices for stock options, bets on a stock's future price.”
0:01:33 · Mary Childs · Option pricing · 1990s
Victor Hagani recalls that Long Term Capital Management averaged annual returns of roughly 30 to 40 percent, far above what the partners had expected.
“I think that we averaged like 40% annual returns, over 30%, way, way higher than what we ever anticipated was possible.”
0:02:14 · Jeff Guo · Fund returns · 1990s
As an example of a relative value trade, Long Term Capital Management bet on Russian debt denominated in rubles because other investors were more afraid of it than necessary.
“Like, for example, they bet on Russian debt denominated in rubles because everyone else was more scared of it than they needed to be.”
0:06:26 · Mary Childs · Relative value trading · 1990s
Leverage means borrowing to increase the size of a trade, so that a dollar of capital can be used to invest several or even twenty dollars.
“Borrowing money to double up on the trade or triple up. So if you have $1, you could invest $2 or $3 or $20.”
0:08:54 · Mary Childs · Leverage
The episode quotes a saying that relative value trading is like picking up nickels in front of a steamroller, meaning small profits carry a risk of being flattened.
“I forget who said that relative value trading is like picking up nickels in front of a steamroller.”
0:09:20 · Jeff Guo · Relative value trading
Long Term Capital Management started in February 1994 with $1.3 billion of investor money, which had grown to over $7 billion by late 1997.
“Long-term capital started in February 1994 with $1.3 billion of investor money. By late 1997, that was over $7 billion.”
0:10:55 · Mary Childs · Fund growth · 1994
Long Term Capital Management returned just 17% in 1997, which did not beat the S&P 500.
“Instead of 40-something percent returns, in 1997, they generated just 17%, which didn't even beat the S &P 500.”
0:12:51 · Mary Childs · Fund returns · 1997
In August 1998 Russia defaulted on its ruble debt and devalued its currency.
“In August of 1998, things really got started. Russia acted in a way that was unexpected. It defaulted on its ruble debt and devalued its currency.”
0:14:23 · Mary Childs · Russian default · 1998
Jeff Guo says banks and competitors who knew Long Term Capital Management's trades began betting against it to topple the fund.
“all of these banks and competitors were now taking the opportunity to bet against long-term capital in order to topple them.”
0:18:26 · Jeff Guo · Market reaction · 1998
Potential investors in 1998 offered Long Term Capital Management money only on condition that it raise a much larger total, such as offering $200 million if it raised $3 billion.
“People would say, I'll give you $200 million, but only if you raise $3 billion.”
0:19:39 · Jeff Guo · Capital raising · 1998
Roger Lowenstein says Long Term Capital Management quadrupled its investors' money in four years before its collapse.
“In four years, they'd quadrupled their investors' money. They seemed to have the black box.”
0:20:47 · Roger Lowenstein · Fund performance · 1998
By the fall of 1998 Long Term Capital Management had borrowed over $100 billion from banks.
“by the fall of 1998, long-term capital management had loved leverage so much that the fund had borrowed from the banks over $100 billion.”
0:22:19 · Mary Childs · Leverage · 1998
Bill McDonough, president of the New York Federal Reserve, summoned the 16 biggest banks to discuss Long Term Capital Management in September 1998.
“Bill McDonough, the president of the New York Federal Reserve, called in the 16 biggest banks.”
0:22:52 · Roger Lowenstein · Fed meeting · 1998
Fourteen of the banks agreed to the rescue and put in about $3.6 billion.
“But 14 of the banks agreed to do this and put in about $3.6 billion.”
0:24:13 · Jeff Guo · Bank rescue · 1998
Victor Hagani says he lost about 80% of his net worth in the collapse of Long Term Capital Management.
“Well, I lost, you know, call it 80% of, I lost about 80% of my net worth.”
0:25:12 · Jeff Guo · Partner losses · 1998
Jeff Guo says big banks including Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank had used heavy leverage to bet on mortgage debt before 2008.
“the big banks, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank and all the rest of them, had been gleefully using leverage to bet on mortgage debt.”
0:27:17 · Jeff Guo · 2008 crisis · 2008
Roger Lowenstein argues the key mistake at Long Term Capital Management was assuming a formula based on historic price patterns could guarantee safety and justify extreme leverage.
“any formula based on the historic patterns of how prices have moved can be a guarantee and therefore can give you license to take such tremendous leverage.”
0:28:53 · Roger Lowenstein · Model risk · 1998