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Allergan: Botox, Rogue Scientists, and the Ultimate Beauty Franchise

18 Sep 2026 · 3h 36m · Alex Kesin, Matthew Pech · 28 quoted facts

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In brief

Botox became one of pharma's most durable franchises through a string of accidents, not a normal drug-development plan. A Cold War bioweapon strain, a government-trained academic manufacturer, an eye surgeon's mortgage, and doctors who found new uses on their own all fed it. Allergan then built a cash-pay aesthetics business, and a hard-to-copy manufacturing process plus regulatory naming rules protected it better than patents did.

The central tension is between how cheaply the science was created and how much value was captured. The academics and physicians who built Botox gave away their ideas and were paid little. Allergan, a sales-driven company, profited, and its tax and takeover maneuvers (Valeant, Pfizer, AbbVie) came to dominate its story. The hosts conclude the playbook is mostly unrepeatable luck.

Key insights

  1. A government bioweapons lab made Botox's drug substance

    Edward Schantz kept making botulinum toxin at Wisconsin after Nixon's 1970 order, and one 1979 batch supplied the US market until 1997. That meant a public university effectively manufactured the drug for free.

  2. Giving away ideas left inventors with little money

    Scott published his method in 1973 without a patent, and the Carruthers never patented cosmetic use. Scott, Schantz and Johnson received single-digit millions or less, against billions in Botox sales.

  3. Complex manufacturing, not patents, protects Botox

    The toxin only works when grown in a specific Clostridium strain and purified in particular ways, and potency was long tested on mice. Rivals struggle to prove they have made something identical.

  4. Cash-pay aesthetics made Botox a subscription business

    There are no insurers, and patients return every three to four months. Allergan bundled fillers and other products with tiered rebates and a loyalty program to keep clinics and patients loyal.

  5. Botox's cheap path depended on rare conditions

    The hosts argue it needed a natural toxin made free by the government, obvious fast effects, and tolerance for risk. They say few modern drugs, such as CRISPR therapies, can match that.

Questions

Why does Botox have no biosimilar (generic-style copy)?

The FDA never gave it an abbreviated pathway, so every rival had to file its own full application. The toxin is also a complex protein whose behavior depends on how it is made, and Allergan guards that process as a trade secret.

Is Botox mostly a cosmetic product?

Not by sales. According to the hosts, therapeutic uses such as migraine, muscle spasms and overactive bladder made up 54% of Botox sales by 2013. Gavin Herbert Jr. said therapeutic uses are about 60% of the business.

How did a bioweapon turn into a medicine?

Military scientists at Camp Detrick purified the toxin, and Schantz kept making it after 1970. Eye surgeon Alan Scott then used it in the 1970s and 80s to relax overactive eye muscles.

Why did Allergan buy Oculinum so cheaply?

Gavin Herbert Jr. initially thought strabismus was a tiny market. He changed his mind because owning the drug would stop rival sales reps from visiting his ophthalmologist customers, and it cost little. Reported prices range from $4.5 million to $28 million.

What was the Valeant bid for Allergan and how did it end?

In 2014 Valeant, backed by Bill Ackman, tried a hostile takeover. Allergan fought with a poison pill, cost cuts and attacks on Valeant's accounting, then sold to Actavis at about $66 billion.

Facts

Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.

Justinus Kerner, a German district health officer, investigated fatal sausage poisonings and tested the toxic extract on animals and himself.

“He feeds tainted sausage extract to different animals and finally puts a few drops on his own tongue.”

0:06:42 · Matthew Pech · Botulism history · 1822

Emile van Ermengem identified the bacterium now called Clostridium botulinum as the source of the poison after a Belgian funeral banquet outbreak.

“in 1897, he discovers the source of the poison, an anaerobic spore-forming bacillus that we call today Clostridium botulinum”

0:08:37 · Alex Kesin · Botulism discovery · 1897

Between 1943 and 1947 at Camp Detrick, Carl Lamanna and colleagues produced the first pure crystalline botulinum toxin type A.

“a scientist named Carl Lamina and his team produced the first pure crystalline form of the toxin, botulinum toxin type A”

0:09:46 · Alex Kesin · Toxin purification · 1943-1947

In 1970 President Richard Nixon ordered the US offensive biological weapons stockpiles at Camp Detrick destroyed, with a carve-out for small amounts kept for peaceful purposes.

“Richard Nixon, who's then president, signs an executive order renouncing offensive biological weapons, and orders all stockpiles at Camp Dietrich destroyed.”

0:17:09 · Alex Kesin · Bioweapons ban · 1970

A single roughly 10-liter botulinum toxin production run made at the University of Wisconsin in November 1979 supplied the entire US commercial Botox market from 1990 to 1997.

“It ends up supplying the entire American commercial market for Botox from 1990 to 1997.”

0:19:11 · Matthew Pech · Manufacturing · 1979-1997

Cutter Laboratories of Berkeley was one of the early manufacturers licensed in April 1955 to make Jonas Salk's polio vaccine, and some of its lots contained live virus.

“in April of 1955, they were one of the early manufacturers that were licensed to make Jonas Salk's polio vaccine.”

0:55:33 · Alex Kesin · Cutter incident · 1955

Alan Scott published his botulinum toxin injection method in 1973 without filing a patent, which made the publication prior art that undermined later patent protection for the medical use.

“Scott publishes in 1973 the exact method he designed from scratch, the novel injection equipment, the technique, everything”

0:29:53 · Matthew Pech · Intellectual property · 1973

The first human study of botulinum toxin for strabismus took place in 1978 at the California Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco.

“The first human study for botulinotoxin happens in 1978 in a single hospital room at the California Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco.”

0:32:58 · Alex Kesin · Clinical trials · 1978

Alan Scott took out a $400,000 mortgage on his house to buy equipment and founded Oculinum Inc. to make and develop the toxin.

“He literally takes out a $400 ,000 mortgage on his house to start buying the equipment.”

0:43:35 · Matthew Pech · Oculinum funding

According to the book Death to Beauty, Alan Scott's total cash outlay to take botulinum toxin from monkey studies to first FDA approval was roughly $4 million.

“Scott's total cash outlay to take this biologic from monkey studies all the way to its first approval was roughly $4 million.”

0:49:22 · Alex Kesin · Development cost

The FDA approved Oculinum's botulinum toxin for strabismus on December 29, 1989, through the orphan drug pathway.

“On December 29th, 1989, through an orphan drug approval pathway, Oculinum gets official FDA approval to manufacture and sell botulinum toxin for the treatment of strabismus.”

1:16:18 · Matthew Pech · FDA approval · 1989

Accounts of Allergan's price for Oculinum conflict: the press and Gavin Herbert said $9 or $10 million, a later Allergan CEO said $28 million, and Alan Scott said $4.5 million.

“A later CEO of Allergan swears it's $28 million. Alan Scott says he sold it for $4.5 million.”

1:20:49 · Matthew Pech · Acquisition price · 1991

Botox Cosmetic received FDA approval in 2002, years after dermatologists began using Botox off-label for wrinkles.

“you may be surprised to learn that Botox Cosmetic doesn't actually get FDA approval until 2002.”

1:44:10 · Matthew Pech · Cosmetic approval · 2002

In his first year as Allergan CEO, David Pyatt cut overhead headcount by 22% and redirected the savings to the sales force.

“In his freshman year as CEO, Pyatt slashes Allergan's overhead headcount by 22%.”

1:52:40 · Alex Kesin · Allergan management · 1998

By 2013, therapeutic uses accounted for 54% of Botox sales across about 25 medical conditions.

“by 2013, right towards the end of his term as CEO, Therapeutics was accounting for 54 % of all Botox sales across roughly 25 distinct medical conditions.”

1:54:08 · Alex Kesin · Botox sales mix · 2013

Allergan won FDA approval for the eyelash-growth product Latisse in December 2008, after clinicians noticed longer eyelashes as a side effect of a glaucoma drop.

“and boom, boom, boom, in December 2008, they had approval for Latisse.”

1:55:27 · Matthew Pech · Latisse · 2008

In 2006 Allergan bought Inamed for over $3 billion, gaining Juvederm fillers and breast implants for its aesthetics lineup.

“Their foundational purchase in this playbook kicks off in 2006 when they drop over $3 billion to buy Inimed.”

1:59:58 · Alex Kesin · Aesthetics acquisitions · 2006

Valeant Pharmaceuticals launched an unsolicited hostile takeover bid for Allergan in April 2014.

“In April 2014, a company called Valeant Pharmaceuticals launches an unsolicited, hostile takeover attempt of Allergan”

2:04:49 · Matthew Pech · Hostile takeover · 2014

Bill Ackman's Pershing Square amassed a 9.7% stake in Allergan worth about $3.2 billion, with Valeant secretly co-funding the effort.

“Bill Ackman's Pershing Square fund had quietly amassed a 9.7 % stake in Allergan, worth about $3.2 billion through a vehicle called PS Fund One.”

2:08:48 · Alex Kesin · Activist stake · 2014

On November 17, 2014, the sale of Allergan to Actavis was announced at $219 a share, about $66 billion total.

“On November 17, 2014, the sale of Allergan to Actavis was announced at $219 a share, about $66 billion total.”

2:17:52 · Alex Kesin · Actavis deal · 2014

In 2017 Allergan assigned six Restasis patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, paying $13.5 million up front and a little over $15 million a year, to try to use tribal sovereign immunity against patent review.

“Allergan assigns them all six key Orange Book Restasis patents and pays them $13.5 million up front and a little over $15 million a year.”

2:36:31 · Alex Kesin · Restasis patents · 2017

Federal judge William Bryson invalidated the Restasis patents and wrote that sovereign immunity should not be a purchasable commodity for private entities.

“Sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable commodity that can be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal responsibilities.”

2:37:23 · Matthew Pech · Court ruling · 2017

On April 4, 2016, the US Treasury issued a temporary regulation targeting serial tax inversions, which undercut the planned Pfizer-Allergan merger.

“On April 4th of 2016, the Treasury stepped in and issued a temporary regulation aimed pretty much squarely of what Allergan was doing.”

2:42:15 · Alex Kesin · Tax inversion · 2016

In August 2016 Allergan sold its global generics business to Teva for $40 billion.

“in August, he takes Allergan's entire global generics business and punts it over to Teva for $40 billion.”

2:43:28 · Alex Kesin · Generics divestiture · 2016

AbbVie agreed in June 2019 to buy Allergan for $63 billion, a 45% premium to its prior stock price.

“In June of 2019, AbbVie agrees to buy Allergan for $63 billion, representing a 45 % premium over where the stock was trading before.”

2:51:23 · Matthew Pech · AbbVie acquisition · 2019

According to Alex Kesin, Allergan spent about $60 million around 2011 to get a new potency assay accepted by the FDA to replace the mouse lethality test.

“I remember reading that in 2011, they spent like $60 million to get a new assay for the FDA.”

2:59:17 · Alex Kesin · Potency assay · 2011

Revance's Daxxify, approved in 2022, uses a peptide stabilizer that makes the toxin last about six months instead of three to four.

“The duration pressure comes from Revent's Daxify, approved in 2022. It uses a peptide stabilizer that makes the toxin last roughly six months instead of three to four.”

3:00:48 · Matthew Pech · Competition · 2022

Alan Scott died on December 16, 2021, at age 89.

“Alan Scott passed away on December 16, 2021, at 89 years of age.”

3:33:21 · Alex Kesin · Alan Scott · 2021

Chapters

  1. 0:00:49The tiny dose behind a $10 billion market

    The hosts open with how little active toxin the whole Botox market uses, and preview the unusual story that follows.

    “represents about 50 milligrams of active neurotoxin”
  2. 0:05:32German sausage poisoning and early science

    Justinus Kerner's 19th-century investigation identified the paralytic effect that later made the toxin usable as medicine.

    “People are dying of a strange, paralytic illness.”
  3. 0:14:36Camp Detrick and Edward Schantz's rogue supply

    Military scientists purified the toxin, and Schantz kept producing it after the bioweapons ban, supplying researchers by mail.

    “Ed and his crew there, they made a pound of it.”
  4. 0:26:56Alan Scott's eye-muscle experiment

    A strabismus surgeon got the toxin with no paperwork and published his method without a patent.

    “No material transfer agreements. No lawyers redlining a term sheet.”
  5. 0:43:35Bootstrapping Oculinum to FDA approval

    After pharma rejected him, Scott financed and built the operation himself for about $4 million.

    “He just bootstraps it.”
  6. 1:18:41Allergan buys Oculinum, and the scientists lose

    Allergan's sales-first culture explains its purchase, and the buyout shortchanged Scott, Schantz and Johnson.

    “I really didn't see it as a big opportunity.”
  7. 1:37:56The Carruthers discover cosmetic Botox

    A patient's remark led to wrinkle treatment, which began as off-label use and was approved in 2002.

    “every time you treat me there, I get this beautiful untroubled expression.”
  8. 2:10:31Valeant and Ackman's hostile siege

    Allergan's cash and balance sheet made it a target, and defending against Valeant ended in a sale to Actavis.

    “a period that David Pyatt called total war”
  9. 2:40:34Tax inversion and the Pfizer merger

    Brent Saunders pursued financial engineering, including a Pfizer inversion that Treasury rules and tax reform ended.

    “They were going to slap a shamrock on Pfizer's balance sheet”
  10. 3:00:27Why rivals struggle to dent Botox

    Distinct drug names, proprietary units and a hard-to-copy process protect Botox, though cheaper and longer-lasting rivals are emerging.

    “each neurotoxin has its own non-proprietary name and its own potency units.”

Transcript

0:00:00
Alex Kesin

Welcome to Approved, the definitive stories behind the world's most interesting biotech ventures. Each episode, we follow one company from founding through FDA approval and commercialization, and all of the drama that happens in between. I'm Alex Kesin, a biotech writer based in San Francisco.

0:00:17
Matthew Pech

And now I'm Matthew Pech, a cancer biologist and drug hunter based in Oakland. Today's episode is on Allergan and its most famous drug, Botox.

0:00:27
Alex Kesin

Hey, Matt, I got a trivia question for you. Yeah. By mass, how much Botox do you think is sold every year in the world?

0:00:35
Matthew Pech

Man, it's funny. I don't think I've ever thought of a drug that way. It's always about dollars, not weight. I know it's potent, but I'm not even sure I'm going to be correct by an order of magnitude. Maybe 10 grams?

0:00:49
Alex Kesin

You are way, way off. Okay, so for reference here, 8 grams, about the weight of a pencil, that is, could kill every person in New York City. Botox is a neurotoxin after all, right? It's literally the most lethal substance known to science. And in 2026, this year, this entire $10 billion market for Botox and its competitors represents about 50 milligrams of active neurotoxin. 50 milligrams.

0:01:20
Matthew Pech

Man, I was so far off. I think I took more than 50 mg of aspirin today. But Botox is definitely spicier than aspirin. The bacteria which makes a neurotoxin grows in spoiled canned goods and kills by slow paralysis. The U.S. weaponized it during the Cold War, even plotting to lace Castro cigars with it. And when Nixon finally ordered our bioweapons destroyed in 1970,

0:01:47
Matthew Pech

the government secretly gave one scientist all of the supply. Eventually, a company called

0:01:54
Alex Kesin

Allergan took this retired bioweapon, which some enterprising physicians in the meantime had bootstrapped into, of all things, a lazy eye treatment. And they turned it into a blockbuster drug that effectively kicked off the entire medical aesthetic sector. And today, it's still roughly bringing in $6 billion a year, decades after its approval.

0:02:17
Matthew Pech

Every part of this absolutely insane story barely looks like your standard blockbuster drug. Almost zero money was spent to get the initial indication approved. It's a half-cash-pay business, so no insurance is involved. It's been growing consistently for decades. It has one of the highest unaided brand awarenesses of any drug in the world. And it doesn't rely really on patent protection to keep its competitors at bay. The clinical trials have been relatively easy to prosecute, and there's literally no path to a biosimilar.

0:02:49

Yeah, this is a crazy drug.

0:02:51
Alex Kesin

I mean, you have this molecule that on paper should be a cheap, copyable commodity, really from the second it was approved. Instead, it's become one of the most commercially durable and valuable assets in the entire pharma industry. Literally valuable enough that in 2014, two different companies waged what Allergan's then-CEO literally described as a total war to take it. One of those aggressors brought none other than Bill Ackman along for the ride.

0:03:21
Matthew Pech

Allergan's corporate timeline is just absolutely bonkers. There's hostile takeovers, there's white knights, there's reverse mergers, there's trying to rent a Native American tribe's sovereign immunity to protect a patent. You know, in many ways, you could tell the whole history of the American corporate tax code through this one company's corporate drama.

0:03:43
Alex Kesin

That, ladies and gentlemen, is Allergan. founded above a Los Angeles drugstore in 1948 by a pharmacist and chemist to sell an antihistamine eye drop of all things. But before we get ahead of ourselves, Matt, and gosh, there's a lot to get ahead of. Let's start at the beginning. And the beginning of this company is not Botox, and it's not even in California. We have to go all the way back to a German country doctor in 1822 to figure

0:04:12
Matthew Pech

out why patients kept dying after eating sausage. As usual, we have lots of exclusive interviews here to add color to the story. From the spry 95-year-old founder of Allergan, Gavin Herbert, Jr., to Eric Johnson, a professor who helped literally manufacture the clinical drug while in an academic lab, to Eric Finzi, a dermatologist trying to repurpose Botox to treat depression, to Brett Saunders, the so-called Wall Street drug dealer who put jet fuel on Allergan's push into aesthetics.

0:04:44

Yeah, this show is going to be so, so good.

0:04:46
Alex Kesin

I think I'm getting crow's feet from smiling so much. So buckle up. Buckle up. Before we get started, today's episode is sponsored by JLL. More on them later. It's snowing hard in Gaeldorf, a small town on the Kocher River in the Kingdom of Wernberg, essentially near Stuttgart today, in the winter of 1816. And while winters in Germany are typically unforgiving, this one is particularly rough.

0:05:32
Matthew Pech

People are dying of a strange, paralytic illness. First, it starts in the victim's stomach without a fever. Then their mouth dries out and their eyelids begin to droop.

0:05:43
Matthew Pech

Then, all of a sudden, they realize that they can't swallow anymore. This creeping paralysis walks down their body until finally their heart stops working and they die. This disease is not new to the area. It's been afflicting the locals for some 20 years. And they know that it must have something to do with eating tainted pork sausage. But what exactly is in it, nobody knows. Everything from prussic acid to housewives underboiling the meat is equally in play.

0:06:12
Alex Kesin

But this time around, there's someone there to stop it. A young district health officer named Justinus Kerner decides to actually figure out the case. So over the next five years, he investigates 155 cases of fatal paralysis tracing back to pork sausage. He collects the culprit sausages, lays out their recipes side by side, and crosses out ingredients one by one until only two survive the list, fat and salt.

0:06:42
Matthew Pech

And so Kerner does what any good young scientist does. He starts to experiment. He feeds tainted sausage extract to different animals and finally puts a few drops on his own tongue. His palate and throat dry out immediately. It's not salt, he eventually figured.

0:06:58
Matthew Pech

So it's something in the fat. But what?

0:07:01
Matthew Pech

When he feeds the fatty extract to birds, cats, rabbits, frogs, flies, and snails, they all die. But when he puts the same material into a small incision in a muscle, the animal survives, and the muscle around the injection goes weak.

0:07:16
Alex Kesin

And with no understanding of modern germ theory, physiology, or molecular biology, he reasons correctly that the toxin works by interrupting the signals nerves send to muscles and glands. Justinus writes, by analogy, it can be expected that in outbreaks of sweat, perhaps also in mucus hypersecretion, the fatty acid will be of therapeutic value.

0:07:39
Matthew Pech

All right. So why are we bringing up this really fun origin story? Well, not so fun, Matt. Yeah, I guess the scientist in me sees it as quite fun.

0:07:50
Matthew Pech

Many of the most important features of what would become Botox have already been figured out in 1822. too. So one is a really unique pharmacology. It's a drug that you can aim. You can pick the muscle and the activity stays where you put it. Two, it's this uniquely observable pharmacology. You can watch the drug work in real time. You don't need a biomarker or a six-month readout. The muscle just stops working really fast. And three, the drug substance just works right out of the sausage.

0:08:25

You don't need to improve on what nature has already designed. It's pharmaceutical

0:08:30
Matthew Pech

grade potency from day one. And that combination of features is the whole empanada or sausage,

0:08:37
Alex Kesin

so to speak. A drug you can aim where you can see the effect in less than a week is something even a single doctor 200 years ago can figure out pretty quickly. While Kerner is the first to document what the poison does, it takes another century to get from sausage poison to the actual causal pathogen. In 1895, at a funeral banquet in Belgium, members of a brass band eat salted ham, and three of them die. A professor of bacteriology named Emile van Emmergen gets some good samples, and in 1897, he discovers the source of the poison, an anaerobic spore-forming bacillus that we call today Clostridium botulinum.

0:09:21
Matthew Pech

And naturally, when you manage to bottle one of the deadliest biological toxins on Earth,

0:09:27
Matthew Pech

tends to catch the eye of, believe it or not, the U.S. military. From Belgium with some detours to UC Berkeley, the study of the toxin migrates cross-country to, of all places, a military base, Camp Dietrich,

0:09:45
Matthew Pech

located in Maryland.

0:09:46
Alex Kesin

With such a lethal agent, scientists in the military start tinkering. Between 1943 and 1947 at Camp Dietrich, with the height of World War II in between, a scientist named Carl Lamina and his team produced the first pure crystalline form of the toxin, botulinum toxin type A. And another scientist at Dietrich, a physiologist named Vernon Brooks, figures out how it actually works. As it turns out, it's a polypeptide, which blocks the release of acetylcholine, the chemical messenger telling muscles to contract.

0:10:21
Matthew Pech

You're going to have to pardon me here because I want to digress and nerd out. Is that okay, Alex? We'll permit it. Thank you. Because this is an incredibly elegant and sophisticated piece of biology that nature created here. Clostridium needs to grow in anaerobic dead tissue, and evolution really has created a

0:10:41
Matthew Pech

super parsimonious system to achieve that goal. We know today that the toxin is a type of enzyme called an endopeptidase that acts like a pair of scissors to cut a target protein called SNAP25. And SNAP25 is, you know, involved in the process of having neurons release neurotransmitters like acetylcholine. What we also know today is that there's a variety of different botulinum toxins, each with a slightly different endopeptidic activity. So we mentioned type A, but there turns out to be toxins type A through type F.

0:11:18

Type A turns out to be the most potent.

0:11:22
Alex Kesin

That's an adorable name for a peptidase, by the way. SNAP25. We biologists know how to name things. Yeah, that's for sure. I got a dumb question though, since you bring it up. How does this enzyme like get into the neuron and cleave SNAP25? Is the bacteria that makes it floating outside the cell? Is it in someone's stomach? I'm having a hard time picturing this.

0:11:47
Matthew Pech

Yeah, it's not actually that intuitive.

0:11:50
Matthew Pech

So it turns out that the toxin complex actually has a second protein that associates with it, the so-called heavy chain.

0:11:58
Matthew Pech

And the toxin uses that to bind to the presynaptic membrane of the target neuron

0:12:05
Matthew Pech

and essentially get endocytosed and sneak into the poison cell. And so the whole toxin complex ends up being this actually very large, complicated protein machine, right? It's almost 900 kilodaltons in size. And then also a bunch of accessory proteins that help the toxin do things like not fall apart while it's going through an animal's stomach. And, you know, that's how if you eat a bad sausage, you can actually get botulism.

0:12:36
Alex Kesin

Man, that's crazy. I'm no biologist, but the way I understand is it sounds like this protein shell around botulinum is wrapping the poison inside in like a kind of molecular Kevlar vest. Is that right?

0:12:53
Matthew Pech

Yeah, it's something like that. It's really cool. But, you know, one thing's for sure, going back to the 1940s and 50s, the military scientists at Camp Dietrich knew absolutely none of this deep molecular biology. They didn't know about SNAP-25. They didn't know about heavy chains. They just knew the sort of macroscopic effect that Vernon Brooks had observed. The stuff stops acetylcholine and it paralyzes the muscle. But that discovery in itself is where the light bulb goes off.

0:13:25

Brooks realizes that if this substance switches off nerve signals, you don't just have to use it as a bioweapon. You could deliberately use a tiny amount of it to weaken an overactive muscle. This is a huge paradigm shift. But to actually test that idea safely, you can't just use a crude, unstable poison. You need a highly purified, measurable, and reliable supply of the toxin.

0:13:49
Alex Kesin

That brings us to the next key player at Dietrich. After World War II ends, a chemist named Edward Schantz takes up the work at Dietrich of studying botulinum toxin. He first perfects the techniques to keep the toxin active and measurable, and then figures out how to actually manufacture large batches of the purified toxin.

0:14:09
Matthew Pech

And when we say large batches, we are not talking about standard lab quantities. We actually asked Eric Johnson, who later became Schantz's research partner at Wisconsin, about what the setup at Dietrich was like back then. He gave us this incredible vignette about a building they called the Black Moriah.

0:14:29
Alex Kesin

Dun, dun, dun.

0:14:30
Matthew Pech

Sounds like a comic book villain. Yeah, completely. Here's Eric describing it.

0:14:36
Speaker 5

The toxin at the time was made in a tar-papered old building that had guards outside in the so-called Black Moriah. Yeah, that's where they actually made botulinum toxin and staph anotoxin and Ed's favorite toxin, which is saxotoxin. I remember one thing about it is people were trying to get micrograms of staph anotoxin B, I think. And Ed and his crew there, they made a pound of it.

0:15:06
Alex Kesin

Wait, a pound of neurotoxin? A pound?

0:15:09
Matthew Pech

Yeah, that's an insane amount. All just sitting in this guarded tar paper shack. I got to say, the secret of how they made those massive batches, by the way, is one of my more favorite pieces of intellectual property history in this whole story. So you would think that the military engineered some highly classified super strain of the bacteria to do all this. But the strain that Chance was using to make all this neurotoxin, which was this special non-sporulating version of clostridium, it was just a hand-me-down, right?

0:15:42

According to Eric Johnson, Schantz managed to get his hands on this strain from a Harvard professor named John Howard Mueller.

0:15:49
Alex Kesin

So just to be clear, you're saying that the foundation of this entire multi-billion dollar drug was borrowed from an academic strain? Yep, produced at a military lab.

0:16:04
Matthew Pech

I love it. You know, you really cannot make this drug without this strain. Mueller ends up giving it to Shantz. Shantz eventually donates it to civilian researchers who end up turning it into the drug, and we'll get into that shortly. And then decades later, when pharma giant Allergan ends up buying the drug, they also get that strain, and they try to patent that strain as the, quote, Allergan strain. Of course, they ultimately had to abandon that application once they realized what the strain's provenance was.

0:16:37
Alex Kesin

Yeah, makes sense. In my opinion, they should have called it the Black Mariah strain, but that might just be me. Okay, getting back to this story. So in the 1950s and 60s at Camp Dietrich, Chance gets this hand-me-down strain dialed in. And naturally, the military wants to start playing around with it. So where else is a better place to send this toxin in the mid-20th century for military purposes. Lennon. Good guess. I don't know if he was alive around then.

0:17:09

So apparently Camp Dietrich sent botulinum toxin to the CIA to lace Fidel Castro's cigars with in an attempt to take him out. Real story. Well, that didn't work. Yeah, clearly it didn't. Alas. Okay, let's flash forward to 1970. Richard Nixon, who's then president, signs an executive order renouncing offensive biological weapons, and orders all stockpiles at Camp Dietrich destroyed. But as it turns out, this order has a vague carve-out for small amounts retained for peaceful purposes.

0:17:43

And nobody had to find what counted as small, useful, or peaceful. So Ed Schantz, who by 1971 had moved over to the University of Wisconsin, along with his cultures, just kept maintaining the toxin. Not only that, but he was supplying non-trivial amounts of it to legitimate researchers all across the country. It wasn't until 1975 that the Senate formally retroactively spared Botulinum toxinae from destruction, and Chance became their authorized producer of it. Ultimately, Chance becomes the guy that produces science that makes Botox.

0:18:22
Matthew Pech

You know, at first, when I was researching this episode, I was a little skeptical of this idea that, you know, quote-unquote,

0:18:29
Matthew Pech

rogue scientist makes Botox possible. Like, how hard could it be to grow some bacteria and purify a protein from it? That's something that most grad students could do. As I researched this more, I realized I was pretty off the mark and for a couple reasons. One is that the neurotoxin that Shantz purifies ends up being the literal drug substance that's used in the clinical trials and which is eventually commercially sold as Botox. You know, it's just absolutely insane.

0:19:01

So they have this 79-11 production run of toxin, which, as you can guess, is a roughly 10-liter culture of botulinum

0:19:11
Matthew Pech

from November of 1979. It ends up supplying the entire American commercial market for Botox from 1990 to 1997. I cannot emphasize enough how unusual it is for a public university to be commercially manufacturing a drug substance. Shantz and his colleagues acted as a one-man quality control system, a precise list of who asked and who got the toxin, written safety instructions on the box, and a room temperature stability standard sealed in a glass vial so that the recipient could check the toxin hadn't lost its potency in transit.

0:19:48

All right, second point here, and this really ties into one of the playbooks of this episode. there is a certain amount of a moat that comes from having ambiguous CMC for your drug substance. What do I mean by that? As we mentioned, the toxin is this elegant, large protein complex, and it turns out it absolutely needs to be produced in clostridium to be active. You can't just clone these genes into E. coli. Really, if you want to get the yield and the potency right, you need to be using the exact strain that's fermented the right way and it's purified the right way.

0:20:22

It really helped to have a single guy in charge of all of this to make this sort of YOLO drug

0:20:29
Alex Kesin

development process possible. Well said. When we were researching this episode, I think we both came to appreciate just how old school their purification process was at Wisconsin. We're talking ammonium sulfate cuts, not even like a chromatography column in the room for their

0:20:46
Matthew Pech

process. Yeah, exactly. This was this really intense, old school protein sciences lab work.

0:20:54
Matthew Pech

Eric Johnson really beautifully described the final stages of that ritual.

0:20:59
Speaker 5

The last step is precipitation and ammonium sulfate. You just don't dump it in. We want about 0.9 molar, but we would add it until we saw a little cloud. And then we'd wait a day or two and see another cloud and they would go back into solution. So every step was focused and, like I say, done in a no-frills manner.

0:21:26
Alex Kesin

Yeah, I love that detail. As it turns out, Ed also wouldn't even touch the plastic pipettes or pipetters. He would use the exact same glass syringe to inject 100 different animals. Basically, this was like brewing a witch's potion, right, instead of manufacturing a drug. That was the CMC mode protecting what will eventually become Allergan's cash cow for multiple decades.

0:21:51
Matthew Pech

Yeah, so again, I really want to emphasize how important Chance and the federal government ended up being in the development of Botox. To be fair, I think Botox still would have eventually become a drug without their involvement. The sort of effect sizes that we're talking about are kind of too big and too obvious, but definitely the timelines of everything would have been pushed way far out. Way to take all the fun out of it. I know, nuance always spoils the fun, right?

0:22:22

Okay, back to the story. The deadliest poison on the planet is just chilling in Wisconsin in an ex-bioweapon researcher's lab. So how does it become a drug?

0:22:32
Alex Kesin

Good question. So if you remember from Camp Dietrich, Vernon Brooks makes that first observation that it could be potentially used for medical purposes. But nobody's picked that up since, until someone studying a completely unrelated medical problem comes looking for it. And that problem was cross-eyes. All right, so from Camp Dietrich and the University of Wisconsin, our story now moves to San Francisco in the 1960s to a man named Alan Brown Scott. Alan Scott is an eye surgeon working at the Smith-Kettlewell Eye Research Institute, which, by the way, Matt, is just a 20-minute walk from my apartment.

0:23:31

That's San Francisco for you. Anyway, so Scott's specialty is strabismus, a condition basically when your eyes are misaligned. Like, for example, if you have crossed or wandering eyes. These conditions typically begin in childhood. And in the 1960s, the fix was a blunt instrument going under the knife. Up to 40 % of strabismus patients needed a second operation because surgeons couldn't accurately measure how strong an eye muscle was or precisely how much to weaken it.

0:24:01
Matthew Pech

Scott wants to find a way to weaken an overactive eye muscle with an injection rather than a scalpel. So he teams up with an engineer named Carter Collins to build an apparatus to measure these forces in living humans for the first time. The engineering here was pretty bespoke.

0:24:19
Matthew Pech

Collins built a little black box EMG machine for the specific purpose of pinpointing the exact muscle to treat. Then they take an ultrafine, Teflon-coated 25-gauge needle to slide anesthetic directly into the patient's eye muscle. Here's the thing, though. While local anesthetics do work to straighten the eye, they wear off in a few hours. After the muscle wakes up, it pulls the eye out of alignment again. So Scott knows he needs a paralytic with a much longer duration of action.

0:24:47

And he starts riffing on a crazy idea. What if you repurpose a naturally occurring neurotoxin?

0:24:53
Alex Kesin

Yep, Scott is a creative thinker for sure. He literally sits down and makes a list of the most vicious stuff found in nature, from enterotoxins and staph infections to the paralytic toxin found in shellfish. But as we know, if you're hunting for something that specifically paralyzes muscles, you're going to inevitably hit the absolute king of them all, botulinum toxin. Except, surely he wasn't going to inject the deadliest biological weapon on Earth right next to a patient's eyeball, right?

0:25:27

Well, in fact, he would go on exactly to do that. In a later retrospective, he writes, Botulinum toxin soon came up for consideration, but was moved to the bottom of the list, as it seemed too crazy to try it. It was too toxic, and we would never get away with the FDA looking at it.

0:25:44
Matthew Pech

Yep, but botulinum does not stay at the bottom of the list for long. Word gets to Scott about a John Hopkins neurologist named Daniel Drockman. Drockman had been injecting botulinum toxin into chick muscles and studying its effects for over a decade. Scott calls him up, and Drockman, eager to share more about his research, doesn't hold anything back. He literally hands over his entire playbook on dilution, dosage, and safety to Scott.

0:26:11
Alex Kesin

With that in his pocket, in 1972, Scott writes a letter to none other than Ed Schantz, the world's only keeper of botulinum toxin at the University of Wisconsin. He wants to get his hands on a sample. And believe it or not, we have his, in all respects, really inconspicuous letter to Ed. Here's how it went. Dear Dr. Shantz, Through the publications of Dr. Drachman, I understand botulinum toxin may be available from you for experimental use. It is our intent to paralyze individual extraocular muscles by injection directly into the muscle in the region of the myoneural junction.

0:26:50

I shall be grateful for your help and suggestions. Sincerely, Alan Scott.

0:26:56
Matthew Pech

Chance examines the bona fides of Scott and personally makes the call. Yup, this guy's a worthy researcher. He gathers up some toxin, precipitated an ammonium sulfate, and stored inside two metal tubes and sends it to him. In the normal mail! No material transfer agreements. No lawyers redlining a term sheet. No one involved in the decision but him. Man, I work in biotech and I wish tech transfer was that efficient nowadays.

0:27:26
Alex Kesin

Yeah, just botulinum toxin chilling next to Christmas toys and letters. But to understand why Chance just gave it away, we should actually bring in Eric Johnson more properly here. So Eric is a professor who worked alongside Chance for decades at the University of Wisconsin. and eventually he ends up taking over Chance's lab. He told us that Chance was just the ultimate old school public servant. He didn't care about money and he just wanted to see if his work could help people.

0:27:59
Speaker 4

Ed was one of the most generous but precise and focused scientists that I've ever known. And I was so pleased or honored to be chosen to work with him on his side. As far as I know, there were no MTAs.

0:28:14
Speaker 5

Ed liked to do things himself. He didn't involve lawyers in any of this. So there were no hooks attached. That was Ed.

0:28:22
Alex Kesin

He would just freely send people talks. I got to say, that's just such an incredibly pure way to look at science. But still, mailing a lethal weapon, like, I can't even imagine how that went down. and kind of makes me wonder when exactly did these sort of informal handshake agreements in science stop being a thing? If you recall from a couple of episodes ago in our Geron story, the father of gerontology, Leonard Hayflick, drove his cell cultures cross country from Pittsburgh to Stanford

0:28:56
Matthew Pech

right around this time that Chance does this. Yep, absolute wild west of biology. You pack it

0:29:02
Alex Kesin

in a cooler and hope for the best. Exactly. Okay, so Chance is fully on board since at this point he was already highly accustomed to supplying the toxin to researchers. Scott gets his mail-order neurotoxin and he goes straight to preclinical studies. And to be clear, nothing illegal is happening here. Many of the rules governing the use of toxins were not yet law or were whitelisted under Nixon. The first thing Scott does is a monkey study.

0:29:28

He surgically tweaks the eye muscles of monkeys to be cross-eyed, and then doses the eye with botulinum toxin to correct it. And it works perfectly. He finds he's able to paralyze precisely the muscle he wants to target, correcting the eye with strabismus. Even better, he realizes the effect lasts for months, and there's zero sign of systemic toxicity. It's a massive breakthrough. So how does he

0:29:53
Matthew Pech

follow it up? By immediately torching any chance of getting a patent on it. No way. Scott publishes in 1973 the exact method he designed from scratch, the novel injection equipment, the technique, everything, and in the process, giving away the core idea to anyone who wanted it. Without any sort of provisional patent filing, the publication made it prior art. This decision completely kills the strongest vector to get IP protection for the medical use of botulinum toxin. Man, I just got so many alarm bells ringing in my head from that.

0:30:27
Alex Kesin

Wow. To be fair here, Scott's background, just like the others, was an academic one, right? He was a clinician. So in literally the year he publishes his patent in 1973, Beidol was not even a thing yet, right? So you can't get royalties from NIH-funded science, and there's no real precedent for commercializing research done in the academy. So for Scott, I give him some flack. It's like an honest mistake to make. And as we'll see later, it doesn't really seem to bother him that

0:30:59
Matthew Pech

much. Yeah, exactly. After 10 years of studying strabismus and having all of this really impressive

0:31:08
Matthew Pech

preclinical data, Scott ends up taking the program to the FDA to file an IND, an investigational new

0:31:16
Matthew Pech

drug application. And he gets it cleared so he can start doing tests in humans, which, you know, if we think about it from the FDA's perspective for a second, has to be one of the most terrifying IND proposals they've ever received. Yeah, 100%. I mean, some randomized surgeon sends you a letter

0:31:35
Alex Kesin

saying, hey, I want to take the most lethal biological weapon known to science and inject it into people's eyes. Can you let me try this pretty please? Yeah, I would sweat a little bit.

0:31:48
Matthew Pech

Let's just say that. Yeah, and add on top of that, some random academics have manufactured the drug. Yeah, so what ends up happening here?

0:31:58
Alex Kesin

Yeah, you're not going to believe this. Are you ready? Yeah, I'm ready. Nothing. They do nothing. His application goes straight into the back burner and sits on some reviewer's desk for four years.

0:32:10
Matthew Pech

Man, if you think the FDA is slow today, it's definitely a lot more organized and well-funded. It turns out that that IND application sort of moves off the desk finally because a colleague of Scott's eventually takes over a leadership position at the National Eye Institute. That guy makes a phone call, puts in a good word, and suddenly, poof, the IND is improved in a matter of days. And by 1977, Scott is cleared to start his first clinical experiments.

0:32:44
Matthew Pech

Once Scott actually gets the green light, the FDA really disappears from the story again. By Scott's own count, between 1974 and 1989, there's a nine-year stretch where he literally didn't hear a single word from the agency.

0:32:58
Alex Kesin

Yeah, so since we've been dancing around it for a bit, we should really talk about these clinical trials. The first human study for botulinotoxin happens in 1978 in a single hospital room at the California Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco.

0:33:14
Matthew Pech

Yeah, so maybe I'll cut you off there. Like, I'm struggling to understand how you recruit your first volunteer for this study.

0:33:23
Matthew Pech

Like, how do you sit across from a patient and say, like, hi, I'm going to inject a retired bioweapon into your face?

0:33:31
Alex Kesin

It's a good question. I think the pitch should not involve mentioning the fact that we tried to kill Fidel with it. But you also have to remember what the alternative was for patients, right? Like these patients wanted to avoid getting surgery that they might have to have performed again. Sharp scalpels, getting their eye muscles physically altered with an operation. Like I also maybe if I had that condition would want to try the poison, right? And that's exactly how Scott pitches it as a lesser evil.

0:34:08

Something to the likes of we can do the painful surgery or we can try this tiny little needle and you'll be in remission for months. It's a long lasting injection and you don't need to go under the knife for it. And through that argument, he finds a person who agrees to go forward with being the first guinea pig to try Botox.

0:34:27
Matthew Pech

Yeah, so that first patient was totally on board for the quick injection. The hospital that was sponsoring the trial, that was a little bit of a different story. They were absolutely terrified. They are so paranoid that the toxin will leak and paralyze the patient's lungs that they refuse to let Scott do the injection in a normal exam room, right?

0:34:50
Matthew Pech

They force him into a full operating room with the anesthesiologist ready to go on an ICU bed, ventilator turned on, ready to go. And, you know, I think based off of the preclinical studies in monkeys, they didn't expect to have any significant adverse reactions. But the hospital protocol mandates that the patient stays in the ICU for three full days after the surgery.

0:35:15
Matthew Pech

That must have really been nerve wracking for the patient.

0:35:18
Alex Kesin

Yeah, I can only imagine. Hearing that little anecdote makes me think about all of the people today talking about how overzealous clinical trial protocols can sometimes be. This was really the peak of it, right?

0:35:34
Matthew Pech

Yes and no. It's sort of like simultaneously a high level of precaution and highly slapdash at the same time.

0:35:44
Alex Kesin

True. I mean, there's like no precedent for this, right? I don't think Tegeneron happened at this point either. So decades before Tegeneron, yeah. Right, right, right. In any case, the tension obviously gets to Scott as well. So we have this little bit from him in a retrospective he writes later where he admits that despite his experience injecting the toxin into monkeys, that it was such an emotional experience for him to inject a patient that he didn't know if he'd be able to keep his hands steady.

0:36:16

So naturally, because of these apprehensions that we've been talking about, the early dose finding studies for botulinum toxin were super paranoid.

0:36:25
Matthew Pech

Yeah, the first patient ends up getting dosed with one mouse unit of toxin, which, depending on your perspective, is either a tiny homeopathic dose or the dose that kills one in two mice. Wow. And according to Scott, the first subject, first dose, like it actually works, right? The amount of toxin that gets injected is enough to straighten out the eye for a couple weeks. The same thing happens for patients two and three. And then I think really it was the fourth patient that the dose had escalated enough that they start seeing a bigger magnitude of effect.

0:37:08
Alex Kesin

Okay, Matt, I got another dumb question now that you bring this up. You inject a poison into somebody's eye, but like, how do you know it stays in the eye, right? I would be so scared that it would leak into my lungs, right?

0:37:22
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I was wondering the same thing too. And again, this is one of the underappreciated things about this drug. So as far as I can tell, it's really three things working together. One is, you know, this is a really big protein complex. This isn't some 40 amino acid incretin, right?

0:37:41
Matthew Pech

This is a 300 to 900 kilodalton-sized complex, and things that are that big, they diffuse slowly. So it tends to stay where you put it just because it can't diffuse that fast. I think, too, you've got to remember the amount of drug that we're talking about here is so small, right? A therapeutic dose is nanograms of toxin. So the total number of molecules of drug going into the eyelid is actually pretty small, so there's not a lot to distribute around.

0:38:10

I also kind of suspect some target-mediated drug disposition is going on, meaning that the toxin doesn't really diffuse too far before it binds to the presynaptic terminal and gets internalized and is metabolized.

0:38:23
Alex Kesin

For such a strange combination of things, the molecular weight, the amount of drug dose, and the drug deposition, I'm having trouble wrapping my head around what the PK even looks like for this.

0:38:37
Matthew Pech

Yeah, me too. I don't think it's ever been measured. Like, I don't know how you, I don't think any sort of standard PK or ADMI parameters for this drug can really be measured because like the amount of drug that would let you run those assays would kill the person. So yeah, it's a very unusual

0:38:58
Alex Kesin

situation in drug development. Totally. This is not at all like your usual run-of-the-mill biotech anxiety. I mean, in a typical phase one, you're really expecting your drug isn't going to be doing anything, right? But for this study, they were sweating bullets that the drug would work a little too well, as in the patient could get really hurt. Yeah, I mean, you get a sense

0:39:22
Matthew Pech

here from how clinical development of Botox works. It took them two, three, four patients to realize that it works in strabismus. You know, that is an incredibly fast route to clinical proof of concept. So getting back to the story a little bit here, they, you know, are cautiously inching up the dose. They end up finding that sweet spot of dose for correcting strabismus. And, you know, once they do though, Scott realizes this doesn't just have to be for strabismus.

0:39:49
Alex Kesin

Yep. So from there on out, clinical trials for all sorts of serious muscle disorders pick up steam. One of the more interesting ones is this case study from 1985 that really shows what the drug could do in people in the real world. It's an anecdote from this really great book we read for this episode, Death to Beauty by Dr. Eugene Hevelson. This guy was a really early physician to use Botox clinically. And I highly recommend you read it if you're interested in the deeper parts of this story.

0:40:22

But anyway, so this anecdote is about this woman who came to Scott's clinic in those early days. She had suffered a stroke and was bound to a wheelchair. And the entire left side of her body was paralyzed with her left eye not working at all. She went blind in that eye. On the other hand, her good eye, her right eye, had this sort of uncontrolled, constant jittering movement from the nerve damage she had from the stroke.

0:40:48

And everything she tried to look at was visually jumbled and confused. Havelson writes that she couldn't even watch television or read a book, for example. So you can imagine this was really a difficult part of the patient's life with that decline in quality of life.

0:41:04
Matthew Pech

Yeah, and so given that there was no sort of existing treatment for her condition, Scott and his team offer up to inject this experimental botulinum toxin right behind her only working eye to try to paralyze that twitching muscle. Obviously, they sit her down and lay out every single risk, including the fact that, you know, this could paralyze her remaining vision or do something worse. And so after they explain everything to her, she just says, quote, the way I am now, what do I have to lose?

0:41:35

So they do the injection, and literally one day later, her eye is completely stable. She can watch TV again, she can read, and she kept coming back for re-injections for years. It just kept working. So it was clear from very early on that Scott's

0:41:51
Matthew Pech

botulinum toxin wasn't just some weird Frankenstein experiment, that it worked. You could give it to patients over and over again and that there seemed to be an opportunity above and beyond

0:42:03
Matthew Pech

strabismus. So you have a drug that works miracles for these really specific debilitating ocular

0:42:10
Matthew Pech

conditions. The clinical proof is there. The patients love it. You'd think the big pharma companies would be knocking down this guy's door to buy it. You'd think so, right? Scott actually

0:42:20
Alex Kesin

does try to get some pharma companies on board at this point, but he gets rejected by around half a dozen of them, each of them one by one. Hmm. I wonder why pharma wasn't interested. Yeah, I know you're being a bit sarcastic here, but there's actually a couple of things at play here, right? So for one, these companies are doing the reasonable thing of running the numbers on the TAM for these strutibismus patients. And naturally, they come to believe this market for misaligned eyes is just way too small to bother with.

0:42:49

But also, as we laid out earlier, there was no patent protection. And on top of that, they had very unorthodox CMC. So that means Scott is pretty much stuck. If big pharma won't make it, he's going to have to do all of this himself.

0:43:05
Matthew Pech

Yeah, it's kind of a wild position to be in. You know, this guy's an eye doctor, and he's definitely not bottling aspirin here. He's got to figure out how to safely manufacture, bottle, dry, package, ship, you know, the deadliest poison on the planet entirely from scratch. You know, pharma is not interested. Venture capital as a concept barely exists at this point. So if you want to fund a botulism startup, how do you even pay for all this?

0:43:35

Well, it's pretty simple, actually. He just bootstraps it. He literally takes out a $400 ,000 mortgage on his house to start buying the equipment. He incorporates the whole operation into a proper business and he calls it Oculinum Inc. And, you know, sorry to make things a little bit more confusing here, but Oculinum ends up being both the name of the company as well as

0:43:59
Matthew Pech

the drug. The name literally means eyeliner. The word Botox at this point is sort of shorthand name that academic researchers used to refer to the toxin in between themselves. I think we've

0:44:14
Alex Kesin

also really been underselling the pressure to make this drug. So to even move forward, the FDA, who comes back into the picture at this point, they tell Scott that he needs a manufacturing license. And they're not going to give him some special academic exemption just because they're a small company. No, they demand the exact same license they issue to massive multinational pharma corporations. Naturally, with zero big pharma money and basically no staff, Scott and his tiny team are going to have to MacGyver a pharmaceutical plant out of thin air.

0:44:48
Matthew Pech

All right. So the first thing Scott does is hire a former Navy radiopharmacist named Dennis Honeychurch. His job is to establish GMP for this bootstrapped operation. And together,

0:45:01
Matthew Pech

they end up building this incredibly weird split supply chain. I think if you were generous, you would call it unique. Because remember, the actual toxin is still being made by Ed Chance back at University of Wisconsin-Madison. And to support a clinical stage operation, you don't need a massive 6 ,000 liter Cho run like you do to make an antibody.

0:45:28
Matthew Pech

A 10-liter fermentation run made enough drug to support the clinical needs of the program.

0:45:34
Alex Kesin

Yeah, and remind me, this is the 7911 batch that they used all throughout the 80s and 90s, right?

0:45:41
Matthew Pech

Yeah, that's right. It was that 10-liter run that made 150 milligrams of toxin,

0:45:46
Matthew Pech

of which they gave 100 milligrams to Scott. The rest they just kept in a jar of ammonium sulfate back in Madison. So yeah, I mean, this stuff is so potent that 150 milligrams was like too much for Scott to actually use. Wow, I wonder if any of it is still around. Probably somewhere.

0:46:06
Matthew Pech

All right, so back to this crazy supply chain. The toxin was produced and purified in Wisconsin. It was then shipped to Berkeley, where it was tested, but not just any place in Berkeley, Alex.

0:46:19
Matthew Pech

Did you see the photos of the old vials of oculinum? I saw the photos, but the address,

0:46:24
Alex Kesin

Is that what you're talking about? Man, I've lived here for like two years. I'm not familiar with the Berkeley Outer Rim yet.

0:46:32
Matthew Pech

All right. So I grew up in the area and this is absolutely insane. So it turns out Oculinum's corporate address was the building that would become my middle school. What? I know, it's crazy. Matt, what the hell?

0:46:50
Alex Kesin

I just need a second to process this. Okay. Every middle school has a rumor about being built on an ancient graveyard, but yours was an undercover botulism packing plant. Like, I would have been terrified to go into that building knowing that.

0:47:07
Matthew Pech

Yeah, you know, and as far as I can tell, they were doing the testing, the storing, and the shipping of the drug right out of that building. And from reading accounts of this, It sounds like they would walk across the street to do the potency testing. And a little bit of a reminder of what potency testing means. That means injecting it into mice and seeing how many of them died. As for the final steps of production, which was diluting the toxin, sticking it into a vial, and then drying it out, the only willing manufacturer they could find was a plant owned by a company called Adria SP in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

0:47:47

Before that, the facility's sole product that they made was literally just sterile water for injection.

0:47:54
Matthew Pech

Well, I need to make sure I'm not hearing things. Did you say Albuquerque? Like Breaking Bad?

0:47:59
Matthew Pech

Exactly like Breaking Bad. But I haven't even gotten to the Walter White part yet, Alex. Listen to how Alan Scott describes this part of the operation. He wrote, While we went skiing at Taos, the technicians produced batches of 10 ,000 vials, which were packed with dry ice and shipped by air back to San Francisco. We were required to declare the dry ice as a hazardous item, but the botulinum toxin was exempt. Are you kidding me? Good luck bottling the bioweapon, guys.

0:48:29

I gotta go hit some black diamonds. Right? Yeah, I mean, it's crazy. I guess that's the upside of bootstrapping the production of a complex biologic drug. And just think about the FAA regulations too, right? It's like, oh, you know, excuse me, this frozen carbon dioxide is a severe flight risk. But, you know, the thousands of vials of nerve agent, no problem, have a great flight. The whole thing is just absurd. Yeah, it really is. You know, and the manufacturing facility really sounds like a Home Depot arts and craft project.

0:49:03

They needed to build a positive pressure clean room to keep the FDA happy. So they ended up like MacGyvering one over a single weekend. They couldn't afford the FDA's official moisture testing instrument. So again, they like jury rigged something out of spare vials, rubber tubing, dry nitrogen.

0:49:22
Alex Kesin

I gotta say, Matt, we've done entire episodes now on lean drug development, but this is the leanest one that we've covered so far, right? We actually know from the book Death to Beauty that Scott kept a line item breakdown of the entire project. And according to the author, Eugene Hevelston, Scott's total cash outlay to take this biologic from monkey studies all the way to its first approval was roughly $4 million. $4 million.

0:49:53
Matthew Pech

Million with an M? Million with an M, as in monkey. What a baller. I think there have been years where I've spent more than that on a single

0:50:01
Matthew Pech

preclinical program. Oh my God. You know, it's a bit hard to do the math around how much it costs for a drug to get approved. But I would say a good rule of thumb is that it takes about one to $2 billion on average to develop a drug. B? B. B as in billion. And it's not like Botox was this vanilla drug substance, right? It was this complex, first-in-class biologics drug. And they spent $4 million.

0:50:29

Crazy. Yeah.

0:50:30
Alex Kesin

B as in Botox. I mean, it's also maybe relevant here to look where that money came from, right? So there was initially Scott's mortgage that we mentioned. On top of that, there was an early NIH grant of $150 ,000, about $800 ,000 in support over a decade from the Smith Kettlewell Institute, where Scott did his studies. But this is amazing. The single biggest funding source for Oculinum in their first clinical program was donations. What do I mean by donations?

0:51:04

Well, Scott ends up charging his 200 plus investigators in the open trials that he runs, and we'll talk about that in a bit, $25 a vial explicitly to cover costs. Now, granted, that number later went up to 40, but all things considered, still really, really cheap. And that sort of Kickstarter-esque fundraising bonanza ended up helping him raise $2.1 million across the entire cumulative count of vials that he would sell. No VC dollars, no investment from pharma, no milestone payments.

0:51:37

This was all bootstrapped.

0:51:39
Matthew Pech

Man, if you strip out the fact that the drug is a bioweapon, like this is the Hallmark channel version of drug discovery, right?

0:51:45
Matthew Pech

You have this persevering doctor who mortgages his house and MacGyver's a clean room and bootstraps his way to a new drug that helps kids see better. It's like it's like the platonic ideal of the can do American spirit.

0:52:01
Matthew Pech

You know, the life science version of that. Yeah. Starring Arnold Schwarzenegger.

0:52:05
Alex Kesin

I feel like there's a version of biotech we tell in our podcast where we're really nostalgic for these Wild West days, at least for Botox and for Scott's oculinum. It basically died after this first program, we should clarify. So it was $4 million for the first, and right from there, the cost to get add-on indications approved was much, much higher.

0:52:30
Matthew Pech

Yes, I think still pretty cheap, all things considered.

0:52:33
Matthew Pech

But yeah, everything that Scott did, you can no longer do, right? Definitely not.

0:52:38
Matthew Pech

If you look at the clinical data that ended up supporting the first approval, the efficacy section is a double-blind study of 12 patients, which was accepted retrospectively, right? Like that was all that it took. Maybe with that, I think we do have the perfect segue here to talk a little bit about the clinical development strategy of oculinum.

0:52:59
Matthew Pech

As we mentioned, Scott ended up treating these trials as sort of this very loose cooperative of doctors who wanted to try this drug for all sorts of things. So while some were getting injected for strabismus, others were using it for cervical dystonia, for sweaty palms, even for people grinding their teeth. And as the word of this kept spreading, the scale of the experimentation just exploded, right? Right. Oculinum's approach to clinical development would absolutely put a modern IRB into a cardiac arrest.

0:53:32

At the peak of this trial, he had over 200 investigators injecting people, and they were going through 10 ,000 vials a year. To give you a taste, like we said that the efficacy section

0:53:43
Matthew Pech

of the initial strabismus study was like 12 patients and a double-blind study, but that's on top of roughly 2 ,000 patients who had been treated for this condition by the time of the

0:53:56
Alex Kesin

approval. It's basically crowdsourced R &D. Yeah. Get this though, this whole time that they were doing this, they weren't even tracking the data very rigorously. According to the book Death to Beauty, in the early days, there was no specific reporting requirements for any of Oculinum's trials by the FDA, which means that they were running it completely through an honors system. And Scott would get these doctors to give him a call pretty much only if a patient had a serious

0:54:26
Matthew Pech

complication. Yeah, this is just like an insane amount of risk to take on. And, you know, it all worked out. But like, you got to remember, strabismus is a pediatric condition, right? So we're talking about injecting toxins into kids. This was all being done with like essentially zero oversight, all things considered. And honestly, in a different world, this could have been one of the biggest ethical disasters in modern history, right? Like a toxin made with real lightweight CMC being tested and all sorts of indications with no oversight being treated as this miracle

0:55:01
Alex Kesin

cure for a whole litany of different conditions. Well, let me stop you there, Matt. There is some context there that I think you'll find interesting. Pretty close to where Oculinum's building in Berkeley was, there was a really tragic CMC disaster that was later called the Cutter incident that kind of shaped CMC policy for a while in the US. Wait, what is this? The Cutter incident. So there's this company called Cutter Laboratories. It was a family-owned Pharma Company based in Berkeley.

0:55:33

And in April of 1955, they were one of the early manufacturers that were licensed to make Jonas Salk's polio vaccine. This particular version of the polio vaccine worked by inactivating live polio virus with formaldehyde, which is used, I believe, to this day still in certain vaccine formulations. But in this case, in some of Cutter's lots, the inactivation didn't fully work, meaning that there was still live virus in the vials. Yikes. Double yikes. From there, they ended up injecting roughly 120 ,000 children with the bad vaccine stock, of which 40 ,000 developed abortive polio.

0:56:12

56 children were paralyzed and five, unfortunately, died from complications. From there, it ended up spreading amongst the community because this was live poliovirus, right? And ended up paralyzing another 113 and killing five more people. All in all, 10 dead from this, 200 paralyzed, all from a bad batch of vaccine that was supposed to prevent that disease.

0:56:37
Matthew Pech

Crazy story. And again, this happened literally two blocks away from Oculinum at the Cutter Labs facility. I think what's crazy is like when they did an investigation into what went wrong at Cutter Labs, they couldn't really point to any obviously sloppy operator or mistake in the vaccine supply chain. The real problem was that nobody, not Cutter,

0:57:03
Matthew Pech

not even the government's own safety labs, really understood the manufacturing process well enough to know when it would fail and why it would fail. So, like, all of their safety tests passed, but, you know, the lots were still bad that were coming out. you know, Cutter wasn't found negligent, but they still lost a major lawsuit against them on the concept of implied warranty, meaning that basically if you sold a biologic as safe and it wasn't, you still had to pay up.

0:57:30

Like you didn't need to be negligent. It was a verdict that sent a massive chill to the rest of the industry. And it also proved the idea that when you manufacture biologic, you can have a tiny undetectable manufacturing flaw that can kill lots of people and you can be a company that ostensibly does everything by the book and still

0:57:50
Alex Kesin

get sued into oblivion. Yep. And from that incident, we can reasonably assume big pharma wouldn't want to touch Alan Scott's crazy biologic toxin, right? Even though we know oculinium was no cutter and this drug worked completely differently than a vaccine, the general counsel of every big pharma in the last number of decades since that incident we're seeing biologics liability get more and more punitive. Eventually, that pressure really hits home and Smith Kettlewell's board of directors finally come to their senses in the 80s.

0:58:26

They realize they have a massive liability sitting on their plate, not only in Berkeley, but also the fact that these clinical trials were being done at their clinic. And eventually in 1987, they step in and force Scott to halt production. So Scott, again, is completely stranded. He has this amazing drug, patients who are basically begging for it, and yet he's legally and financially boxed out of making it. So if this drug is going to survive, he needs a real pharma company to step in and take

0:58:57
Matthew Pech

it from there. Enter Allergan, a profitable eye care company who steps in to buy Oculinum. They simply believe they're picking up some tiny niche drug for lazy eyes. What they don't realize is that they accidentally bought one of the most lucrative, culture-defining blockbuster drugs in pharmaceutical history.

0:59:35
Alex Kesin

With Oculinum on the cusp of approval, we have to tell you about Allergan. Geographically, our story now moves from NorCal to SoCal, where the company that would eventually buy Oculinum was based. And that company had absolutely nothing to do with toxins, wrinkles, or really anything to do with glamour. It had to do with itchy eyes. Let's do some time traveling back to 1948, where this whole story begins.

1:00:00
Matthew Pech

You have this Los Angeles pharmacist named Gavin S. Herbert Sr. and his chemistry friend, Stanley Bly. And one day, they decide to set up a small makeshift lab on the balcony above Herbert's drugstore. They first briefly incorporate as Child's Institute Inc. around some thumb-sucking deterrent products that they never end up pursuing. But then, Bly comes up with an antihistamine eye drop, and that drop gives the company its real identity and its name. They fuse the word allergy, with the active ingredient of the drops, neoantrogen, and they get allergan.

1:00:35
Matthew Pech

They officially reincorporate in 1950.

1:00:38
Alex Kesin

Fire Than Child Institute, Inc., I suppose. Unfortunately, right as they get going, they hit an absolute brick wall. In 1953, Stanley Bly, who by then is the only person in the company who actually understands their main drug's chemistry, unexpectedly passes away. This is not only tragic, but also really bad timing for allergan, because at this point, Total sales of their eyedrop are only at around $25 ,000. And even worse, almost none of Bly's formulas were documented.

1:01:08

He literally just kept them in his head.

1:01:10
Matthew Pech

Man, I think substandard CMC really is one of the two themes of this episode. According to our research, the company was only able to survive because a young associate professor at USC's School of Pharmacy named John Biles came in. Right in the nick of time, he manages to reverse engineer the drug and also reformulate Allergan's entire product line from scratch. This single-handedly saves the company. Meanwhile, the guy keeping it alive on the commercial side is the founder's son, Gavin Herbert Jr.

1:01:44

He is Allergan's very first salesman, working out of the back of his car with a brief leave of absence for getting drafted into the Navy to fight the communists in the Korean War. Thank you for your service, Mr. Herbert. Thank you for your service. You know, for such a young guy, Herbert had a pretty mature founding philosophy with a level of self-awareness that I imagine most CEOs aspire to reach. He later said, reflecting on his time at the company, quote, In 1957, I was about 24 years old and had just gotten out of the Navy as a corpsman.

1:02:16

I think the best decision I made was realizing how little I knew and how important it was to bring in talent that represented the different segments of the business.

1:02:24
Alex Kesin

That's a great quote. I wonder if Mr. Herbert inspired Mr. Dunning and Mr. Kruger. But I mean, it's clear from the get-go that Gavin Herbert and, as we'll soon see, the future CEOs of Allergan aren't really trying to make this company into some genius R &D lab that a pharmacope would typically run. Instead, they knew super early on that they are a really good sales organization, first and foremost. Allergan's whole strategy was basically, let someone else invent the drug, we'll buy it, reformulate it, and sell the hell out of it.

1:03:01

But back then, in 1957, they are still very much in their salad days. Allergan's only existed for seven years as a company at this point, mind you. And the whole business now has grown to maybe around $200 ,000 a year. But Herbert, sensing an opportunity, decides to bring in a marketing guy from the pharma company SmithKline & French. And together, they draw up this wildly ambitious plan to launch a product nationwide, their very first outside of California.

1:03:30
Matthew Pech

The plan is that they're going to do an entire national launch on a budget of $50 ,000. So much for $4 million, huh? Yeah, all these numbers are so unimaginably small. So Herbert marches down to the bank to ask for a loan on the $50 ,000 and gets unexpected news. They're bankrupt. Oh, what? Not kidding. He actually later described his memory of this, quote, The banker patiently explained to me that we were bankrupt, but he loaned me the money anyway.

1:03:58

We went ahead with the program, and thank God it worked. Unbelievable. I mean, just the very fact of pharmaceuticals being financed from a mom-and-pop bank loan is really, again, such a foreign world. We used to be a country. Yeah.

1:04:15
Alex Kesin

But it worked, right? Like, they were able to kick the company off the ground for real at this point. After this loan, they launched prednephrin, which is an optimologically formulated corticosteroid. And sales cost $1 million by 1960, just like that. Bang.

1:04:35
Matthew Pech

Then in 1965, they introduced Herplex, which again is just a existing antiviral that's formulated to be used in the eye. Fun fact, it ends up being only the second drug of any kind approved under the new FDA rules that require actually proving drug efficacy. Finally, 20 years into the business, they go public in 1970 using the proceeds to build a huge five-story R &D and marketing building in the life science capital of the world, San Diego.

1:05:05

Nope. Irvine, California. What? Yeah, there's nothing there, but that's where they incorporated, and that's an ophthalmology powerhouse now. Herbert later says that analysts at the time thought it was completely insane since they were only doing $10 million in sales. But as we know now, Herbert was clearly a very prescient young man. And again, just to make clear, Allergan is not trying to discover new molecular entities, right? So this is a very different sort of therapeutics company than the types that we've covered in our, you know, the first four approved episodes.

1:05:42
Alex Kesin

That's right. Their entire business model at the time essentially was taking drugs that already exist, that were proven to work, and then reformulating them specifically for the eye and then selling them to ophthalmologists. Allergan was fundamentally a formulation and distribution business, kind of like how Ascendas Pharma or Alkermes is today. But this is exactly how Botox eventually sneaks into their portfolio. It's a product that they didn't invent, sliding perfectly into their specialized sales channel that they've already spent decades building.

1:06:14

So to understand how this Allergan buyout of Oculinum will actually happen, we're going to need to take a look at Allergan's true superpower. Pure, relentless focus on selling to eye doctors. To appreciate why that was such a massive advantage at the time, let's give some context on how unique the ophthalmology market was back in the 80s. Back then, something like 90 % of eye doctors were in private practice, and 40 % of them worked solo.

1:06:42
Matthew Pech

Yeah, that's like 6 ,000 individual eye doctors scattered around the U.S., 100 % focused on people's eyes and nothing else. And unlike a lot of other physician groups that over time ended up joining hospital networks or other things like that, the eye doctors have largely stayed independent. The reason we bring this up is because if you want to sell a product to an ophthalmologist, you need to have a real dedicated sales force that's built for that specific task.

1:07:13

You actually have to drive around and show up. One of the little nuggets we found in our research was, you know, by 1989, Allergan had a sales team of almost 300 reps to service the U.S. and they even had some newfangled laptops to make them more productive. No way. Yeah. I can't imagine how big those laptops were. The founder of the company was showing up too. You know, he was spending 20 % of his time physically out in the field just listening to doctors.

1:07:43
Alex Kesin

According to Gavin, that was literally tied into their compensation plan, believe it or not. Here's what he had to tell us.

1:07:49
Speaker 5

Yeah, I think part of our success was the amount of time we spent with the professionals understanding their needs. We used to have a bonus program and the product managers had to spend 10 % of their time in the field and they didn't get a bonus. We kept tracking.

1:08:07
Alex Kesin

What a great detail. I mean, like every company on earth claims that they can get close to the customer. but how many go as far as Allergan to put a number on it and then track it and then withhold your

1:08:20
Matthew Pech

bonus if you miss it? Yeah and you know this was clearly not something that was just on a poster it was something they actually did and the payoff for having that big sales team and doing all that intense groundwork was really massive. Herbert told us about one week where he personally interviewed 35 different eye doctors, and then he asked them one simple question. In the patient's own words, not the medical term, what's the most common complaint that you hear?

1:08:47
Alex Kesin

Yeah, spoiler alert here. The answer was not keratitis sicka, but if you guessed that, congratulations. That is the medical term for itchy, scratchy eyes. That single insight of itchy, scratchy eyes made allergen go after dry eye. Why is that so important? Well, they were able to scale dry eye from a million dollar market to today 3 billion dollar market.

1:09:11
Speaker 5

Here's how Herbert described that realization to us. Usually I would go out for four or five days and I would almost always have three or four key questions that I was asking. As an example, one week I remember being asked and my question was, tell me in the words of the patients what their presenting complaints were. And so that question, all of a sudden, we've turned up that 18 % of the questions, they were asking about itchy, scratchy eyes.

1:09:47

They weren't asking about keratitis seca. It turned out we focused our attention on that for a long time. It became a

1:09:55
Alex Kesin

huge market. It's clear nobody else was building a product around the actual words the patients were using. But in reality, that was the whole Allergan playbook. Due to the fact that the market was so fragmented back then, Herbert doing the bare minimum of physically showing up to these clinics and talking to the doctors gave them a massive advantage. Okay, so they have their commercial strategy completely dialed in. But behind the scenes, their corporate structure starts going through some issues.

1:10:24

It starts with this trend that we're going to see over and over again today. The fact that they've become obsessed with, of all things, optimizing their taxes. You

1:10:32
Matthew Pech

want to get into this, Matt? Oh, 100%. But maybe I'll give them some grace here. If you are a

1:10:38
Matthew Pech

pharmaceutical company and you're running a tight ship, which, you know, I think Allergan is a very well-run organization, what levers do you actually have to, like, increase profitability, right? Your cogs are already pretty low. The company's not doing that much R &D. Margins are pretty high. Right. So like it turns out that in that sort of regime, getting your tax rate down is one of the biggest levers you have left to increase profits.

1:11:04
Alex Kesin

Yeah, it sounds good to be true, but it's actually kind of hard to argue with that. Right. Of course, we're kind of foreshadowing here that this doesn't stop here as a nervous habit that the company does to the point where literally, and I say this half in jest, You can look at the last 50 years of American tax policy just by looking at all of the shenanigans that Allergan does over its lifetime. It really all kicks off here in 1978.

1:11:30

So they go public. Around this time, Gavin Herbert Sr. passes away. And Herbert Jr. is the only one running the public company now where he owns about 35 % of the stock in a trust.

1:11:43
Matthew Pech

That's a lot of responsibility on his plate. And, you know, around this time, a European buyer comes in and makes an all-cash offer for Allergan. At this moment in history, the U.S. capital gains rate is sitting at 70 % brutal. Herbert refuses to hand the government 70 cents on the dollar, so he goes out and finds a White Knight buyer instead, merging with SmithKline in 1980 for around $236 million. The merger actually surprisingly works out great.

1:12:14

Smith-Kline leaves their team alone and kickstarts real internal R &D at the company. But this is American corporate history after all, so everything goes in waves. About a decade later, another tax-driven maneuver had spit Allergan right back out. Smith-Kline merges with the UK's Beecham Group in 1989, and to balance the assets, they make the decision to spin Allergan back out to shareholders. So suddenly, Allergan is an independent public company again and is approaching $1 billion in sales.

1:12:47

And crucially, they had already opened a manufacturing plant in Ireland, a tiny footprint that will eventually set the stage for the largest tax inversion attempt in pharma history.

1:12:57
Alex Kesin

Stay tuned for that. That's going to be an interesting part of their history. So despite acting like a billion dollar financial vehicle, even through the Smith Klein years, their culture was still pretty intense and very pressure cooker like. Executives like Gavin weren't just lounging around in their corner offices, but were really always on the field visiting doctors. to the point where if you were a new employee and you couldn't handle that level of intensity, you would just kind of get washed out of the company.

1:13:32
Matthew Pech

Yep, Allergan was bigger at this time in the early 90s, but they were still very hungry, which sort of perfectly tees up what happens in 1991. You have this newly independent company that's intense and they find in front of them a very strange piece of M &A. They have to decide, do they want to buy the poison? All right, after that little interlude on the early days of Allergan, we can finally come back to Botox. It's 1987, the drug is not yet approved, and Oculinum's partners are starting to get cold feet.

1:14:08

So both Smith Kettlewell's board of directors and their insurers want out, and they force the company, Oculinum, to halt production entirely. That decision creates a frustrating quagmire for patients, because at that point, Alan Scott has hundreds of patients with severe facial spasms who are physically dependent on these injections just to get through their day. And without their drug, their spasms were returning so violently, they literally could not keep their own eyes open.

1:14:36
Alex Kesin

Mitchell Brin, who is then a clinician at Columbia working with Scott, describes in a later retrospective how the halt actually went down in practice. Essentially, they had to take the insurer's withdrawal letter to their IRB. And with that letter, the board basically said the following. Listen, you can keep your patients who are already enrolled in treatment. Just don't add any new ones. That was nearly the reality for every investigator in the country except the NIH. But here's the kicker, Matt.

1:15:06

Because these patients were so desperate for the drug, they started to mobilize. And this is the pre-accelerated approval days. So it's even more interesting to look back at this. They flooded the FDA with letters for approval. We're hoping to get compassionate use for this therapy.

1:15:23
Matthew Pech

Yeah, that's all a great story, except we know that an avalanche of male doesn't magically get a BLA in your hand. For oculinum to pull that off, they needed an inside man. And when we spoke to Eric Johnson, he told us exactly who that inside man was. Carl Lamina.

1:15:40
Alex Kesin

Lamina. Why does that name sound familiar? Was he one of the guys making Botox at Fort Detrick?

1:15:46
Matthew Pech

Yeah, exactly. He was one of the bioweapons researchers back in the 40s. Wait, now he's at the FDA. Yep. After the closure of the bioweapons lab, he had taken a horizontal career switch to work at the FDA. And as Eric put it to us, it's good to have a friend. Lamina basically walked them through exactly what steps they needed to satisfy regulators. And he was the one who suggested they file as an orphan drug to simplify the clinical trials.

1:16:13
Alex Kesin

You know, just calling up your old buddy from the biological warfare days.

1:16:17
Matthew Pech

Yeah, wild.

1:16:18
Matthew Pech

So with Lamina's inside guidance and these desperate patients mailing in, Oculinum manages to pull off the BLA. On December 29th, 1989, through an orphan drug approval pathway, Oculinum gets official FDA approval to manufacture and sell botulinum toxin for the treatment of strabismus.

1:16:39
Alex Kesin

And that brings us straight back to Allergan. If Oculinum was really going to sell and distribute this to eye doctors, Allergan was kind of the perfect partner for them. Right away, Gavin has signed purely on as the exclusive commercial distributor of Oculinum, meaning Allergan's sales force will get the drug into doctors' hands. But Scott would be entirely responsible for the making and manufacturing of the drug. The catch here, though, of course, is that sales is one half of the equation, right?

1:17:08

And it wasn't necessarily even the hardest one because patients were practically begging to get this drug. Manufacturing a regulated neurotoxin, on the other hand, at commercial scale, no less, is a completely different headache. You can't MacGyver CMC forever, right? So eventually the supply chain caught up with Oculinum and Alan Scott. By 1991, about a year after approval, Alan Scott realizes the manufacturing demands are way too high for the motley crew at Alculinum. It takes a shortage of toxin hitting the U.S.

1:17:43

for Scott to realize he was ready to cash out.

1:17:46
Matthew Pech

Honestly, I think he wanted out for a really long time. You know, he's a scientist and eye doctor at heart, right? Like not an entrepreneur. I think he ultimately had to choose between running a pharma company or being a clinician and researcher. So Scott phones Gavin Herbert directly, asking Allergan if they want to purchase the company.

1:18:08
Alex Kesin

Here's the amazing thing. Even though they had this established relationship, Allergan almost passed on buying Oculinum again for the exact same reason that they gave them years earlier. If you remember, Matt, there were a half dozen companies that Scott pitched, and Allergan was one of them. When we interviewed Gavin Herbert, he told us that the pitch that Scott gave him this time around was in a little place called Truman's, which was the in-house tavern at the Allergan Complex in Irvine.

1:18:39

Here's his account of that moment.

1:18:41
Speaker 5

Initially, we were pretty skeptical of that. It was a very small market. I mean, Bluff Rouse Pads probably was a, I don't know, $10, $20 million market. And I really didn't because as part of our strategy, we were surrounding the ophthalmologist with basic chronic needs. I really didn't see it as a big opportunity. In fact, I started to say no because the market was so small.

1:19:07
Alex Kesin

But right as Gavin is about to say no, he catches himself. He starts running the pitch through about that surround the ophthalmologist strategy we were talking about earlier and realizes, what if he just brings it in-house? Sherbismus is a tiny market. That's fine and well. But if Allergan has it in their bag, that means no competing sales rep gets an excuse to walk into his client's offices. So partly out of a protectiveness to guard his turf, partly because the cost is so low, he changes his mind and agrees to purchase oculinum.

1:19:40
Matthew Pech

But even then, he hedges his bet. Instead of just writing a check up front, he structures the deal like a call option. Herbert actually broke down the mechanics of that deal for us. a detail I haven't seen printed anywhere else.

1:19:53
Speaker 5

When it got to be approaching $8 or $10 million in sales, we decided to convert from a licensing royalty deal to buying the company for, I think, $10 million. That believe was the number.

1:20:07
Matthew Pech

You can really see in this quote some of the competitive advantages that come from investing in a specialty sales force. One is that, you know, you are the gatekeeper to physicians, And so these drug companies do have to go through you. And then secondly, it's just like there isn't any marginal cost really to have the sales rep have one more drug that they sell to the physicians, right? You know, so really there's a bias towards action and a bias towards just adding drugs and seeing what happens to them.

1:20:38
Alex Kesin

That makes sense. You know, Matt, despite a large amount of narrative detail we have about the acquisition as a whole, the price tag of it is a bit of a mystery. Have you seen this?

1:20:49
Matthew Pech

Yeah, this is really funny how we've talked to so many people involved in this and everyone has been giving a different number. Like every single record contradicts each other, right? The press and Gavin say it's $9 or $10 million. dollars. A later CEO of Allergan swears it's $28 million. Alan Scott says he sold it for $4.5 million. I mean, what I will say is like, no matter which of those numbers is true, we're really talking about pocket change by biotech standards here, right?

1:21:22

I mean, on Approved, we have discussed yearly CEO pay packages that are bigger than these numbers, right? And so even though Herbert said he was doing a charitable favor effectively to doctors for distributing these drugs. He accidentally pulls off one of the greatest investments in pharma history. Sort of insane.

1:21:42
Alex Kesin

It is insane. But there, of course, was a catch to acquiring this company because this company was kind of a mess at the time, right? Allergan buys Oculinum. They inherit not only Ellen Scott's business, but also his crazy supply chain. Remember, the entire operation was basically Ed Shantz and Eric Johnson making the toxin at Wisconsin, and Scott and Honeychurch QC-ing it, putting it into vials in Berkeley and New Mexico to ship out.

1:22:11
Matthew Pech

Yeah, and it turns out in our research, we discovered Scott had a very specific handshake agreement with Ed. In a recent retrospective published by Eric, he claims that their original contract actually gave Chance a full-blown rev share on all oculinums sold, which Allergan presumably discovers at the exact worst possible moment. Right after the ink on the acquisition is dry, they suddenly realize they owe a percentage of all sales in perpetuity to Ed Schantz. So Allergan's president at the time, Bob Bishop, packs up a horde of lawyers and heads to Madison

1:22:47
Alex Kesin

to squash the deal. As it turns out, Eric Johnson was in that room when this all went down, and he He told us that in the entire 17 years, he worked with Ed Chance. He only saw him angry two times, this time being one of them. Matt, you want to say the first time? Yeah, I can't believe this.

1:23:06
Matthew Pech

He said Chance was mad twice in his career. Once when Alan Scott mailed back a leaking vial of botulinum toxin in the mail. And the second time was in this meeting with all the lawyers. Yeah. Here's how Eric described the showdown.

1:23:27
Speaker 4

Of course, the other time he got upset was during that meeting with the Army of Allergan lawyers and Bob Bishop coming and stonewalling his lawyer to accept their offer. He did not trust Allergan, and he did not want to work with Allergan.

1:23:45
Speaker 5

So I think him and his lawyer were steamrolled by these Army of lawyers from Allergan, and they decided they could love some.

1:23:53
Matthew Pech

Man, brutal scene, a bunch of academics meeting up with a bunch of corporate types. It does bring up a glaring question, like, why was Ed Chance sort of negotiating this with his own personal lawyer, right? Like, shouldn't the university have been standing right there behind them? You want to remind the listeners why this is relevant, Alex?

1:24:18
Alex Kesin

Sure. So for those of you listening in who caught our second episode on Geron, you already know that the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation plays a major role in spinning out IP from the university. They are pretty much Wisconsin's giant, infamously protective technology transfer office. When it came to Jamie Thompson and his embryonic stem cell patents, Worf acted like an absolute rottweiler, fighting a multi-year legal battle to protect that IP, literally being upheld by the Supreme Court at the end of the day.

1:24:52

So naturally, you would expect the same office to step in and defend Ed and Eric when Allergan started throwing its weight around. They did actually go to Worf asking for that backup, but at the time, they were not interested and ended up refusing the case.

1:25:07
Matthew Pech

I can sort of understand why, given everything seemed to have been operating based off of gentlemen agreements. So that's definitely a difficult situation to win an actual legal case. Anyways, at the end of the day, Worf ends up leaving Ed to hang out to dry on his own. And so with zero institutional leverage really helping him fight back, as you can imagine, Bishop and Allergan have the upper hand here. So though he initially started with a true sort of rev share on this drug, Ed is strong-armed into a lump sum compromise to make Allergan go away.

1:25:46

And of course, Eric, who was, you know, just this assistant professor also sitting there in the room, he walked away with absolutely nothing. Here's how Eric remembers that meeting going down.

1:25:57
Speaker 5

Alan got $7.5 million, and Ed got 10%, and $750 ,000.

1:26:03
Speaker 4

And I wasn't even offered any money in that meeting.

1:26:06
Speaker 5

I didn't have a lawyer. I was a young professor. You know, I just shut my mouth shut, and the decisions were made, and Ed was quite upset with the process and the results.

1:26:18
Alex Kesin

Just a shitty situation all in all. To put this level of compensation in perspective, CDMOs that manufacture antibodies often charge royalties. And flashback to our earlier Keytruda episode, that's how MRC technology made something like $1 billion for figuring out how to humanize Keytruda. On the other hand, Shantz actually did manufacture the physical drug substance for Botox for 20 years. And here he is getting strong-armed into a flat payout just because he got outgunned by lawyers in that conference room.

1:26:56

But of course, that couldn't be the last of their grievances with Allergan, right? These things never end as cleanly as they do. Nope.

1:27:04
Matthew Pech

So remember, Allergan may own the botulinum toxin now, but they're still very much beholden to Chance and Eric to actually manufacture the drug substance. Apparently, the buyout contract between Allergan and Oculinum only gave Allergan rights to the original batch of toxin, the so-called 7911 batch. As we mentioned earlier, that's the batch that's made back in 1979. And by the time Allergan is throwing its weight around in the late 80s, the toxin is literally a decade old, right?

1:27:39

And because it's so old, it was starting to physically break down and become immunogenic.

1:27:46
Alex Kesin

The fact that it was still working just goes to show the beauty of the potency of this drug. Yeah. But immunogenicity, is this because if the protein breaks down, it looks a little bit foreign to the body?

1:28:01
Matthew Pech

Yes. And I think part of the issue is as it breaks down, you have to inject more nanograms to have the same functional effect, right? And so there's just more of a chance to develop an immune reaction the more protein you inject. So with this old batch of toxin, at one point, almost 20 % of patients were developing neutralizing antibodies against the neurotoxin. And once that happens, you can't inject them anymore, right? So, you know, Eric and Ed, you know, their names are on the master batch record.

1:28:32

they were trying to convince everyone to stop injecting this specific batch of toxin into humans anymore. And it's funny, this era of Botox is called the old Botox era. And old Botox had a reputation as being this sort of crappy immunogenic drug. Oh, so it's not like old Coke? No, in this case, old Botox is not the better thing. Oh. You know, of course, there was an obvious solution to this problem, which was to make a new batch.

1:29:05

And Chance and Eric had done this. They had manufactured a second batch, the so-called 88-4 batch. So as you can tell, made in 1988.

1:29:15
Alex Kesin

This is the batch that they end up sending to Bob Bishop, right? So Bob wanted to use it for their newer approvals. in the late 90s. Eric told us that they handed that high quality 88.4 batch to Bob Bishop and Bob promised to return it to them. But Allergan instead commercialized this batch in Europe, making millions of dollars on it and never gave them a penny for it. So just like the buyout, when it came to the financial benefits reaped from this drug, the scientists didn't get much

1:29:56
Matthew Pech

from it. Yeah, these academics keep getting outmaneuvered by a corporation. Again, I think this is why the ultimate transaction numbers for the purchase of oculinum are all over the place, right? Well, despite all that bad blood, you know, the ink finally does dry and Allergan officially owns the drug. And it's time for the final slap in the face to the academics. One of the first moves they do is to strip away the oculinum label and rebrand the drug to the name we know today, Botox.

1:30:32
Alex Kesin

Yep. And Allergan, of course, didn't come up with that name.

1:30:36
Matthew Pech

Yeah. As you can probably tell from the name, this wasn't some focus grouped corporate branding name, right? Just the fact that you would leave the word tox in the name seems like a mistake. Eric told us that the word Botox was literally just the shorthand word that he and Ed used around the Madison lab to describe the type A botulinum toxin.

1:31:03
Speaker 4

It was, you know, it was just an internal nickname.

1:31:05
Matthew Pech

And Allergan then turns around and both takes the name and legally trademarks it as their own, which is wild.

1:31:13
Alex Kesin

That pretty much sums up this chapter of Botox's, well, now Botox's history, right? But Aragon takes their drug, they take the good batch, and they even trademark Ed and Eric's inside joke name for the drug. But despite all that history, Eric doesn't harbor any bitterness about how the cookie crumbled. He told us the following.

1:31:35
Speaker 5

It seems like we were crazy. We were dumb, you know. But we say as long as we help people live better lives, that's what matters.

1:31:44
Alex Kesin

It's not the money. What a mensch. Okay, let's propel a bit forward into the commercial rollout of Botox. Predictably, it wasn't exactly a cash cow from day one. Sales at the end of 1991 were pretty modest at around $13 million, but the immediate revenue wasn't the prize here, was it, Matt?

1:32:03
Matthew Pech

Not at all. We'll cover what the real prize is shortly. I would highlight they effectively buy an approved drug for one times revenue, which is pretty impressive in the pharma business. They definitely got a good deal. And the other important piece to highlight here is the drug was approved for a rare eye muscle disorder, right? And so it got orphan drug status. And that means seven years of American market exclusivity. And this kept sort of any potential European competitors out of the market.

1:32:35
Alex Kesin

And on the manufacturing side, it's on the select agents list, right? Yes, I think so.

1:32:41
Matthew Pech

Yeah, that's a good point that there's a whole other piece here around the fact that this is a bioweapon, which adds to the complexity of competing in this space. Absolutely. It turns out Allergan absolutely did need that seven years of market exclusivity because they didn't know how to manufacture this drug and suddenly they had to make it themselves. There definitely wasn't going to be a patent on the composition of matter, right? that was absolutely dead in the water.

1:33:12

So the true long-term defense of protecting this business was the physical manufacturing process. So they had to use this seven-year window to reverse engineer the toxin in their own corporate facilities and to wean themselves off of Ed Chance.

1:33:28
Alex Kesin

Yep, that weaning process ended up taking a whole six of those seven years to actually fully proceed, believe it or not. And as Eric wanted us to make sure to note, this was the exact batch that he and Chance originally begged the FDA not to approve due to those immunogenicity risks. But because it was ultimately the only legally approved material on the books, Chance's old 79-11 batch is what stayed in the vial ultimately for every American patient up until 1997.

1:34:05
Matthew Pech

Man, that's crazy that a batch of drug made in 1979 gets used for decades to service an entire commercial market. So they do finally manage to land a fresh in-house prepared batch of its own neurotoxin. They call it BSB 2024. And as you might expect, the difference in quality and potency between this and the old stuff is pretty staggering, right? The 7911 batch is decades old. The new material that Allergan makes ends up being like five to six times more potent by weight.

1:34:41

So, you know, if an old vial of Botox used to have 25 nanograms, a new vial of Botox only needed five nanograms to have the same clinical potency.

1:34:52
Alex Kesin

Yep. That was fantastic for fixing the anti-drug antibody issue that the older 7911 batch had. but it ended up having some hiccups of its own. Do you want to describe those?

1:35:05
Matthew Pech

Yeah, the transition in manufacturing was not smooth at all, right? Like the FDA's own clinical review of Botox confirms that these batches were not really rigorously evaluated for comparability. When they started using the new batch in the clinic, there was some safety signals coming up, right? Like this new pure stuff was giving a higher rate of drooping eyelids, perhaps not unsurprising because, you know, the new toxin was essentially spreading further from the injection site compared to the old stuff.

1:35:39

Yeah, it's hard to remake CMC from scratch like this.

1:35:43
Alex Kesin

Yeah, damn. So even when they fixed this problem with CMC, they still created another one that ultimately delayed the approval of some of those late 90s early 2000s indications yeah and I think

1:35:58
Matthew Pech

what's funny here is that like it's this competitive moat of like shitty CMC where they sort of knew exactly how the Botox was made but like in the same way that like a witch can mix together a potion that works right like the assays to validate a lot were bespoke you know we're not talking about some small molecule with a defined chemical formula here, right? It's this incredibly large, complex, fragile protein molecular machine whose activity and distribution, immunogenicity all change depending on like how you prepare it.

1:36:37

Because it was so messy, it really made the path

1:36:41
Alex Kesin

to a biosimilar non-obvious. To recap the state of play for Botox at this point, it is still strictly a therapeutic drug used exclusively to treat crossed eyes, severe eyelid spasms, facial spasms, and other muscular disorders. But because it's this incredibly potent, highly localized tool sitting right there in the hands of physicians, the aperture for physician-led experimentation and serendipity was completely wide open.

1:37:08
Matthew Pech

Enter Jean Caruthers. She's an ophthalmologist who did a fellowship down in San Francisco back in 1982, where she actually learned to inject Botox straight from Alan Scott himself. By 1987, she was up in Vancouver, and she had become a true pioneer with the drug.

1:37:23
Alex Kesin

One day, a patient marches into her office. Jean can tell that she is visibly annoyed.! This patient walks up to Jean, points right at her forehead, between her brows, and starts complaining because Dr. Carruthers skipped that spot during her injections. And Jean's response to this is pretty funny. She apologizes and says something like, I'm so sorry. I didn't treat you there because I didn't think you were spasming there. And the patient fires right back with what is now basically the founding quote of today's multi-billion dollar aesthetics economy.

1:37:56

Oh, doctor, I know I'm not spasming there, but every time you treat me there, I get this beautiful untroubled expression.

1:38:03
Matthew Pech

Wow, that is nuts. It is so rare that like a single patient anecdote is like biologically and medically correct. I know, right?

1:38:13
Alex Kesin

I find it amazing too. But of course, what makes this story special is that Jean didn't just file this away in the back of her head. She took the anecdote home to dinner that night with her husband, Alistair Carruthers, who happened to be a dermatologist. So it took those things to happen two and two for the aesthetic use case of Botox to be discovered. Alistair had been struggling for years to treat aging faces using the tools of the era, things like collagen fillers and fat injections, but those only, of course, bulked up the folds in the skin and couldn't actually do anything to relax the underlying muscles like Botox could.

1:38:56

Exactly.

1:38:57
Matthew Pech

And the moment Gene tells him about the patient's comment, a light bulb goes off. As he's described it since, they had the ultimate built-in division of labor to launch a brand new field. He had a clinic full of cosmetic patients looking for answers, and Gene had the toxin and knew how to inject it. They didn't have to look very far for their first test subject either. As it turns out, their very first cosmetic subject was their own receptionist, a woman named Kathy Swan.

1:39:24

She had been sitting at the front desk for years, watching every single grateful patient walk through the door. So when they asked her to try it, she said sure.

1:39:32
Matthew Pech

Three days later, her forehead was completely smooth, and the Caruthers became true believers in Botox just like that.

1:39:39
Matthew Pech

Beauty of a drug with a huge effect size. Bingo. While using their secretary as a guinea pig was easy enough, getting regular patients to willingly let them inject a neurotoxin into their faces was a completely different hurdle. When the Caruthers pitched it to other people, patients would often look at them and say, I heard it's a terrible poison. Why on earth would I do that? So Jean basically joins the club of crazy researchers in this story and tests it on herself.

1:40:08

Don't try this at home, kids. Yep. So she had Alistair treat her own frown lines, and then she'd literally walk patients over to the mirror to show them off and reassure them. There's this fantastic tidbit from her about that in an interview where she said, quote, you know, Alistair, I've got some really good frown lines. Treat me. And then I'd pull out the picture of my huge frown lines before, and I'd pull my bangs back and say, what do you think?

1:40:33

And they'd say, oh, do it. And I haven't had frown lines since 1987. How romantic. It is so rare in the pharmaceutical industry that like the prescribing physician can say, I use the drug and look how good it's working for me, right? That's great marketing.

1:40:55
Alex Kesin

I think this is still what med spas do today, right? They have the practitioners usually super Botoxed up. Oh, for sure. Anyway, so Gene and Alistair eventually managed to recruit 18 patients that I imagine were exceptionally brave. There's full informed consent, the whole nine yards, and they get injected with the toxin. They track them for up to a year, confirming that the effects cosmetically reliably last about three to four months. And in 1991, right as the oculinum sale to Allergan is also coinciding, they pack those findings and present them at an annual meeting, the American Society for Dermatologic Surgery.

1:41:38

What do you think the response was to

1:41:40
Matthew Pech

this study, Matt? I'm going to guess sunshine and rainbows as they understand the incredible financial windfall that was in front of them. Like Oprah Winfrey style, you get Botox,

1:41:54
Alex Kesin

you get Botox under the chairs. Something like that. No, no, no. It was unfortunately completely ridiculed. Dean later said that there was a quote, dead silence in the room. People came up to her afterwards in dismay pretty much and like almost a level of disgust because how could she use a deadly poison for something so frivolous as wrinkles, right? Yeah, that's a good point. I mean,

1:42:23
Matthew Pech

if you're a physician, one way to think about this is that it's all risk and no benefit, right? So under that sort of thinking, I can see how they were disgusted by this. Yeah, they had completely

1:42:37
Alex Kesin

missed the alpha on this weird toxin thing that would later become a blockbuster drug, as we know. So despite taking all of the heat and walking out of that conference feeling like pariahs, Jean and Alistair pushed forward anyway with their cosmetic use case for Botox. They published their foundational paper in 1992, breaking down how those 18 patients, showing beyond a shadow of a doubt that not only did it work, but it was also super, super safe.

1:43:08

But right there, sitting on the 50-yard line of pharmaceutical history, they made the mother of all enforced errors. Wait, don't tell me.

1:43:17
Matthew Pech

They never patented it. Oh my God. They also didn't file a method of use patent. Oh my God.

1:43:24
Alex Kesin

The cheat code to the universe. They didn't patent it. Not a single one. Even with the precedent earlier of this, they managed not to do it.

1:43:33
Matthew Pech

Yeah, you would think that the sort of folks adventurous enough to force their secretary to be a test subject. I would have expected these folks to think about IP, but it sounds like they didn't.

1:43:46
Alex Kesin

I know. You'd think that they'd be kicking themselves every day for the rest of their lives because of that. But much like Eric and much like Ed and much like Alan, Alice, there's actual explanation for why they seem to not have been bothered too much by how much it made after they failed to patent it was the following. We learned in med school that if you have an idea, you give it away.

1:44:10
Matthew Pech

Man, the amount of intellectual property that has been given away in this episode is unbelievable when you stack it up. Yep. If you look at the official corporate timeline for Allergan's aesthetics franchise, you may be surprised to learn that Botox Cosmetic doesn't actually get FDA approval until 2002. But the reality is the market did not patiently wait for an official go-ahead to start using Botox for wrinkle reduction. Instead, off-label use exploded almost immediately. Normally, doctors have plenty of reasons to avoid the kind of Wild West behavior we're about to describe, chief among them being that insurance won't reimburse for off-label uses.

1:44:51

Most of the time, there isn't a good clinical reason to YOLO things in medicine. But in Botox's case, those two standard guardrails were completely moot points.

1:45:00
Alex Kesin

After the Carothers go public with their data, dermatologists pretty much right away start adopting Botox into their clinic for cosmetic use. By 1994, Allure magazine was already running multi-page features on it. And by 1997, the off-label demand became so relentless that it outran the actual supply of the drug, which, remember, was still technically only being manufactured for eye spasms and strabismus. Naturally, the FDA began to catch wind of this and knew something was up.

1:45:31

In 1999, three full years before official cosmetic approval, You can read agency clinical reviews explicitly stating that the majority of all Botox use in the U.S. seemingly was off-label. They even specifically documented that doctors were using it to reduce frown lines and facial skin folds.

1:45:51
Matthew Pech

It wasn't a secret at all, right? You had almost $300 million a year in sales, and that definitely was not the strabismus market driving that. Doc, my eye is twitching. You also had this whole celebrity dermatologist circuit popping up with Arnold Klein injecting Elizabeth Taylor, Cher, Dolly Parton. And she rests in peace. Rest in peace. And yeah, all of this was happening years and years before the FDA formally approves its use in wrinkles.

1:46:26
Speaker 4

We asked Gavin Herbert about this period,

1:46:29
Matthew Pech

and we asked him whether he expected the FDA to ever greenlight the use of Botox for cosmetic applications, and he told us it was really touch and go.

1:46:39
Speaker 5

Initially, when we first learned about the dermatologist using it for reducing tram lines, we were frankly skeptical whether it would ever get FDA approval because if you think about risk to benefit, was it cosmetic, right? Yeah, botanicalism talks about this extremely potent drug. And so we were initially concerned that the FDA would never approve it. In fact, they were honestly against it initially.

1:47:09
Alex Kesin

I don't really understand this well, then. What flipped the agency's mind? It doesn't really sound like it was the clinical data, right?

1:47:18
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I think it was the simple fact that the FDA had completely lost control of the situation, right? And as Gavin explained to us,

1:47:28
Speaker 5

Dermatologists took advantage of the fact that they could prescribe it, although it was unapproved. And after they found there were several hundred dermatologists using it on a regular basis, they concluded that the best way to control it was for us to proceed with a new drug application, which we did, and the results were quite incredible. So they really had no choice but to approve it.

1:47:54
Alex Kesin

Okay, that makes sense.

1:47:57
Matthew Pech

Yeah, absolutely nuts. And you can kind of see how this forces the FDA's hand. By the time the ink is dried on that official approval, the FDA wasn't, you know, creating the market at all. Patients were already walking into the clinic and asking for this drug by name. The approval really let Allergan sort of finally turn on the marketing fire hose for this drug in a legal fashion.

1:48:22
Alex Kesin

Yeah, are you getting deja vu, Matt? because I certainly am. The trend we're seeing today with GLP-1s where pharma is not really used to seeing this kind of drug which has a massive, purely consumer-driven kind of demand, at least not outside of highly addictive or habit-forming drugs, right? Yeah, and I wanted to highlight here

1:48:45
Matthew Pech

how weird some of the data dynamics are for this drug. You know, in many prior episodes, we've talked about clinical trial design and investors scrutinizing data prints and which patient reported outcomes are appropriate but for these early days of botox when we're talking about treating crossed eyes or for eyelid spasms these are really big effect sizes that are obvious and it it almost makes the trials feel like a formality and a sort of safety data set generating exercise right?

1:49:19

Like you can literally watch with your own eyes, the muscles stop twitching.

1:49:24
Alex Kesin

This is also a problem with some of these newer GLP-1 trials. In some of these more recent trials, say from the last year, the patients that were on placebo knew they were on placebo because they weren't losing weight at the rate that the active agent arm was. Just it's very eerily reminiscent

1:49:43
Matthew Pech

enough today. Yeah, for a drug that has such a noticeable effect, there's definitely issues with functional unblinding and people on the placebo group leaving once they realize they're not getting the good stuff. One thing I'd highlight from this era of allergan is you can see the sort of somewhat dangerous playbook they're learning, which is how to profit enormously from off-label demand for a drug long before they have the legal right to actually promote it.

1:50:13
Alex Kesin

Yep, yep, yep. In the 90s, that was clear with the early cosmetic boom. And as we'll also see, they run it back later with their more broad therapeutics business. These doctors out in the wild discovering new use cases faster than they can even make the protocols for running trials

1:50:32
Matthew Pech

on them. That's where the efficient frontier is. And unfortunately, a bit of foreshadowing here, That's also where the felonies are. But for now, all is well and good at Allergan. Right around this time of the cosmetic approval, July 2002, Allergan decides to really lean all the way in and become a pure play specialty pharma company, right? So they had this large legacy eye care and context lens business and they decide really to spin it off into its own separate thing called AMO.

1:51:05
Alex Kesin

Yep. And the mastermind driving all of these new business pivots is David Pyatt. David took over the reins from Herbert as CEO in the late 90s. And from here, he's going to be running the company for the next 15 or so years, ultimately transforming this company, which when he steps in is a sleepy eyedrop company, all the way into becoming a absolute aesthetics juggernaut. In 1998, David Pyatt steps in as CEO when Allergan's market cap is sitting right around $2.3 billion.

1:51:39

He's a Scottish foreign executive, fluent in five languages, and interestingly, not an ophthalmology insider. His prior gig was running the nutrition division over at Novartis, which actually, as I learned in research for this episode, included the Gerber Baby Food Unit. Did you know that?

1:51:56
Matthew Pech

I didn't even know that was part of Novartis.

1:51:59
Alex Kesin

Yeah, that's what I'm saying. But the real flex here is that he was recruited to Allergan by none other than Herbert Boyer, the co-founder of Genentech, who was then chairing Allergan's board at the time.

1:52:13
Matthew Pech

Yeah, great little piece of biotech royalty hiding right there in the org chart. Anyway, Pyatt, he comes to the door and he has two immediate diagnoses for the Allergan Corporation. One, company's too inward looking. It's choked with middle management. and secondly, that the company lacks focus, which, as he liked to joke, was, quote, not exactly a great trait for an ophthalmology company. But I'm...

1:52:40
Alex Kesin

Okay, so Pyatt first attacks the bureaucracy in the company. In his freshman year as CEO, Pyatt slashes Allergan's overhead headcount by 22%. And internally, naturally, people were obviously assuming the worst, figuring he was trying to dress up the company for a sale. But then he pulls out a total wildcard from there. He decides to take almost all of that cash saved from those layoffs and immediately redeploys it directly into Allergan's Salesforce. As he later described, quote, They were surprised when very quickly I turned around to put almost all of the savings into the Salesforce because I wanted to get the message back to the customer that they come first, not us internally.

1:53:21

Once I knew things were really on the up and up, we really started pumping money back into R &D.

1:53:26
Matthew Pech

And that R &D injection completely transforms the scale of the company. When Pyatt arrived, Allergan was spending under $100 million a year on research. Over his 17-year run, he pushes that annual budget to over $1 billion a year. But the craziest part of that Pyatt era is what actually drove that growth. Ask anyone on the street, and Botox is just a wrinkle eraser. Yet under Pyatt, half of the entire Botox franchise quietly morphed into serious therapeutics.

1:53:54

They landed approvals for cervical dystonia in 2000, severe sweating in 2004, overactive bladder, limb spasticity, and finally the crown jewel indication expansion, chronic migraine in 2010.

1:54:08
Alex Kesin

So by 2013, right towards the end of his term as CEO, Therapeutics was accounting for 54 % of all Botox sales across roughly 25 distinct medical conditions. So weirdly enough, for all of the cultural fame on the cosmetic side of Botox, more than half of this empire was actually built on treating debilitating muscular conditions.

1:54:31
Matthew Pech

I have to say it's pretty cool how these additional uses of Botox keep getting discovered through pretty much the exact same mechanism. Chronic migraine is a pretty good example here.

1:54:40
Speaker 4

Doctors noticed that patients getting Botox for facial spasms or wrinkles were also reporting fewer headaches. So Allergan chased the field observation and ran the PREEMPT trial program, which, by the way, features a classic biotech sleight of hand.

1:54:55
Matthew Pech

The first PREEMPT trial actually missed its primary endpoint for total headache episodes, coming in with a p-value of 0.344. They only salvaged the program because they pivoted to a different endpoint measuring headache days. The drug was obviously working, but you can literally watch them move the goalposts to get it across the finish line. What I would say Allergan was very good at was discovering drugs by accident, essentially. Botox wasn't the only serendipitously discovered cosmetic drug that they sold.

1:55:27

The most famous sequel to their Botox playbook was this drug Lumagin, a glaucoma drop they already sold that contained a prostaglandin. and clinicians kept calling in to report a bizarre side effect, which was their patient's eyelashes were growing dramatically longer and darker. So Allergan, you know, leaned right into that field observation and changed around the packaging a bit to have a, you know, an applicator of this drug to the eyelash, ran the trial, and boom, boom, boom, in December 2008, they had approval for Latisse.

1:56:02

So as they think about filling out their portfolio, they end up doubling down on what they know best, which is essentially hunting for weirder, even more unconventional indications for Botox, right? They even took Botox all the way into a phase two trial for major clinical depression. Depression? Explain. Yeah, you sound skeptical, but this was a serious line of research, and it sounds unintuitive until you look at this facial feedback hypothesis. It's this idea that paralyzing the frown muscles could interrupt some sort of neurological loop that reinforces negative emotions.

1:56:45

And true to form for Botox, the idea came from a physician out in the field, dermatologic surgeon Dr. Eric Finzi, who connected the dots after reading the research of psychologist Paul Ekman. In our interview with Eric, he told us,

1:57:01
Speaker 5

I've been using Botox for my patients for years. And then all of a sudden it dawned on me that I had the ability to conduct the experiment. It was right in front of me. I knew how to interact and did it on a thousand people already by then. And I said to myself, well, okay, maybe I can try a little trial on depressed subjects.

1:57:26
Alex Kesin

Finzi ended up publishing on a small pilot study showing striking remission rates in treatment-resistant depression. That, of course, caught Allergan's eye, no pun intended, and prompted them to license the patents running a formal phase two trial. Ultimately, the phase two showed mixed results and Allergan ended up licensing out the depression program a while later. But it shows also like how wide Pyatt as CEO was casting the net for field discovery, right? If a condition involved a muscle or a nerve, they were going to test it.

1:58:02
Matthew Pech

Yeah, you raise a good point there, Alex. And I think it was MIT's Eric von Hippel had come up with the concept of field discovery. this idea that the most valuable uses of a technology are often identified by the actual users of the technology rather than the manufacturers of it. You know, friend of the pod, David Shaywitz, wrote this nice piece calling Botox sort of a luminous example of this.

1:58:28
Alex Kesin

Yeah, that's a great analogy made by David for Botox. This is around the time where David Pyatt's commercial genius is really in full force with his franchises. If your best R &D engine is a bunch of dermatologists tinkering in their clinics, finding new use cases, you have to keep those specific doctors really, really happy. You want them playing exclusively in your sandbox. And ultimately, what does Allergan do? Well, they dust off Gavin Herbert's Surround the Ophthalmologist Playbook and repurpose it for plastic surgeons.

1:59:04
Matthew Pech

Yep, exactly. they build this whole commercial engine for the plastic surgeons and the dermatologists and the estheticians. They build what we call the aesthetic stack. And this really is a business model that probably looks pretty alien to the rest of the pharma industry, right? Like just think about what's going on here, right? There's no insurer in the room. There's no formulary to think about. There's no Medicare price negotiations to think about. There's no PBM taking a cut.

1:59:36

You know, this is an entirely cash pay business. The patient is just paying out of pocket by choice for a result that they see in a mirror in like two to three days. And then they come back in a couple months and do it again. It really is an amazing business. A consumer product with the pricing power of medicine and a really low churn rate.

1:59:58
Alex Kesin

More like a software subscription than a recurring medicine prescription. But to make that surround the physician's strategy work, Allergan ends up realizing that Botox isn't enough. They couldn't resist having just one great drug for aesthetics. They needed to give their sales reps a whole bag of goodies to cross-sell, to basically own the non-surgical phase. So they go on a massive shopping spree. Their foundational purchase in this playbook kicks off in 2006 when they drop over $3 billion to buy Inimed.

2:00:32

And they had to outbid another company for it, Medici's. Why is that company special, Matt?

2:00:37
Matthew Pech

I think they were Botox's main rival trying to race to build the same aesthetic stack.

2:00:44
Alex Kesin

Yep. They had Dysport, which was the British version of Botox, you can call it. What else did Inimed have?

2:00:51
Matthew Pech

I mean, I think the Inamed purchase was really the foundational pillars to building this aesthetic stack, right? It gave them Juvederm, which is this hyaluronic acid filler, which is a really nice complement to Botox. So Botox will relax the wrinkle and then Juvederm plumps the face back up. Again, these drugs that have relatively similar schedules and a perfect thing to cross-sell. Inamed had some FDA-approved breast implants right as the FDA was sort of warming up to those again.

2:01:24

Over the years, Allegan just keeps building that stack deeper and deeper. So they buy Kybella, which helps dissolve double chins. They buy something called CoolSculpting that's supposed to freeze body fat. And so you really start to see this situation where you have a sales rep that can go to a plastic surgeon or a medical spa and sell that physician Botox, a filler, a fat dissolver, an implant, etc., etc.

2:01:54
Matthew Pech

They can make you look so pretty, Matt.

2:01:55
Matthew Pech

A dream come true. I was so close to getting Botox to research this episode. And Mrs. Petsch drilled you out of it. Yeah, exactly. Here's the most important piece, though, which is what this aesthetic stack gives Allergan. You can now sell this bundle of goodies to a clinic in a way that forces them to stay loyal to you. So the way they do this is they have these massive tiered rebates where if a provider hits their volume targets across the entire Allergan portfolio, it unlocks a manufacturer rebate that substantially ends up changing the clinic's margin on selling these.

2:02:34

So what you're really doing is aligning incentives and essentially motivating the provider to not just sell Botox, but sell the whole bundle of aesthetic products to their clients. And then they do this for the patients too, right? They really try to lock the patient in as well. They roll out a consumer loyalty program. I think it was initially called Brilliant Distinctions, and now it's called Allee. And yeah, it's like frequent flyer miles for your face, essentially.

2:03:03
Alex Kesin

Let's talk about some of the unit economics here. There's an era of really high volume med spas in Florida that would run dedicated Botox days. I think they're still around actually, but one that we heard of ran these things and literally would book 70 patients 10 minutes apart. The clinic buys Botox on the purchasing side for about $14 a unit. And then a 1099 contract nurse would inject it for like all around 70 grand in an afternoon.

2:03:38

Why does that work? Well, it's because when the FDA is expanding the label from frown lines to crow's feet and etc, the clinic can just sell it more units. And by 2013, ultimately, Allergan is a cash printing machine. Botox is doing $2 billion a year. The company altogether is making $6 billion in revenue. and they have literally $3.5 billion in the bank as savings, no debt. Pied at the time was actually bragging that their growth let them think 7 to 10 years out, but the balance sheet was ironically a little too strong.

2:04:14
Matthew Pech

Yep, unfortunately, it was starting to make them the ultimate corporate target. Because in early 2014, this beautiful aesthetic machine comes under the single most vicious hostile corporate attack in modern pharma history.

2:04:29
Matthew Pech

The barbarians are at the gate, and they brought Bill Ackman.

2:04:49
Matthew Pech

In April 2014, a company called Valeant Pharmaceuticals launches an unsolicited, hostile takeover attempt of Allergan, kicking off a years-long battle for the company. This is the inflection point for Allergan's existence as a company, before a relatively calm and quiet company with a weird portfolio, and after a corporation riddled with Actavis drama, legal battles, even political intrigue. All of it starts with this M &A takeover with Valeant.

2:05:17
Alex Kesin

So who was this mysterious suitor, Valeant? In every philosophical respect, this company was Allergan's exact opposite, Run by Michael Pearson, a former McKinsey consultant, surprise, surprise, Valeant focused on products with limited competition. It was effectively a highly focused tax optimization scheme, doing shenanigans like merging with a Canadian company to get their tax rate down. Most relevant for your story, though, and perhaps what they became most famous for, it thought R &D could and should be cut to the bone.

2:05:53

Pearson cut Valeant's own R &D from around 12 % of revenue in 2007 to under 3 % in 2013.

2:06:02
Matthew Pech

Valeant's entire model was buying companies for their established products, cutting everything the CEO considered waste, administration, research, and then supercharging sales. This was all done in conjunction with tax-optimizing the profits that remain. It was, in his own words, quote, a business model that gets rid of the value-destroying part of the pharmaceutical companies and keeps all the pieces that are value-sustaining. But in most other people's eyes, this was just all unsustainable financial engineering. One of the most vocal critics was Henry Termier, the legendary CEO of Genzyme, a man who built his entire legacy on the exact kind of long-term R &D focus that Pearson despised.

2:06:42

Termier, who was on Allergan's board at the time, put it perfectly. quote,

2:06:56
Alex Kesin

I think Termier put it rather politely, if anything. When we brought up Valeant to Gavin Herbert, Allergan's founding CEO, he didn't give nearly as diplomatic of an analysis.

2:07:15
Speaker 5

jail for what they did against my blood pressure every time I think about it. We were a strong, independent company that got taken over by crooks. You know, we had to escape.

2:07:27
Matthew Pech

Man, that's hilarious. 93 years old and just incandescent with rage. You'd love to see it. But to Valeant, you know, that history didn't mean anything to them. In the Valeant view of the world, Allergan was the perfect acquisition target. Under leveraged, swimming in cash,

2:07:48
Alex Kesin

sitting on a big R &D budget. Yeah, to be clear, financial roll-ups aren't inherently evil. As we covered in our first episode of Approved Amalyn Pharmaceuticals, there are legit and defensible roles for Actavis to step in and shake things up in a biotech. For example, when ICANN took on Amalyn, he was able to force management to commercialize their drug more efficiently. Clearly, Valeant was not doing that here. When you load your entire buyout machine with massive debt, slash your victim's R &D budgets to under 3 % and engineer your revenue growth strictly by jacking up the prices on those acquired drugs, you're more like burning the company furniture to keep the stock price warm.

2:08:33

Yep. And, you know, Allergan CEO David Pyatt

2:08:36
Matthew Pech

knew that. He realized that if Allergan was going to survive this, it wasn't going to be enough to just politely decline the buyout. They had to turn themselves into a porcupine. Yep, make themselves

2:08:48
Alex Kesin

prickly and painful to swallow. Here's what made the Valeant attack so dangerous. They weren't acting alone. Bill Ackman's Pershing Square fund had quietly amassed a 9.7 % stake in Allergan, worth about $3.2 billion through a vehicle called PS Fund One. The timing there was not a coincidence. In secret, as it turns out, Valeant had partially co-funded Bill's effort to take a stake. It was a perfectly orchestrated win-win for both sides. On one hand, Ackman gets an early stake in the bid, guaranteeing a massive payday when the stock pops and gets acquired.

2:09:26

And Valeant gets a 10 % voting block, guaranteeing they have persistent pressure on the board from the inside. So with the bid now public, Bill Ackman turned the screws, making his case for Allergan being a mismanaged mess. Quote, You are fiduciaries for a $50 billion asset. Your actions have wasted corporate resources, delayed enormous potential value creation for shareholders, and are professionally and personally embarrassing for you.

2:09:53
Matthew Pech

As you can imagine, Allergan was not exactly thrilled with this. And, you know, what makes this hostile merger so insulting is when you look at the dynamics of how this is funded, essentially Valeant is just like reaching into the cookie jar of allergen, right? Like Valeant is going to use the cash flows and the pristine balance sheet of allergen to essentially pay for the $48 billion price tag to buy them, right? It's crazy. So fucked up.

2:10:26
Alex Kesin

It's literally like an alien parasite of a horror movie. That's what it sounds like to me.

2:10:31
Matthew Pech

Okay, it's a bit dramatic, but yeah, conceptually spot on. Yeah, I mean, and what followed was a period that David Pyatt called total war, right? Between April and November of 2014, Allergan ran daily war room calls, and the board met 34 times over that period, usually on Sundays. and they would take Saturday off for a breather. Oof.

2:11:00
Alex Kesin

Shabbos is for the boys. Yeah, having these weekly Sunday board meetings sounds like a special kind of hell. But on top of that, to survive the siege, Allergan launched a massive counteroffensive built around three main tactics. The first move they did was the classic poison pill, of course, diluting the stock to stop Ackman from buying more shares. It gave management some desperately needed breathing room so they could hatch more plans.

2:11:27
Matthew Pech

The second move was kind of psychologically fascinating. So they needed to convince Wall Street that they didn't need Valeant's help. You know, they really needed to convince Wall Street, hey, you know, maybe R &D is a little bit bloated, but we can get lean and mean all on our own. And Allergan launched so-called Project Endurance. So this was this half billion dollar cost cutting initiative that ended up slashing 13 % of the workforce and sort of trimmed some of their early stage programs.

2:11:59
Alex Kesin

That's some pure corporate judo right there. It's like the three little pigs, except the little pig just takes a sledgehammer to the porch himself.

2:12:09
Matthew Pech

Yeah, exactly. Like nothing more to do here. And, you know, again, the concept is there's no need to hand over the keys to an outsider if management's already sort of doing what needs to be done to increase the stock price.

2:12:23
Alex Kesin

Agreed. But if you thought that was cool, Matt, that was really just a warm up for their third act, what I like to call the reverse UNO card. Sun Tzu famously said that the supreme art of war is subduing the enemy without lifting a single finger. Pyatt read that and went, nah, let's just nuke their balance sheet from orbit. So instead of just playing defense on their own turf, Allergan went straight for the jugular and attacked Valeant's accounting.

2:12:48

In SEC filings, they called out massive inconsistencies in Valeant's books, pointing out to Wall Street that their supposed organic growth was a complete mirage masking steep sales to clients. Pyatt publicly compared Valeant to Tycho, while basically letting out a very loud no comment when reporters asked if they were actually going to be the next Enron.

2:13:11
Matthew Pech

Man, Enron, Tycho, haven't heard those names in a while. Pyatt turned out to be quite prescient, right? So what ended up being the story of Valeant was they were telling Wall Street that they were rock stars when it came to selling high-priced drugs when in reality, they were just secretly warehousing the drugs at captive pharmacies they controlled and pretending that there were sales happening. So this is called channel stuffing. It's a legal trick to sort of prematurely recognize revenue.

2:13:48

And it ended up triggering criminal probes, SEC fines, and prison sentences. So Pyatt ends up being vindicated in the end.

2:13:59
Alex Kesin

But calling out their accounting was a long-term play, right? It didn't solve the immediate threat, which brings us to their fourth defensive move, the classic scorched earth maneuver. Since Valeant desperately needed Allergan's pristine balance sheet and cash reserves to fund their buyout, Allergan decided, why not just spend it all ourselves? They opened talks to acquire a company called Salix Pharmaceuticals, an indebted drugmaker, deliberately aiming to load up on debt and drain the exact cash pile Valeant was drooling over.

2:14:32
Matthew Pech

Yeah, what's so funny about that story is that it's a very sensible strategy, but they ended up having to pull the plug because they realized Salix was doing the exact same sort of channel stuffing inventory fraud that Valeant was doing.

2:14:50
Alex Kesin

Ay, ay, ay. You can't make this stuff up. But even as the dust settled on the proxy war here, the court rulings were still looming and Pyatt needed a sort of escape hatch. So he finds a way to lock one in. Early on in the chaos of this takeover bid, a man named Brent Saunders reaches out to him with a promise that changes the trajectory of Allergan's future, as we'll come to see. At the time, Brent Saunders was the CEO of Actavis, a New Jersey headquartered, Dublin registered pharma company.

2:15:22

and when we interviewed him, he told us about the first white knight offer that they give to Allergan.

2:15:28
Speaker 4

I had reached out to David Pyatt early in the beginning of that hostile situation and I said to him, I'll never do a hostile deal. It's not in my DNA because I think the people of a company are an important part of the value of a company. And so I said to him, look, if you ever get to a point where you think you can't win this hostile battle, I want you to know that I'm here and would be happy to act as a white knight.

2:15:54

And I will preserve the innovation. I will preserve the DNA of the original Allergan. And he said, no, we're going to win. I said, that's fine. Put it in your back pocket. And if you need it, call me. We can move fast.

2:16:06
Matthew Pech

Yeah, not surprised that Payot said no right off the bat. You know, he wanted to fight it out and keep Allergan independent. But Brent had that offer just floating out there and waiting for the exact moment that the reality of the situation would catch up to them. All right, so by the autumn of 2014, the legal ground was really shifting for everyone. That November, a federal court ruled that Pershing Square, despite serious questions about whether its secret stake amounted to an insider trading arrangement, was allowed to vote its shares at a special meeting set for December 18.

2:16:41

Allergan's fight team did the math and concluded there was a real chance they'd lose that vote. So it was time for their fifth and final move. Find a white knight, a friendly, more palatable buyer who would pay a price Valeant could not or would not match.

2:16:55
Alex Kesin

Cue the return of Brent Saunders, CEO of Actavis. And ironically enough, something we have yet to mention is that he was previously the CEO of Bausch & Lomb, which he previously sold to none other than Valeant.

2:17:10
Matthew Pech

Yeah, so Brent was well aware of what sort of company Valeant was, though he wasn't willing to tell us anything juicy on record. As Brent remembered that moment, the waiting game for who would own Allergan ended up in real time right in his office.

2:17:27
Speaker 4

I was sitting in my office and I had CNBC on the TV with the sound off and I saw the breaking news come by and it was that Bill Ackman had won the court case to vote his shares. And I kid you not, within a few minutes, I don't know if it was five or ten minutes, my assistant says, David Pyatt's on the phone for you. And I knew then that he was open to a discussion.

2:17:52
Alex Kesin

Talks got serious fast. On November 17, 2014, the sale of Allergan to Actavis was announced at $219 a share, about $66 billion total. That was more than $100 a share above where Allergan traded when this whole battle started, and roughly $40 a share above Valeant's highest bid. As one Allergan director put it perfectly, quote, this was the best deal that no one wanted.

2:18:21
Matthew Pech

Yep. Remember, Pyatt and Allergan didn't want to sell at all. Allergan's stated goal for years was to remain a vibrant independent company. And, you know, Gavin Herbert flatly told us he had preferred the company stay independent. But once that court ruling came in and it became clear that Ackman was going to be allowed to participate in the shareholder vote, it became pretty clear that independence was going to be unwinnable. And so David Pyatt's job changed right then, which was get a highest price as possible and make sure the company was put into the hands of someone who wouldn't completely gut it.

2:18:58

Pyatt had known Sanders for years from ophthalmology circles and judged that he and his team would be good stewards of the business.

2:19:05
Alex Kesin

And let's be clear here, Pyatt definitely got intrinsic value out of this deal. He later said on record, quote, when we closed the deal with Actavis, the headline number was 66 billion. And when it actually closed, the deal was 71 billion. So you can see a year's work, 41 billion, nobody can really complain. The press ended up dubbing him the Braveheart of Allergan. And the Orange County Business Journal made him its business person of the year.

2:19:32

And after that, there's almost something Cincinnatus-like and what he did next. So instead of hanging out a shingle to advise other besieged CEOs and cash in on his new reputation as the Braveheart of Allergan, he puts down the sword and walks away, ultimately raising some money for eye hospitals in Africa, far, far away from Bill Ackman, as you can humanly possibly get.

2:19:55
Matthew Pech

It's funny, he later said he had exactly one regret from the whole ordeal, which was getting quoted in the press calling Valeant vile. So anyways, if you look at the whole tally in this ledger of events, it's pretty clean, right? Like Allergan ended up creating roughly $40 billion in value in that year, keeping its people and saving its R &D organization. You know, Valeant ended up losing the deal. It lost its CEO and would soon watch over 90 % of its market value vaporize as people became wise to

2:20:32
Alex Kesin

the accounting tricks that were going on. Yep. And then there's Mr. Bill Ackman, of course. On paper, he technically lost the takeover battle, but he also made an absolute fortune on the trade. His stake in Allergan nearly doubled, netting Pershing Square over $2 billion on the deal. Unfortunately for Bill, he ended up, well, taking the payout in Valeant's stock and doubling down his bet on them. This ended up costing his fund nearly $4 billion when Valeant ended up collapsing.

2:21:04

There's a rough lesson in there about the difference between being right about a trade and being right about a business.

2:21:10
Matthew Pech

Yep, and, you know, the scientist in me is very happy that pure financialization lost and R &D won.

2:21:18
Alex Kesin

Amen. Actavis officially closes the acquisition on March 17, 2015 for about $70.5 billion. And Pyatt exits a CEO, cashing out his stake for roughly $530 million. An incredible run for a guy who took the company from a $2 billion market cap to over $70 billion. Brent Saunders takes over leadership of the combined entity. But the craziest detail is what happened a few months later after the buyout. The buyer, Actavis, completely drops its own corporate identity and renames itself, da-da-da-da-da, Allergan.

2:21:58
Matthew Pech

Goes to show you where the real value was, or at least where the real brand value was. A $70 billion acquirer decided the name on the Target store had more brand equity than its own identity. Here's what Brent had to say about the name change.

2:22:14
Speaker 4

There are always things that the company you're buying does better than you do. Otherwise, why would you be buying them? By definition, they have to do something really well. And, you know, Actavis was not a name that had been around a long time. It started as a generic drug company when we merged Forrest and we kept the Actavis name. But there was no loyalty to that name. And when I looked at Allergan and the rich history that Allergan had, you know, I knew Gavin, I knew David Pyatt, and I knew that name meant a lot to them.

2:22:42

And frankly, as an aside, I like the name Ben. And so it was a really easy give and it was the right thing to do.

2:22:50
Alex Kesin

Exactly. So from this point forward, when we say Allergan, we're basically talking about the ship of Theseus version of the company. Botox is exactly the same. It's the same molecule, still made in Ireland. But the corporate entity underneath it is now a Frankenstein generics roll up, kind of wearing Allergan like a trench coat. You'll see.

2:23:15
Matthew Pech

Yeah. To make sense of this new trench coat era of the company, we need to really look at the guy who took over David Pyatt's place as CEO.

2:23:23
Matthew Pech

If Pyatt was really the ultimate operator, the guy who built the business brick by brick, the new CEO, Brent Saunders, was really the ultimate dealmaker.

2:23:33
Alex Kesin

Yeah, he's an insane dealmaker. Actually, Brent Saunders' career started in compliance. You want to get into that, Matt?

2:23:41
Matthew Pech

Yeah, a pretty insane CV. Yeah, so he got a JD and MBA. He ended up serving as chief risk officer at a healthcare company and then was in life science consulting at PricewaterhouseCoopers. And then in 2010, he became the CEO of Bausch & Lomb at the ripe age of 33. 33. I've got time. I've got time. Yeah, insane. And from that point forward, like the amount of deal making that he does just goes absolutely vertical.

2:24:14
Alex Kesin

Yeah, it's kind of hard to rival Brent's resume. He sells Bausch & Lomb to Valeant for a little under $9 billion, jumps straight into a pharma company called Forest Labs as their CEO. He then sells Forrest to Actavis for $25 billion within a single year of being CEO, takes the chair of Actavis, and then right around that time closes the Allergan deal. So by February of 2015, Forbes is literally putting him on the cover with a headline that says, Wall Street's drug dealer, five years, three companies, $100 billion in M &A.

2:24:52
Matthew Pech

Yep, that's quite the moniker. And, you know, I think Brent clearly leans into it. When we interviewed him next to photos of his kids on his desk was that framed Forbes cover. We asked Brent directly about sort of the relentless pace of M &A in this industry and whether that consolidation was net good or net bad.

2:25:14
Speaker 4

The ultimate responsibility of a leader of a pharmaceutical enterprise is to bring innovation to solve for unmet medical need. And the bets are getting riskier and more expensive. And so a larger enterprise or more well-resourced R &D organization can take those bigger bets to solve bigger problems. And so ultimately, I think that's one of the top pros. Clearly, the cons are, you know, consolidation obviously leads to some job loss. It leads to perhaps some less relevant R &D getting cut.

2:25:49

But the ecosystem is pretty efficient. That cut R &D usually becomes somebody else's prize. And so at the end of the day, I think most consolidation is good, but not all of it is good.

2:26:01
Alex Kesin

That makes sense. So in franchise, you need to roll up companies. in order to build a balance sheet big enough to handle modern R &D risk?

2:26:10
Matthew Pech

Well, that's definitely what the new version of Allergan had. Ultimately, as I think about the Brent Saunders era of Allergan, I think it's best characterized as combining a look-better, feel-better pipeline with, frankly, the same relentless focus on financial optimization. By look-better, feel-better, what I really mean was therapeutically focusing on A, making the Allergan aesthetic bundle even bigger, and to have a separate thematic area of focus on neurodrugs, especially in the depression and migraine areas.

2:26:47

And many of those assets were coming in directly from Actavis. During this period of the company, Allergan really aggressively pursued M &A against a targeted set of biotechs and assets in the aesthetics and neurospaces, typically trying to bolt things on right around phase two proof of concept time and then, you know, push the programs forward through approval and commercialization. This was a pattern of stepping stone acquisitions that Brent internally branded the, quote, open science strategy. On the look better part, Brent immediately understood the magic that was the cash pay aesthetic business.

2:27:25

While traditional pharma companies were sweating insurance co-pays and PBMs, Brent noticed a fascinating psychological quirk in how patients thought about paying for health versus paying for beauty.

2:27:35
Speaker 4

We had a drug at Allergan called Linzess for IBD. The co-pay was, I think, right around $30 a month. And I had a patient who was very upset around the $30 a month co-pay for her Linzess. and we offered her all the patient assistance, support and all the things that you try to do to help a patient who has affordability issues. And she kept writing to me and writing to me. And so finally I said, why don't we just talk?

2:28:02

And so I was talking to her and along the way she said to me, what other products do you guys make? And I said, well, the one you probably know is Botox. And she said, oh, I love my Botox. I get it every three or four months. And I didn't say it to her, but it dawned on me, She had no problem paying several $100 every quarter for her Botox, but was very upset about her $30 copay for Linzess.

2:28:24

You know, that probably happened a dozen or so times throughout the years. People were preconditioned that medicines should be free and aesthetics should be paid for. I think that line is blurring today.

2:28:37
Alex Kesin

Great, great anecdote from Brent there. It's really funny how compartmentalized spending is in people's mind, right? Anyway, clearly he had an eye for this stuff. But beyond that, I think Brent also has a really good intuition around the culture at Allergan, being so obsessive with interacting with physicians, right? He told us that he took Gavin Herbert's legacy eye care playbook and pushed it over to aesthetics. Here's what I had to say.

2:29:06
Speaker 4

Ophthalmology is a very close-knit community. The KOLs, the ophthalmologists and optometrists are very used to interacting with industry on some other therapeutic areas. I would say the thing I learned was how important that also was to the aesthetic community. And I think one of the things that I added to Allergan when I got there was bringing, they were doing it, but ophthalmology was where they were doing it better. And when I joined, we applied it equally to aesthetic medicine.

2:29:39

And even though I don't sell any products into that group, I still talk to the derms and plastics all the time. I give them all my cell phone number. I go out and ride with the field reps. I go to all the scientific meetings. I work the booth at the conventions. So I've always felt that that's important. And I think when you do that as a CEO, everyone else sees that that's what they should do too.

2:30:00
Matthew Pech

So during this period of the company, Allergan adds to its aesthetic bundle, which at this point was only Botox and some fillers and some implants. And it adds on body contouring. It adds on some fat dissolvers and it adds on skin resurfacing.

2:30:17
Alex Kesin

Yeah, there's just an incredible ability for Allergan to bundle and cross sell all of these products in this specific market because they made it, right? Like this doesn't exist in pharma without Allergan as far as we know. So we have the Anchor Botox that as a patient you're going into your doctor's office for say four times a year. It's like 15 to 30 minutes to get an injection. Really the perfect kind of Goldilocks zone for not super high labor costs, but also long enough to have this captive audience to upsell the other pillars of Allergan's aesthetic bundle to.

2:30:56
Matthew Pech

Yeah, and, you know, no other place in pharma where the doctor can act as a personal advertisement for all the products too, right?

2:31:06
Matthew Pech

That's true. As we know from Gene Carruthers, right? Yeah, and Allergan just does such a good job of making sure the provider is incentivized to cross-sell the whole portfolio of aesthetic products and give the customer a whole set of rewards to make sure they keep spending their money in the world of Allergan. And it's such a high pressure sales tactic, right?

2:31:28
Matthew Pech

It's like, hey, you got these rewards. If you don't use them, they expire.

2:31:33
Matthew Pech

And guess what? Your face now looks old again.

2:31:35
Alex Kesin

That's like the worst thing in the world. People really care about that. Indeed. Okay, so let's talk about the feel better part. What was in that pipeline, Matt?

2:31:45
Matthew Pech

Yeah, it's this whole smorgasbord of bets in Alzheimer's and migraine and depression. Probably the most notable neuro win in this period is really advancing cariprazine for bipolar depression. And then, of course, purchasing two oral CGRP antagonists from Merck. And, you know, that's a bet that ends up paying off insanely well for allergen.

2:32:12
Alex Kesin

Man, that's crazy. Shame on Merck, given their record otherwise, right?

2:32:18
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I think in retrospect, out licensing that wasn't a great idea, but they were a little distracted by a molecule called pembrolizumab at the time. So I don't feel too bad for them. Yeah, I wonder what that amounted to, huh?

2:32:31
Alex Kesin

Anyway, they end up with a really nice trifecta of drugs and migraine. They, of course, already had injectable Botox, which was approved for chronic migraine prevention. That's for people with more than 15 headaches a month. There's also the CGRPs, ubrograpant and atogapant. Those are these oral drugs that are approved for the much larger episodic migraine market. That's less than 15 headache days a month. And those can be dosed as both a preventative treatment as well as acute.

2:33:01
Matthew Pech

Man, there's actually a lot to talk about of this company in the neurospace. But I think for the sake of time, we really need to focus on Botox.

2:33:09
Alex Kesin

Yeah. So Matt, as you mentioned, the third hallmark of the Brent Sondas era is financial optimization. Let's talk about that a little bit.

2:33:17
Matthew Pech

You know, we had talked before about how tax optimization was a big recurring theme in this company's history since the 1980s. Under Brent Saunders, that strategy reaches its absolute apex.

2:33:30
Alex Kesin

Where do you want to draw the line, though? Should we rewind the clock a little bit?

2:33:33
Matthew Pech

Yeah, we can give a couple of vignettes here. Maybe we'll start in the narrow part of the business. As with all pharma companies, you know, Allergan had a focus on lifecycle management. And it's really about squeezing every last drop of value out of the assets that are already approved. The Brent Saunders version of that, I think a good example of that is what he did at Force Labs with an Alzheimer's drugs called Namenda, which was taken twice a day.

2:33:59

It was about to lose patent protection. So they made a new patented version, so-called Namenda XR, that only had to be taken once a day. So this is a very normal occurrence in the pharma industry. And normally a company just heavily starts to market the new drug to convince physicians to swap over. That campaign usually starts right near the end of the exclusivity period of the original drug. Saunders tries to execute the so-called hard switch, literally pulling the old drug off the market entirely so that patients were forced into taking the new drug before the generics could even launch.

2:34:34

Yep, that's right.

2:34:35
Alex Kesin

And he actually went on record on an earnings call saying something along those lines. Ultimately, a federal judge had to step in and block the whole thing as monopolization. But it was certainly a creative strategy.

2:34:49
Matthew Pech

Yeah, that's what makes Brent's leadership here so interesting, right? He built his whole career early on in compliance. So I guess if there's anyone who knows how to find the exact line between legal and illegal, it should be Brent Sanders.

2:35:03
Alex Kesin

Yes, and we're not making any commentary about the legality here, but we're just saying this is a useful skill set, right? If your entire corporate strategy is to operate on the efficient frontier, let's say, of the legal line, then you need someone who knows the compliance base. And clearly Saunders was very well acquainted through his prior roles in this kind of stuff.

2:35:25
Matthew Pech

Yep. And if you want to look at the ultimate example of Allergan trying to push that legal boundary to its absolute limit during this era, We just have to look at how they defended their cash cow in the dry eye business called Restasis. So this is a drug that they launched back in 2003, and they built the prescription dry eye market from absolutely nothing, right? They defined this business.

2:35:48
Alex Kesin

So Allergan, around that 2010s era, was trying to get a second wave of patents, exclusivity for re-stasis, doing things like formulation and novel dosing, really to push the window of generics from approaching around the 2020s instead of the 2010s.

2:36:06
Matthew Pech

So in 2017, this approach is not working so hot, but a Dallas patent lawyer named Michael Shore convinces Allergan to take a, let's call it novel, approach to defend the Restasis IP. The basic idea, pay a Native American tribe to act as a legal shield. In other words, to monetize their sovereign immunity. Yep, this guy clearly watches, Nathan, for you.

2:36:31
Alex Kesin

By September of that year, Michael Schor has lined up for Allergan, a willing conspirator in that scheme, the St. Regis Mohawk tribe. Allergan assigns them all six key Orange Book Restasis patents and pays them $13.5 million up front and a little over $15 million a year. Then Allergan invokes the tribe's sovereign immunity to try to completely dodge a patent review process called Interpartes Review. This is the process by which Allergan's generic competitors were trying to avoid its second wave of those restasis patents we were just talking about on the basis of their obviousness.

2:37:11

And I kid you not, Schor called it verbatim patent arbitrage to essentially exploit the value gap between a patent exposed to review and one that's immune to it.

2:37:23
Matthew Pech

Yeah, look, this trial was dealing with real poverty, so you can hardly blame them for taking the cash and participating in the scheme. The federal judge who handled the case, William Bryson, absolutely saw right through Allergan's maneuver, right? He invalidated the patents and he delivered a pretty famous takedown of this whole scheme. He said, quote, Sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable commodity that can be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal responsibilities.

2:37:51
Alex Kesin

Ouch. Yeah, the federal circuit ended up backing up this judge and the whole gamut failed completely. But when you zoom out, it also captures the ups and downs a little bit of the tenure of Brent Saunders as CEO. In fall of 2016, he's publishing a social contract, which ended up going viral online, pledging to do right by patients in it. And a year after that, there's this whole rent a Native American tribe's sovereign immunity thing, right?

2:38:27
Matthew Pech

Yeah, it's pretty ironic. And, you know, the most ironic part is like Allergan loses, but Restasis still doesn't end up having generic competitors till 2022.

2:38:37
Matthew Pech

too. It turns out to be actually quite reminiscent of the Botox situation. Are you serious? Yeah, it turns out it's not obvious how to make a exact generic copy of a complex nanoemulsion of cyclosporine, right? It's pretty hard to measure PKPD of a drug that's applied directly to the eye. And Allergan ends up using the FDA's citizen petition process to help raise the question to the FDA of whether these generics were truly bioequivalent to

2:39:14
Matthew Pech

ristasis. And when all of those questions ends up being resolved in 2022, Allergan has made another $4 billion of revenue on ristasis. Bravo. Yeah, definitely runs with Botox.

2:39:28
Alex Kesin

Also reminds me a little bit of Amgen's strategy prosecuting Regeneron Sanofi's PCSK9 antibody body, Teva with Capaxone. Like when you are a first entrant competitor in a new kind of drug and have a head start on the regulatory process, you're kind of locked in, right? They're going to lean on the side of caution and that in itself is a financial moat for

2:39:56
Matthew Pech

biosimilars, generics, etc. Yep, there's definitely some prize to pioneering a regulatory pathway. All right. So we talked about this hard switch strategy for the Alzheimer's drugs. We talked about parking your IP at some Native American tribe. That is all peanuts in financial optimization compared to the defining transaction of the Brent Saunders era of Allergan, a $160 billion merger with Pfizer. Wait, Pfizer is way bigger than Allergan. How did they pull that off? You are correct. It was a reverse merger.

2:40:34

The mechanics here are kind of hilarious. Giant American Pfizer would technically be, quote, acquired by the smaller Irish domiciled Allergan. And, you know, the whole point here was tax inversion. They were going to slap a shamrock on Pfizer's balance sheet, shift the tax home to Dublin and magically dodge about $1 billion a year in U.S. taxes. Walk into the mechanics a bit deeper. There were other advantages as well. Pfizer had all this cash offshore that had been accumulating.

2:41:06

Theoretically, if it brought it home, there would be this huge repatriation tax would have to pay. So the structure helped them avoid that. And then the second advantage would be when you're a multinational company like this, you can do these shenanigans where the Irish part of the company gives a huge loan to the American part. And then you can use the interest payments to reduce the theoretical profitability of the American subsidiary, which, you know, further lowers your tax bill.

2:41:32

So all sorts of fun financial optimization. And to be clear, many, many companies were doing this at the time.

2:41:40
Alex Kesin

I'll take your word for it, but the timing was really crazy here. If you remember, they tried to pull this off in the middle of the 2016 presidential election cycle. And it turns out that this kind of thing, like a corporate tax loophole, this egregious was literally the only thing that Bernie Sanders, Hillary and Donald Trump agreed on. And when you unite those three, you know that you've done something truly unfathomably unholy. Imagine Trump and Hillary agreeing on something.

2:42:14
Matthew Pech

Yeah, boggles the mind.

2:42:15
Alex Kesin

Hillary, you're right. We can't let them do this. We can't let Elergan do this. That's a pretty good Trump. I practice in the mirror. The political backlash was so intense, in fact, that this plan of a merger lasted literally shorter than it took to get to the election. On April 4th of 2016, the Treasury stepped in and issued a temporary regulation aimed pretty much squarely of what Allergan was doing. They gave it a bit of a thinly alluded name, serial inverters, but it clearly was about what was going on with this whole inversion at the time.

2:42:54
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I mean, they changed the law in a way that applied to exactly one company, which was Allergan and Pfizer. So petty. In the end, it ends up kind of being a blessing in the sense that a year later, Trump's in office and he gets the American corporate tax code rewritten, which means that the corporate tax rate drops a lot and the way that repatriation taxes work were overhauled. You know, no matter what you believe in the merits of that change, one thing is for certain, it removed all of the financial logic of merging together Pfizer and Allergan.

2:43:28
Alex Kesin

Exactly. So the Pfizer deal was pretty much dead in the water, all said and done. Granted, that means that as far as the operational and balance sheets things go, Saunders has space to pivot. And to his credit, the silver lining from the inversion is that his next move for Allergan is one of the greatest capital allocation decisions of the 2010s. Literally in the same year, 2016, in August, he takes Allergan's entire global generics business and punts it over to Teva for $40 billion.

2:44:03

The timing of that sale is exquisite. They basically

2:44:07
Matthew Pech

sold it to Teva right before the U.S. generic prices fell off of a cliff. Teva took on a huge amount of debt to buy that whole portfolio. They got absolutely obliterated in the years that followed. Definitely one of the best timed divestitures in pharma history. And, you know, it left Allergan flush with nearly $33 billion in cash just as that generics market collapsed.

2:44:31
Alex Kesin

Yeah. And to give Allergan the benefit of the doubt, this was like a mutually consensual decision, right? It was Teva that their management actually wanted to go through with this. Terrible decision on their part, but absolutely fantastic and really sharp M &A decision that Brent did at that time. Enough of these things happened during his tenure that I really don't think this was just

2:44:54
Matthew Pech

pure M &A luck, right? Yeah, I think he has enough of a track record to show his bona fides and timing. But speaking of luck or lack thereof, by 2019, the luck of the internal pipeline was starting to run out. There was a series of high-profiled pipeline failures and Actavis

2:45:13
Alex Kesin

investors were starting to circle. Not again. Yeah. So in March of 2019, the big bet on an antidepressant by Allergan called rapastinil. They put in $560 million of M &A money into this drug. It failed three phase three depression trials, like all within a week of each other. And to make things worse, this was a day after a competing drug from J &J got approved by the FDA. And the verdict from the street obviously was not kind at all for this.

2:45:50

This was supposed to be their big multi-billion blockbuster after restasis and Botox, etc. But besides that, there were a couple of other unlucky. What's the saying in baseball when you strike out? At bats, maybe? A couple unlucky at bats. They were quite unlucky at bats. Thank you, Matt. There was also Abyssopar, an eye drug, which was rejected by the FDA over inflammation concerns. There was Senecriveroc, a NASH drug that had failed a couple of times in various trials.

2:46:22

And then there was, as we mentioned way back, the Botox for Depression program. Right around this time, it ended up getting postponed and then licensed back to Dr. Finzi's company. But the real nail in the coffin was in July of 2019, coming back full circle here, the FDA puts out a worldwide recall on Allergan's BioCell textured breast implants. They end up getting linked to a rare lymphoma. It's crazy. Allergan acquired this franchise because it had cleared regulatory concerns from the FDA, I believe, in the early 2000s.

2:46:58

And here we are. It ends up being pulled off the market again.

2:47:02
Matthew Pech

And is now a liability of unknown size. As you can imagine, when you have this type of pipeline failures, investors stop giving you the benefit of the doubt. and they start looking at the company and ask, why exactly does it make sense to have look better and feel better exist in the same company? Yeah, that's a good point.

2:47:23
Alex Kesin

On one hand, when things are going well, you are thrilled that you have those diversified pipelines and franchises in the company. But on the other hand, you have something like this, unfortunately, happen just by pure chance, right? The neuro-focused traditional therapeutics company and then the cash pay aesthetics business, I can understand as an investor the confusion.

2:47:46
Matthew Pech

Yeah, and the only real reason I can think about why a single company should have those two things under the same corporate umbrella is initially Botox was useful for both wrinkles and migraines. And then in the shotgun wedding that was Actavis and allergan, there's a bunch of neuroassets to prosecute. I guess I'm grasping at straws here And the lack of comprehensibility here ultimately meant that Allergan stock traded at a pretty significant conglomeration discount. It's definitely this weird combination of the aesthetic business, which is high margin, cash pay, branded, that should probably trade at a pretty high price to earnings ratio.

2:48:26

And then you have this other bucket, which is like the specialty therapeutics. It has a lot of clinical risk. It's a, you know, a reimbursable market that should probably trade at a different price to earnings ratio. I would imagine that those are actually like different investor bases that want to invest in those two different things.

2:48:42
Alex Kesin

Yeah, I mean, looking back with the benefit of hindsight, I'm still a little bit miffed by it. You can see in the historical stock price performance of Allergan in that era, roughly a 30-ish percent decline in market cap over the Saunders era. That's once you start including dividends and buybacks and growth in Botox sales, just for context. But I think Brent probably can say clearest how the R &D pipeline of Allergan ended up affecting the company during this tenure.

2:49:16

Here's what he had to say.

2:49:18
Speaker 4

The pipeline, I think, did pretty well. Not everything worked, but the two oral CGRPs both worked and are great products today. Caripazine or Vralar is probably, I think, one of the top antipsychotics on the market today and doing incredibly well. And, you know, who knows over the last five years what else we would have done if we had given the chance. But I think most importantly, the team was fantastic. It was right up there with one of the best teams I ever worked with.

2:49:45

And so given five years of more runway, I think the sky's the limit in what we could have accomplished if we stayed independent.

2:49:51
Matthew Pech

Yeah. And for reference, if Saunders sort of made market cap go down 30% and doubled Botox sales, David Pyatt, who came right before him, 32X market cap and 25X Botox sales over his 17 years tenure. year. We asked Brent about his take on the era, including a social contract piece. And I think we were both pretty happy with his surprisingly candid reflection on the execution of the playbook.

2:50:22
Speaker 4

I think we did some things well and we made some mistakes. And with the benefit of hindsight, you'd love to go back and fix the mistakes. But look, I think we always had good intent to try to do the right thing, even if it sometimes didn't seem that way from the outside. I always deeply cared about affordability, access, and innovation. Those were three areas where I really tried to be more forward-leaning than perhaps some of my counterparts at the time.

2:50:49

But, you know, we weren't perfect. And I wish if I could go back and rewind the clock, I'd love to redo the unforced errors and focus more on the good we could have done.

2:50:58
Matthew Pech

Got to give him credit for owning up to what happened.

2:51:01
Alex Kesin

Yep. I respect Tim a lot for saying that. Ultimately, though, Saunders' Wall Street drug dealer persona manages to make a significant comeback in that year, 2019. He finds a lucrative safe harbor in the face of those pipeline setbacks and pushes away the Actavis shareholders. What happens, Matt?

2:51:23
Matthew Pech

In June of 2019, AbbVie agrees to buy Allergan for $63 billion, representing a 45 % premium over where the stock was trading before. Yep, I guess there was a conglomeration discount, huh? It looks that way.

2:51:40
Alex Kesin

Okay, so why did AbbVie do this? Well, their motivation was their patent cliff. They had a drug, very famously Humira, best-selling drug in the world. Right around this time, it was starting to face biosimilar competition. And much like we've seen in previous episodes, first BMS with Amelin, then sharing Plow with Merck, Abvi needed a cash flowing business to fill their patent cliff. So they closed the deal in May of 2020 by the Irish scheme of arrangement, of course.

2:52:15

And they timed this all during the pandemic. So just keep that in mind as I continue to explain. Gap consideration came to about $64 billion. And Brent took roughly a $40 million change in control payment, declined to take a seeded AbbVie on their board, moved on to, of all things, Bausch & Lomb, exactly where he was with Fred Hassan a decade earlier.

2:52:40
Matthew Pech

Yep. Brent sort of times that sale of Allergan pretty perfectly right before COVID ends up impairing their aesthetic business, albeit for just a year or two.

2:52:52
Alex Kesin

That's right. And from there, we kind of wrap up the independent life of Allergan. 72 years after a guy mixes eye drops on a balcony above a Los Angeles pharmacy, this company is no more.

2:53:07
Matthew Pech

But its primary cash engine, the Botox franchise itself, did not slow down. Not even for a second. Not one.

2:53:32
Matthew Pech

all right after that super fun corporate drama interlude let's get back to botox i think we've gone through this episode pretending like Botox had a monopoly on the therapeutic and cosmetic neurotoxin market. And to be clear, Allergan and Botox had this large head start and they had all these interesting competitive moats, but definitely nothing lasts forever in the pharma industry. I think the first thing that happened was really that the competitors arrived. In the cosmetic market, the first American rivals were Dysport and Xeomin, got approved seven years after Botox.

2:54:11

As we record this in 2026, there are now six approved neurotoxins, with Juveau, Daxify, and Latibo having joined in the last six years. While Botox Cosmetic continues to be the market leader, rival products have started to fragment the market. Botox still holds around 60 % market share defended the way Allergan has always defended things, an injector loyalty ecosystem, a strong brand, and a steady drip of new indications.

2:54:38
Alex Kesin

An important point on new indications, by the way, since we have already mentioned the moat that has come from Allergan's aesthetic bundle, each cosmetic facial indication that Botox got approved for was a separate approval process, a sensibly a new point of monopoly for Botox. At this point, Botox is approved for frown lines, crow's feet, forehead lines, platysmal bands. And as we record this in August 2026, literally just last week, AbbVie got an approval for its fifth aesthetic indication, masseter muscle prominence.

2:55:15

Brent gave us the reason why these matter so much for market share.

2:55:19
Speaker 4

The name Botox, that's an eponym for the procedure, is something that has continued to be invested in. And, you know, it has, I think, probably the highest unaided awareness of any drug in the world. I think the second thing that Allergan has done in terms of indications. So Botox is the only one that has multiple indications on the face. Almost everybody else does the Gabella region and that's it. And then they draft off of Botox. But from a training perspective, you can only train what's on label.

2:55:49

And so Botox having multiple indications, that allows you to go out and do really important and critical training of injectors and professionals and doctors and keep that brand vibrant and alive and fresh and innovative.

2:56:03
Matthew Pech

Yep. So Botox has approvals for five different facial injection sites, whereas its competitors are all still technically only approved for frown lines.

2:56:12
Alex Kesin

Somehow, I bet the injectors don't often respect that rule. I'll say this much though, Matt. For therapeutics, the picture is a lot clearer. One of the crazy nuggets of the first couple of approvals for Botox, the fact that the FDA never granted a biosimilar pathway. So literally to date, every time a competitor for a therapeutic indication has gotten approved, like blepharospasm, for example, it's had to develop its own drug from scratch and run it through the whole gamut of a BLA.

2:56:44

No abbreviated BLA process. Yep. And actually, if you go on the FDA's website today and look at the label for Botox, you'll notice that all of the type A neurotoxins have these distinct nonproprietary names. So I'll give you a couple of examples just to kind of get an intuition for this. Botox is Ona botulinum toxinae, ONA. Dysport is Abobotulinum toxinae, ABO. And what this basically means is that when a physician prescribes you one of those neurotoxins, you legally cannot substitute one for the other,

2:57:22
Matthew Pech

which is crazy. Yeah, it's crazy. I mean, the analogy here would be if your physician prescribed you Lipitor and then your pharmacist or health insurance was literally not allowed to swap in, you know, Teva's generic atorvastatin. So they really kind of completely locked in their market share because of this. Agreed. But okay, since the audience is probably wondering though, how did this happen for Botox? Yeah, I think it's a complex situation and I think it's partly from some of the moves Allergan made and then partly from regulatory bodies.

2:57:58

So one piece of the story here you got to remember is that for a long time, the only way to validate the potency of a batch of Botox was that old school mouse lethality test, right? Seeing what dose killed 50 % of mice that received a specific amount of toxin. Botox is undoubtedly a very complex drug. We've talked about this, right? It's a biologic purified from the fermentation of one very specific strain. It's this complex mix of core and accessory proteins that then gets activated by the host strain and then it's formulated with stabilizers in a very specific way.

2:58:33

So you can definitely imagine that small changes in the size of that complex or its potency can be the real difference between an injection of neurotoxin getting rid of some wrinkles and an injection making your eyelid droop all over the place. The way that Allergan turns that raw toxin into a safe, consistent drug product is a really big trade secret that they keep, and they fought tremendously hard with the International Trade Commission to keep that process under wraps.

2:59:02

So essentially, Sure, you can know exactly what Botox is, but still struggle tremendously to manufacture it in a way that proves to the regulatory bodies you've made something identical to Botox. That all makes sense.

2:59:17
Alex Kesin

And it kind of rings true for why biosimilars exist distinctly as a pathway as opposed to just being generics. Botox is a biologic, but only anomaly. It's not really not like the others. But that wasn't the only thing Allergan did to protect Botox, right? So I remember reading that in 2011, they spent like $60 million to get a new assay for the FDA. I think to replace that mass killing assay you were talking about, Matt. And sure, you can argue that was good for the mice and Casey Affleck and PETA.

2:59:57

But from a business perspective, I mean, it's kind of clear that was a smart move from them, right? It gave Allergan a proprietary way to measure potency and nobody else really has this assay anyway.

3:00:11
Matthew Pech

Right. It's crazy, right? If you look at a bottle of Botox these days, it literally says 100 Allergan units of toxin right there. They've got their name in the units. Those are freedom units, Matt.

3:00:27
Alex Kesin

Yeah, so I would say that the take home is basically each neurotoxin has its own non-proprietary name and its own potency units. And all of that kind of puts them into their own neighborhood of therapeutic neurotoxin space, which is why Botox is still making so much money today, right?

3:00:48
Matthew Pech

Yep, it's definitely part of the answer. Ultimately, Botox dominance is really being tested on two fronts, pricing and duration. The price pressure comes from the Korean competitors, Juvo, Evolus' New Tox, and Hugel's LeTibo. The duration pressure comes from Revent's Daxify, approved in 2022. It uses a peptide stabilizer that makes the toxin last roughly six months instead of three to four. Longer duration is a genuine threat because it means fewer purchase occasions, the exact opposite of the repeat visit economics that has made Botox and the Allergan Bundle a machine.

3:01:24
Alex Kesin

The experience of Amy Engel, nurse practitioner and owner of Sweet Spot Med Spa in Florida, highlights really nicely how the dynamics around cosmetic neurotoxin usage has shifted over time. As told in the Business of Aesthetics podcast, which we'll link below, Amy's Med Spa was at 1.1 of the top 15 Botox injectors in the country by volume. But now she's shifted from primarily using Botox to primarily using Juvo. Evolus, the company that sells Juvo in recent years, has assembled its own stack of aesthetic products to rival the Allergan-Abvi bundle.

3:02:04

Now they have 10 % of the American cosmetic neurotoxin market. Amy talked about how Evolus was weaning her patients off of Botox. The first lever she mentions was the undeniable proof of her face.

3:02:18
Speaker 4

When I walk into a room and a client asks me, so what's the best one? We carry five of the six on the market. And I'll say, well, there is no best one, but there is a best one for you. And then I'll say, but if you want to know, I'm wearing Jevo.

3:02:34
Alex Kesin

The second lever was price.

3:02:36
Speaker 4

So my Botox, I'll just spill the beans. My Botox is $14. My Juveau is $12 a unit. And I usually do not have specials on Botox, but I do have specials on my other products. As we got into using the product more and I felt more comfortable with it, I started converting my patients from Botox to Juveau. I made the price point a little bit lower. However, the bottom line was better. And so it just kind of exploded from there.

3:03:04

People just really started loving the product and loving the reward. So that's how I kind of transitioned my patients from Botox to DuVo.

3:03:14
Alex Kesin

And as she sold more DuVo, Evolas helped her with third lever, more marketing.

3:03:19
Speaker 4

For instance, right now we have a billboard on one of the main roads here in town and it has our name on it. It has my picture on it. And I already have people coming up to me and saying, hey, I saw you on the billboard. They've given me lots of other marketing materials and they've made a commercial for our business because we use the product.

3:03:39
Speaker 5

And because of that, that was really motivating for me to use the product more, right? Because Allergan doesn't do that.

3:03:46
Alex Kesin

Yeah. So you can see Amy respond to the economic incentives that are playing out here. Because Evolas is paying her to sell their product with a bigger customer rebate, higher margins, subsidized advertising, the works, it's tempting for a lot of med spas to switch to a product due to those advantages. What's funny is having multiple different neurotoxins to offer ends up being a really useful way to increase lifetime value of the customer. Both to help on one hand with customer acquisition, to unlock that first injection of neurotoxin when the customer is really only familiar at first with the Botox brand.

3:04:26

But then for longtime Botox customers who may feel like the product has stopped working and they want to try something else.

3:04:35
Matthew Pech

Yeah, it's interesting here to think about how having more competitors instead of being a zero-sum game really essentially makes the pie bigger for everyone. There's a bunch of other sort of macro factors at play that are helpful to the market as well. You know, America and the rest of the Western world is getting older. Customers are starting to use Botox at an earlier and earlier phase. and then there's a new tail one that sort of no one could have predicted.

3:05:05

The GLP-1 weight loss revolution with drugs like Ozempic start to strip fat from people's face. It gives that sort of gaunt, hollowed look that the press calls Ozempic face. Allergan Aesthetics has really read about that shift early and is heavily marketing its fillers to sort of make up for the volume that those drugs create and was the first to win an approval for Juvederm for a temple filler. So yeah, we'll continue to see how this aesthetic juggernaut evolves over the decades.

3:05:40
Alex Kesin

Okie dokie. Before we get to the scoreboard, which we do at the end of our episodes, it's a good place to talk about how interesting of a moment we are in time with respect to how pharma is becoming more interested in direct-to-consumer. On one hand, you have this increasing headwind of the efficiency of drug R &D precipitously declining over the last while, so-called Elrheim's Law. On the other hand, as we've seen with Allergan, there is this repeatable playbook that Botox gives us that you can have one of the best-selling direct-to-consumer drugs.

3:06:15
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I think what you're asking is essentially, is there a playbook from Botox that can be rinsed and recycled in this industry? And I think there's a lot of people who will listen to the early part of this episode and think, wow, drug discovery used to be bizarre, used to be loosely regulated. and look at what sort of medical innovation was possible in the good old days of bootstrapped physicians. You know, drug discovery has gotten so bloated and inefficient and inexpensive since then.

3:06:47

I can sort of see where they're coming from, but I think you can just look at something like CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing to see how special Botox was and how many different stars had to align for cheap physician-led swashbuckling drug discovery to actually work versus not work or, you know, at worst, kill people. So, you know, CRISPR-Cas9, like Botox, was this drug substance that was more or less the perfect drug right out of bacteria, right?

3:07:18

It needed to be tweaked a little bit to edit human DNA, but not very much. And also like Botox, it could be pointed to the pathobiology of many different diseases, right? Anytime there's a DNA mutation, theoretically, it could help. The industry went really fast from discovering the CRISPR-Cas9 systems to an approved product. It was a potent substance. It targeted critical node and pathobiology of many different diseases. And academic researchers like Jen Doudna pushed really hard to have straight from academia scientists lead the charge to bring those drugs to patients.

3:07:56

But that was definitely not enough to get a $4 million BLA, right? Botox, most importantly, had this system pre-built by Mother Nature to deliver the complex into neurons. And it definitely also helped that the drug substance was essentially made for free by the U.S. government. In contrast, CRISPR-Cas9 has just struggled tremendously with how to deliver it into cells and how to deliver it into tissues. And then Botox fundamentally has better pharmacoeconomics, right? It gets re-injected every quarter, whereas CRISPR can't really re-dose it.

3:08:28

And then I think most importantly, Botox has been pointed to diseases where there is no alternative treatment option, whereas CRISPR-Cas9 has really struggled against alternative therapeutic options as well as competition from, you know, a whole bunch of different gene editing technologies that are out there.

3:08:45
Alex Kesin

Yeah, I see what you mean. On one hand, it's not hard to see how two exotic modalities are a $4 million BLA on one end to $1 billion to get another approved. I can't help but appreciate that the CMC that goes into gene therapy is really complicated and expensive. That especially since the 90s, the IRBs are really strict with gene therapy. The safety, unlike Botox, is you're dealing with the entire body, right? You have almost the opposite problem of Botox in that it's not localized at all.

3:09:24

So yeah, I mean, it's an interesting comparison with some caveats, of course.

3:09:29
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I think if the only thing you changed to Botox out of the story was to make it marginally less safe, I think this whole story falls apart, right? There's just no world where the FDA allows you to inject this into someone's face to look better. Just a small number of adverse events would be the difference there. You know, going back to that $4 million BLA thing and how come we can't do that anymore, I think one lesson here is if you focus on clinical situations with massive, obvious, and rapid effect sizes, it just solves so many different issues at once.

3:10:08

from how big your clinical trial needs to be to getting physicians on board to commercializing the thing. You know, we talked so little about anything related to clinical trials in this episode because like it just fundamentally wasn't a big deal for Botox, right? And you put all those things together and like essentially my take-home is if mother nature gives you the perfect drug and the US government manufactures it for you and you very slowly execute the clinical development using physicians that are like so eager to be involved that they pay you, and then the effects are obvious to the naked eye, and you take an inordinate amount of CMC risk, then yes, drug discovery can be super cheap when

3:10:53

you put all those things together. Well said.

3:10:57
Alex Kesin

It's like you can have two of three, right?

3:11:01
Matthew Pech

Do you know the triangle? Yeah. Yeah. Most drugs will only have one of three, let alone, you know, three of three. Exactly.

3:11:10
Alex Kesin

Gavin Herbert actually beat us to that exact conclusion that you just drew. When we asked him if there was any reproducible playbook here for modern drug hunters trying to build the durable franchise, he pretty much told us flat out no.

3:11:25
Speaker 5

Well, I don't think you could duplicate. I think that there was a bit of serendipity involved in that enabled us to achieve that. Because it was a biological, there were different rules that made it more difficult for competition. We've had more five competitors for 15 or 20 years, and yet they've been able to maintain a 65 % market share, which is quite remarkable.

3:11:52
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I appreciate that he just said it was mostly luck and some things related to regulators not really figuring out how to let a biosimilar come to market.

3:12:04
Alex Kesin

Yeah, 93 years of wisdom there. The other playbook from Botox that is probably more applicable today is whether you can create a more durable franchise from FDA-approved drugs by selling them direct to a consumer. So what we have in mind is basically, of course, the GLP-1s, Rosempic, Manjaro, where they can be turned into a long-term viable brand for Novo and Lily. Of course, we couldn't help ourselves but ask Brent Saunders what his prediction was for their business outlook.

3:12:34

And here's what he had to say.

3:12:35
Speaker 4

I really had a vision of look better, feel better, right? That's really important to an individual's self-confidence and outlook and attitude. And so I think if I had a GLP-1, you know, there's a market that's purely therapeutic for diabetics or pre-diabetics or people with coronary heart disease or high comorbidities. But there's another component of helping people look better to feel better. Part of that is attitude and mental health, but part of that is also, you know, if you lost 15 pounds, maybe you would exercise more.

3:13:11

Maybe you'd go to the gym more, and maybe that would improve your cardiovascular system, your muscle mass, your mental health. And so I think it's all interrelated in some ways, and I think the GLP-1s, when used appropriately, can play an important role in that as well.

3:13:25
Matthew Pech

He tied that trend directly back to how the market is splitting today, using longevity and weight loss as a perfect examples of the cash pay model that Allergan pioneered.

3:13:34
Speaker 4

Proving longevity as a reimbursable FDA endpoint, those are very long studies.! I think if you look at the GLP-1 market, you're really seeing it bifurcate right into a reimbursed and cash pay market pretty nicely. You know, Botox probably started as one of the first big drugs that was cash pay.

3:13:52
Matthew Pech

Yeah, great point. And I do think pharma right now is seeing the success of incretins and relearning one of the key lessons of Botox, which is it's just such a huge tailwind to sell products into therapeutic areas that actually have massive latent consumer demand for conditions that they would gladly pay for out of pocket. it, right? Rather than having to spend a fortune on marketing and educating patients that a disease even exists, let alone that they should treat it.

3:14:22

Weight loss, like wrinkles, is something that's obvious and consumers have been trained for decades. That is a condition worth treating and that that's a condition that they should spend their own money to combat. Again, going back to whether there's like a repeatable playbook here for Botox, one big difference between Botox and the Azempic and Muncharas of the world is that Botox really was right off the bat the absolute perfect drug embodiment. Like there's been newer drugs added to the market.

3:14:51

None of them are truly better. They're mostly just different. So with Botox, you had the best in class drug from day one. So you really could go all in on creating a brand at the drug level. And, you know, obviously it was very helpful that every time you paralyzed a new muscle in the face, you got a new FDA

3:15:11
Alex Kesin

approval. Yeah, yeah. I think in contrast, everyone right now can see that the current wave of injectable GLP-1s can and will be improved upon. I mean, this was what our entire first episode was about, right? Things like more convenient routes of administration, less nausea, less complicated dosing schedules, etc, etc. Potentially, the only places that these earlier waves of ingredients could end up being durable in are therapeutic indications that require inordinately huge trials to run, like cardiovascular disease or Alzheimer's, for example.

3:15:50
Matthew Pech

Yeah, exactly. I think what Lilian Novo can do right now is create a really strong brand around the companies themselves being the trusted source for weight loss, regardless of what the current best sort of drug embodiment is. And then two, it sounds like creating a really strong consumer loyalty program, you know, the same way Allergan did with Brilliant Distinctions, can be quite useful to keep people sort of loyal to a specific ecosystem of weight management

3:16:20
Alex Kesin

products. I'm wearing Gozempic. Yeah, it makes me wonder whether Lily and Nova will end up trying to create their own analogous version of an aesthetic bundle built up by these weight loss drugs, or I guess analogously AbbVie trying to do the same thing by building up their own GLP-1 pipeline. I'll add, we're starting to see a little bit of this, right, with the orals where Lily has their own version and Govo has their own oral version of the peptide, each with their own

3:16:53
Matthew Pech

benefits and downsides? Yeah, I think potentially what you're saying is that like all these pharmas are going to create their own bundle direct-to-consumer stacks that may vary a little bit in what is actually in them. So you can imagine the male-gendered stack, which includes like muscle growth and Botox and hair loss and ED. And then you can imagine, you know, the neuro optimization stack on sleep and anxiety and wakefulness. I think when we talked to Brent, he's seen this behavioral shift that, of course, started with the aesthetic neurotoxin and, you know, potentially is going to become a permanent feature of the broader pharmaceutical

3:17:37
Speaker 4

industry. Quote, you know, today I see it in a lot of my other businesses. There is a higher propensity for a patient to be willing to pay for a medicine than there ever has been in the past.

3:17:50
Alex Kesin

Whichever the case, it's going to be a really fun space to watch over the next few years with all of the emerging competition as we're seeing right now in the Incredent space. With Lily purchasing Sentessa earlier this year, buying a Rexin franchise with psychedelics and depression, etc.

3:18:10
Matthew Pech

Yeah, a lot of interesting science is going on here. Maybe a final thing before we get to grading Allergan. I think some people will make a conclusion from this episode that lots of good things happen when you let physicians just experiment with drugs on their own. And if you just get drugs to physicians, they'll eventually find good uses for them. I think we actually saw a version of this come to the head with sort of the recent FDA advisory committee meetings on trying to get these unregulated, mostly untested peptides into the purview of the FDA.

3:18:44

I kind of see it as a perfect modern contrast to the botox story. Interesting.

3:18:49
Alex Kesin

Are you saying that just because of the scale of these NF1s or is it something else? What do you have in mind?

3:18:56
Matthew Pech

Yeah, I mean, I think in some ways these folks are trying to frame what they're doing like as if it were the early days of Botox, meaning physicians playing around with random drugs off-label, seeing an effect that they believe is real and then hoping to force the FDA to approve it through sort of a non-traditional path. But again, like the similarities really end there because with the peptides that we're talking about today, these are pretty much random peptides that work through unknown pathways and that have almost no PK or PD data.

3:19:31

It's just a real complete shot in the dark. And the efficacy data is just really, really weak.

3:19:37
Alex Kesin

Yeah, I can see that. On the other hand, with Botox, I think it's important to add here that even though the PKPD isn't clear and you are injecting a literal known toxin, Scott, right from the get-go, knew what the mechanism of action was. That is super important for determining the safety of the drug.

3:19:56
Matthew Pech

Yeah, they knew exactly what it did, even if they couldn't measure PK. They knew it was localized. And they also were targeting diseases where the clinical effect was like super fast and immediate right it's like an eye is twitching and you inject something has it stopped twitching right it's pretty binary so Botox really was the perfect scenario for sort of YOLO physician experimentation to actually be productive again you need all the stars to align for for that to be the case

3:20:28
Alex Kesin

100 % all right after that fun digression into predicting the future let's do some playbook and analysis. Like all approved episodes, we're going to score Allergan and Botox across three dimensions, patient impact, financial impact, and academic impact. Maybe let's start with academic impact this time. What did you give it, Matt?

3:20:51
Matthew Pech

Yeah, this one was tough. I gave it a B. How to do academic rating for this episode is really hard given how unusual of a drug development story this is, right? An academic ophthalmologist did almost all of the lifting from clinical hypothesis through manufacturing and approval, right? He even paid for it himself, right? This is like the holy grail of academic impact, you know, pushing something all the way forward to an approved drug yourself. In a literal sense, yes.

3:21:27

Yeah. Yeah, and then it gets even more tough when you think about how indication expansion worked for Botox, because, again, this was really physician-scientist-led experimentation that pushed the drug into a bunch of new spaces with allergan clever enough to listen to the physicians and turn those field observations into an FDA label. But the final piece on academic impact, instead of talking here, I think Eric Finzi really explained it best.

3:21:57
Speaker 5

So here's the take-home message. If you have a disease and the muscle is part of the circuit of that disease and you interrupt that muscular circuit, you have a treatment for a disease. So, in my case, it's become clear that inhibiting muscular contraction around the head has a kind of profound effect, right? Overactive bladders, well, you get a needle into that muscle. What about a sweat glance? Well, it turns out you can inject these little tiny muscles around the sweat glance, it can't work anymore.

3:22:34

So, you don't sweat. It's all about where is the muscle. And in terms of psychiatry, what I figured out is that there is a muscle involved in the generation of anger, fear, and sadness. And what easier way we treat that than with Bonte? It stays right there in the muscle, and that's why you don't get side effects.

3:22:56
Matthew Pech

I mean, he said it so well, right? Botox was the pharmacologic tool that proved muscles play an important role in many different pathobiological circuits. and that included obvious things like a twitching muscle, but it also included really inobvious things like migraines and potentially depression. This is all really novel and Botox was 100 % necessary to unlock that biology. Yeah, and it's just crazy. You know, nature handed humans like the world's most perfect muscle relaxer and then we just went to town finding all the uses for it.

3:23:32

How do you rate it, Alex?

3:23:33
Alex Kesin

I think I'm going to be a little more strict. worked. See? Don't get me wrong. A nifty clinical story about how many indications it was able to get into. But unlike, let's say, in our previous episodes, Amlin did for Incredins, Geron did for HESCs and telomerase biology, and Keytruda did for immune checkpoints, Botox has been unusually self-limited. And maybe it goes back to that point of how easy the drug substance was to turn into a drug right away.

3:24:09

You didn't need to modify the chemistry much at all. I guess up until recently,

3:24:14
Matthew Pech

right, with Daxify. Yeah, exactly. That's a good point. This wasn't like a RAS-like story of 30 years of hitting your head against the wall trying to correctly drug a target that you know is good. Exactly. All right. On to financial impact. What do you think? It's obvious. It's A plus. Yeah. I mean, if this isn't an A plus, I don't know what is, you know, both on the money in and the money outside, right? 4 million bucks to get a BLA is amazing.

3:24:45

And Allergan positioned themselves perfectly so that they and they alone could buy the drug for next to nothing. And then they also had this incredible ability to leverage the ideas and investments and brand names and literal strains from other people to turn this into a juggernaut with a million different approved indications over time. Now that I think of it, Botox Cosmetic is probably the best lifecycle management of a drug ever, right? It was approved in 1989.

3:25:17

It's still doing billions in sales almost 40 years after that approval. Maybe a fair comparator here is Pfizer's Viagra, you know, the erectile dysfunction drug, right? Viagra is also a proprietary eponym like Botox, meaning, you know, it defines the whole product category. but you know it only has 40% of the sadafinil market eight years after losing market exclusivity whereas you know botox still has 60% share of the cosmetic market

3:25:48
Alex Kesin

decades later insane yeah when you put it like that you could literally have a baby born when botox is first approved being of age ready to get botox now today yeah well said yeah the only thing that comes kind of close to this in mind is maybe amgen's embryo would you agree it's like for this one they had to do a lot of interesting maneuvers to protect the american patent exclusivity

3:26:19
Matthew Pech

for it yeah fair and they definitely like ramp to revenue way faster than botox yeah yeah anyways

3:26:27
Alex Kesin

back to the financials of allergan it was really amazing how they were able to use this drug to anchor a whole basket of aesthetic products to clients. And look, I mean, there's these shenanigans around tax optimization over the years. They were sometimes kosher, sometimes not, but for dramatic effect, I think they help improve the score here, right? They were always entertaining. And the reason they did it is because they were making so much money, right? Like, as you mentioned at the way beginning of this episode, the margins for Allergan were so strong.

3:27:02

It was one of the only levers left to pull. Perhaps the only person that didn't get the A-plus side of the financials here are Alan Scott, Ed Shantz, and Eric Johnson. These people put in their own sweat equity. In one case, one of them literally mortgaging their own house to bring oculinum into fruition. And yet all of them got pennies on the dollar for how much Botox ended up ultimately grossing. I think Alan got single-digit millions, Ed got just shy of a

3:27:37
Matthew Pech

million, and Eric got nothing. If a venture firm took out a $400 ,000 loan to make an investment and was only paid back $7.5 million and that was considered a win, the whole category of venture

3:27:53
Alex Kesin

would collapse, right? All right. What about clinical impact? For me, I'd put it at B. So some of Botox's original approved indications have seen newer therapies take their place. I don't even think strabismus is treated with botulinum toxin anymore. On the other hand, I think the anecdotal patient stories that we've heard in this episode are really, really hard to dismiss. It opened up a huge cosmetics market also. I hesitate to call that patient impact, but maybe in a way it's also helped people become more conscious of their health or be less squeamish with the idea that you can take a drug like Botox while still being healthy.

3:28:36

It'll maybe be this Lilinovo generation that really reaps the rewards of getting both patient impact and also some of that aesthetic appeal, right, for what these lifestyle drugs

3:28:48
Matthew Pech

are giving in benefit to patients. Yeah, that's a really good point around Botox normalizing the concept of taking a drug while you're still healthy versus waiting to be unhealthy to take a drug. For me, the clinical patient impact of Botox is, maybe this is a semantic difference, But I guess I see removing wrinkles as patient impact. It's clearly something that people want, right? This was not a drug that was shoved down the throats of the consumer.

3:29:17

Like there was insane latent consumer demand. People were using this before they were legally allowed to. And millions of people use the drug now. And in the multi-billion dollar world of facial skin treatments, Like this is one of the few things that actually does exactly what it says it's going to do. Right. It's like it's this oasis of efficacy in a world of marketing puffery, essentially. So, you know, I would be like almost more upset if my wife spent $600 on creams versus like just getting a Botox injection.

3:29:50

Right. And then it's not just wrinkles. Right. Like half of the market is therapeutic and, you know, it is approved in a dozen other real indications that have real unmet medical need. I think most prominently migraine. And, you know, I can't think of another drug that has been this useful across so many disparate indications. That's true. Yeah. Clinical development was life on easy mode, as we mentioned, right? Yeah. All these effect sizes in most of the indications, not all, but most were pretty big.

3:30:22
Alex Kesin

I'll add one caveat there, and it's the fact that when we spoke with Gavin, he told us that after the MacGyvering era of oculinum was over with that first $4 million indication, it was a huge schlep to convince the FDA to have that same level of laxity for things like cervical dystonia and hyperhidrosis, etc. So clinical development was on easy mode for the era that FDA was kind of in La La Land. But after, let's say 1990, it ended up being like most any other drug company.

3:31:01

Yeah.

3:31:01
Matthew Pech

Maybe another reason that I gave this clinical impact an A is I think the sort of open the FDA to the concept of an aesthetic approval. You know, I think that that is a pretty momentous thing that they accomplished. I think people can argue whether that's good or bad, but that's definitely big clinical impact.

3:31:21
Alex Kesin

That's true. Allergan made history with Botox, that's for sure.

3:31:25
Matthew Pech

All right. To end this episode, I think we've come up with two drugs and three people that are natural bookends to this story.

3:31:33
Alex Kesin

Yeah, let's kick this off. So starting with the drugs, Trenobot-E and AGN151607. These are Allergan slash AbbVie Now's effort to expand the neurotoxin franchise. Trenobot-E is a type E toxin designed to start working faster and wear off faster than Botox. Perfect for a customer who's hesitant of a toxin and who needs a frown line touch up the day before a big event. As we record this, AbbVie is working to get the BLA across the finish line.

3:32:03
Matthew Pech

Then there's AGN-151607, a next-generation type A toxin, advancing in clinical trials for more surgical therapeutic applications, like ventral hernia repair. Two drugs designed to keep the decades of cash and indication expansion moving forward. AbbVie recently broke ground on a Botox research building, a clear physical indication that it sees the juggernaut of neurotoxins to keep chugging along.

3:32:29
Alex Kesin

Then there's the people, Alan Scott and Gavin Herbert Jr. year. We last left Alan Scott back in 1991, selling oculinum to Allergan for a pittance so that he could get back to what he enjoyed doing, the clinic. By any reasonable accounting, he had every right to be bitter about the oculinum payout. He'd taken the most lethal toxin on earth from monkeys all the way to FDA approval, mortgaging his house in the process to do it, and then selling it for a few $1 million to a company that turned it into a multi-billion dollar a year franchise.

3:32:59

Eugene Helvison, who wrote the definitive account in Death to Beauty, found that the most striking thing about Scott was that he was a man with so much cause for resentment and yet simply had none. His own summary was the following, I am not sure if we had all the fun and Allergan got all the money, but it was something like that. Alan went back to the clinic and the lab at the Smith-Kettlewell Institute in San Francisco.

3:33:21

He founded the Strabismus Research Foundation in 2013. He kept publishing into his late 80s, his last paper at 87 years old, on an implanted electrode to lift the eyelids of buffer spasm patients. His final research was on the opposite of Botox, injecting bupivacaine to strengthen weak eye muscles, chasing the Strabismus problem the toxin could never quite solve. Alan Scott passed away on December 16, 2021, at 89 years of age. Botox did roughly $3.6 billion in revenue that year for AbbVie.

3:33:56
Matthew Pech

The other personal bookend to a story that began in 1948 is Gavin Herbert Jr., the founder's son, Allergan's first salesman out of the back of his car and CEO from 1961 to 1991. Gavin is now in his mid-90s, still working and still spry. He chairs Rogers Gardens, a garden store his father started, among other ventures, including a groundwater remediation company. When asked about the enduring magic of the franchise, Gavin gave us the ultimate retrospective on what makes the asset so singular.

3:34:50
Speaker 5

about 60 % of the business. I've always thought the cosmetic oil interest in could be a little bit of a fad, but treating some of the serious medical conditions like post-stroke paralysis or migraine headaches, I mean, those are not fads. They don't go away.

3:35:08
Alex Kesin

But the story of what this toxin actually gave back doesn't stop with the balance sheet or the wrinkles. Eric Johnson, the guy who spent decades brewing it in Madison, revealed the detail that blows all of that away. Because back in the 1980s, Eric was accidentally immunized against the toxin. His arm, he told us, stood out for years.

3:35:31
Matthew Pech

And because of that exposure, his blood was collected for antibodies, antibodies that went straight into Baby Big, the botulism immune globulin that the California Department of Public Health ships worldwide to save infants suffering from infant botulism. Eric held up a vial of it on our Zoom call and said, quote, so this drug didn't more than help people with disorders.

3:35:55
Alex Kesin

It's saving babies' lives, too. Mic drop. From a German sausage poison to a Cold War bioweapon down to an eye doctor's mortgage and a baby's hospital bed, that is Botox for you.

3:36:08
Matthew Pech

That's our show today. For Approved, I'm Matthew Pech.

3:36:11
Alex Kesin

And I'm Alex Kesin. We'll see you next time. See you next time. Thank you.