Anat Admati said the 1987 Black Monday crash involved program trading and portfolio insurance strategies.
“Yeah, so it was program trading and insurance, portfolio insurance and all these replication strategies and all this stuff.”

5 Aug 2022 · 1h 27m · Anat Admati, Barry Ritholtz · 24 quoted facts
Anat Admati argues that banks are dangerously fragile because they run on too much debt and too little equity, and that this is a policy choice rather than a necessity. Tax breaks on debt, deposit insurance and implicit government backing let banks borrow cheaply and push losses onto the public. She says the fix is simple: make banks fund themselves with more of their own money.
The conversation moves from banking to technology and corporate power. Admati sees a common pattern: sectors that are closely tied to government, such as banks, tech platforms and drug makers, can shape the rules and avoid accountability. The tension she keeps returning to is that profitable, apparently stable institutions can still be inefficient and unsafe, and the people who benefit rarely have a reason to change the system.
Admati stresses that 'capital' describes how a bank pays for its assets, meaning how much comes from owners versus borrowed money. It is not cash set aside, so a bank can hold lots of cash and still be thinly funded by its owners.
A veteran banker told Admati the business model of a small bank is 'subsidized deposit insurance'. Cheap, government-backed funding is the privilege, while the lending itself is something anyone could do.
Admati says interest is deductible for corporations and for homeowners who borrow. She argues this encourages debt over equity, and that mortgage deductions mostly benefit wealthy buyers of bigger houses.
She says banks that keep earnings instead of paying them out would be safer, and she has asked economists for years to name any harm to society. She says banks resist because heavy debt makes their owners' stake look cheap to them.
Borrowing from the film Spotlight, Admati says bankers, regulators, accountants, rating agencies and some academics help keep a risky financial system going. Many of them benefit from complexity, or from the system's fragility.
She says banks fund themselves with very little equity and a great deal of debt, which leaves them effectively on the edge of insolvency. Because their creditors, especially depositors, are passive and the government backs them, nothing forces them to cut back.
Admati says it is not a pile of cash. It describes how a bank's assets are paid for, meaning how much comes from the owners' own money versus borrowed money.
Admati describes it as a law that gives online platforms immunity from lawsuits over user-posted content, intended to let them moderate without being sued. She says that bargain became questionable once platforms began curating news feeds and gathering data.
She and Ritholtz agree that platforms should have to share anonymized data so researchers can see what users are reading and how much misinformation spreads. Ritholtz suggests tying this to keeping Section 230 protections, and Admati calls data access the starting point.
She says to phase out the tax preference for debt and make banks rely much more on equity by retaining earnings instead of paying them out. She says this simply rearranges who bears the downside, so those with the upside also bear the losses.
Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.
Anat Admati said the 1987 Black Monday crash involved program trading and portfolio insurance strategies.
“Yeah, so it was program trading and insurance, portfolio insurance and all these replication strategies and all this stuff.”
Anat Admati recounted a veteran banker telling her that the business model of a small bank is subsidized deposit insurance.
“The business model, in other words, the positive net present value of the bank, he said subsidized deposit insurance.”
Anat Admati said the FDIC has a line of credit to the U.S. Treasury of roughly $500 billion.
“they have a line to treasury for, I think, $500 billion or something.”
Anat Admati said FDIC chair Sheila Bair refused to implement the Basel II rules, which let banks use their own models to set risk weights.
“And the FDIC had Sheila Bair. And Schielebeer refused to implement this Basel II that had fancy schmancy risk weights, manipulable ways, model-based ways”
Anat Admati said French banks held about 40 percent of Greek government bonds in 2010.
“French banks had in 2010 40 % of Greek government bonds.”
Barry Ritholtz said the Nasdaq Composite fell about 81 percent from peak to trough in the internet bust, while U.S. house prices fell about 32 percent.
“the internet peak to trough was about 81 % decline in the NASDAQ comp, whereas I think houses fell about 32%.”
Anat Admati said her current research interest is the corporation as a legal person that has rights and responsibilities.
“And so now that's my current interest, which is the corporation as a legal person.”
Anat Admati described Section 230 as a bargain giving online platforms immunity from lawsuits over user content so they could moderate it.
“And they constantly had to deal with being sued. And so they wanted, but the government, so there was this sort of a bargain made with them that we will give you immunity from lawsuits. And the idea was that it would enable you to moderate.”
Anat Admati said Google's founders, who were at Stanford, initially disliked advertising and thought search should be run as a nonprofit in academia.
“When Google started, the creators of Google were at Stanford. And they said at the time they didn't like advertisements. They thought search should be run as a nonprofit in the academic domain.”
Barry Ritholtz said Yahoo once tried to buy Google for $1 million and Google's founders did not accept.
“Famously, Yahoo tried to buy them for $1 million and they said, let us think about it.”
Anat Admati said Facebook got into legal trouble because its ad tools let advertisers target housing ads by race.
“Facebook got in trouble for allowing people to mark race as a thing and put housing ads in front of people from certain race.”
Anat Admati said the Sackler family withdrew large sums from Purdue Pharma and then sought a release from civil liability through Purdue's bankruptcy.
“the Sacklers took away a whole bunch of money. It's a private company. And then they sought release from the bankruptcy of Purdue, not themselves.”
Anat Admati said the Sacklers offered about $4 billion in exchange for a release from liability, a deal an appeals court later struck down.
“$4 billion and give us a release, and we're out of here. And where is that right now?”
Anat Admati said Delaware's main business model is incorporation fees and that a corporation can be formed in minutes without identifying its owners.
“That's the only business model it has for the state is these fees. You can become a corporation 10 minutes if you pay just not that very much without even identifying yourself.”
Anat Admati described the proposed Enablers Act as an expansion of the Bank Secrecy Act's know-your-customer requirements.
“And that is expansion of the bank secrecy law, which is basically you know your customers.”
Anat Admati said allowing corporations to deduct interest was a historical mistake that favors debt over equity.
“the historical mistake was made to allow tax deductibility of interest, where debt funding is a funding expense, not a business expense”
Anat Admati co-wrote a theory paper called the Leverage Ratchet Effect, published in the Journal of Finance in 2018.
“So I have a theory paper that I learned a lot from called Leverage Ratchet Effect and Journal of Finance 2018.”
Anat Admati said Judge Jed Rakoff cites Pfizer as a repeat offender that kept returning to court and receiving deferred prosecution agreements.
“He loves to give the example of Pfizer, even after the COVID. And he says they would keep coming back. There would be a deferred prosecution.”
Anat Admati said a few hundred academics signed a letter at the start of the COVID crisis urging that relief go to people rather than corporations.
“So at the start of the COVID crisis, there was a letter organized. A few hundred academics in law, finance, economics signed it”
Anat Admati said Neil Barofsky wrote a book about the bailouts and had been the special inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
“Neil Borowski wrote a book about bailout. He was the inspector general of the TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program.”
Anat Admati said Michael Lewis ends The Big Short by arguing the problem was not that Lehman was allowed to fail.
“Michael Lewis, by the way, in the book The Big Short, ends by saying the problem was not that Lehman was allowed to fail.”
Anat Admati said a lawyer in the film Spotlight said 'it takes a village to abuse a child', which inspired her essay on the enablers of a dangerous financial system.
“if it takes a village to raise a child, it takes a village to abuse a child.”
Anat Admati said her Stanford neighbor, an electrical engineering professor named Weissman, is the namesake of the Weissman score used in HBO's Silicon Valley.
“he is, his last name is Weissman. So he is the one after which the Weissman score, compression score is.”
Anat Admati described the Canadian banking system as roughly five tightly regulated and very profitable banks.
“the Canadian system is basically a system of five banks or something like that, all pretty tightly regulated but also very profitable.”
Admati explains how a detour from operations research into economics at Yale led to finance, which she then studied from inside an academic 'bubble'.
“by the end of the first year, I kind of knew a new language.”
She corrects a common confusion and explains that capital describes how a bank funds its assets, which is the core of her critique.
“Capital is not cash. It's on the other side of the balance sheet.”
A veteran banker's remark shows how government-backed funding, not lending skill, can be a bank's real edge.
“he said subsidized deposit insurance.”
Admati explains the legal bargain behind online platforms' immunity and how news feeds and data gathering strained it.
“we will give you immunity from lawsuits. And the idea was that it would enable you to moderate.”
She turns to corporations as legal persons with rights but diffuse responsibility, using the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy as the example.
“the Sacklers took away a whole bunch of money. It's a private company.”
Admati argues that deductibility of interest for homes and companies subsidizes borrowing and distorts the economy.
“We should not favor debt over equity funding for corporations”
She lays out her core remedy: banks should retain earnings and fund themselves with plain equity rather than clever debt.
“the more they hate equity, the more I know they have too little of it.”
She argues that PPP loans and earlier bailouts favored banks and corporate investors over households and workers.
“what was PPP loan but a windfall for the banks?”
Drawing on the film Spotlight, she describes the network of enablers who keep a dangerous financial system going.
“So the key word is enablers.”
Admati recounts advising and appearing in HBO's Silicon Valley, and why she thinks media shapes how people think.
“I've come to appreciate how important media is, all forms of media.”
At KKR, we've spent 50 years understanding what matters to our clients and companies. From pioneering private equity to investing across credit, real assets, insurance, and sports, KKR has built the experience to navigate complexity, the judgment to recognize opportunity, and the conviction to create lasting value. Because when people and institutions are counting on us, understanding what matters isn't just important, it's everything. KKR, understanding what matters. Visit kkr.com slash what matters. For big business, AI opened up a
world of promise, but that world of promise turned into a world of pain. Cost spiraling, data trapped, security and governance risks multiplying, and ROI out of reach. That's why enterprises turned to Boomi to connect data, apps, and AI, helping them operate securely, efficiently, and at scale. Boomi turns a world of AI pain into a world of AI gain. As Boomi says, we got you. Head to boomi.com. That's B-O -O-M -I dot com. Being a small business owner isn't just a career, it's a calling.
Chase for Business knows how much heart and effort go into building something of your own. Manage all your business finances, from banking to payments to credit cards, all in one place with Chase's digital tools.
Plus, access online resources designed to help your business thrive. Learn more at chase.com slash business. Chase for Business. Make more of what's yours. The Chase mobile app is available for select mobile devices. Message and data rates may apply.
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. Member FDIC. Copyright 2026. JPMorgan Chase and Company. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ritholtz on Bloomberg Radio. This week on the podcast, I have yet another extra special guest, Professor Anat Admati teaches at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. She is an expert in so many fascinating areas that you wouldn't think are related, but they really are. Why has technology developed the way it has and more or less exempt from a lot of government regulations or protected by government regulations?
Turns out their business model is a little similar to the way the banking industry has managed to capture a lot of regulators and continue to operate fairly freely without the sort of regulation and capital requirements and equity requirements that would make banking safer. Really a fascinating conversation about everything from misinformation to technology to banking and financial fragility, I found the discussion to be quite fascinating, and I think you will also. With no further ado, my interview with Professor Anat Admati of the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
So let's talk a little bit about your background. You have a lot of degrees. You have a bachelor's from Hebrew University, then a master's in arts, a master's in philosophy, and a PhD from Yale University. Tell us a little bit about your academic journey.
So my journey starts where I took a lot of math. I was good in math and I loved math. It was very pretty. It was all, but I decided I probably won't be good enough to be a mathematician. So it was kind of in my romantic mind when I was, you know, in my early 20s, I was going to take but not give back to math, you know, that kind of thing. And so I had to find something.
And at first it was going to be sort of applied math, like operations research, which was the worst kind of math. It's like optimization. And it's kind of boring. But I got an opportunity to go to Yale. And these degrees were just kind of simultaneously gotten. I mean, I was out of Yale in three and a half years with all these degrees. And I just had an opportunity landed on my lap to go to this program in operations research at Yale.
And I was promised that Yale is very interdisciplinary. and once you pass your qualifying exams, you can do whatever you want. And I had never taken an economics course before that. But when I got to Yale, my advisor said, why don't you take microeconomics and take mathematical economics and take some economics? And by the end of the first year, I kind of knew a new language. And it was all much more interesting because there was interactions between people and equilibrium and all of that.
And by second year, I took the course that was absolutely a must-take in the crowd that I was hanging with, which was Steve Ross Financial Economics. Yale didn't even have a program in finance. The School of Management was just created. This was back in the late 70s, early 80s. And he was just teaching people all they needed to know about finance, which was just coming up.
It had become professionalized when before it was just a bunch of disparate theories. So you find your calling in economics, but you really take some of your background and dig pretty deep into financial regulations and technology. Where did the tech background come from?
I'll tell you. So that all, I was totally in the sort of finance bubble. First kind of, you know, market microstructure, you know, trading mechanisms. This is the quaint, you know, 1987, little Black Monday, you know, small Black Monday.
Just that little one-day glitch.
19 % decline in one day.
22, 22 point something, yeah.
Yeah, so it was program trading and insurance, portfolio insurance and all these replication strategies and all this stuff. And so that was kind of the little crisis of the day, right in the little details. And that's before high frequency trading and all the rest of it. But then I worked on trading mechanisms and how information gets into prices and informed and uninformed trading and markets for information and newsletters and managed money, portfolio theory. And then I got more interested in kind of governance, but governance in the narrow sense, corporate governance and contract, which was all about the problems between shareholders and managers.
So that was that. And then comes the financial crisis. So until the financial crisis of 2079 or however you actually time it, I was in this finance bubble. I was teaching corporate finance. I did research, theoretical research. So I built little mathematical models and analyzed them. And I lived in that little bubble thinking all is well until this crisis was like, what just happened? And so I never was interested in banking, particularly. We have a lot of silos, you know, even within economics, let alone in all the social sciences and law and all of that.
So we're each in our little silo with our little journals, all this stuff. So I just got curious. Wait a minute. I teach corporate finance. The bank is also a corporation. Now, why does it have like almost no equity funding? What's going on there? I teach people capital structure theory and how are banks so different? Why are they so different? They hate equity with this passion. And so the more I dug, the weirder it got. It really like I fell in a rabbit hole.
It totally was a rabbit hole. Like curiouser and curiouser, you know, that kind of thing.
Well, tell me if I'm oversimplifying banking, because what we've seen over the past half century before the financial crisis was simply banks figured out that the less capital they keep on the books, the better their profit margins appear, even though they're essentially just assuming more risk. And the better the profit margins are, the richer everybody got. And so we've seen a half century of first deregulation, then fairly radical deregulation, all of which worked to the bank's advantages until suddenly it no longer did.
So in the book, we go through a lot of the history of banking, including the basic banking model, which is sort of it's a wonderful life, kind of 363 boring banking model. And that, too, had a crisis in savings and loan and in many other banking crises. So it's not like banking is inherently risky because inherently the bank's taking risk with depositors' money. And the depositors are unable to really behave like normal creditor. And that's really sort of the beginning of the sort of original sin in banking, that they're always over leveraged, always.
They are never efficient in providing any of the services on both sides of the balance sheet because they always have the temptation and the ability to take just a little bit more risk on both sides of the balance sheet.
That's the nature of fractional reserve lending you get.
But it's their incentives. So the key to understand it is it's not like essential or efficient. It's just that that's how they want it. So the thing is that banking is sort of inherently fragile because banking is inherently inefficient that way or forever poorly regulated or poorly controlled by their investors, including the depositors. So to that you add expansion in the business model that allows taking more risk, hiding more risk with derivatives, with universal banking, all of that, and the increase in safety nets, implicit and explicit, with deposit insurance, with all of that, they became able and obviously interested in living more and more and more in debt.
Now, in my research, even after the first, after the book, we were already beginning to do this research, I understood a lot better stuff that we teach in basic courses as very static theory of how companies fund. And it's like one round of funding, debt and equity, and then the world is over. But for real living, you know, breathing companies, any company, the funding decision as well as investment decisions are always made by shareholders or managers on behalf of shareholders maybe in light of previous commitment.
So in the dynamics of it, once you took debt, your preferences change completely. You're no longer maximizing total value of the firm. You're maximizing the value of equity in the firm. And from that perspective, equity seems expensive to all heavily indebted corporations, banks in particular, because for other corporations, if they take on more and more debt, the creditors will start pushing back. The creditors will start putting covenants. The creditors will jack up the rates because the creditors will worry about all the distorted incentives of the borrower lender that happen.
Gamble the money in Las Vegas or underinvest in things because there's not enough upside. all of those things that characterize sort of the frictions that characterize heavy indebtedness.
So that makes the finance sector very different than the rest of the stock market?
Well, the banking, especially because the creditors in banking are particularly passive. And so therefore, the usual market forces that push against high leverage in other companies that just naturally with no regulation would limit, there's no corporation that lives, it's healthy. unless they're on their way to bankruptcy, that lives with single-digit equity numbers. Of course, it depends how you measure it, and there's book, market, all kinds of other things that we can discuss. But the banks basically got used to and got stuck, and it's very addictive to be there, especially at this extremely low equity level.
From that vantage with the overhang of debt being so, so heavy that you're effectively insolvent all the time, but you're just not recognized as such, then you hate equity. You want to take money out.
So let's stay with that point because that's pretty fascinating. It was pretty clear to observers that the reason Lehman Brothers didn't get bailed out is they were not just a little insolvent, but deeply insolvent. The rest of the banks that were out there that survived seemed to recapitalize. They sold equity. They brought more money in. Goldman Sachs took a big chunk of money from Warren Buffett. JP Morgan Chase bought Washington Mutual. They did more capital reserves and they ended up buying Bear Stearns as well.
When you say capital reserve, again, I mean, people get very confused about what that is. They put more cash. No, no, no, cash, not cash.
Just straight up equity.
Capital is not cash. It's on the other side of the balance sheet. Capital is about how you fund. It's not cash reserve. Okay, so that's really important. Also, the pile of cash.
So let's delve into that.
Let's delve into that because that's very, very confusing. To this day, you can find people saying, set aside cash. That's not what capital is about. Capital is about, obviously, there is the measurements of it at a given point of time. But when you take a snapshot and you talk about capital ratios or risk-weighted capital ratios or all of that, they are entirely on the funding side. So you've got your assets, whatever they are. They have some risk and whatever.
However you put numbers on that through accounting and what's allowed and not allowed. And all of that is like a big can of worms, actually. but you know and netting of derivatives and all of that but then the question is how do you fund those assets and so the question is how much gets funded by making promises to investors by debt any kind collateral non-collateral now deposits are very unique because deposits are unsecured debt to the bank
to the depositors to the depositors
they don't have collateral right okay so it's the FDIC that's holding the bag there now does the FDIC even know how much risk they're bearing when all the assets are so encumbered that they're all pledged at collateral?
Do they? No, they don't. Now, I have a very vivid recollection during the financial crisis of the FDIC talking about their reserves dropping from $90 to $60. I think it dropped as low as $40 billion. And hey, if we get a bunch more disasters, we're not going to be able to cover the depositors.
Exactly, because they stopped charging. Also, because there were no defaults before the crisis, they stopped charging deposit insurance. And all of a sudden, there was a lot of bank failures, not the big ones, except for Lehman, but Lehman wasn't an FDIC-insured bank. And so, but when other banks, small banks, started failing, what can the FDIC do in general? Well, they can go back to the large banks and just assess them more because they have no way, and I can assert this to you, no good way to risk adjust their deposit insurance fees.
They're supposed to be self-financing the FDIC through fees, but they really are taking a huge leap for insuring what by now must be like, I don't know, $13 1 trillion. And more will come if there were tremors because money moves back in deposits from money market funds and all of that.
From uninsured money market to insured bank deposits.
And so the FDIC, which is a C's for cooperation, is totally backed by the government. However, in practice, they have a line to treasury for, I think, $500 billion or something. But should something actually happen? So we're all on trust with this system. They tell us, don't run, don't rush, your money is safe. And I trust that. No bank runs, people. No bank runs. So we solve the problem.
When you say that they stop charging fees, I've been under the impression that the banks that have that nice little logo, the emblem, FDIC insured, aren't those banks paying some small percentage of the account?
I do. And basically, I once asked a 40-year veteran of banking in all the biggest banks, you know, through the 60s, 70s, 80s, 90s, who basically came out of retirement to be in a private equity firm that was buying distressed banks from the FDIC. And he said to me, oh, Anat, you're looking at the big banks. Let me tell you what goes on in the small banks. And then I asked him the following simple question, because there are thousands of small banks in this country.
I said, what's the business model of a small bank? And the answer was three words. The business model, in other words, the positive net present value of the bank, he said subsidized deposit insurance.
Subsidized deposit insurance. That's it.
In other words, their entire funding. So what they do on the asset side, anybody can do. Zero NPV, commercial, real estate, whatever. And how they fund is where they're privileged. Now, what happens, my model of banking, you know, basic safety nets, is that the big banks may well be overpaying for the deposit insurance part to the FDIC. And the FDIC, and they pass on some subsidies down to the small banks, so they keep happy enough. And because the big banks have implicit guarantees that are priceless because they have access to the Fed.
And that is worth a ton. In the financial crisis, let's remember, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies.
Right. Previously, they were brokerage firms, not banks.
They were investment banks. Regulated by the SEC, which also Lehman was. And at that time, the commercial banks, so Citibank within Citigroup, were regulated, among others, by the FDIC. And the FDIC had Sheila Bair. And Schielebeer refused to implement this Basel II that had fancy schmancy risk weights, manipulable ways, model-based ways to allow the banks to tell us how risky they are and therefore determine their equity requirements.
In other words, mislead regulators in a legal fashion.
There's research that showed that banks in Germany that were allowed to use this advanced approach to this fancy scientific approach to regulation were misrepresenting their own risk and making more loans with less risk weights. In other words, inappropriately low risk weights. That much more leverage. Yes. And, of course, the epitome of the failure of this regulation is assets that had zero risk rates but were risky, like AAA-rated security, like Greek government, lending to Greek government in Europe.
I mean, the banks in Europe basically fed this subprime lending to the Greek government.
At KKR, we've spent 50 years understanding what matters to our clients and companies. From pioneering private equity to investing across credit, real assets, insurance, and sports, KKR has built the experience to navigate complexity, the judgment to recognize opportunity, and the conviction to create lasting value. Because when people and institutions are counting on us, understanding what matters isn't just important. It's everything. KKR. Understanding what matters. Visit KKR.com slash what matters.
Quick question for you. How much of your day is spent typing? Email, Slack, notes, prompts to chat GPT? Whisperflow is a voice-to-text app. Instead of typing, you talk and it types for you in any app on your Mac, Windows, iPhone, or Android. It takes out the ums, fixes the typos, and the result sounds like you wrote it, four times faster than typing. So the email that used to take two minutes now takes 30 seconds.
Whisperflow is free. Download it at whisperflow.ai. That's W-I -S-P -R flow dot A-I.
Running a small business takes everything you've got. But with Chase for Business, you're not alone. They bring together local support and a broad range of resources to more than 7 million customers. With a deep understanding of your day-to-day needs, they provide products and guidance built to help you thrive. Right now, earn $500 when you open a new Chase Business Complete Checking account for new business checking customers with qualifying activities. Offer expires January 21st, 2027.
Chase Business Complete Checking has the flexible tools you need to accept payments, make deposits, and manage your finances with confidence. Learn more at chase.com slash podcast biz offer. Chase, make more of what's yours. Fees may apply to Chase Business Complete Checking accounts. The $500 offer is available for new business checking accounts with qualifying activities through 1-21-2027. Eligibility and qualification requirements must be met. Additional restrictions may apply. Please speak with a business banker for more information.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., member FDIC. Why should Greece pay more in interest rates than another country like Germany? That doesn't make any...
Well, they paid a teeny sliver, but the French banks just went and lent them a ton. And when they couldn't pay, the European Union and all these other countries and the regulators who allowed these banks to make this reckless loan, who had just bailed out these banks from investing in our real estate bubble, couldn't admit to their citizens that they would bail out their banks again if Greece defaulted. So that they blame all the things on the lazy Greeks.
And they kept bailing out Greece so Greece could pay the banks until the banks got out. So that was the zero risk rate for sovereign lending in Europe. And it's just one example of how awful, awful the regulation was pre-crisis. And then you tell me that, oh, they recapitalized and did all of that. I'm not so impressed. Yes, you know, first of all, Bank of America and Citi were zombies coming out of the crisis, despite multiple bailouts of Citi.
Citi for sure, Bank of America, not much better.
By Alman Onor and zombie banks, I mean, I believe that. They were, the examples were, if you wanted to have this systemic resolution through the FDIC, we could have tried it in a, you know, not in a crisis.
Meaning put them into a prepackaged bankruptcy. Show me that it works. Show me that it works.
You know, outside the crisis where everybody's failing. You know, I was on this FDIC systemic resolution advisory committee which was part of Dodd-Frank was saying, oh, if Lehman Brothers was sent to the FDIC for a resolution because FDIC knows so well how to do the small bank resolution, just come over the weekend, take over a small bank, and the people don't even know.
Because they're the same, because Lehman Brothers. You know, Lehman Brothers had repo 105 where they were moving all of this risk each quarter. Thousands of subsidiaries. Right, just hundreds of billions of dollars and misrepresenting their books to the regulators and to the investors.
Do you know that Lehman bankruptcy is not even over yet? Every year I go back and check, it's still going on. It's still long gone. So this is how unresolvable these, now in the first -
To be fair, it was only 15 years ago, so, you know.
And it was a small one by comparison. I mean, this was the biggest bankruptcy at the time, but there were a fraction of JPMorgan Chase or Citi or all of these that they tell you now can fail without, and they have them do living with an old kind of stupid things. I don't think JPMorgan Chase can fail. No, because we don't even -
If they did, it would just be incredibly disruptive.
Exactly. So I'm not even blaming for bailing out. I am blaming for not doing basic prevention. So that raises a really interesting point. You
mentioned the French banks and the lazy Greeks. When you offer people free money or dramatically discounted money, we shouldn't blame the Greeks who took, hey, this is a great deal. We're going to take this. You have to look at the banks that lent it to them and said, why are these banks being so irresponsible and reckless to make such cheap loans to credit debtors who are working. Under the eyes of their regulators.
Under the eyes of their regulators. So the regulators are not being called to why they allowed these loans to be made by TUBIC to fail French and German banks. French banks had in 2010 40 % of Greek government bonds. That's amazing. Yes. And Greece only did a little bit of restructuring after the banks pretty much got out, left the Troika creditors to be a bailout fund of European nations. ECB and IMF, those were the Troika. Now, why did IMF invest?
Oh, because IMF was led by some French. No, because IMF should not have intervened in a European, inter-European thing. You know, Europe had enough to be able to resolve this. They just didn't want to. So IMF being led by, you know, French people, you know, Dominique Claes-Chan, and then later by Lagarde, who had to deal with it later in 2015, when they were kind of the adult in the room, if you want to call it.
So let's draw a parallel. The French banks and the Greek borrowers, there were a lot of people criticizing in the 2000s the U.S. homeowners who were taking HELOCs and refinancing and taking loans. And I looked at it as it's not the responsibility of the consumers. When an institution like a large bank says, we're going to loan you money and we're not going to charge you interest for three years and then it'll reset, but don't worry about it.
The individual consumer doesn't understand that. Wait, free cash? Where do I sign? It's the banks and their regulations.
It's the lady in the hot tub in the big shorts saying she's got five houses. That's right. You know, exactly. So the question is - Very parallel to Greece. No, exactly. So that's why I used subprime to kind of as a parallel. Yes. So reckless loans were made to people who couldn't pay, liars loans, who clearly couldn't pay because of the commissions of the mortgage, you know, sellers. The whole structure was - The whole structure. And you still had the Fed assuring us everything was fine there.
And you had a system incredibly levered and interconnected create, through all these contagion mechanisms that we explain in the book, a perfect storm from a small decline in housing prices. I mean, the correction, the price correction itself was much smaller than internet bubble burst. which wiped out a lot of paper wealth.
And to put some numbers on that, the internet peak to trough was about 81 % decline in the NASDAQ comp, whereas I think houses fell about 32%. And then there were some defaults.
Okay, but I mean, the amounts were trivial, really. And how do they create a global financial crisis from a little housing bubble burst in the US?
Securitization. It spread it through everything.
And super duper triple securitization that are side bets, basically, on the mortgages. And only the big short, they made money.
Quite amazing. One of your research pieces really caught my eye. I love this title, Is the Internet Broken? Tell us about it.
That was actually the title of a course that I taught with one of the producers of HBO Silicon Valley.
Which we'll talk more about later.
Yeah, which I got to be involved in in the last season only. And therefore it was one of the ones I streamed, kind of had to binge stream sort of to see also the season I ended up at also being a cameo in the last show with Metal Ditch, the whole thing. And being there in the Stanford graduation and decorating his office and all that stuff. Anyway, banking is super regulated, but poorly regulated. But it's like born kind of born tied at the hip with the state, with the government, because of central banks, because of, you know.
So they're just, because they're about money, they're kind of intertwined with government in ways that not everybody understands, because they're still private corporations, but they are super duper connected.
And just to put a little context about that, in the first, I don't know, century of American history, they weren't. They were completely independent and they failed with shocking regularity.
Because we had regulations that also prevented them from diversifying. So they were very subject to local calamities and they just kept failing. And their privately issued money was good as long as it was good and then it wasn't. So then we decided to have a currency and the whole history of banking, et cetera, until we got to have, you know, national banks and these mammoth banks that consolidated and consolidated and still thousands of other banks. So just a bloated, huge system.
But anyway, so I was basically, I've seen banking since I started looking at it in 2009, 10, and then becoming involved in that, consumed with that, lobbying for policy, you know, how I get to be.
So how did you go from banking to technology and the internet?
So here's what happened. So then it's over 2015. I'm kind of, I've already spent like literally five years of my life full time on banking where I just came to look, you know. And here I was, you know, just, and it's just kind of, you know, it's a bit sickening to kind of be in that environment. I'm like, wait a minute, I'm in Silicon Valley. And now, at that point, there was already the first round of what's called Tech Lash.
You know, that was Cambridge Analytica. That was when all these tech companies stopped being, you know, the ones we love the most. And we started being a little bit suspicious. You started having the people saying it's addictive. And, you know, that was the first round, not Francis Hogan, which is more the more recent after, you know, the 2020 election or whatever. But this was kind of after 2016, you know, and into 17. So I became curious about this sector as a sector just to because I come from my original interest was in corporate governance.
Generally, corporations run on behalf of shareholders. And what's the implication? which in banking I saw were disastrous, you know, because they could get away with all the stuff they got away with, which was extremely inefficient and included all kinds of bad policies, tax subsidies of debt, all kinds of things that I saw no reason for and just somehow stuck bad bankruptcy codes.
Is technology any better?
Well, so I wanted to check. So I'm like, here is a sector that has sort of an origin that's completely different. In other words, born free. Born free in the sense that, you know, they got started in the private sector. A lot of the, even the innovations, the things that are wonderful that we take for granted, the fact that our email goes for free, that all of a sudden we have all these communication technologies. And let's remember, though, that the Internet itself started with, you know, with the government, started with DARPA and all of that.
Same with semiconductors, began with NASA. Right, exactly.
So let's remember that the government got it sort of started. And then obviously there were a lot of innovations. There was a mouse and there was, of course, the browser, the first search engines, all of that in the 90s. So it's a very young sector, the Internet. And now we're all digital, now all the way to mobile. So first it's desktops and Internet. When I sort of in the 80s, we were writing emails in the 80s already.
But then there was laptop. and then there was mobile. And so this whole move to, you know, we got our digital everywhere and we're so connected in the worldwide web, which was pretty recent innovation, sort of, you know, 2000, early 2000s, was fascinating to me in terms of how it interacts or not with government because people were beginning to think something's wrong with it. You know, privacy issues, you know, net neutrality. neutrality. I mean, there were all these topics.
I had no clue what the policy was. I ended up taking a dip into banking regulation. And now, what is there any? What is the regulation? How is it different from telephone? How is it different from newspaper? How is it different from TV? You know, what sector does it disrupt? So let me jump in and ask a question about that.
Section 230 is a big regulation that tech companies get to use to say we're not a media company and we're not responsible for misinformation. We're a platform. Tell us about Section 230 and what we should know about it.
Yeah, so I didn't know about Section 230 until I started delving into this Section 230. What is it? There's a whole book about the 19 words that changed the Internet.
And they are?
And they are, the government cannot regulate, cannot tell these companies they're immune from any litigation on content. Now, preceding this, there were a lot of lawsuits that were targeted at companies that actually tried to moderate content, like Compustat. So you had these servers, these platforms, and the ones that claimed to do some moderation, like to keep it family friendly or this or that, were getting sued for content that was left up. You know, some enemy of mine posted something that, you know, that I was related to Columbine or some nude pictures of me or whatever.
And they constantly had to deal with being sued. And so they wanted, but the government, so there was this sort of a bargain made with them that we will give you immunity from lawsuits. And the idea was that it would enable you to moderate.
In other words, you're a platform, not a creator of original media content.
Right, because people just post. Okay, so you're not responsible for that content. But of course, then comes a slippery slope, which is news feed, which is the data gathering that happens, you know, that Facebook, for example, collects.
And then ultimately, misinformation and disinformation. Are these companies being responsible members of society or are they hiding behind 230? How do you take that apart?
They're obviously for profit. I mean, when Google started, in that class, we dug into it. When Google started, the creators of Google were at Stanford. And they said at the time they didn't like advertisements. They thought search should be run as a nonprofit in the academic domain. And Google started with a Stanford Google search and then a web search. So it started right at Stanford, just like, you know, Facebook was for, you know, for college students to meet people.
And so then, you know, Internet Bubble burst and they wanted to, you know, get funding and go public and all kinds of things like that. And then investors.
Famously, Yahoo tried to buy them for $1 million and they said, let us think about it. And it didn't, the deal never went down and it turned out to be quite financially remunerative to them. To the Google, yes.
And so then they have the venture capitalists and they have the people breathing down their necks to produce. And all of a sudden, all their nice words about how they're against advertisers. Then they were sort of, you know, they.
That was then.
That was then. And then they found more and more and more ways to monetize the predictiveness of where people are going and sell that to advertisers and targeted ad and all of that. But by then, also destroying newspapers, especially local newspapers, and therefore becoming. And then, of course, the way they curate. So now you're going to say, I didn't create this content. It's not my content. You know, I will have some filters to remove, you know, naked people or whatever else.
But now I'm going to curate a news feed to you that I think is what you want to see. Now, maybe what you want to see is things that, you know, you're going to get aroused by that create engagement, which became sort of the mantra for what they were looking for is to get you to spend more time and therefore give them more information. So you kind of trace the business models and you step back and ask, well, how is that working out for us?
And this surveillance capitalism, what was called, et cetera, you know, was beginning to not work very well already in 2017, 18. And the Silicon Valley HBO series in the last season was sort of seeing that trend. And they wanted to kind of capture the fact that all of a sudden Zuckerberg is in front of, you know, of congressional committees. and the sort of beginning rumbling about what's going on there.
So let's break this down to a couple of different topics because there's a lot of things going on, especially when we're talking about Google and Facebook. So hold aside local newspapers and others that were hurt by Google, Facebook, Craigslist, eBay, go down all the list of things that they used to generate revenue from. And Zillow is another one. I think all the ad revenue streams for now, it's pretty much subscription and a little bit of advertising.
But let's talk about some of the big things you've brought up. One is misinformation. The other is the engagement that the algorithms are driving outrage, not information. What are the responsibilities of these companies and what are the responsibilities of regulators to look over these companies and say, are they doing a good job or are they causing societal damage?
So I delved deeply into it and I'll give you just the brief answers. First of all, you know, there is some debate about whether, you know, why our ecosystem of sort of just engagement, you know, with each other has gotten so toxic. And, you know, you can, you know, it doesn't, it's not all from the internet. I mean, you can talk about, you know, cable, television and, you know, Rush Limbo and Fox News or whatever, whoever is your channel that you think is…
America's News Network, Newsmax. So some of it is TV. The extremists have really gotten extreme.
So exactly. So we had a certain polarization with all the proliferation of media outlets and people choosing their silos. So it's no longer the evening news that gives you the truth anymore. or everybody has their own truth. And the Internet is just one place where that happens. Now, the problem with the Internet, and I think what needs to happen, so first of all, this country has a First Amendment, which means that the government can't do much.
Can't stop you from criticizing the government or engaging in political speech. There are areas that can be restricted. But very little. Well, yeah, very little.
We're at the mercy of these private companies. Now, what we can do and what we can regulate is just, first of all, what happens behind, you know, what is actually going on? What are people seeing? Let's see. You have researchers unable to access the data to even know how much misinformation. What are people reading? I mean, you don't have, you know, even in a—
Because they're private companies.
Yes, because they don't release it, because they are not forced to disclose relevant information to the public, to researchers, anonymized and all, but just so we can understand what their impact is on our lives.
And that seems like a pretty fair trade for the government to say, we're going to continue giving you Section 230 protections, but in order to qualify, you have to release all this data to us.
A lot of data is the absolute starting point of that.
That seems like a fair amendment to keeping all these nuisance lawsuits off their back.
There are people more involved in that policy debate. I basically became conversant enough, at least to teach a course. I haven't done a lot of writing on it. I basically took it into my examples of two sectors, banking and the Internet, that sort of seem to have some kind of a clash with democracy, basically.
Because of the need for government exemptions and regulation and support in some way versus just the Wild West, unfettered.
Because, you know, the government is always there. It's what it does and what it doesn't do for all sectors. It's the rules of the game for the economy. And they affect all companies. That's labor law, environmental laws, all kinds of consumer protection laws, and some specific regulations, airline regulation. In other words, the rules, the speed limits, the rules of the road for companies and for people. Are you allowed to do mandatory arbitration or not? There's just thousands of things that were the law in general, not specialized to a sector, but just the laws that exist, anti-discrimination or you name it.
I mean, Facebook got in trouble for allowing people to mark race as a thing and put housing ads in front of people from certain race. That was against—
Of course, it's supposed to be race-blind.
Yeah, so they got against basic civil rights law. So they have to interact with all laws. They have to obey all laws, minimum wage, you know, all kinds of laws. And so now that's my current interest, which is the corporation as a legal person. They are not a set of assets owned by shareholders. They are a separate thing, right? Twitter is a thing. They have a board. They have shareholders. They have various stakeholders. Everybody has some claim or some control in some cases.
How does a corporation as a legal person interact with the rule of law in general? They have rights. They have responsibilities. responsibilities who's home to get more and more rights they send the lawyers to get more and more rights in the courts political speech rights religious rights you know they get more and more rights in the courts and responsibilities is kind of nobody home when you come for you know you caused harm when you come for say Boeing or Purdue or you know PG &E or all these companies you know that's what I'm interested in now a corporation living in a legal environment who are they what
do they harm? What happens? What can we do? Well, you named some companies that have run afoul of the government because they engaged in some pretty bad and sometimes reckless or even illegal activity. So you mentioned Boeing. They didn't do a great job with their 737 MAX. Right. That was problematic. They took a bunch of shortcuts. Arguably, they did not follow their own internal procedures. Well, they were competing with Airbus. Right. You mentioned Purdue engaged in all sorts of behavior where it was pretty clear, hey, we can't ship this much.
No, that was all the enablers around them, the McKesson and all the pharmacies and all of that.
But they know internally, this is a town of 300 people. Why are they getting 8 ,000 pills a month? That was a distribution.
They were marketing it through the doctors and to the public using false claims and misleading deceptive marketing. Now, what happened? No individual in Purdue was, you know, three were criminally charged.
A couple of libraries, though. So you got that. That's a problem.
But, yeah. But, you know, the Sacklers took away a whole bunch of money. It's a private company. And then they sought release from the bankruptcy of Purdue, not themselves. released from all civil liabilities, which a court above bankruptcy court struck down. And now where are we? We're nowhere. It's a mess. That company cannot possibly make up for all the harm they caused. And voila, the Sackler's name is obviously not as prestigious as it used to be.
There should be some clawback of the billions of dollars that were extracted from the company.
This is like fraudulent conveyance. I mean, in bankruptcy, usually you say you took money out, you diverted money, You know, knowing that this thing is going to collapse. In the bankruptcy, right. So ahead of bankruptcy, they can look back.
And you're supposed to be acting on behalf of the creditors.
Well, but they were the owners. I mean, so exactly. So the creditors can. But now the creditors of Purdue are, you know, mostly victims and insurance companies and the government. And, you know, so in the bankruptcy court, all these tort victims, including people whose family members died, people who are addicted, you know, Medicare, all the insurance companies that had to pay, all the municipalities, all the states. I mean, you've got claimants from here, and the Department of Justice comes and says, well, you call it a Medicare fraud.
You know, we want billions of dollars. Who gets
the little pie that remains? Well, that's for the judge to assess, but you can't assess those damages without having access to the capital, the money that's pulled out. They said, we'll throw in
$4 billion and give us a release, and we're out of here. And where is that right now? Yeah. It's nowhere. I mean, the bankruptcy court is back to, they had a sort of an agreement and it was thrown out, which is very rare. That tells you how egregious the behavior was.
It's really rare. You have to really go out of your way to mess up for a bankruptcy court to say
that's - No, it wasn't the bankruptcy court. They chose a particular bankruptcy court, a particular bankruptcy judge. This is shopping. Exactly. Form shopping. And then that judge was favorable to these master agreements and gave them that. And the other court said that doesn't make sense.
The appellate court said no good.
And so now the bankruptcy agreement is back at the bankruptcy court. Is it the same judge or is it a different court? I'm not sure. But the victims anyway were publishing saying, well, I wasn't going to get very much. Maybe I was going to get $3 ,000 or $1 ,000. And now I may not get anything. So they were even, they signed because it was so little they were going to get anyway. So it's all kind of pathetic.
See, to me, when it's so little, I say, full speed ahead, litigate it, and we'll let a jury figure it out.
Well, the question is, so here's the question for the victims. You know, can they actually go after the Sacklers? The Sacklers' money is abroad. How can you actually find it? This is like the discussion we have today.
Because you could track that down and claw it back. Well, it's complicated. If it goes from a U.S. bank to overseas.
It's complicated. I mean, that's like how we now say, well, you know, can Delaware, you know, Chancery Court make Elon Musk, you know, buy Twitter? It's like, OK, the court can decide, but what muscle does the court even have?
Quick question for you. How much of your day is spent typing? Email, Slack, notes, prompts to chat GPT? Whisperflow is a voice to text app. Instead of typing, you talk and it types for you in any app on your Mac, Windows, iPhone or Android. It takes out the ums, fixes the typos and the result sounds like you wrote it. four times faster than typing. So the email that used to take two minutes now takes 30 seconds.
Whisperflow is free. Download it at whisperflow.ai. That's W-I -S-P -R flow dot A-I.
Running a small business takes everything you've got. But with Chase for Business, you're not alone. They bring together local support and a broad range of resources to more than 7 million customers. With a deep understanding of your day-to-day needs, they provide products and guidance built to help you thrive. Right now, earn $500 when you open a new Chase Business Complete Checking account for new business checking customers with qualifying activities. Offer expires January 21st, 2027.
Chase Business Complete Checking has the flexible tools you need to accept payments, make deposits, and manage your finances with confidence. Learn more at chase.com slash podcast biz offer. Chase, make more of what's yours. Fees may apply to Chase Business Complete Checking accounts. The $500 offer is available for new business checking accounts with qualifying activities through 1-21-2027. Eligibility and qualification requirements must be met. Additional restrictions may apply. Please speak with a business banker for more information.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., member FDIC. With ChatGPT, you can do more than get answers. You can get things done. When you're running a business and looking to expand, you need a clear view of the landscape before making any decisions. ChatGPT can help you prepare. Connect your Google Drive, point to relevant files and reports, and ask Chat to research competitors, industry forecasts, and market signals. It can turn the
findings into a strategic deck in your team's template that you can review before presenting to your leadership team. Growing a business is ambitious, and ChatGPT can help you do it with confidence. Get started at ChatGPT.com. I want to talk about Elon Musk and Twitter
because the question becomes, are contracts enforceable? When someone says, can they make him do this? I don't know, his assets are in the United States. He signed a binding agreement. It's up to the court to either enforce that agreement. You know how these things happen. In the 11th hour, there'll be a deal cut because no one wants to take a risk of finding that out.
Well, the question is, what actual, you know, literal power does that Delaware court have, you know, on Elon Musk? He's known for, you know.
Snubbing his nose at the rule of law.
For saying the rules don't apply to me. And so far they haven't. Mocking SEC and making a joke out of SEC, whatever.
If the Delaware courts want to continue people incorporating in Delaware and enforcing contract law, then they have to really think about how they're going to enforce this. Because if he walks away scot-free from this, then Delaware just lost a giant source of money.
Yeah, I mean, you know, among the books, there's a book called What's the Matter with Delaware? And so that's quite, I mean, if you start going back to the origins of incorporation and why we even have corporate law in the state and why Delaware is sort of the state that matters to the whole world on corporate law. That's the only business model it has for the state is these fees. You can become a corporation 10 minutes if you pay just not that very much without even identifying yourself.
And that's like a whole other can of worms. Why is the U.S. so slow in, you know, basic, basic transparency that you have more transparency in China? You know, David Barboza was able to track the wealth of the top Chinese people through chains of corporate ownerships because for a little bit of money, you can find out the actual beneficial owners of every private corporation. And if that's another corporation, then you can pay a little bit more until you get to a person.
Not in the U.S. In the U.S., you know, because Delaware likes it and because other states that compete with Delaware like it and because the legal profession likes it, we somehow sign on all kinds of agreements that are sort of, you know, for transparency after all the scandals, the Pandora paper, the Panama paper, and all of that. And we're the laggards in the world. So right now, finally, because of sanctions on Ukraine, et cetera, we have a law going through the Enablers Act.
And that is expansion of the bank secrecy law, which is basically you know your customers. But we had, you know, FinCEN, you know, the department in Treasury that gets all these suspicious activity reports, you know, leak. And we saw what happens to all these banks that file suspicious activity reports and still process the transaction. and nobody has enough resources in Treasury to go over.
Well, they file the report that lets them do the transaction.
And the money laundering is just pervasive. So dirty money, when we talk about jurisdictions taking dirty money, you know, it's a competition between U.S. and U.K. You have American kleptocracy on one hand. You have, you know, Butler to the World and all kinds of other books, Moneyland and kleptocracy, kleptomania, saying that U.K. is the winner on this. You know, which one is more of a home to dirty money? Butler to the world is like, you know, we are no longer an empire, but we'll solve it.
You want something hidden? You want something taken care of? The butler will take care of it.
Quite fascinating. So we already talked about borrowing and how that magnifies risk. Tell us some of the dark side of borrowing and what we should be doing about that.
So the use of debt to fund things, meaning I give you money, then I get an IOU from you, okay, is pervasive throughout the economy. I mean, it's sort of a particular contract that gets signed all the time. And a lot happens by using debt funding, okay? And we seem to encourage it unnecessarily for buying houses or for funding corporations against other forms of funding.
Well, when you say for buying housing, how else can you buy a house?
Well, it depends if you want to subsidize it or not. In this country, we subsidize homeownership only if you borrow through taxes. So we don't need that deduction. That deduction is doing nothing good. If you want to subsidize homeownership, choose the people you want to subsidize. And then, for example, you can give them a little tax credit for their down payment.
So in other words, instead of making the interest you pay on your mortgage deductible, you can make the down payment deductible, and that would encourage more homeownership. Yeah, but specific people, not the rich people.
Because right now, housing subsidies, even with poor people's specific housing subsidies and vouchers that nobody takes and all of that, most of the subsidies for housing go to rich people.
I mean, that makes no sense.
The bigger the house, the bigger the deduction. It's a regressive.
Now, it's been capped in a lot of places.
It's been capped, but it should be canceled, and many countries don't have it. Now, for corporations across the world, the historical mistake was made to allow tax deductibility of interest, where debt funding is a funding expense, not a business expense, should not be considered a business expense. We should not favor debt over equity funding for corporations because they can always have access to their own profits and to investors. That's global? That's global? That's pretty global. Some countries try to fix that.
So there are some papers about that tax bias.
Who does it better?
Well, I think that, you know, I think Belgium's tried to have some, there were other countries that were giving, you know, something to dividends and tried to fix that bias, the tax bias. It is well known that the tax bias of debt over equity is a distortion in the economy. The economy periodically starts, and even Bloomberg here, Bloomberg View, screams every so often to stop that. And somehow nobody's listening. So it's just this persistent distortion that we never fix.
In the United States, the bias towards debt over equity is distorting capital structures in corporate America?
Because debt has a dark side, precisely for that reason. The dark side of debt, I mean, I already mentioned the sort of addictiveness of debt at high levels. Okay, which is especially true for banking because they are heavily indebted fundamentally and because they have all the safety nets that make their creditors more passive and that allow them to ratchet up their debt. So I have a theory paper that I learned a lot from called Leverage Ratchet Effect and Journal of Finance 2018.
Anyway, so what's the dark side? You know, when I teach this and I also teach undergraduates, and by the way, I'm not even teaching finance and economics anymore. I'm teaching so interdisciplinary that it's listed in political science and it sort of has a lot of law. It's very out of silo. It's very, very cross-disciplinary. So I took my class out of the finance listing. It's kind of a general kind of class. It's called power in finance or business and government, power in engagement, those kinds of courses where I start with like human rights and I talk about corruption and all kinds of words that usually are not to be heard in a business school.
But anyway, there. back to the dark side of borrowing of debt. So, you know, as long as you keep your promise, everybody's happy, okay? What if, so there are different terminologies that are important to distinguish. There's the issue of default. What if you just don't pay? You promise and you don't keep your promise. Now, you know, stuff can happen. You might end up filing for bankruptcy, but bankruptcy is a legal process. So it has to be separated from default.
It can happen before default. You know, PG &E filed for bankruptcy, companies filed for bankruptcy without defaulting to seek protection from their creditors, okay? So bankruptcy is like a legal option that is for, you know, to kind of get from all the overhangs of debt that prevent you from breathing, okay?
That's more of a full preemptive restructuring than...
It's supposed to be. It's supposed to be sort of forgiving. Now, for an individual, again, it's like a fresh restart. We're forgiving of taking too much debt. But if you use it as a shield, like we discussed the Sacklers, et cetera, or if you start spinning off as subsidiaries, it's going to take off your talcum liability if you're a Johnson & Johnson using some Texas two-step trick or whatever. Right. Or you're a Pfizer and, you know, and they found you guilty of some fraud and you just put the— Not Pfizer.
Did Pfizer get into trouble? Yeah, yeah.
Ask Judge Rakoff about that. Well— And he'll tell you they are a recidivist— In the Southern District. In the Southern District. They are a recidivist corporation. He loves to give the example of Pfizer, even after the COVID. And he says they would keep coming back. There would be a deferred prosecution. So why do we keep deferring it? And then once I insist that they admit guilt, they send the liability, the criminal liability, to a subsidiary. And they fail that subsidiary and go and completely continue.
And does that shield the company from liability?
They manage to find tricks to shield from liability all the time. or to just sort of shift the liabilities around kind of in between all the contracts and the covenants and all of that. So there's a lot of shielding going on. But in any case, that's if you're clever. If you're an individual or a small business, you know, it's harder for you to play those games of liability shifting. Anyway, so the dark side is that you have your decisions, once indebted, are very different and potentially very inefficient relative to if you were just doing things in your own money versus that borrowed money and a little bit of your own money.
Because you're going to take excessive risk. You're going to gamble for resurrection, take excessive risk. So you're biased in favor of risk, in favor of more boring, and against certain boring investments because they benefit from those. the net present value of those kind of first goes to the creditor because you're after. So you might be biased against making a boring business loan if you're a bank because you want
to go playing derivative instead. So you talk about the problem of working with other people's money, meaning whether it's banks or hedge funds or private equity, it doesn't matter. They get to speculate with OPM, keep the gains. But if there are losses, it goes to... So how do we deal with that in our financial system? How do we make our system less fragile than it appears to be?
The first thing to do is to counter the forces of that intense desire to keep leveraging, which I sometimes say the more they hate equity, the more I know they have too little of it. It's like their intense hate of it says, I can't live unless you give me cheap debt to keep rolling my debt. You know, I'll default, terrible things will happen or whatever. So they have always access to funding, especially if you're a too big to fail bank.
The creditors will just not think, especially if they lend to you with collateral in short term, that they'll be harmed. You know, once they think they are harmed, you know, they'll start running off, et cetera. So you have fragile funding. The only counter to that is not, you know, clever debt that converts to equity that nobody's going to ever trigger because we've seen that, is plain old equity. Your earnings, you know what I mean? You have profits that you pay out.
How will the world be harmed? You know, for 10 years now, the book is almost 10 years old. We've been asking every so often, you know, macroeconomists, all kinds of people who speak in this space, even academics, saying, just tell me one thing as an economist. How will the world, society, be harmed if the banks retain their earnings? There's still their money.
Their shareholders don't get dividends.
But you put the money to good use. Don't burn it. You know, invest it. You know, if you invest in something safe, the risks to the shareholders will go down, and the required return accordingly, because we know finance, risk and return are intertwined, risk and required return. Why is Warren Buffett never paying dividends? Because he's investing the money on behalf of his shareholders. So are we not? So Warren Buffett himself, when he invests in banks— Although he is buying back stocks.
I know. Well, yeah, because that's a more tax advantageous and he's so profitable.
So all of this comes back. It's funny. It keeps circling around. It often comes back to what's most tax advantaged, how have the regulators teed this up, and how have you
managed other people's risk. If you can shift the downside risk to somebody and you can get the upside, that's the bright side of leverage for those who take it if they can avoid the downside. Right. So the homeowner may or may not be able to avoid the downside, but homeowners levered up, took cash-out refinancing and re-levered. And basically, cash-out refinancing, when the house price goes up, is the same as paying dividends when you make profit.
It's the same. I ask my students, what's the equivalent of cash-out refinancing? Bethany McLean wrote, the house is not a credit card, but that was the ads. Take your home on vacation before the financial crisis. So this is like the dividends that the regulators are allowing banks to keep paying, even though they live on pathetically low, meaningful equity levels. Now, they don't default, so you don't see that they may well be insolvent. We just don't know it because the accounting disclosures don't really show you what's going on.
So how should we fix this? What should banks and financial institutions be doing differently? How should we change the tax code and the regulatory environment?
First of all, you have to ease out of that tax preferences. And secondly, you're just against what their incentives are. You know, if it's a tax subsidy, it comes out of somewhere. I'm even willing to settle on the tax bill as an amount of cash that they owe that's a function that's the same as right now, except if they didn't lever as much in order to get that same tax bill. In other words, to lower their tax bill.
Because it's the fragility of that overhang, the inefficiency of that overhang that is making the entire system fragile. Because in the dynamics of contagion, which we explained, the banking dominoes, one defaults on another like we're seeing in crypto right now. And then there's the information contagion where I'm now worried that this whole sector is going to fail. Lehman fails and the next thing to fall is some other banks in the same business. And that was, by the way, a concern of some people in the Fed, even like Kevin Warsh, after Bear Stearns was bailed out, basically.
Well, that's because they all own the same crap, right? And they were exposed to one another. People talk about Lehman like it's a domino that sent it off. I love to describe Lehman Brothers as the first house in the trailer park that the tornado destroys.
I have visuals in my TEDx talk that basically have tall buildings and I color code them red for debt, green for equity, very little. And then the green disappears and they topple on one another. And then there's Uncle Sam kind of trying to kind of save.
So it all comes back to insufficient equity relative to way too much debt.
Oh, yeah. That's just the most obvious thing. That's like the no-brainer thing. So when you look at it, as I came and looked at it, I'm like, why are we here? There's a simple, like, costless fix. You just rearrange the financial claims in the economy. So where the upside, the people with the upside also bear the downside. That's the way it's supposed to be. It's not supposed to be, you know, privatized gains, socialized losses. It's supposed to be.
And this is a basic thing, bipartisan and everything.
Didn't Dodd-Frank fix some of this? Or it was reputed to have fixed some of this? Or was it watered down that much?
So Dodd-Frank, so let's just be clear on what Dodd-Frank was. Dodd-Frank was a massive law with, you know, a thousand pages. Dodd-Frank gave authority to regulators. Dodd-Frank gave in Title I, told the Fed to solve the too-big-to-fail problem, to do whatever they need for financial stability. And the Fed is still failing to do that.
Really?
Yes. Quick question for you. How much of your day is spent typing? Email, Slack, notes, prompts to chat GPT? Whisperflow is a voice-to-text app. Instead of typing, you talk and it types for you in any app on your Mac, Windows, iPhone, or Android. It takes out the ums, fixes the typos, and the result sounds like you wrote it, four times faster than typing. So the email that used to take two minutes now takes 30 seconds.
Whisperflow is free. Download it at whisperflow.ai. That's W-I -S-P -R flow dot A-I.
Running a small business takes everything you've got. But with Chase for Business, you're not alone.
They bring together local support and a broad range of resources to more than 7 million customers.
With a deep understanding of your day-to-day needs, they provide products and guidance built to help you thrive. Right now, earn $500 when you open a new Chase Business Complete Checking account for new business checking customers with qualifying activities. Offer expires January 21st, 2027. Chase Business Complete Checking has the flexible tools you need to accept payments, make deposits, and manage your finances with confidence.
Learn more at chase.com slash podcast biz offer. Chase, make more of what's yours.
Fees may apply to Chase Business Complete Checking Accounts. The $500 offer is available for new business checking accounts with qualifying activities through 1-21-2027. Eligibility and qualification requirements must be met. Additional restrictions may apply. Please speak with a business banker for more information. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. Member FDIC. With Jatchy BT, you can do more than get answers. You can get things done. When you're running a business and looking to expand, you need a clear view of the landscape before making any decisions.
ChatGPT can help you prepare. Connect your Google Drive, point to relevant files and reports,
and ask chat to research competitors, industry forecasts, and market signals. It can turn the findings into a strategic deck in your team's template that you can review before presenting to your leadership team. Growing a business is ambitious, and ChatGPT can help you do it with confidence. Get started at chatgpt.com.
So why have the banks been relatively stable for the past decade?
Just because they don't implode doesn't mean they're healthy. I guess.
I guess just because you don't drop dead doesn't mean you're not safe.
If you're bloated and inefficient and taking up much more of the economy than we need, because you can, And meanwhile, you know, you're paying yourself and all these people all these salaries where we should have a more efficient financial sector. And instead, it's so bloated and so profitable. It comes out of somewhere. So, you know, to me, the banking sector is not healthy just because it exists and profitable. Right.
It hasn't died doesn't necessarily mean. Yeah.
You know, you're overweight and unhealthy, but you have the feeding tube. You know what I mean? You're still alive. Whatever. Whatever analogy you want to get.
What do you think is going to happen? So I'm not going to ask you for a rate forecast or what the Fed's going to do. The era of cheap capital and free money and zero interest rate clearly is coming to an end. Is the tide going out and we're going to find out who's been swimming naked?
In banking, I don't think so. For banks, actually, higher interest rates could be very profitable. Yeah, more spread. So they're actually having some trouble with squeezed yields.
So isn't the pushback to that, hey, they weren't making big spreads on lending and they still managed to not implode. If they could survive zero, they should do well at 2 % or 3%.
But these banks have so many ways to make money. I mean, look at the COVID. Okay, look at how they made money through COVID with the supports to everybody. I mean, banks were the vehicle through which we gave PPP loans. And what was PPP loan but a windfall for the banks? They were given, I think they took the money at the quarter percent and were paid 1%. So that's a spread right there on hundreds of billions of dollars.
And it was riskless. And it was riskless. It was guaranteed and forgiven. And so they took no risk. They did hardly any credit worthiness because we were rushing to give the money out. And they were not liable for checking the papers because it was all so rushed. They gave a lot of it to their favorite clients. and then we needed to give more of it.
There was a lot of fraud also built into it. That too.
And a lot of companies, it wasn't meant to God. And then the Fed was standing ready and started buying corporate bonds. And that was a huge debt spree for the entire corporate sector, which again, the investment banks benefited from from all this debt party that went on. And so, you know, it was a wonderful life during COVID In the banking sector.
You know, it's funny you brought that up because in the United States, we have a tendency to ask the corporate side to do things that should be government business. So if the whole idea behind PPP was to keep people employed in small and medium businesses, why get the business involved? Why isn't that directly from the government? And the same thing with health care. Why is so much health care through businesses instead of directly through some government entity?
Please leave businesses out of it. Let the government do its responsibility directly with the citizenry.
So at the start of the COVID crisis, there was a letter organized. A few hundred academics in law, finance, economics signed it, telling the government right around the time of the CARES Act, first one to not give money to corporations to give it to people who need it so in other and part of it was logistical in this country because you know you basically you have the data in IRS and everything you and social security everybody gets
a W-2 payroll exactly
so you you take over that's what governments did in Europe you take over the payroll so this way it's not that their discretion to kind of their goodwill to now they can't higher again in the airlines, et cetera. So, you know, they came for bailouts, and the airlines are a classic example, after having paid virtually everything in dividends right before that. And now they're crying. They would have had plenty of money if they were a little more circumspect.
And for airlines in particular, bankruptcy has traditionally worked great. You don't ground the planes, you want them to fly. Everything keeps flying, right. And you just renegotiate some contracts. We had plenty of time to do that during the crisis. Why are we bailing out the investors that just got a huge reward? We're not effectively at least zeroing them, if not clawing back some of this money.
Right. The old joke about airlines is they haven't been profitable since Kitty Hawk. But let's stick with government payments to corporations. We saw something very similar in the financial crisis where the banks who were bad lenders were bailed out, but really the borrowers didn't see. There was some relief, but not a lot.
Yes. So there was clearly a huge bias towards bailing out the banks, you know, forming the runway, all of that. And, you know, the person who wrote most eloquently about this is Neil Borowski, of course.
Bailout. Even more specific.
Neil Borowski wrote a book about bailout. He was the inspector general of the TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program. and he was complaining and describing, and other people did too, how little the programs did. I mean, remember from that, they bailed out AIG, they bailed out the auto manufacturers, but homeowners didn't get relief and it had collateral harm. So the programs for homeowners were voluntary to the lenders. Now, the loans were securitized, so now there's no lender to negotiate with and it's much more efficient to renegotiate the loan than to foreclose.
Instead, you had a massive housing crisis in which there were a lot of foreclosures, a lot of people misplaced, very traumatic experience for a lot of people whose mortgages should have been restructured, basically. And again, it was the lenders that were doing it and then the lenders that just didn't choose. I mean, you had in the accounting of, say, Citigroup, You had them not want to restructure second mortgages, which were clearly – or no one to declare on their accounting, which were clearly a total loss because they were second junior mortgages.
But they were rescued. They were bailed out of those.
Exactly. And so they were not even acknowledging their losses. I mean, you could see this on their book to market. I mean, you could see that they were exaggerating their books hugely.
And for people who may not remember Neil Borofsky, he was the NYU law professor who was the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
And he wrote this book about how they bailed out Wall Street and left Main Street.
I've been begging Neil to come on the show.
Yeah, he's a partner in a law firm. And one of the things he did afterwards was Ben Lofsky, who was the regulator in New York, employed him. Yeah, Jenner, yes. And employed him for a few years. He was a full-time monitor of Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse being now one of the poster childs. I mean, you know, if you want to talk about reckless banks, you know, you had David Enrich, I think. You know, Credit Suisse right now, but Deutsche Bank being the poster child.
And, you know.
They all seem to be slowly recovering from their original on life support status.
You're a zombie and we feed you enough and we give you time and you come out from the dead.
15 years, 10 years. Absolutely.
So if you never can die, you know, you come back.
Well, that's no surprise. And they've all essentially come back. So one last piece of research of yours I have to ask about. it takes a village to maintain a dangerous financial system. Why does it take a village? How many entities have to be involved to keep finance dangerous?
So I will talk a little bit about this. This was my own summary of my experience over the five years in which I really was devoted entirely to this little policy battle where the book and writings that we did afterwards We're sort of debunking a whole set of flawed claims, what we call. We call them bankers' new clothes. But it's not just bankers. It's policymakers. It's even academics who say things that fall under the category of fallacious, false, or then kind of true but irrelevant.
Knowingly false or just ignorant or both?
I don't know what goes on in people's heads. I really don't. Oh, I do, and it's insane. I can say, you know, this person should know better than utter that nonsense. sometimes I'm told people whisper in my ear they don't understand. And I'm like, wait a minute, bread and butter finance, they don't understand? Leverage and risk, risk and return, they don't understand? That doesn't make any sense to me. You know, I write open letter to JPMorgan Chase, reading his letter to shareholders.
I write all these different op-eds. I just did this for five years straight, including a year and a half in the bunker writing the book. And in 2015, I decided, okay, what happened to me here? Why is it so difficult? And, you know, who did I meet along the way who kind of led to this situation that I encountered? And so at the time, 2015, two movies came out. I was actually in New York for a month or two staying at NYU and was kind of, you know, in town for various things.
There are many stories I can tell you about that period. And the two movies that came out and competed for the Oscar that year were The Big Short. And I came to see it with Adam McKay and some of, you know, pre-showing because he wanted to see what finance people, academics will say to the movie. And later he recorded a session with us because people were asking him what to do. Of course, he finished the book, Why Now Nobody Goes to Jail, which was kind of most of what he showed was legal.
So it was kind of not the end that Michael Lewis had in the book. Michael Lewis, by the way, in the book The Big Short, ends by saying the problem was not that Lehman was allowed to fail. The problem was that Lehman was allowed to succeed for as long as it did. So he went back to partnerships, moving to limited liability corporations and becoming reckless with other people's money. But anyway, so I was asked to write an essay for a book that was edited by a philosopher that was called Just Financial Market, Finance in a Just Society.
So it was about justice. And so I had to connect what I've seen in finance in the banking area to some sense of justice, of who inflicts injustice. And so the way in which people cause harm is sort of by doing and by not doing is by being willfully blind by all these terms from psychology about how you can cause harm and sleep overnight. You know, so it was basically I started asking, why has it been hard to get through with my simple message?
Who were all the people who were trying to be on the other side of this? So you start with the bankers. They benefit. You know, you then go to all the different private sector gatekeepers, the accountants, the credit rating agencies, you know, consulting companies that, you know, A lot of people that want the regulation to be very complicated because it creates a lot of jobs, doing stress tests and all kinds of fancy things, even if they're not really good.
On and on, the people who are enabling the situation. So the key word is enablers. Now, the title came from the movie Spotlight, which was the other movie that came out. Spotlight was a movie about sexual harassment in the church, Catholic church. and it was about journalists in Boston uncovering how sexual harassment in the church persisted and how once they investigated the abusers moving around the system, they were able to see the problem as much more systemic than the one at a time little story.
And that's the parallel between the two.
In the movie Spotlight, the lawyer to some of the victims, who of course, even if there was a settlement, they were told to shut up, just like a lot of settlements that I've been looking at. NDAs, sure. All the NDAs. The lawyer says to the journalist, if it takes a village to raise a child, it takes a village to abuse a child.
Quite amazing.
Yes, and it takes a village to raise a child. It's an African saying that Hillary Clinton adopted for the title of her book. Takes a village to abuse a child is all the enablers who look away, all the people who kind of make the situation a wrong persist. And, you know, go to all kinds of things. Go to Weinstein, go to a lot of wrongdoings that persist. There were enablers along the way. So I wanted to see the enablers in my world in which maybe not even crimes were committed, but there were sort of legal deceptions.
There was a capturing of the regulators. There was sort of, you know, the capturing of the politicians. There was confusing the politicians. There was confusing the public. Who all did that? And so I went all the way to academics, all the way to people whose job is to the regulators and their narratives and basically said, here is what they're saying. And here is why it's flawed and wrong and misleading. And this enables this system to persist.
At the same time, there was a book by a Dutch journalist who did called Joris something called Swimming with Sharks. It was about banking culture. And all he did was he interviewed a bunch of people in the city of London about their jobs anonymously. And he was just trying to map out how people felt about their jobs and who's getting paid and who's getting fired and whether they think it's fair relative to their high school friends or whatever.
And he became so alarmed with the financial system that he started having these analogies of an empty cockpit. You know, oh, my God, you know, all these people, nobody's taking. I told him we took a walk in London along the river and I said, you know what? It's worse. I mean, he's an anthropologist by training. I come from the ivory tower and finance down to the ground and we meet in the same place. This is crazy.
OK. And I said to him, it's worse than, you know, an empty cockpit. He has a nightmare where he walks in the cockpit and it's empty. I said, you know what? The pilots of the airplane are paid to do flips and to fly low, and they have their own parachutes. So they don't care about the passengers. So it's kind of worse. The people who control this system benefit from its fragility. And so you can't fix it until you, you know, that's what the book tries to do is educate the public.
So right now it's going to be 10 years since the book in February 2023 will be 10 years. And we are considering right now republishing this book in 2023 with a sort of one epilogue chapter, maybe a preface, explaining how the book is still relevant to COVID bailouts, to crypto, which we didn't get to discuss.
We're going to talk about that in a minute.
Okay, I'm happy to talk about it. And to the fraying of democracies.
democracies. So before we get to my favorite questions, I have to ask you my curveball question, which is you're an advisor to HBO Silicon Valley, a show I just adored. Tell us about that experience. How did they find you other than the fact that you're at Stanford and what'd
you do for them? So how they found me was that they originally found my neighbor, who's an electrical engineering professor. And he is, his last name is Weissman. So he is the one after which the Weissman score, compression score is. Oh, really? And on the show, they created this new compression algorithm. And this was from some research because this co-producer, Jonathan Duton, was sort of scouting the Silicon Valley to kind of find a believable story, to capture the spirit of Silicon Valley.
And, you know, looking for storylines and concepts. And then he came across this. And then this professor and a couple other professors from computer science and engineering helped the show be as believable as it was. Now, as it went through and it was all out there in the garage and all this stuff, it got to the sixth season. Now, my neighbor said to me, knowing what I was doing about, you know, financial system and my general interest in corporations and society, I said, you've got to meet this guy, ponytail, and we're sitting around coffee.
And later, he says, you know, you ought to teach a course with him. And that was when I became, I said, you know, I'm curious about this sector. Guy knows everybody, okay, because everybody was cameo in Silicon Valley. And he knows about the history of the internet and all of those things. And he's not an economist. He's, you know, an anthropologist by training. He's sort of a producer, a writer. And so we embark on this MBA course.
And while they were writing the sixth season, so they end up putting me as an advisor. I mean, they didn't pay me anything. I just signed a bunch of paper and they gave me $200, which is like a bottle of wine for all of this. Just because they didn't want me to later claim that, you know, I gave them some idea, copyright, because it was impacting their coverage of sort of governance issues. Mission statements. They mocked mission statement.
the plagiarism of mission statement, these kinds of things, because it's like, you know, mission statement. So talk is cheap, as I said. And so we taught this course to MBA entitled Internet Broken. And then this was the spring quarter of 2008.
Quick question for you. How much of your day is spent typing? Email, Slack, notes, prompts to chat GPT? Whisperflow is a voice to text app. Instead of typing, you talk and it types for you. in any app on your Mac, Windows, iPhone, or Android. It takes out the ums, fixes the typos, and the result sounds like you wrote it, four times faster than typing. So the email that used to take two minutes now takes 30 seconds.
Whisperflow is free. Download it at whisperflow.ai. That's W-I -S-P -R flow dot A-I.
Running a small business takes everything you've got, but with Chase for Business, you're not alone.
They bring together local support and a broad range of resources to more than 7 million customers. With a deep understanding of your day-to-day needs, they provide products and guidance built to help you thrive.
Right now, earn $500 when you open a new Chase Business Complete Checking account for new business checking customers with qualifying activities. Offer expires January 21st, 2027. Chase Business Complete Checking has the flexible tools you need to accept payments, make deposits, and manage your finances with confidence. Learn more at chase.com slash podcast biz offer. Chase, make more of what's yours. Fees may apply to Chase Business Complete Checking Accounts. The $500 offer is available for new business checking accounts with qualifying activities through 1-21-2027.
Eligibility and qualification requirements must be met. Additional restrictions may apply. Please speak with a business banker for more information. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., member FDIC. With ChachiBT, you can do more than get answers. You can get things done. When you're running a business and looking to expand, you need a clear view of the landscape before making any decisions. ChatGPT can help you prepare. Connect your Google Drive, point to relevant files and reports, and ask chat to
research competitors, industry forecasts, and market signals. It can turn the findings into a strategic deck in your team's template that you can review before presenting to your leadership team. Growing a business is ambitious, and ChatGPT can help you do it with confidence. Get started at ChatGPT.com. something like that. And then, so as they were doing, in the fall, they finished, they were showing the thing and they were filming, like early in the fall, they were filming the last episode.
And so he calls and says, okay, you guys, I got them to fly four of you down to LA and be cameo in the very last episode and hang out here for the day and see how we film it. See all the scenes, see the prison scene, see this, all these different things. It was an abandoned kind of car manufacturing of some sort. It was just like a bunch of warehouses where they had it. I've never seen a show, a fictional show, being filmed.
The cameras, all the rooms.
And that wrapped up in 2019, right? The end of 2019.
Yeah, exactly. So this was 2019, spring into fall. And so we were there. we flew down to LA and we had to bring our cap and gown if we had it or they would put on us they had a whole thing of cap and gowns for this graduation thing event that we were sort of part of so we they had all these people they recruit for the day to be just sitting there and then and you know as long as you don't utter a word so if we uttered one word in the movie we would have to be unionized gotcha but if we were just silent then they could film us and we could be there.
So they had another scene that they filmed in the hallways of the sort of Stanford University offices and we got whiteboards to decorate. So I have a certain corner in the whiteboard behind Milditch when he was kind of, you know, reflecting at the very final scene and we saw it being filmed and then we hung out with him. So it was kind of my reward. I'm like, you know, when I teach banking, I don't get to have so much fun.
But when I thought about the internet, I actually got to see. And my point there was only here in this whole discussion is I've come to appreciate how important media is, all forms of media. So even a movie, it shapes how people think. There was a scene there where the guy's in front of Congress and then he rips the mic and, you know, this whole thing. And that was modeled after Mark Zuckerberg going to Congress. He kind of looks like him.
So much fun. So let me jump to
our speed round, our favorite questions, which we'll blow through pretty quickly, starting with, aside from Silicon Valley, what have you been streaming? Tell us what's kept you entertained.
So I'm a little bit of a latecomer to finish it, but I've loved Succession, which I finally finished very recently. And now I'm intent on finishing Borgen because I had a— Borgen. Borgen is about Danish. It's like the West Wing for Denmark. And it had this female, former minister, et cetera. Anyway, it's kind of a few seasons of a Netflix series, Borgen. And so it's very good. I mean, I know there's, you know, We Crash and other things, but that's enough for that.
I just started We Crash. It's actually very good. I heard that. I'm about halfway through it. My co-teacher tells me. And I loved—
But I read so much about WeWork, I'm kind of sick of it, especially being Israeli. Well, I love the book Cult of We. Cult of We, yeah.
And the—whatchamacallit—the show seems very true to that. And there was a podcast, yeah. Yeah. Tell us about your mentors who helped to shape your career.
So this advisor, Steve Ross at Yale, was very important to getting me interested in finance. And in some respect, in this sort of cosmic view of where I am today and my transformation of my – where he was there. Unfortunately, he died a few years ago. But he was there to sign my petitions and encourage me all the way to takes a village. Was there to kind of tell me I'm not going mad when I hear all this nonsense and to approve of what I was doing.
even though in some of my criticism of academics, I criticized some of my sort of academic brothers who were also his students, but he sided with me. So that was very meaningful to me. Yeah, so he was my main advisor. Because right now, for knowing all the finance I know, I'm able to call the book.
That's great. Tell us about some of your favorite books. What are you reading now? And what are your all-time favorites?
Oh my God. So my all-time favorite is The Little Prince. That's just the book. I'm reading a lot, and now I'm listening, so that makes it faster because I don't read as fast as I would like to. But I've read lots of books. Right at the moment, I sort of finished direct, and I'm like the world for sale and freezing order, which you discussed, flying blind on Boeing. You know, Sickening is a book on the healthcare sector and how we know all our healthcare system.
Very scary, worse than banking to some extent. American kleptocracy. Right now, I'm reading a book very close to home called Who Killed Jane Stanford, which is like, whoa. I mean, all the stories we tell at Stanford and that history of Stanford going back to the 19th century and Gilded Age and the Stanfords, whoa. So that's a history professor at Stanford who wrote a book, Who Killed Jane Stanford. Jane Stanford was very important to the creation of Stanford.
But right now, of course, Stanford is way off from what she wanted. And yesterday I got The Bond King from Mary Child, so that's my next book. That's a great list. So a whole bunch, yeah.
That's a really good list. What sort of advice would you give to a recent college grad who is interested in a career in either investing, finance, academia, or technology?
My first advice, because I've learned it kind of the hard way, is watch out for the assumptions you're making and other people are making. So when people say things, there's often implicit assumptions they're making. And some bad assumptions can take you down. Even LTCM, with all the brilliant people, went down on bad assumptions. So bad assumptions are very dangerous. And then, of course, you have to kind of be careful not to maintain the big picture, to be aware of losing yourself in certain activities.
So maintain the big picture and check for assumptions is kind of my main advice.
Good advice. And our final question. What do you know about the world of banking and finance and regulations today that you wish you knew 30 or so years ago when you were first getting started?
I had no idea about how much politics, laws, and law enforcement matter to economic outcomes. I just lived in the little bubble of economics where we make assumptions. And when I sort of realized what was going on in banking, I started questioning all the assumptions that I made before. And it's been my sort of journey ever since. It's like, huh, that's sort of interesting. Is this true? And what's actually going on? So I've become a sort of real explorer of what happens when I don't make the assumptions that I make or when I question people's assumptions.
Did you spend any time researching the Canadian banking regulation? Because when I was writing Bailout Nation, that was my compare and contrast. It's so different from the U.S. system.
It is, and I know a little bit about it. But it is a very different system because the U.S. is a very fragmented system. And the Canadian system is basically a system of five banks or something like that, all pretty tightly regulated but also very profitable. So essentially, one of the ways I formulate the difference is that we subsidize debt for banking, and they essentially subsidize equity by giving them a big charter value because they're so entrenched in their oligopoly.
Quite fascinating. We have been speaking with Professor Anat Admati. Thank you, Professor, for being so generous with your time. If you enjoy this podcast, well, be sure and check out any of our previous 400 or so. You can find those at Spotify, iTunes, wherever you get your favorite podcasts from. We love your comments, feedback, and suggestions. Write to us at mibpodcast at bloomberg.net. Sign up for my daily reads at ritholtz.com. Follow me on Twitter at Ritholtz.
I would be remiss if I did not thank the crack team that helps us put these conversations together each week. My audio engineer is Justin Milliner. Paris Wald is my producer. Sean Russo is my head of research. Atika Valbrun is my project manager. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. If you listen to financial news, you know a lot of time is spent thinking about what's next. The next opportunity. The next investment.
The next move. But sometimes what matters most is being ready for what you never saw coming. For more than 75 years, Cincinnati Insurance has worked with independent agents to help protect businesses, homes, valuables, and more. because planning for the future isn't only about knowing what's next.
It's about making sure you're ready for what you can't predict. Let Cincinnati insurance make your bad day better. Find an independent agent at CINFIN.com. Congratulations. You've built a dashboard. But now comes the follow-up question and the follow-up to the follow-up
and the dashboard for that. Meet HEX. Give everyone the power to ask their own questions, explore data and build with AI, all in natural language. Because every answer should spark another question, limited only by your curiosity, not your data team's bandwidth.
Go deeper than dashboards. Visit hex.ai.
The world of business is constantly evolving, and Comcast Business keeps you totally in step with secure AI-backed networking in more than 100 countries. They're powering over 90 % of the Fortune 500 and millions of small businesses. That's a lot of muscle. And behind it all, thousands of experts answering your call at 2 a.m. like it's 2 p.m. One partner powering how business gets done for companies around the globe. When you add it all up, no one does business like Comcast Business.