# The rise and fall of Long Term Capital Management

- **Show:** Planet Money
- **Published:** 22 Feb 2025
- **Source:** https://www.npr.org/2025/02/21/1232862544/long-term-capital-management-ltcm
- **Transcript:** https://podcasts.opennash.com/shows/planet-money/the-rise-and-fall-of-long-term-capital-management-247124/
- **Provider:** OpenNash Podcasts (machine-generated)

## In brief

Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a 1990s hedge fund run by math-minded traders, including Nobel Prize winners Myron Scholes and Bob Merton. It showed that even a brilliant model fails when it treats markets as purely rational. The fund piled huge borrowing onto tiny price gaps. Journalist Roger Lowenstein argues no formula built on past prices can justify that much leverage.

The tension is between a fund that looked perfectly safe on paper and the panic, copycats and rivals the models left out. The collapse of 1998 was contained when the Federal Reserve got banks to buy the fund. The hosts and guests argue that this rescue taught the market the wrong lesson, and they link it to the bigger bailouts of 2008.

## Key insights

1. **Borrowed money turned small edges into huge risk** LTCM's trades each earned only tiny profits, so it borrowed heavily to make them worthwhile. By fall 1998 it had borrowed over $100 billion, so a modest market shock could wipe it out.
2. **Success attracted copycats and shrank opportunities** Returns fell from 43% in 1995 and 41% in 1996 to 17% in 1997 as banks and hedge funds copied the strategy. The fund did not adjust, even though the math looked less attractive.
3. **Panic made unrelated bets lose together** After Russia's August 1998 default, risk managers everywhere cut risk at once. Positions that should have offset each other all lost money, which the models had not allowed for.
4. **Rivals bet against LTCM as it stumbled** Banks and funds knew LTCM's trades, so some sold to protect themselves and others bet against it. That made its losses worse and helped sink it.
5. **The Fed's 1998 rescue may have set a precedent** Fourteen banks put in about $3.6 billion and took over the fund's assets, with no taxpayer money. Both Victor Hagani and Roger Lowenstein say this shielded the market from the full consequences, which they see as a lesson ignored before 2008.

## Questions this episode answers

### What was Long Term Capital Management and why did it matter?

It was a hedge fund started in 1994 that used math models to find small price gaps between similar assets and bet on them. It matters because its 1998 collapse threatened the wider financial system and is one of finance's best-known cautionary tales.

### What is leverage and why did it sink the fund?

Leverage means borrowing money to make a bigger bet than your own cash allows, so gains and losses are both magnified. LTCM borrowed over $100 billion, so when every trade went against it, it could not survive.

### What is a relative value trade?

It is a bet on a price gap between two similar assets, buying the cheap one and betting against the pricey one, expecting the prices to come back together. The hosts gave the example of betting on Russian debt in rubles while betting against Russian debt in dollars.

### Was LTCM bailed out with taxpayer money?

Victor Hagani says no. He says the Federal Reserve only hosted a private rescue in which 14 banks put in about $3.6 billion and bought the fund's assets cheaply. Roger Lowenstein agrees no taxpayer money was used but says the precedent was similar.

### What did the episode say we learned from LTCM?

The hosts and guests argue we learned very little. Lowenstein says no formula based on past prices can guarantee safety, and Hagani and Lowenstein both suggest the rescue left markets unprepared for 2008.

## Facts

- **Mary Childs** [0:01:33]: "A group that included Myron Scholes and Bob Merton, the guys who'd figured out how to mathematically derive prices for stock options, bets on a stock's future price."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:02:14]: "I think that we averaged like 40% annual returns, over 30%, way, way higher than what we ever anticipated was possible."
- **Mary Childs** [0:06:26]: "Like, for example, they bet on Russian debt denominated in rubles because everyone else was more scared of it than they needed to be."
- **Mary Childs** [0:08:54]: "Borrowing money to double up on the trade or triple up. So if you have $1, you could invest $2 or $3 or $20."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:09:20]: "I forget who said that relative value trading is like picking up nickels in front of a steamroller."
- **Mary Childs** [0:10:55]: "Long-term capital started in February 1994 with $1.3 billion of investor money. By late 1997, that was over $7 billion."
- **Mary Childs** [0:12:51]: "Instead of 40-something percent returns, in 1997, they generated just 17%, which didn't even beat the S &P 500."
- **Mary Childs** [0:14:23]: "In August of 1998, things really got started. Russia acted in a way that was unexpected. It defaulted on its ruble debt and devalued its currency."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:18:26]: "all of these banks and competitors were now taking the opportunity to bet against long-term capital in order to topple them."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:19:39]: "People would say, I'll give you $200 million, but only if you raise $3 billion."
- **Roger Lowenstein** [0:20:47]: "In four years, they'd quadrupled their investors' money. They seemed to have the black box."
- **Mary Childs** [0:22:19]: "by the fall of 1998, long-term capital management had loved leverage so much that the fund had borrowed from the banks over $100 billion."
- **Roger Lowenstein** [0:22:52]: "Bill McDonough, the president of the New York Federal Reserve, called in the 16 biggest banks."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:24:13]: "But 14 of the banks agreed to do this and put in about $3.6 billion."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:25:12]: "Well, I lost, you know, call it 80% of, I lost about 80% of my net worth."
- **Jeff Guo** [0:27:17]: "the big banks, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank and all the rest of them, had been gleefully using leverage to bet on mortgage debt."
- **Roger Lowenstein** [0:28:53]: "any formula based on the historic patterns of how prices have moved can be a guarantee and therefore can give you license to take such tremendous leverage."

## Transcript

**[0:00:00] Speaker 5:** This message comes from Insperity, because how you HR matters. From payroll and benefits to HR compliance and talent development, helping your business move forward with confidence. Learn more at insperity.com slash HR matters.

**[0:00:15] Speaker 4:** This is Planet Money from NPR.

**[0:00:20] Mary Childs:** In the mid-1990s, a group of people thought they'd finally achieved this dream that had existed since the dawn of financial markets. They'd figured out how to take risk. They built a model that could help them generate great investment returns consistently over time. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they were math nerds.

**[0:00:40] Jeff Guo:** We were mostly cut from the same cloth. This is Victor Hagani. He was the youngest of the group. Like we were all, you know, kind of game playing, geeky kind of people. And we just really felt attracted to the same kinds of problem solving and the same kinds of thought processes and intellectual challenges. Victor was part of this new crew of traders on Wall Street, where before people had made investment decisions based on like what they thought about a company's prospects or maybe just based on a hunch.

**[0:01:15] Jeff Guo:** These guys used data, lots of data and computers.

**[0:01:19] Mary Childs:** It was math over emotions. Risk-taking had always been an art, but now they could turn risk-taking into a science.

**[0:01:27] Jeff Guo:** To a large extent, you can get rid of certain risks, but if you're going to make money, then you have to be taking risk.

**[0:01:33] Mary Childs:** Victor had gone from working at an investment bank to getting hired into this elite, illustrious group. A group that included Myron Scholes and Bob Merton, the guys who'd figured out how to mathematically derive prices for stock options, bets on a stock's future price. For this work, Myron Scholes and Bob Merton would go on to win a Nobel Prize in economics.

**[0:01:55] Jeff Guo:** Myron and Bob's model provided them with like this X-ray vision. They could spot all these discrepancies in the market where what the price should be didn't quite match what the price actually was. And the idea was those were opportunities to make money.

**[0:02:11] Mary Childs:** And Victor and his friends made so much money.

**[0:02:14] Jeff Guo:** I think that we averaged like 40% annual returns, over 30%, way, way higher than what we ever anticipated was possible. They were doing amazing. And part of their investing strategy was sometimes not investing. When the opportunities aren't good, you just shouldn't do very much. So sometimes they didn't do very much.

**[0:02:36] Mary Childs:** Were there like game nights?

**[0:02:37] Jeff Guo:** It was constantly, well, it was like game afternoon and game night.

**[0:02:41] Mary Childs:** What games?

**[0:02:43] Jeff Guo:** Well, a lot of poker.

**[0:02:44] Mary Childs:** Poker during the day, poker at night, different types of poker. They would turn their desk chairs away from their computer screens of price charts and yield curves to face each other and ante up. They got to play games of risk and probability with actual living legends Bob Merton and Myron Scholes.

**[0:03:02] Jeff Guo:** Well, playing poker with Bob Merton was terrifying because he was really a poker expert. Like he had programmed and written and solved aspects of poker very early on. So, you know, like we played with Bob, but we just knew that Bob was going to walk away with some of our money. Okay, okay. It wasn't all just for fun. I think we kind of felt guilty about it at the time. But it was like giving an outlet to risk taking so that if you kind of like to take risk, it was good to take the risk here and be very risk averse in what we were doing for the firm.

**[0:03:39] Jeff Guo:** So it was an interesting and fun example of risk taking and risk not taking. Yeah, it was like they could take their risks in the game. But when it came to the markets, Victor and his friends only wanted to take these smart, profitable risks.

**[0:03:53] Mary Childs:** They applied their lofty, perfect academic models of cold rationality to the busy, chaotic, real financial markets. To great, great profit.

**[0:04:03] Jeff Guo:** I just always felt that, you know, this was all just sort of too good to be true. It was amazing. I was so happy. I was so grateful. And so on.

**[0:04:11] Mary Childs:** And then it all came crashing down. Hello and welcome to Planet Money. I'm Mary Childs.

**[0:04:17] Jeff Guo:** And I'm Jeff Guo. Today on the show, it's maybe the most famous story in all of finance. The legendary rise and fall of long-term capital management. A story of perfection gone spectacularly wrong when risk-taking should have been risk-not-taking.

**[0:04:35] Mary Childs:** Perfect, safe, clever bets that turn into a perfect disaster that threatened the entire financial system. And how we have learned perfectly nothing from it.

**[0:04:53] Speaker 4:** Stay tuned for the following announcements and messages from our sponsors. This message comes from Mattress Firm. Sharing a bed should not mean losing sleep every night. Their sleep experts will match you with a bed designed for more uninterrupted sleep. Like a Tempur-Pedic made with unique temper material that absorbs motion so you can rest undisturbed. Right now, you can save up to $1 ,000 on select Tempur-Pedic Split King Sleep Systems during the Black Friday sale.

**[0:05:19] Speaker 4:** Visit Mattress Firm today to find your perfect sleep solution. They make sleep easy.

**[0:05:25] Speaker 5:** This message comes from Insperity. Because how you HR matters. From payroll and benefits to HR compliance and talent development. Helping your business move forward with confidence. Learn more at insperity.com slash HR matters.

**[0:05:40] Speaker 4:** This message comes from Schwab. At Schwab, you can get everything from self-directed investing to full-service wealth management, all in one place. No matter your investing goal, life stage, amount to invest, or know-how, you can invest your way with Schwab.

**[0:05:57] Jeff Guo:** Victor Higani and his poker-playing co-workers at the fund, Long-Term Capital Management, had cracked the code of how to invest using their perfect mathematical models. The way they went about it was like this. First, they would find something cheap. That wasn't very difficult. If you were looking, it was pretty easy to see it. But finding something cheap actually means finding two things. If we were going to buy something that was cheap, we had to find something that it was cheap relative to.

**[0:06:24] Jeff Guo:** Otherwise, it didn't mean anything.

**[0:06:26] Mary Childs:** Yeah, what is cheap if it's not, if it's just relative to something else? Because they weren't just buying a stock because they thought it was going to go up. They were betting on a discrepancy. They saw that one bond or stock cost too little relative to another very similar bond or stock. They were balancing the price of one thing off of another, like some kind of asset price parkour. Like, for example, they bet on Russian debt denominated in rubles because everyone else was more scared of it than they needed to be.

**[0:06:56] Mary Childs:** And they bet against Russian debt denominated in dollars because it was overpriced. That is called a relative value trade.

**[0:07:04] Jeff Guo:** So that's step one. Find something underpriced and find something similar that's overpriced. then they have to figure out why those discrepancies might exist. You had to explain it like, OK, why is this the case? And then you had to decide whether the reasons that were causing it were going to get stronger and make it go further apart or whether they were going to dissipate over time and whether there would be a convergence. In many cases, the idea was just to hold it long enough so that they had to converge.

**[0:07:37] Mary Childs:** Hold on to the trade for the long term. That's how they managed the capital. You get it?

**[0:07:45] Jeff Guo:** Nice. Now, often a reason for these price discrepancies was that people were being irrational. They were pricing these things wrong. And long term capital's mathematical models could show just how wrong these other people were. So long term capital could take the other side of the bet. They take the rational, empirically correct position and then wait.

**[0:08:06] Mary Childs:** So step one, find an opportunity like Russian debt in dollars is overpriced relative to Russian ruble debt. Step two, explain why that opportunity exists. Come up with a good explanation and understand what directions the prices should go.

**[0:08:21] Jeff Guo:** But these opportunities, these price discrepancies, they were generally not that big. Because, you know, everyone else is also out here in these financial markets looking for underpriced things. So the big discounts aren't going to happen. Whatever you find is going to be little. Hence, step three. Then you use leverage to try to give yourself a good return on investor capital.

**[0:08:45] Mary Childs:** What is leverage?

**[0:08:46] Jeff Guo:** Well, leverage means that you're borrowing money so that you can have more of the trade on than just investing the capital that you have.

**[0:08:54] Mary Childs:** Borrowing money to double up on the trade or triple up. So if you have $1, you could invest $2 or $3 or $20. And if your bet is correct, you get, you know, 20 times the profit you were gonna with your just $1. Leverage amplifies whatever you're doing. You can win that much more, but you can also lose that much more. Most hedge funds do this, but long-term capital did it to the extreme.

**[0:09:20] Jeff Guo:** Because come on, if you have a great trade opportunity and you believe in it, you should bet big. You shouldn't be limited by your fund's little bank account. you should bet as big as humanly possible. I forget who said that relative value trading is like picking up nickels in front of a steamroller. Nickels because these are teeny tiny opportunities to profit. Steamroller because what if something goes wrong? You've borrowed so much more than you have. All your leverage could flatten you.

**[0:09:50] Jeff Guo:** So the idea is to grab all the nickels, avoid the steamroller.

**[0:09:55] Mary Childs:** So step four, put on the trade. Take the opportunity. They'd call their bank or broker and say, hello, I have $20, 19 of it borrowed, and I'd like to use it to bet on this bond or option or whatever, please. And so that is a game that Victor and the group at Long-Term Capital Management were playing. And it was working.

**[0:10:14] Roger Lowenstein:** For the first three years plus of their fund, the world moved exactly the way they thought it would move.

**[0:10:21] Mary Childs:** This is Roger Lowenstein. He wrote the book on long-term capital management. And he says in the beginning, this fund was verging on mystical.

**[0:10:28] Roger Lowenstein:** You know, they seem to have a formula. People are always looking for a formula, a technique, a model, you know, something that they can say, I just plug this in and tomorrow I'll be X percent richer. The day after tomorrow I'll be, you know, X plus Y percent richer.

**[0:10:44] Jeff Guo:** Clients loved them so much so that they had too many people calling them up, hitting up their pagers, begging them to take their money to invest. They were turning clients away.

**[0:10:55] Mary Childs:** And in his first few years, their bets were right. Nickels upon nickels upon nickels. Long-term capital started in February 1994 with $1.3 billion of investor money. By late 1997, that was over $7 billion. But with all that success came a few problems.

**[0:11:12] Roger Lowenstein:** If you own a stock and it triples, that stock that you own is a lot more expensive than it used to be. Now, it might still be a good investment, but it's probably not as good an investment as before it tripled.

**[0:11:22] Jeff Guo:** Yeah, the opportunities for the future were looking a lot less profitable. And Roger says at some point, you know, a prudent money manager would say, OK, it's all played out just like I thought it would. Now I should adjust what I'm doing. Re-evaluate. It's just that it's difficult to know when to adjust.

**[0:11:42] Roger Lowenstein:** All you know is, hey, the math isn't as good as yesterday. We're a little richer today, but that means tomorrow doesn't look as enticing. And they could and should have adjusted their portfolio.

**[0:11:54] Mary Childs:** They'd wrung so much profit out of the markets. In 95, they generated 43 % in returns, and the next year, 41%. And another thing about too much success? Everyone else notices. Everyone else started copying them, trading desks at other hedge funds at banks. Long-term capital now had more competition, more people buying up the same stuff, scooping up those nickels.

**[0:12:19] Jeff Guo:** It was the hot thing, you know, so it just was attracting money just as we were making a lot of money. Those trading desks were making a lot of money. So the bank management gave them more money and said, make me make even more. Here's more capital. And it expanded really quickly. And the opportunity set just looked a lot less attractive than it had looked. there was a smaller and smaller set of opportunities. There were nickels to pick up.

**[0:12:44] Jeff Guo:** We could see that. Sadly, we probably didn't make the right, we didn't respond in the right way to it all.

**[0:12:51] Mary Childs:** That phenomenon was starting to show up in the returns for their clients. Instead of 40-something percent returns, in 1997, they generated just 17%, which didn't even beat the S &P 500.

**[0:13:05] Jeff Guo:** And right about then, by 1998, things had started happening around the world that would fundamentally change long-term capital's

**[0:13:13] Mary Childs:** future. First, financial markets were getting interesting. There was a financial crisis roiling Asia, sparked in Thailand, now hitting Indonesia and South Korea. Long-term capital's models haven't really predicted that, but so far, not that big a deal. The trouble was pretty

**[0:13:29] Jeff Guo:** contained. There were these currency devaluations, stock markets dropping, but we weren't super active in these emerging Southeast Asian markets. We had some little things on here and there, but very, very small, and we weren't too worried about it.

**[0:13:44] Mary Childs:** OK, little stuff. All fine. Not that big a deal for long-term capital management.

**[0:13:49] Jeff Guo:** What was happening in the spring of 1998 was that Citigroup was shutting down their proprietary trading operation, and we didn't really know it. Citigroup was shutting down the group that had been doing the same basic strategy that long-term capital management was, meaning they had owned very similar things to long-term capital and were now having a going-out-of-business sale. So prices were going down.

**[0:14:13] Mary Childs:** Which, OK, maybe some buying opportunities in there, you know?

**[0:14:16] Jeff Guo:** Everything was starting to behave a little bit differently, but we didn't realize it created a reshuffle, and I think it kind of got things started.

**[0:14:23] Mary Childs:** In August of 1998, things really got started. Russia acted in a way that was unexpected. It defaulted on its ruble debt and devalued its currency.

**[0:14:34] Jeff Guo:** We didn't actually have much exposure in Russia. I mean, we lost money in Russia, but not a lot.

**[0:14:38] Mary Childs:** Not a lot. Losses they could handle. That wasn't the problem.

**[0:14:43] Jeff Guo:** When that happened, that triggered all kinds of risk managers all over the financial system to say, hey, you know, we're going to take we got to take risk off the table.

**[0:14:54] Mary Childs:** And this is when and why things went so sideways for long-term capital. Risk managers, people whose jobs were to make sure their firm wasn't doing anything crazy, they were suddenly acting in a way that no model had predicted. They were like, whoa, this Russia default really surprised us. That's scary. Can we ratchet down how much money we have out there? Can we sell the riskier stuff until we feel better?

**[0:15:19] Jeff Guo:** And it just freaked everybody out. And all of a sudden, everybody was like, we got to reduce risk. Where can we reduce risk? And then that started to set something in motion at that point. So the partners of long-term capital management, they're at their desks. Nobody's playing poker. They are watching their nickels evaporate. Some of the prices are dropping. All of them are moving faster than they normally do. We're losing money. The market is much more volatile than it's been.

**[0:15:47] Jeff Guo:** Lots of different positions we have are losing money, but not all of them. That was very disturbing. It was very stressful and we were trying to figure out how to react to different things. But the market was still functioning.

**[0:15:59] Mary Childs:** The group was still able to function to sell things to other people into a very falling market. Stock markets in Europe dropped more than 5 % in a day. For the month of August, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 15%.

**[0:16:13] Jeff Guo:** And then the dynamic of the market sell-off changed. And then one day we look at our screens.

**[0:16:20] Mary Childs:** Their screens start showing something weird. Some of the things they owned, they're positions that shouldn't be affected at all by Thailand or Russia. They're also having huge swings.

**[0:16:30] Jeff Guo:** And some of the exact positions that we had all of a sudden, you know, made a huge gap move, just got repriced instantly and, you know, very far away from where it had been. Long-term capital's bets were wrong, but they were getting too wrong. Like this one bet? Which, you know, I mean, it would never move more than 1%, but it moved by 12 % up against us.

**[0:16:54] Mary Childs:** And then their offsetting bet in the other direction, shouldn't that bet be working out?

**[0:17:00] Jeff Guo:** It was not. When we just saw things that didn't make any sense anymore, we're OK. When we saw the thing went down, when it should have gone up, then we knew what was happening for sure. And it was like that was like that stomach dropping moment.

**[0:17:14] Roger Lowenstein:** It wasn't that one asset went against them or another did. but that every asset, every asset that they traded went against them.

**[0:17:23] Jeff Guo:** Roger Lowenstein says basically everything long-term capital owned was going against them. It was no longer just a market sell-off sparked by panic over world events. Now it was a market sell-off swirling around long-term capital.

**[0:17:37] Mary Childs:** Because in all their beautiful, perfect mathematical models of risk-taking and risk-not-taking, Roger could see that long-term capital had failed to account for something.

**[0:17:48] Roger Lowenstein:** a big thing. You had what I call the human factor, which tilted the odds. Yeah, the sell-off may have

**[0:17:53] Mary Childs:** started with Russia, but then the human factor. People got spooked across the board. And then when long-term capital started to stumble, Wall Street saw an opening. The street knew what their

**[0:18:05] Roger Lowenstein:** basic trade was. So the street, either for self-protective reasons, because they were in the same trades as LTCM, and they said, hey, I don't want to be exposed to the kind of losses they're having, I'm going to get out, which move markets against them. Or sort of more aggressive posture saying, I think LTCM is vulnerable. What they own, I'm going to bet against.

**[0:18:26] Jeff Guo:** The Wall Street banks that long-term capital traded with knew their trades. The funds who'd been copying them basically knew their trades. And all of these banks and competitors were now taking the opportunity to bet against long-term capital in order to topple them.

**[0:18:42] Mary Childs:** And this was something else that their perfectly rational models had failed to predict, that their peers and competitors had been jealous and were more than willing to help them fail.

**[0:18:50] Jeff Guo:** Now, there was still a way to get through this. It's in the long-term part. Long-term capital just had to have enough money and enough capital so that they could ride this out until prices recovered. It was like, we've got to raise this capital fast. You know, otherwise there's no, you know, this is not going to end well.

**[0:19:11] Mary Childs:** So they called up all their clients and all the people who had been beating their door down to give them money to invest.

**[0:19:17] Jeff Guo:** So we went out to all these people that were begging to invest with us and said, OK, here you go. Here's your big opportunity. Yeah, your big opportunity, right? Just like you wanted to invest your money with long-term capital management.

**[0:19:32] Mary Childs:** And people were interested, even at that point. But not if they were going to be the only ones doing it.

**[0:19:39] Jeff Guo:** People would say, I'll give you $200 million, but only if you raise $3 billion. I don't want to give you $200 million if you only raise $500 million. That's not going to be enough for you to survive this. Long-term capital needed a lot of money because they borrowed so much to invest in their smart, perfect trades, which were now all upside down.

**[0:19:59] Mary Childs:** And this chapter, this is the steamroller part. Their model had not predicted the panic over Russia's default. It didn't understand how people act when they're scared. And now, by the summer of 1998, people were too scared to save them.

**[0:20:14] Jeff Guo:** And we just never quite got there. And a lot of, you know, it was just the whole thing was in motion very quickly. Some days, they lost hundreds of millions of dollars. It was dizzying. And it was spreading.

**[0:20:27] Roger Lowenstein:** Wall Street stocks were crashing. Credit all around Wall Street was drying up because nobody knew how far or deep the reverberations from LTCM would run.

**[0:20:39] Mary Childs:** By late September, long-term capital management was effectively over. Because sometimes, emotions triumph over math.

**[0:20:47] Roger Lowenstein:** In four years, they'd quadrupled their investors' money. They seemed to have the black box. Over the next month, they lost half their assets. And in the ensuing couple of weeks, they lost virtually all the rest. It was all over.

**[0:21:03] Jeff Guo:** After the break, we find out just how far the reverberations of long-term capital's collapse would go.

**[0:21:16] Speaker 4:** Stay tuned for the following announcements and messages from our sponsors. This message comes from Mattress Firm. Sharing a bed should not mean losing sleep every night. Their sleep experts will match you with a bed designed for more uninterrupted sleep, Like a Tempur-Pedic made with unique temper material that absorbs motion so you can rest undisturbed. Right now, you can save up to $1 ,000 on select Tempur-Pedic Split King Sleep Systems during the Black Friday sale.

**[0:21:41] Speaker 4:** Visit Mattress Firm today to find your perfect sleep solution. They make sleep easy.

**[0:21:47] Speaker 5:** This message comes from Insperity. Because how you HR matters. From payroll and benefits to HR compliance and talent development. Helping your business move forward with confidence. Learn more at insperity.com slash HR matters.

**[0:22:02] Speaker 4:** This message comes from Schwab. At Schwab, you can get everything from self-directed investing to full-service wealth management, all in one place. No matter your investing goal, life stage, amount to invest, or know-how, you can invest your way with Schwab.

**[0:22:19] Mary Childs:** There is this saying attributed to industrialist J. Paul Getty, If you owe the bank $100, that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem. And by the fall of 1998, long-term capital management had loved leverage so much that the fund had borrowed from the banks over $100 billion. They weren't just the bank's problem. They were everyone's problem.

**[0:22:43] Jeff Guo:** The entire financial market was destabilized, which is why, Roger Lowenstein says, on September 22nd, the Federal Reserve stepped in.

**[0:22:52] Roger Lowenstein:** Bill McDonough, the president of the New York Federal Reserve, called in the 16 biggest banks.

**[0:22:59] Mary Childs:** The Fed president said, please come in for a visit. He gathered the banks in a conference room and said, let's figure this out. Long-term capital was not invited.

**[0:23:07] Jeff Guo:** Now, the banks were not required to help here.

**[0:23:10] Roger Lowenstein:** But when the Fed calls you, you go, obviously. And he said, it's up to you guys. It's private money. But I don't want to see these guys fail chaotically. Is there a way that we can orchestrate their funeral, so to speak?

**[0:23:26] Mary Childs:** I envision this Fed meeting as a group of somewhat guilty children, like their siblings, their cousins or something. And a parent has locked them in a room and said, OK, maybe you didn't make the mess, but you have a mess. How are you going to clean it up?

**[0:23:41] Jeff Guo:** Victor Higani says that at first, each individual bank was kind of behaving like children. They're like, this isn't my problem. They were like, I don't know, we'll just see what happens. And the Fed said, no, no, no, this is a risk to the market. You guys have to do something about this. We think that you should all put in a couple $100 billion each and take over the fund and resolve this crisis in that manner.

**[0:24:08] Mary Childs:** A couple of the banks were still like, thank you for this opportunity, but no, and left the room.

**[0:24:13] Jeff Guo:** But 14 of the banks agreed to do this and put in about $3.6 billion.

**[0:24:19] Mary Childs:** In the end, the 14 banks bought all the stuff that long-term capital had at an enormous discount. Eventually, those prices would recover. And the banks made money.

**[0:24:29] Jeff Guo:** Just a few years before, long-term capital had been the toast of Wall Street. They were geniuses throwing around over $100 billion, only a little bit of it theirs. And now it was no more.

**[0:24:43] Mary Childs:** For the partners at Long Term Capital, including Victor, this was personally and financially painful.

**[0:24:50] Jeff Guo:** It was very sad for ourselves. It was very sad for the investors that we lost all this money for. It was really painful for several years afterward. You know, we had built something and we made mistakes and, you know, it was unfortunate.

**[0:25:05] Mary Childs:** Victor's professional reputation was invested in the fund. His career was in the fund. And he'd had money in the fund.

**[0:25:12] Jeff Guo:** Well, I lost, you know, call it 80% of, I lost about 80% of my net worth.

**[0:25:21] Mary Childs:** But that Fed orchestrated funeral, it worked. It stopped the panic. And Roger says there are two

**[0:25:29] Roger Lowenstein:** main reasons why it worked. The Federal Reserve chief had his thumb on their necks. And the other thing is they each had the comfort that no one potential investor would have had alone, which is I'm not going in alone. So they could put in enough capital, presumably, to withstand more market moves against them. It took a group effort to staunch the bleeding.

**[0:25:50] Jeff Guo:** But Victor wants to make something clear about what happened here. He and his fellow partners of the now-defunct long-term capital management lost money. Nobody swooped in to make them whole again. And certainly the government did not send taxpayer money to

**[0:26:04] Mary Childs:** fill in their losses. The rescue effort was a rescue of the financial system, not of long-term capital management.

**[0:26:11] Jeff Guo:** We didn't get bailed out. You know, there was no government money involved. You know, there was just no bailout as we would commonly think of a bailout.

**[0:26:21] Mary Childs:** Victor says this was a private recapitalization. The 14 private banks got to buy a bunch of assets at buyer sale prices from a private company. Victor says while the Fed did babysit, it was just hosting a hedge fund yard sale.

**[0:26:36] Jeff Guo:** Now, to Roger, whether the Fed just babysat or the government used its actual money ultimately ended up being kind of a matter of semantics.

**[0:26:45] Roger Lowenstein:** I think it was better from a public policy, certainly, that there was no, you know, they didn't take money from food stamps and give it to LTCM.

**[0:26:53] Mary Childs:** Yeah, that does sound bad.

**[0:26:54] Roger Lowenstein:** That would sound worse. But I think from the standpoint of the example it set for markets, it didn't make, you know, much difference.

**[0:27:03] Mary Childs:** By intervening, the Fed set a precedent. Because just 10 years later, in 2008, the financial system would again be on the brink of collapse. Except this time, the problem was much bigger.

**[0:27:17] Jeff Guo:** Yeah, the big banks, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank and all the rest of them, had been gleefully using leverage to bet on mortgage debt. Mortgage debt that was way riskier than their models predicted. And in this case, the government really did bail out some banks and financial institutions. I feel that somehow the LTCM experience had to be unheeded for 2008 and 2009 to have unfolded the way that they did.

**[0:27:51] Mary Childs:** Victor and Roger agree on this point. Yes, the Fed or the government has some interest in a stable financial system. But because in 1998 the Fed intervened and orchestrated long-term capital's funeral, we didn't see what would have happened had it been allowed to fail chaotically. We didn't really feel the consequences of all that risk-taking and all that leverage. So we didn't really learn that maybe that was too much risk.

**[0:28:18] Roger Lowenstein:** I think that's a bad example. I think capitalism works best with real traders taking real losses when they occur. It disciplines the way people try to make real profits.

**[0:28:30] Jeff Guo:** Because if the government is going to come in and fix everyone's mistakes, is there really any difference between risk-taking and risk-not-taking?

**[0:28:39] Mary Childs:** And Roger says it is folly to think that anyone would ever solve that age-old dream of a perfect mathematical solution to risk. Being able to predict the future. Because you can't. That's the only thing that history does promise us.

**[0:28:53] Roger Lowenstein:** It was just sort of the height of financial. hubris. I don't mean hubris in a personal way that they were bad people. I don't mean that at all. But I think they were wrong on a key point, which is the assumption that any black box, any formula based on the historic patterns of how prices have moved can be a guarantee and therefore can give you license to take such tremendous leverage. That black box has not been invented.

**[0:29:23] Mary Childs:** But maybe this time, Roger.

**[0:29:24] Roger Lowenstein:** Maybe this time. Maybe this time.

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