Chip Clark's father was a middle school English teacher near Natick, Massachusetts.
“My dad was a middle school English teacher in one of the local schools.”
The Long Run with Luke Timmerman
9 May 2018 · 1h 5m · Chip Clark, Luke Timmerman · 22 quoted facts
Chip Clark, CEO of Genocea Biosciences (spelled 'Genosha' in the transcript), argues that a company can survive a major clinical and market setback if its leaders act early and decisively. After its herpes vaccine won no investor or partner backing for a $150 million phase three trial, Genocea shelved the program. It pivoted to personalized cancer vaccines, betting that its platform for finding T-cell targets was the real asset.
The central tension is between believing a product works and the market refusing to pay for it. Clark says the herpes vaccine worked, yet the stock fell, cash ran low, and 40% of staff were laid off. The second half covers rebuilding trust. He describes keeping the remaining staff motivated, raising new money, and facing well-funded neoantigen rivals. The new plan still has to be proven in the clinic.
Clark says the three Gen 3 herpes trials showed consistent, statistically significant benefit. Investors and partners still balked at the roughly $150 million, three-plus-year phase three cost and at what they would pay for the product.
Phase 2b data arrived in mid-2017 with about a year of cash left. Without money or a partner for phase three, shelving the program and cutting 40% of staff was the only way to buy time.
Genocea's method profiles the T-cell responses patients actually make, which Clark argued suited personalized cancer vaccines after checkpoint inhibitors showed T cells matter. This let the company pivot without inventing new technology.
Headcount fell from about 110 to about 70 after the restructuring, then roughly 20 more people left. Clark says he shared financing and partnering status openly, and used share-price comparisons with Biogen and Celgene to argue that deep troughs are survivable.
Clark says published results from NEON and BioNTech showed needle-to-needle times of 18 to 20 weeks, while everyone's goal is 30 days. Shipping between outside suppliers is a major cause of delay, so the field's future depends on shortening that chain.
Chip Clark says the drug worked, but investors and partners doubted people would pay for it and would not fund a phase three trial costing about $150 million over three-plus years. With only about a year of cash, the company could not afford it alone.
It is a treatment built from mutations unique to one patient's tumor, called neoantigens, so the immune system's T cells learn to attack that tumor. Clark says Genocea's platform identifies which antigens a patient's T cells actually respond to.
Clark says staff went from about 110 to about 70 in the restructuring, then roughly 20 more left. Luke Timmerman said cash was down to about $12 million at the end of 2017 while the company burned about $50 million a year.
Clark says the company recapitalized in January 2018. The host said it raised about $55 million, and Clark said the investors included NEA. Clark says this gives about two years of cash.
A cancer patient can't easily wait months for treatment. Clark says published rivals took 18 to 20 weeks from biopsy to injection, the industry goal is 30 days, and shipping components between suppliers is one of the biggest causes of delay.
Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.
Chip Clark's father was a middle school English teacher near Natick, Massachusetts.
“My dad was a middle school English teacher in one of the local schools.”
Chip Clark's given name is William, the same as his father, and his parents chose the nickname Chip to tell them apart.
“my father is also William and my parents wanted me to have, wanted to call me something other than what they call him which is Bill and for whatever reason they landed on Chip”
Chip Clark says his parents married before the Supreme Court's Loving decision legalized interracial marriage nationwide.
“They got married before interracial marriage was the law of the land. It was pre the loving decision in the Supreme Court.”
After Harvard, Chip Clark joined SmithKline Beecham, now part of GlaxoSmithKline, in a two-year management training program.
“I was fortunate to join what is now Blackstar SmithKline. It was SmithKline Beechin at the time.”
SmithKline Beecham bought Diversified Pharmaceutical Services, a pharmacy benefit manager, and Chip Clark was tasked with implementing it in Japan with limited success.
“And one of the things they did was purchase DPS, Diversified Pharmaceutical Services, a PDM. And my job was to implement that in Japan, which was ultimately not hugely successful”
Chip Clark lived and worked in Japan for four years with SmithKline Beecham.
“though I did live and work there for four years.”
After business school, Chip Clark worked in biotech venture capital at Care Capital in Princeton, New Jersey.
“I ended up in biotech venture capital with some ex-SmithKline Veacham pharma executives at a firm called Care Capital in Princeton”
Chip Clark says The Medicines Company pioneered the model of in-licensing clinical-stage drugs and repurposing them, and Vanda Pharmaceuticals was one of the first fast followers.
“the medicines company really pioneered this model, and I think we were one of the first fast followers on that model.”
Chip Clark served as chief business officer of Vanda Pharmaceuticals from 2004 to 2010.
“I left the firm four years after joining to be the chief business officer at Vanda and had a wonderful experience from 2004 all the way through 2010.”
Luke Timmerman notes that Merck launched Gardasil and Pfizer-Wyeth launched Prevnar, two commercially successful vaccines, before Clark joined Genocea.
“Merck had come out with Gardasil and Pfizer-Wyeth had come out with Prevnar.”
Chip Clark says several big pharma companies had tried and failed to develop a therapeutic vaccine for genital herpes before Genocea pursued Gen 3.
“several big pharma companies had tried and failed to develop a therapeutic vaccine, an immunotherapy to treat genital herpes”
Genocea's T cell hypothesis held that the herpes virus is mostly invisible to antibodies, so a vaccine should engage T cells instead.
“We call it the T cell hypothesis. The pathogen spends some of its life, or in fact, most of its life, essentially invisible to the antibodies around which vaccines have been designed for decades.”
Chip Clark names Agenus, Vical and an Australian company called Cordon as other developers of genital herpes vaccines.
“A company called Agenus, which has since pivoted itself into focusing almost entirely on immuno-oncology. A company called Vical, a company called Cordon, an Australian company”
Chip Clark says Genocea ran three clinical trials of Gen 3 that mostly showed consistent effects on surrogate endpoints and clinical measures.
“We ultimately ran three clinical trials and, with a few exceptions, showed very consistent impact on both surrogate endpoints as well as clinical measures”
Genocea's phase 2b data for Gen 3 came out in mid-2017, when the company had about a year of cash left.
“our phase 2b data came out in the middle of last year and we at that point had about a year's worth of cash left”
Chip Clark says a phase three trial of Gen 3 would have cost about $150 million and taken more than three years.
“or there was an unwillingness I would say to invest in the phase three program which was going to cost $150 million or so it was going to take three plus years”
Genocea shelved its genital herpes vaccine program in September 2017, according to host Luke Timmerman, with Clark agreeing.
“You end up deciding to put the herpes program on the shelf September of last year, 2017.”
Genocea's headcount fell from about 110 to about 70 in its restructuring, and about 20 more employees then left.
“we went from about 110 people to about 70. And then through the attrition, we lost another 20 people.”
Luke Timmerman says Genocea had about $12 million in cash at the end of 2017 while spending roughly $50 million a year.
“I saw you were down to about 12 million cash at the end of 2017. So when you're burning 50 million a year, you don't have to be a math genius.”
Luke Timmerman says Genocea raised about $55 million in January 2018.
“So this is all preclinical. I know you raised another about 55 million, I think, in January.”
Chip Clark says the flu vaccine was effective only about 20 to 30 percent of the time in the season discussed because the wrong strains were predicted.
“And this year, the flu vaccine works, forget the numbers, but it's like 20 % of the time, 20, 30 % of the time, because we guess the wrong strains to try to cover.”
Luke Timmerman notes that NEA, typically a private early-stage investor, took part in Genocea's public-company financing.
“Well, I thought it was interesting that NEA, which is typically a private early stage or early to mid stage investor, they were part of this in a public company.”
Clark describes his teacher parents and the emphasis on education. This explains his drive and self-reliance.
“I was born in Boston and raised in the western suburbs, a town called Natick.”
Clark explains how an economics degree and Japanese studies led to a job making products and then to four years in Tokyo.
“I was solving for something that would let me make stuff and would let me go to Japan.”
Clark moves into biotech venture capital at Care Capital and co-writes the business plan for Vanda Pharmaceuticals. He then serves as its chief business officer.
“wrote the business plan for Banda Pharmaceuticals”
Clark lays out the logic behind Gen 3: unmet patient need, failed big pharma rivals, a T-cell rationale and an achievable trial path.
“We call it the T cell hypothesis.”
The core tension. Clark says the drug worked but the market balked at the value and the phase three investment.
“It's ultimately an MPV dispute and sort of a willingness to undertake the investment.”
Clark describes the personal toll of laying off colleagues and walking away from a product patients wanted.
“I almost can't put into words how hard it was.”
Clark explains how he kept morale up by showing that Biogen, Celgene and others once traded at the same share price.
“I found the date when Amgen, I'm sorry, Biogen was trading there.”
The discussion turns to how long it takes to make a patient-specific vaccine and why shortening that time matters.
“they were in the 18 to 20 week range”
Clark reflects on NEA joining the board and shifts from fearing for survival to proving the new strategy with about two years of cash.
“It's no longer are we going to survive”
Welcome to the Long Run. This is a podcast for biotech adventurers. I'm your host, Luke Timmerman. Today's guest on the show is Chip Clark. He's the CEO of Cambridge, Massachusetts-based Genosha Biosciences. This vaccine platform company got into a jam last summer. It got through a phase two trial with its lead therapeutic vaccine for genital herpes. Clark tried to insist the trial was a success and the product had a future. The market disagreed. The stock tanked.
Cash ran low. Staff morale sank. Something had to be done. How did Clark think about restarting the company? Pivoting, as he says, toward a new future as a personalized neoantigen cancer vaccine developer. Clark was candid about this difficult stretch at Genocha, and I think many entrepreneurs will be able to relate to the experience. Now, before we get going, for more than 200 years, Harvard Medical School has shaped the design of medical school education throughout the world.
Now, Harvard Medical School is bringing its expertise to organizations that seek to drive growth and innovation in health care. Harvard Medical School designs and delivers customized executive-level programs that provide business and science leaders with a fundamental understanding of current medical practices, the changing economic landscape of health care, and the latest advances in biomedical science. Companies like Google, Amgen, GE, and Athena Health are among the diverse array of companies leveraging the insights they have gained through Harvard Medical School.
Programs include first-hand insights into physician decision-making, patient perspectives, real-world workflows, and the business of medicine. Advances in technology, biomedical science, and patient care that may present new opportunities for your company. Discussions on trends in patient-centered care, data science, genomics, digital health, policy, and reimbursement. And exploration of state-of-the-art treatments for specific diseases. For a free consultation on how your company can gain new customer insights with Harvard Medical School, the Long Run Podcast listeners can go to a special place.
Point your web browser to hms.harvard.edu slash long run exec, all one word. I'll say that again. For a free consultation on how your organization can gain insights from Harvard Medical School, go to hms.harvard.edu slash long run exec. Just about everyone in the cancer R &D business is thinking about combination therapy and complementary mechanisms of action. Not only do drug developers need to see proof of their biological mechanism as a monotherapy, but also in combination with other treatments that are fast emerging on the scene.
This gets complicated in a hurry, especially when you think about all the possible mechanisms, dose regimens, and tumor types that need to be taken into account. Companies today often have to burn through 30 to 50 patients in a Phase I clinical trial to get the answer to these important questions. That takes a lot of precious time and money. Presage Biosciences is working to improve this approach. They are working with biopharma companies to use Presage's patented microinjector device that enables intratumoral microdosing of experimental cancer drugs.
This microdosing tool can allow for a half dozen or more combinations of drugs to be injected directly into a single tumor while the tumor is still in the mouse or in the patient. This is a way to run multiple experiments at once to get maximum information to guide drug development on time and on budget. The device is being used in a clinical trial right now. To learn more, go to presagebio.com. Next on the long run, Rob Perez was a lower middle class kid from Los Angeles who found early on that he had a knack for sales.
A college basketball player with some hoop dreams that never quite materialized, he paid his way through college by working at fitness centers. Chance brought him into the pharmaceutical business, where he ended up succeeding beyond his wildest dreams at Cubist Pharmaceuticals, the antibiotic developer. Now he's got some different ideas on how to connect biopharma to the wider world and do some good in different ways. I think you'll enjoy that conversation quite a bit. But for now, join me and Chip Clark for the long run.
So today with me on the podcast is Chip Clark. He's the CEO of Genosha Biosciences. Welcome, Chip. Thanks for joining me on the long run.
Thanks so much, Luke. Happy to be here.
So, Chip, you and I have spoken many times over the years about Genosha, but I don't want to assume that the listeners know a whole lot of the story. So I think maybe we can start before we get into the company story, which I want to spend a lot of time on. I'd like to ask a little bit about you and where you come from. So maybe we could just start real quick. Like, where were you born and raised?
I was born in Boston and raised in the western suburbs, a town called Natick. My parents are, well, my parents are wonderful. My dad was a middle school English teacher in one of the local schools. And my mother was also trained as a middle school teacher, though she has a degenerative eye disease and went blind not too long after I was born. And so stayed at home to raise me and my three siblings.
Okay. Okay. Are you the oldest, youngest?
I am the oldest, yes. Okay. Go ahead. I'm sorry.
Oh, so sounds like, I mean, both your parents are educators. So was that a big emphasis, a value they impressed upon you and your siblings?
Yeah, I think so. They certainly looked at sort of their own personal paths, and they, like any parent, wanted to ensure that their children would have even better lives than they did. And so they absolutely stressed the role of education. I guess I happened to be pretty good at school. I didn't have, you know, I was thinking about the question of what led me into biotech, and it's not as though I was very good at science and math, but not good at back to the exception of other subjects, but always found it interesting.
You were interested in a variety of subjects, kind of well-rounded?
Well, I wouldn't go so far as to call myself well-rounded, but I definitely really liked school, liked doing well in school, and I think I always felt like, and this is as much from my parents' upbringing as anything, that hard work and driving toward objectives, measurements of success were important things to me and absolutely shaped the way I approach
work. Now, it's funny, you know, in all the years we've spoken, I was just looking at your 10K before this interview and realized I didn't know your first name was William. And I thought, William Clark? That sounds like familiar, you know, the core of discovery, these 19th century explorers, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. So, is there a story there?
Unfortunately, no connection to that William Clark, though I'm proud of my family. It's simply that my father is also William and my parents wanted me to have, wanted to call me something other than what they call him which is Bill and for whatever reason they landed on Chip it's certainly different I've had a love-hate relationship with the name there are a lot of people who look like me who are named Chip so it's been It's been interesting, but I certainly made my peace with the name.
Well, for those who are not familiar, what do you mean by people who look like me?
Well, so I am African-American. My father is white and my mother is black. And so when I think of my race, I think I truly am African-American. And I used to, when I was younger, consider myself black. And certainly I'm comfortable with the sort of black culture. But I ended up being troubled by that label, if only because it meant that I was, by definition, rejecting my father, who was such a big part of my life, who, as it happens, faced rejection from his family to marry my mother.
They got married before interracial marriage was the law of the land. It was pre the loving decision in the Supreme Court. And he, my dad, lost his family, or at least lost his parents and their generation of his family for marrying my mom. And so for all of those reasons, I couldn't consider myself just black. Yeah, so I'm truly African American. And as I said, there aren't many African Americans named Chip Clark, I suppose.
Yeah, yeah, I can imagine that. But it gives you a different lens on the world to, you know, travel. I mean, as frequently as I'm sure you did between these two worlds, so to speak.
Yeah, I think that's true. I think I've always felt a little bit different. a little bit apart. I never looked, I mean, I grew up in a sort of a working class suburb of Boston, and there weren't, there were not many black families and where both parents were black. And I was, my family was the only mixed race family that I can recall. And so we felt different, apart, never really unwelcome, except by a very small minority of people.
Perhaps looked down upon a little bit. But that always shaped certainly the way I felt about myself and how I fit in. It made me feel very clearly that I had to be self-sufficient and that I wanted to prove to people that I could be just as good at whatever, largely academic things, as people around me.
You do well in school. Yeah. And where did you end up going?
I went to Harvard undergrad and had a great experience there. And from—
What did you study?
I studied economics. so it doesn't obviously put me on the path to biotech but my kind of minor was Japanese language and history and political economy which also had I think a significant influence on me it made me, this was in the late 80s and so it was at a time when Japan was supposed to be taking over the world taking over the US I felt really strongly that A, I wanted to go to Japan and B, that I wanted to work in a career where I would be making something, making a product.
A lot of my classmates went to law school or consulting or banking and, you know, not to in any way look down on those professions, but it just wasn't right for me. And when I was looking around for things to do post-graduation, I was solving for something that would let me make stuff and would let me go to Japan. And I was fortunate to join what is now Blackstar SmithKline. It was SmithKline Beechin at the time.
and they had a management training program there that would both give me groundings in the industry, help me see the company from a few different angles. I got to do pharmaceutical sales for going on a year. I did business development. I did HR.
Wait, this is during like summers or internships as you're an undergrad?
No, this is, I'm sorry, this is my post-graduation job. It was a two-year management training program for people right out of college.
Okay, but you also did an MBA at Wharton, but that came later? That came later, yeah. Okay, so you get out of Harvard, and wow, there's a lot to learn here. I mean, the language, the culture, the pharmaceutical industry all rolled together. How fluent did you get in all those three things?
Well, I've had more experience with the pharmaceutical industry than with Japan. though I did live and work there for four years. And yeah, I was in Tokyo and had a tremendous professional experience. I had a team of several people working with me, first in R &D project management and then in business development. I was there. To take you back, SmithKline Beecham was one of the companies that was pretty aggressive in trying to branch away from the pharmaceuticals as a core business.
And one of the things they did was purchase DPS, Diversified Pharmaceutical Services, a PDM. And my job was to implement that in Japan, which was ultimately not hugely successful, but still a tremendous learning experience. So my...
Yeah, that was a trend for a while when the pharma companies got, they had that. And I mean, they tried to diversify in other ways, too.
Yeah, yeah, yeah. And SB at the time was pretty broadly diversified. It did have and continues to have a consumer products division as well as a clinical labs division. So it was just a really interesting company that was trying to stitch together different parts of the health care system into a coherent whole. not ultimately fully successful, but still for a young guy out of college, a great way to see how companies work generally, to figure out what I personally might have been good at, and to kind of figure out a good sort of professional path.
It sounds like a good combination of strategy and operations. You know, kind of deep in the weeds if you're dealing with PBMs. Yeah. So then I guess the entrepreneurial bug hits. Tell me about that.
I guess it all actually starts with the time at Smith's County, where, you know, I had this chance to try to build a business in the Japanese market. and there was no blueprint and where the healthcare system by design was just completely different than the U.S. system. And so it was not immediately obvious that a pharmaceutical benefits manager could in any way succeed in Japan. Just the notion of pharmacists or even physicians through a formulary impeding somehow on the decisions that physicians made with their patients would have been at the time almost impossible to contemplate.
And even today, though I'm sort of removed from how the Japanese healthcare system works, I think it's still really challenging to contemplate. Physicians are treated like dodge there. I had a kind of a funny experience with the healthcare system. While there, I was on the company soccer team and broke my leg in a game and, you know, sort of went, I was brought to the emergency room to get my leg looked at and put in a cast, et cetera.
And the doctor was sort of manipulating my leg and then I asked a question. And he looked at me astonished. Not because I could ask the question fluently in Japanese, but the notion that I was asking a question so through him that he was incredibly flustered. And my question was this. You're about to take an X-ray. can't I get a lead vest to protect my body? And he said, oh, you don't need that. And I said, well, why are you leaving the room?
And he was absolutely floored by it. So that's an anecdote that speaks to the broader point, that the Japanese healthcare system is very different. I don't believe even today there is this, I think there's a soft notion of formularies, But the notion of external control over physicians' decisions has not really taken root the way it has in the U.S.
There may be some American physicians listening to this now thinking, boy, maybe I should check out moving over to Japan. I kind of like not being questioned.
And look, there are cultural reasons for that. And yes, there's good and bad to every system. And kudos to Japan. But yes.
But you were involved with Vanda, I believe, mid-2000s. How did that happen?
Well, so being in charge in Japan made me really want to be an entrepreneur. And so I left Japan right after that, after four years to go to business school, with the idea that that was going to be both a transition back to the U.S. for me. From my experience, if you're in Japan more than four years, you're sort of there for life, and I wasn't ready to make that commitment. And so business school is both the way for me to make a transition back to the States, build a network, and sort of get groundings in the other aspects of a sort of company building that could potentially be of use down the road.
And had every intention of working on another kind of startup opportunity. It turns out that the first opportunity I had was within SmithKline region. They were looking to spin out the PBM and sort of the information side of the PBM as a new co. And I worked on that during business school. But it sort of collapsed around the time of, and probably in a small part because of, this SB-Glaxo merger. And so as a kind of backup, I ended up, and I don't mean to sound glute when I say this, I ended up in biotech venture capital with some ex-SmithKline Veacham pharma executives at a firm called Care Capital in Princeton, which was a great way to sort
of understand how small companies, small biotech companies start and get built successfully. And had a, you know, just a wonderful experience kind of surveying the landscape, meeting with hundreds of companies probably in the end, or at least reading the business plans for hundreds of companies and getting a sense of what made companies work or not work. And I became convinced that I can do this. And so while at Care Capital, wrote the business plan for Banda Pharmaceuticals and together with one of the partners at Care Capital, we met in Jerry Karabellis, and a couple of other people, including the current and still CEO of Banda Pharmaceuticals called Mihalis Polymeropoulos, sort of wrote the plan, seeded the company.
And the notion behind the company was and remains in licensing clinical stage assets, repurposing them, and driving them to commercialization. It was, I think, the medicines company really pioneered this model, and I think we were one of the first fast followers on that model. And the company's still quite successful. They have two approved products on the market that are really making a difference for patients.
Now, did you go all in in an operating role or did you sort of straddle the worlds of venture capital and, you know, the Vanda startup?
Yeah, I straddled the world for a year and found that Vanda went from probably a quarter of my time to half my time to virtually all of my time and really wanted to go all in. And so I left the firm four years after joining to be the chief business officer at Vanda and had a wonderful experience from 2004 all the way through 2010.
Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. And then you get the call from Genosha. Yeah. All right? Yeah. And now this is antigen discovery, antigens that are going to be recognized by T-cells. Correct. Right? I mean, even then, that was the idea. You got a platform here, Darren Higgins, the Harvard scientist. He'd done some work even back at Berkeley. What was interesting about this?
Well, I think, as I said before, I had a lot that I loved about the Vanda experience. The biggest sort of challenge, I think, that we faced there was that ultimately we were developing not necessarily completely novel programs. And from among the opportunities I was evaluating when considering leaving Vanda, what to me was just so exciting about Genosha was that if our platform could work, there would be a way to transform the discovery of vaccine discovery and development.
And our focus at the time was entirely on infectious disease. But think about this. We have 40-plus infectious diseases that are addressable by vaccines, and it's only a slight simplification to say that for the remaining infectious disease where there aren't good vaccines, it's because we haven't figured out how to bring the T-cell arm of the immune system to bear to address those pathogens. And the notion of coming up with vaccines against so many terrible pathogens was hugely exciting.
So technology, of course, was top of mind, but as would always be the case, it's looking at the quality of the board, the quality of the investors, the quality of the team that all factored into my decision that ultimately Genosha was where I wanted to settle my energy.
You know, at that time, that was when I first started paying attention to the company. And people forget, I mean, it sounds like a long time ago, but, you know, Merck had come out with Gardasil and Pfizer-Wyeth had come out with Prevnar. these were very successful commercially successful and scientifically clinically meaningful vaccines so it was you know vaccines had gone through this long kind of fallow period right where they were all cheap generics and yes like we take for granted the measles mumps rubella the diphtheria pertussis all that kind of stuff yes um you know enormously important public health interventions uh but not a lot of new innovation going on and that's what you looked at and said wow,
you know, if we could do even one like that, that would be pretty worthwhile.
Exactly right. Though I think in retrospect, it almost looks like it was a big pharma fever dream because you talked about those very important vaccines that launched around that time. And there were a couple of big acquisitions like J &J investing in Crusoe for a few $1 billion. And then very little after that. It's been kind of a quiet period.
Well, and it's important to note that in biotech, I think it's also important to, you know, beware the tidy success narrative. You know, it's always easy to look back in retrospect and say, wow, those guys came up with Prevenor and Gardasil and it all happened in a straight line. Rarely is ever the case. And here we are today. You've been at Genocia now for eight years. It's been a long road. You've taken this company public. I think the day that we're recording this, your stock is, you know, a little over a dollar a share.
It's not quite what we like. You just raised some money. But no, I mean, you went public, you know, it's something a lot higher than that. Yes. So I think it's important to talk about the setbacks along the way and how you respond to those. But let's talk about that first program. How did you settle on really putting your resources, your time and energy and money into the genital herpes therapeutic vaccine? What was exciting about that?
Yeah, so I inherited some of the work, but I also endorsed it. And the bottom line, thinking from our perspective was that for a few reasons, this was a really attractive opportunity to pursue. One, millions of patients need new treatments for genital herpes. It's a market somewhat served by oral drugs that afford some control over symptoms, some control over disease transmissibility, but by no means provide sort of bulletproof protection for patients. So Hugh John Met Need was, of course, at the top of the list.
The second point in making this attractive to us was that several big pharma companies had tried and failed to develop a therapeutic vaccine, an immunotherapy to treat genital herpes, which to us meant both that the problem was real and hard to solve and that if we could crack it, there would be companies waiting at the other side for our product. And I think the third, and of course this matters, was that there was some compelling evidence that T cells mattered in this disease.
We call it the T cell hypothesis. The pathogen spends some of its life, or in fact, most of its life, essentially invisible to the antibodies around which vaccines have been designed for decades. And so there was...
Antibodies come from B cells. Yeah. We're talking about T cells.
Exactly. Yeah. Just the notion of bringing the other arm of the adaptive immune response to bear to control a terrible pathogen was hugely compelling. So I think all three of those rationale points factored into our decision. And probably the fourth factor was that as we contemplated the clinical development program and what proof of concept could look like and the time, cost, and effort required to get there, it seemed like an easier lift than it would be for many other diseases.
So all of those factors influenced our prioritizing the genital herpes program.
You could look at a surrogate endpoint with viral shedding to get an early read of whether it's acting in the scientific way you theorize. Yes. Genital lesions was, you know, a pretty objective measurement of clinical benefit. You probably didn't need a 10 ,000 patient clinical trial to take this through FDA. All this lined up, wearing your business hat, because this is who you are, you thought, okay, I think the cost-benefit pencil's out here.
Right, right. No, exactly right. So it made perfect sense to go after it, even if it's not a disease that if you have, you're going to die. the benefits to patients would still be transformative. And so for all of the reasons you just said, it made business sense. For the reason I just said, it's a cause you can really rally people behind, whether patients, physicians, or of course your employees as well.
But now, were you pretty much the only company out there running trials like this?
No, there were and remain a few other companies trying to develop vaccines against genital herpes. A company called Agenus, which has since pivoted itself into focusing almost entirely on immuno-oncology. A company called Vical, a company called Cordon, an Australian company, are just a few examples of the peers in the field that we sort of, I guess, had friendly competition with.
Okay. So they're out there designing trials and communicating to the street about some of these same endpoints. So people are getting a little more familiar with, okay, what does success look like here? What's it going to take to get something through the FDA? I mean, you weren't telling a completely out-of-left-field novel story nobody had ever heard of.
Well, I think you're right. I think it's also the case, though, that if you think about investors generally, they don't have that many vaccine plays for them to be evaluating, whether you're talking about investors meeting in the street on the buy side or on the sell-side analysts. So there was, of course, some education to do. But on the other hand, what ultimately goes into a vaccine is fairly straightforward. It's proteins, it's an adjuvant. And there was nothing truly sort of esoteric about the disease or how we were seeking to treat it.
So pros and cons.
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For a free consultation on how your organization can gain new customer insights with Harvard Medical School, go to hms.harvard.edu slash longrunexec. So you work your way through phase two. Yeah. And you're getting interim readouts along the way. But then you come to a point where you have to make a decision to do something different, to pivot, to restart the company. What was your – how did you think about that? And along with your board, I presume.
Yeah, they were certainly aware of and involved in the decision making. Well, look, I mean, I think, so we, as you said, were successfully developing this program. We ultimately ran three clinical trials and, with a few exceptions, showed very consistent impact on both surrogate endpoints as well as clinical measures in a statistically significant and clinically meaningful way. So the darn thing works. but the fact of the matter was that we had our phase 2b data to sort of go into the timeline specifically our phase 2b data came out in the middle of last year and we at that point had about a year's worth of cash left and you know our sort of mantra with our investors leading to those
data. And from that point on was, you know, this is a really exciting opportunity. And it's not, we're not going to do phase three unless we can do phase three, meaning we're only going to proceed into phase three if we have the capital, whether through fundraising or through
partnership or partnerships. But Chip, now you're saying the phase, that these clinical trials were positive, but yet the stock market didn't see this in the same way. What were they seeing? What were they seeing that, how are they looking at this differently than you?
Well, I think ultimately what you're, the way we think about it is that there was sort of a disconnect on the value of the asset. I don't think anybody disagrees that there are millions of patients who need and want new treatments for genital herpes. But I think the The verdict on the asset, the judgment of investors and potential partners thus far has been either that there was a real willingness to pay for Gen 3, that's the name of the program, based on the profile that emerged.
So it was positive, but you wouldn't look at it and say that it was a cure. it was we thought a very credible complement to and possibly replacement for the oral medicines and so there was disbelief about the willingness to pay for that or there was an unwillingness I would say to invest in the phase three program which was going to cost $150 million or so it was going to take three plus years and and maybe there's some people who sort of had problems with both of those things.
So I don't think there was much dispute that the drug worked. It's ultimately an MPV dispute and sort of a willingness to undertake the investment.
And then it becomes kind of like a, you know, a downward spiral. Like your stock goes down, your cash is, you don't have 150 million in the bank. So you can't just fund this thing yourself for three years. You're going to need to go to the street to raise more money. But, you know, You'd have to do it at really painful terms if you could even do it at all. And this is where I think a lot of companies get in real trouble.
They kind of grit their teeth and try to exaggerate what they've got. And they can sort of transform into a different kind of penny stock that's out there proclaiming they've got something better than they really have got. and attracts a sketchy group of investors. You didn't want to do that, right? But you've got to do something.
I don't want to say that the thought didn't cross my mind. This drug works, and the passion for it from patients and providers is real. I believe in this product. And so the possibility of discontinuing clinical manufacturing work on it while we look for the right home was an incredibly hard decision. But I guess part of what made it a relatively rational decision for us to pivot to cancer was that in some ways the cancer field had evolved in a way that really played to the strengths of our platform.
And what I mean by that is checkpoint inhibitors over the previous years had really demonstrated, of course, that patients really could benefit from an immunotherapy, specifically one that takes the brakes off T cells. Others had shown that the patients who benefit from checkpoint inhibitors are the ones whose T cells are specifically homing in on the personalized mutations in their tumor, the so-called neoantigens. And so we were sitting there saying, well, gosh, we have this platform.
We have a real way to profile T cell immune responses patients make. to their disease, whatever the disease is. And so we thought, well, gosh, we have a better way, potentially, to identify the antigens to go into a vaccine. And if we were right, we would have a great way to make personalized cancer vaccines.
So when this science is emerging, around the same time you're going through this hard decision with what to do with your genital herpes program, You end up deciding to put the herpes program on the shelf September of last year, 2017. Correct. You lay off 40 % of your staff. Yes. It's a hard thing, I'm sure.
I almost can't put into words how hard it was. First, again, this is a product that patients are screaming for. And so, you know, it's really, really hard to let go of it in that sense. It was incredibly hard to say goodbye to genotians who had worked so hard on Gen 3 and who believed in me and in the leadership team that we were on a mission that not only mattered, but that we could carry through.
And so to have to stand up in front of the company and to say that we didn't yet have the means to advance Gen 3 and that as a consequence, we had to take that very bitter medicine was, it's easily the most difficult thing I've had to do professionally.
This is a lot. This is a big strategic move and there's a personal dimension to it. But did you get any memorable pieces of advice on, you know, how to restart the company?
Well, I, you know, when you build a company, you hope that you're building the company, yes, for success, but also to withstand shocks. And I've been very fortunate to have a very experienced and patient board to help guide me and my team. I've been very fortunate to help build, I think, a very capable team. And so, and by the way, I married well. So my wife, although she'd probably tell you there were days when she thought I was going to grow a threadbare gray Afro and walk the earth for a couple of months.
You know, having her to serve as just a support, a supporter and as a sounding board was helpful. And I think where the board and others have been so incredibly helpful is just in allowing me and our team to step away from the day-to-day, think strategically about the decision.
Don't drink your own Kool-Aid and think like Pollyanna, like, well, this is going to get better and we'll just hang in there a little while longer. And then people really start to lose confidence. It's like rip off the Band-Aid quick. Okay. So now, you know, I think people who know the science of immuno-oncology, I mean, they can get this very quickly. Your company has got a platform. It's been around a long time, and it's very good at discovering individual neoantigens that are recognized by T cells.
You know, that's kind of obviously important by this time, you know, summer of 2017. So, but, you know, so you've got your internal facing part explaining this whole decision. And I'm sure, you know, your people, I mean, hard as it may have been, they understood it. But, you know, you got this whole Wall Street and external world, which is pretty unforgiving after a company hits the iceberg. Yeah. Well, I mean, I'm sure you've heard everything. out there, like people thinking that this is kind of an opportunistic thing, like, oh, you're rebranding the company as IO when the IO wave is cresting.
You know, it sounds kind of like, you know, it could be a fly by night kind of thing. And meanwhile, like there's these, all these, you know, hot companies that are getting started with lots of venture capital. I think you named nine different competitors out there. And, you know, but one of the benefits of being young and new is that, you know, you don't have the taint of a failure, a perceived failure. So now you're rolling the rock uphill.
What's that like? How do you reboot this thing? Restore confidence?
You're absolutely right. We had to be convinced that not only were we doing this because, you know, it's a hot area, but we had to be convinced that we had something real to be able to compete with companies that were ahead of us in terms of branding, companies that were ahead of us in terms of tremendous capital raises. And look, we're sort of, honestly, we're honored to be competing with some really, really smart companies. But yeah, can we do it?
We absolutely believe we can. As I said, you sort of build a company to withstand shocks, and we continue to have a strong team and a thoughtful board, we had to really be convinced of a game plan and we had to sell it. As you well know, Cambridge is an incredibly hot job market for biotech. And there's almost an embarrassment of choice for people in the industry. And so one of the biggest things for me was to figure out how to get people to stay.
And so that was the impetus for just moving as quickly as possible forward on sort of devising a game plan, one that we can have conviction on. Think about how best to package it internally, talking about what is the opportunity to transform ourselves. And then to really recruit people, re-recruit the employees, to be excited about what we could do when, for many of them, sort of the day before, the week before, they were thinking exclusively or very much about genital herpes.
and you know fortunately one of the privileges of working in Cambridge is that there are lots of great examples you can you can of companies that went through shocks like ours to turn to for inspiration and one of the things I did was I looked up I looked I looked at our share price on the day and and of a big all hands meeting we had and from memory it was like a dollar 40 And I looked up when a lot of other biotech companies were trading at $1.40.
And the bad news is that there are lots of biotech companies that have that experience. But I found the date when Amgen, I'm sorry, Biogen was trading there. I found the date when Celgene was trading there and Gilead and Alkermes. And I could put up in front of the company that look at these massively successful companies, Companies that are transforming thousands, millions of lives potentially today. They've all been there. And so, you know, ultimately, and of course I have to admit, this was, you know, really, really aggressive cherry picking of data.
I mean, you know, of course. Still, but, you know, I mean, companies go through their trough. Yeah. I mean, it's an innovative business. Most things fail. You know, it's going to happen to everybody at some point if you're trying to do something difficult and worthwhile. But, yeah, that's – how many people actually jump ship? Because you know as well as I, there's probably half a dozen companies at the Kendall Tea Stop where people could just like go – like they wouldn't even need to change their commute.
They could just walk across the street and go work there.
So as a consequence of the restructuring itself, we went from about 110 people to about 70. And then through the attrition, we lost another 20 people. And these were, and I bear none of them ill will. There are so many choices here, as I said. And, you know, from the period of September of last year until January, when we recapitalized the company, all they were, I was asking them to buy into a vision to an opportunity to truly transform a company.
But I also couldn't point to the money to do it. And so I was very transparent with the company about where we were in business development discussions and in financing discussions. And fortunately, I think I just built a little bit of a reserve of credibility such that people trusted me. And ultimately, the theme that I kept harping on, it was part of my story with that share price analysis with Biogen and Celgene, et cetera. It was, you know, look, companies go through this.
They adapt and they change. And my sort of call to arms was, let's transform the company together. The only thing that's not on the table is changing the company name. I want to work with everyone to redeem the company's name. But in the meanwhile, what we're doing, especially now that we've recapitalized the company, is revisiting everything from names of rooms to core values to the look and feel of our website. All as a part of this, yes, transformation of the company, but as a way of ensuring buy-in across the company.
and re-embracing the sort of the startup ethos.
You mentioned some of the cosmetic type things that companies do, you know, let's spiff up the website or change the name, which is one nice way to make people forget about that failure and let's turn the page and never, ever talk about that thing that failed again. But, you know, people do remember. Yes. And it actually rings hollow. in many cases. So you're keeping the name, but you got to do something. You are kind of running on fumes by this point.
I saw you were down to about 12 million cash at the end of 2017. So when you're burning 50 million a year, you don't have to be a math genius. That's not going to last very long. So what do you do next? Yeah. And in fact, we had debt on the balance sheet
that was rapidly approaching the amount of cash on hand. And so the situation was, you know, even tighter than you described. So we had to find a way to quickly tell a new story in an environment where, as we've said, there are so many companies trying to do something similar in the new antigen vaccine field. And where investors have, just much like Cambridge-based life science workers, there's an embarrassment of great, seemingly great opportunities to invest in hot new technologies.
But fortunate for us, as I said before, we have, though we are competing in a field where very well-heeled, very smart companies like Moderna and gritstone and neon are playing, we also have a real difference. Our technology platform works and is very different. And we've shown data most recently at CITSE in November, really in our minds, showing not only that the output from our platform is meaningfully different from the sort of educated guesses that others make to design their vaccines, but that those differences should translate into better vaccines.
You are identifying the specific neoantigens that are recognized by the T cells and the T cells that infiltrate tumors.
On a per patient basis. Well, I think it's a logical leap that they infiltrate tumors because others have shown that the sort of the cohort of antigens in the tumor is pretty reflective of what you find in blood in the periphery. And we're using peripheral blood. But I don't, yeah, I don't think there's much controversy that we are taking a faithful snapshot of what's happening in the tumor.
Okay. So you've got a platform here and there's bioinformatics is an important piece of this, which, you know, I'm sure you've been honing for years to make sure that you're, you're, you're detecting the, you know, the signature antigens that really matter, that generate more
potent T cell responses. Yes. Really it's the right, it's responses to the right antigens. You know, the flu vaccine kind of proved the importance of antigens for us this year. I mean, we, making a flu vaccine is not hard, but figuring out the right targets to include in the vaccine is, you know, bedevils us. We make guesses based on viruses incubating in, you know, poultry in China every year. And this year, the flu vaccine works, forget the numbers, but it's like 20 % of the time, 20, 30 % of the time, because we guess the wrong strains to try to cover.
It's the same concept here. And yeah, our data are preliminarily very compelling. And we're going to file an IND very shortly to hopefully prove
this point. So this is all preclinical. I know you raised another about 55 million, I think, in January. So you have, you know, some more breathing room now to execute on an IND.
If we were to change our name, I think it would be to Lazarus. We were very close to dead, but we are alive and we think we're thriving. There's a really excited team here, eager to prove that we belong in the conversation with some of the companies that I mentioned previously in the neoantigen field.
Now, you know, in my newsletter, I've written about some of those other companies and I don't want to spend a whole lot of time on the brass tacks on this show, but I know that, you know, this is a serious heavy lift on manufacturing to get the neoantigens made and mixed into a therapy that you can re-infuse back into patients. Their turnaround time is important. How far are you on kind of sketching out how that business model will look for you guys?
Well, I won't go so far as to say that we know what we would price the product at. But certainly, we have spent quite a bit of time stitching together what we think is a supply chain that can deliver our personalized vaccine in a phase 1, 2A appropriate needle-to-needle time and sort of cost of goods. And we also, as we look forward, believe that there's a real opportunity through economies of scale and further investment to dramatically reduce those, both the time and cost of making the vaccine.
So we're certainly working with the end goal in mind, but it's going to take really kind of the experience with this clinical trial to define the sort of the magnitude of the lift. But we're confident based on the preliminary reps we have with our supply chain that we should be, you know, comfortably within the same time for needle to needle that our peers who have published data thus far achieved.
It's anywhere between, what, 30 days and 90 days?
Well, I think everybody's goal is 30 days. I haven't seen convincing data that anybody's there. It's more likely, if you look at the Nature papers in July of last year that the NEON founders published and that BioNTech published, they were in the 18 to 20 week range. And I'm confident we'll be within that range again for the phase 1-2A trial. But again, I also think we and others anticipate being able to quite substantially reduce those times.
Now, for those not familiar, I mean, basically, you're taking a biopsy from a patient looking at that tumor, studying it for its antigen profile, and then making copies of it that you can then give back as the drug. And if that's taking, say, 18 weeks, I think most people, oncologists, patients would say, boy, that's, we can't wait that long. We need a treatment faster than that. You got cancer, right? And it's on the move. Yeah. So that's why 30 days is a little more, a little more believable or practical in the market sense.
For sure. But I think everybody would also agree that if you can dramatically up the response rates to checkpoint inhibitors, which is ultimately what we're trying to do in the personal vaccine field, that is, you know, you can be, you know, it's worth some weight for such a benefit. But of course, we would all agree that more patients across more tumor types would be available the faster and more cheaply we could make the vaccine.
Mm-hmm. Do you plan to make these at a single central place that you control, or do you have a contractor to do the manufacturing?
Yeah. For now, we do have outside suppliers that we've knitted together into what we think is a coherent supply chain. But the opportunity to go from, call it 18 weeks needle to needle, to something dramatically shorter comes largely from, I think, investing strategically in certain capabilities, both to drive down costs as well as time. But I can tell you that in our 18-week needle-to-needle time, shipping is one of the bigger drivers of time as we shuttle the product components from point A to B to C to D, et cetera.
So you need to have some friends at FedEx who, you know, treat your packages with care. Yes, yes. But I think, you know, we were, as you noted earlier, able to attract some very, of course, I think they're brilliant investors, deep-pocketed investors to buy in, not just to the notion that we should succeed in the upcoming clinical trial, but that the vision that we have around building best possible vaccines around the right antigens is a great basis for longer term investment in the capability of better, faster, cheaper vaccines.
Well, I thought it was interesting that NEA,
which is typically a private early stage or early to mid stage investor, they were part of this in a public company. And Ali Bebahani joined your board. And I think most people think he's an up-and-comer. He's not dumb money.
No, no, no. I'm certainly at this point biased in thinking that he's a smart guy. But they did quite a bit of work. And when you have a fund as large and as successful as theirs, you can bring a lot of resources to bear in evaluating opportunities. And so we were honored. We feel validated by their investment, not to say that we're resting on our laurels in any way. But it's a nice feather in our cap.
I can tell you that the knot in my stomach day-to-day is different than the knot in my stomach that existed from sort of September to January. It's no longer are we going to survive, but it's, you know, how do we keep getting better as quickly as possible? And I'm really pleased to have NEA as one of our partners in that regard.
That is a little better feeling if you're going to have a knot in your stomach, which I suppose you kind of always do as the CEO for one reason or another.
That's part of the fun of the job. You're never truly off. But if you're excited about who you're working with and what you're working on, it ultimately is. And by the way, you have a great wife at home who understands that you have this knot in your stomach. You're going to do just fine.
So when you cherry picked that stock table data on those other companies, did you also notice how long did they have to go through those troughs before they went up and to the right? The answer varied.
But there are a couple of instances, and I can't tie specific numbers to specific companies in my head anymore. But there were a couple of companies that went into fairly stratospheric heights within a couple of years. And there were a few companies where it took longer. But we're doing this for the long run for, I think, the right reasons. But we're certainly also cognizant of the fact that we have two years of cash, which really means you kind of have a year plus to really prove that the strategy works, The team is right, that the execution is good.
And if you can get there, then we're confident that even if we're not day-to-day truly tracking our stock price, it's going to be on the right trajectory.
If you've got two years, you said you're on the verge of filing an IND. You should have some data that you can show to the street by that point to keep this going.
I think validation comes in many forms. And of course, as you said, one is the actual data from the clinical trial, but the second is publications and presentations at medical meetings on sort of the underpinnings of the platform and interesting data that we're generating there. And then, of course, partnerships is an area of intense focus and interest of ours. I think this notion that targets matter, the notion that choosing the right antigens for vaccines, whether personalized or not, as well as for cell therapy, is real.
And I think there's recognition that we have potentially sort of the better mousetrap here. And so I think validation could come in the form of business development deals this year as well.
Well, Chip, we're out of time, but I want to thank you for spending a little time with me today on the long run and sharing your story about the knot in the stomach, which I'm sure a lot of entrepreneurs can relate to, whether they're able to talk about it or not.
Thank you. I really appreciate the opportunity.
Thanks for listening to The Long Run. a production of Timmerman Report. Music comes from D.A. Wallach. Thanks to Presage Biosciences and Harvard Medical School Executive Education for sponsoring. Next on The Long Run, Rob Perez. Hear his story and think about the new bargain he's working on between biotech and society through a non-profit called Life Science Cares. And thanks for listening to The Long Run. Tell your friends about it on your favorite podcast app or on social media.
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