William Shockley was one of three scientists who invented the transistor in 1947, according to Chris Miller.
“William Shockley, who is one of the three scientists who invented the transistor in 1947”

Analyse Asia with Bernard Leong
3 Nov 2022 · 53m · Chris Miller, Bernard Leong · 24 quoted facts
Historian Chris Miller argues that semiconductors, not oil or rockets, are the hidden thread running through modern geopolitics and economics. Chips began as military hardware, became a mass civilian product, and are now so specialized and concentrated that no country can make advanced ones alone. That gives a few firms and places, such as Taiwan's TSMC, outsized power over everyone else.
The central tension is between national security and global scale. Companies grew rich by selling to the whole world, while governments now try to restrict who gets the best chips and tools. Miller says China's push for self-sufficiency cuts against how Japan, Korea and Taiwan caught up, which was by plugging into global supply chains. He does not expect a chip embargo to trigger a war over Taiwan.
Miller says the Soviet Union had scientists and money, but a small military-only market, no offshore assembly and a habit of copying. Production runs stayed small and costs high, so the chips were never near the cutting edge.
Japanese firms won through manufacturing quality and cheap bank capital. They probably overinvested and competed against each other, and Korean firms later took over memory chips.
By making chips only for other companies' designs, TSMC offered capacity that did not compete with its customers. That let design-only firms multiply, and Apple, Qualcomm, NVIDIA and AMD supplied the scale.
Miller says Samsung and TSMC caught up by integrating into global supply chains. China's incentives now point toward domestic self-reliance, which he calls a political choice more than a technical one.
Miller says the controls cut off roughly 1% of chips going into China, while the oil embargo hit Japan's whole economy. So China can reasonably wait, which makes a Taiwan attack less likely to be a direct response.
Miller says chipmaking depends on specialized tools, software, chemicals and designs from different countries. Even the US imports lithography machines from the Netherlands and materials from Japan, and its most advanced chip fabrication happens in Taiwan.
Fabless firms design chips but do not own factories, and a foundry such as TSMC builds them. Miller says Morris Chang's design-free foundry model solved the customer-service, capacity and design-theft worries of using a rival's factory.
Moore's law is the prediction that the number of transistors on a chip grows exponentially, giving far more computing power. Miller says that is why a chip a few generations behind is 'miles behind', which makes catching up hard for China.
Miller thinks it is unlikely to be the trigger. He notes China has wanted control of Taiwan since 1949, and the restrictions cut off only a small slice of the most advanced chips, unlike the oil embargo on Japan in 1941. He is more worried than before as the military balance shifts toward China.
Miller says probably not on its own. He says Intel's problem is getting its technology and business model to work, not a lack of money, and the CHIPS Act money is split among many companies.
Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.
William Shockley was one of three scientists who invented the transistor in 1947, according to Chris Miller.
“William Shockley, who is one of the three scientists who invented the transistor in 1947”
Eight of William Shockley's engineers left his business in the 1950s and founded Fairchild Semiconductor.
“eight of his smartest young engineers abandoned his business in the 1950s and set out to found their own company, Fairchild Semiconductor”
Bob Noyce left Fairchild with Gordon Moore and founded Intel in the late 1960s.
“abandoned Fairchild along with Gordon Moore, founded Intel in the late 1960s with the vision of producing”
Intel's first focus product was DRAM memory chips, which Chris Miller says became the most widely produced chip type in semiconductor history.
“And Intel's initial product that it focused on was DRAM memory chips, which are the most widely produced chip since then in the history of semiconductors.”
The first chips were produced for use in missile guidance computers, according to Chris Miller.
“since the first chips were produced for use in missile guidance computers”
US, Japanese and European chip firms moved assembly to Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Philippines for cheaper labor, which the Soviet Union did not do.
“whereas U.S., Japanese, and European firms very early on turned to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines as a place to find cheaper labor for assembly”
In the late 2010s China spent more money importing chips than importing oil, according to trade data Chris Miller studied.
“China spent more money importing chips than it spent importing oil, which is sort of an extraordinary data point”
Chris Miller says integrated circuits make up over 40% of Taiwan's exports, about 25% for the Philippines and Malaysia, and over 15% for Korea.
“In Taiwan, over 40 % of exports are integrated circuits. The Philippines, Malaysia, 25%. Korea, over 15%.”
A recent smartphone chip contains over 10 billion transistors, according to Chris Miller.
“there's over 10 billion of them on your smartphone if you've got anywhere near a recent model”
Japanese chipmakers, funded by bank loans at lower interest rates than US firms faced, invested more and won DRAM market share in the 1980s.
“Japanese firms faced lower interest rates, could invest more, and won a lot of market share over time as a result”
Intel CEO Andy Grove abandoned DRAM memory chips to focus on microprocessors, which went into personal computers.
“Andy Grove, the CEO of Intel at the time, abandoned the DRAM business, which was the product around which Intel was founded, to create a new product called a microprocessor”
Korean firms out-competed Japanese chipmakers in the 1990s and 2000s, and Japanese firms now play little role in DRAM production.
“And in the 1990s, 2000s, Korean firms out-competed them. And so today, Japanese firms don't play much of a role at all in D-RM production.”
Japan imposed voluntary export quotas on chips to avoid US tariffs, which raised DRAM prices and benefited Korean rather than American producers.
“Japan, in order to avoid tariffs, imposed voluntary export quotas, which drove up DRAM prices but actually benefited Korean producers, not American producers”
The US funded a research consortium, which Chris Miller calls Sumatec (Sematech), to boost US chip R&D, with a mixed record at best.
“The US also funded a research organization called Sumatec, which was designed to boost R &D in the US.”
Samsung had an R&D facility in Silicon Valley, which Chris Miller counts as part of its knowledge transfer from the US.
“And Samsung also had an R &D facility in Silicon Valley as well, which is part of that knowledge process.”
Morris Chang enrolled at Harvard after fleeing the Communist takeover of China, and was the only Chinese student in his class.
“enrolled at Harvard right afterwards, becoming the only Chinese student in his class.”
Morris Chang visited Taiwan in 1968 as part of Texas Instruments' search for assembly facility sites in the region.
“he'd never been to Taiwan before, but visited in 1968 as part of TI's effort to scout out the best facilities in the region”
Morris Chang founded TSMC in 1987 as a manufacturing-only chip company.
“In 1987, founded TSMC with a brand new business model in mind, which was rather than integrated designing chips, manufacturing them”
TSMC licensed production technology from Philips, the Dutch firm from which ASML was spun out.
“TSMC licensed production technology from Philips, the Dutch semiconductor producer, which ASML was spun out of”
Apple is TSMC's largest customer, and Chris Miller says it provides guaranteed yearly funding that lets TSMC invest heavily.
“Apple, its largest customer, is very important in terms of providing TSMC the guaranteed funding every year”
Chris Miller says China's domestic chip market is about 20% of the size of the world market.
“they're going to end up with a market that is 20 % of the size of the world market”
Chris Miller says Chinese Communist Party leaders have wanted control over Taiwan since 1949, before semiconductors existed as an industry.
“because China has always wanted control over Taiwan since 1949”
Chris Miller says US export controls cut off only about 1% of chips going into China, a small segment of ultra-advanced data-center GPUs.
“It's just a small segment of ultra-cutting-edge GPU chips for data centers. So that's 1 % of the chips that are going into China are being cut off.”
Chris Miller says Intel's problem is technology and business model, not funding, so CHIPS Act money alone will not decide whether it recovers.
“Intel's challenge has not been a lack of money. Its challenge has been getting its technology to work and getting its business model to work.”
Miller explains how a puzzle about the Cold War arms race led him to chips as the core of military power.
“they couldn't miniaturize computing power with any success at all”
Trade data showed Miller that chips were central to Asian economies, and China spent more on chips than on oil.
“semiconductor trade absolutely at the center is missing something important”
The founding of Fairchild and Intel shows how commercialization, not just invention, built the industry and moved it from military to civilian markets.
“the huge difference between scientific invention and commercialization”
A small market, no offshore assembly and a copying culture kept the Soviet Union permanently behind the cutting edge.
“the Soviet Union never adopted a outsourcing model for assembly and testing”
Japan won memory chips on quality and cheap capital, pushing Intel toward microprocessors.
“was a manufacturing problem rather than an innovation problem”
Government support, cheap capital and strong execution let Samsung overtake its rivals.
“extraordinary cases of going from a tiny role to playing a major role”
Chang's life path and his foundry-only business model reshaped the global industry.
“only to manufacture chips for any customers who were willing to design them”
Miller says China's drive for self-sufficiency runs against how Samsung and TSMC caught up.
“the incentives inside of China's system are no longer to integrate with supply chains”
Miller argues export controls are not like the oil embargo, then looks ahead to autos, AI and custom chips.
“China has always wanted control over Taiwan since 1949”
No, it's impossible today for any country to do it all on their own. And even if you look at the United States, which is still the biggest player in the supply chain by far, it's still the case that the U.S. can't do it all on its own. As you mentioned, imports lithography equipment from the Netherlands, it imports chemicals and materials from Japan, and then the most advanced fabrication of processor chips is in Taiwan. So no country can do it alone, and really no country is even closed.
Welcome to Analyse Asia, the premier podcast dedicated to dissecting the pulse of business technology and media in Asia. I'm Bernard Leong, and semiconductors brought the rise of Asia and are now the choke point technology that curtailed the rise of China. With me today, Chris Miller, Associate Professor in the Fletcher School of Tufts University, and author of his new book, Chip War, to help us to look at semiconductors from a historical lens and provide us the perspectives to look at the future.
Chris, welcome to the show. Thank you for having me. Yes, and I've actually spent over a weekend to read Chip War, which is a very good narrative read. And in fact, it seems to tell the story of the history of the world from the lens of a semiconductor. But then in this podcast, we always start off with getting to the origin story of the interviewee. So my first question to you is, how do you start your career?
Well, I began as a historian focused on the Russian economy and the history of the Soviet Union. And I previously wrote three books on different aspects of Russian history and political economy on the pathologies of the policymaking process in the late Soviet Union. And my second book was on economic policymaking in Putin's Russia called Putinomics. And then finally, a broader survey of the relationship between Russian economics and population trends and infrastructure with its foreign policy in Asia.
And I came to this topic, semiconductors, not planning to write a book called The Chip War, but planning to create a book analyzing the arms race and the missile race during the Cold War. And the question that I wanted to answer was, why was it that the Soviet Union, like the United States, could build nuclear weapons with extraordinary explosive power and in large quantities? Why was it the Soviet Union, like the U.S., could build rockets and send people into space and actually send the first satellite and the first person into space?
But they couldn't miniaturize computing power with any success at all and fell far behind in computing. And this struck me as an interesting puzzle because everyone realized that computing would be not only economically important, but also militarily important. So there was every incentive in the Soviet Union to invest heavily in computing, to try to find ways to apply computing power to military systems, but it just didn't work. And so as a result, the Soviet Union, which kept up in the key technologies of the arms race in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, which were long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, failed to keep up with the key technological trends in the 1980s and 90s up to the present, which are the
application of intelligence to military systems. And so that was the puzzle that led me to this book. And the more I learned about weapon systems and missile programs, the more I realized that the interesting part of contemporary weaponry is not really the engines that power rockets or the metallurgy that's involved in making the case of the rockets, but actually the guidance computers inside of them. And that's true for basically all weapons systems today. The interesting part and the part that makes them useful and applicable is actually the guidance system and the communications that enable it and the broader infrastructure of acquiring, sending, processing information that connects weapons to their targets.
And that was fundamentally a question of computing power. And the more I dug into that, the more I realized that actually semiconductors stand absolutely at the center of the production of military power today. And not only military power, as I'm sure we'll discuss all of the key trends in recent history, I came to realize not really be understood properly without understanding the computer chips that enabled them and drove them forward.
So it's a pretty serenitopitous discovery that actually from military that leads you to the history of semiconductors and that actually span the history of the world in the last three to four decades. And the story is still ongoing. So I have one more question for you. What are the interesting career lessons that you can share with my audience to your own experience, I guess, from being a historian, academic, now writing a book on semiconductors?
I guess what drew me towards this topic originally was not any sort of plan, but just a desire to understand at a pretty granular level the details of military technology. And then I decided to write this book, Chip War, not solely because of the military aspect, but when I was able to understand some of the connections between that and several other contemporary themes today. And I was doing the initial research in the very early stages of when the U.S.
was beginning to dramatically restrict the supply of chip technology to certain companies in China like ZTE and Huawei. And so I came to realize, just from reading the headlines in newspapers in 2017 and 2018, the extent to which semiconductor production and design was centralized in a small number of countries and a small number of companies. And so that helped me understand the lines that connected the early Cold War story that I was analyzing historically in the present day that was in the headlines.
The third data point that helped me triangulate the fact that there was something really important going on here was when I was studying some of the trade data in the late 2010s and came to realize that China spent more money importing chips than it spent importing oil, which is sort of an extraordinary data point. It helped me realize that actually I didn't understand globalization in its full context. I was missing something fundamental. When you start digging into trade data across the Asia-Pacific region, what you find is that semiconductors are absolutely fundamental.
In Taiwan, over 40 % of exports are integrated circuits. The Philippines, Malaysia, 25%. Korea, over 15%. And so any description of globalization that doesn't put semiconductor trade absolutely at the center is missing something important. And so piecing together those three different facets, the military story, the trade and globalization story, and the U.S.-China dynamics were really helpful in helping me realize that this wasn't just a story of military technology that was important. It was a much broader story that brought together different strands and issues that I was interested in, but hadn't previously realized the connections between.
Which comes to the main subject of the day, the book Chip War. And I think I already started reading it and completed it. And from the reader's perspective, it did feel like the history of the world, even the rise of Asia written from the semiconductor's point of view. And you also have talked about the inspiration of how you actually came to writing this book by just tracing back from the Soviet Union's military history, weapons, and then get to it actually gives this, and also looking at the trade history of what China is purchasing.
I think the first question I probably want to ask you is, what are the key themes and major takeaways from the book, Chip War, that you intended for your audience?
Well, there were a couple of things that stood out to me. First was the extent to which Moore's law, which predicted exponential growth in the number of transistors that could be put on a chip and therefore the amount of computing power that a chip can produce, was a far more dramatic force than I'd previously realized. I'd heard of Moore's law, but hadn't really thought through the consequences. And in fact, nothing in contemporary society can be understood without the fact that we're able to apply vastly more computing power to all sorts of problems because of Moore's law.
So the first thing is just the overwhelming importance of exponential growth and computing power to all aspects of modern life. Second is the extent to which military and strategic considerations have been a fundamental driver of the chip industry since the earliest days, since the first chips were produced for use in missile guidance computers. And today, over 90%, almost all chips really go into civilian uses, smartphones, PCs, and things of that nature. But it's still the case that it's often that defense uses are driving cutting-edge R &D in semiconductors.
And it's increasingly the case today compared to the past couple of decades that concerns about the application of semiconductors to produce military power is at the core of what's driving government policy towards this industry. And so the complicated balance between commercial considerations that drive companies and strategic considerations that drive countries has also been there since the founding of the industry. And the third facet is the extraordinary scale at which the semiconductor industry exists. And the scale happens both at the macro level and at the microscopic level, and they're related.
The transistors on the chip in your smartphone, for example, are among the smallest devices humans have ever produced. And there's over 10 billion of them on your smartphone if you've got anywhere near a recent model. But it's only possible to create virus-sized transistors by the billions and billions because we've got extraordinary scale. And the factories that produce these transistors on your chip are some of the most expensive and large-scale factories ever produced. And so there's a deep interrelationship between the massive scale of the biggest semiconductor companies and the fact that they're able in a cost efficient manner to produce the tiny scale of the transistors inside.
And understanding that dynamic between macro and micro and the fact that you couldn't have the miniature scale without the large concentration by a couple of key producers, it was also, I think, crucial in understanding the ways the industry has transformed over the past couple of decades and why we ended up in a situation where a tiny number of firms control the production of all the computing power that the rest of the world relies on.
which is a bit ironic because when I was growing up, a lot of people were saying that semiconductors are commoditized and then the investment bankers were sprouting all this thing about hardware being commoditized. And today this is the actual lifeblood that is controlling most of the trade between Asia, US and the rest of the world. So I think the best way to start from talking about your book is to talk about the history of semiconductors, which came from Silicon Valley.
In fact, I think a lot of people who don't study the law of Silicon Valley is that actually whoever started the Silicon is actually to serve the military at the very start. But what I want to get you to do is can you summarize the story of the treacherous eight and how part of this team, for example, Bob Noyes and Gordon Moore, who was famous for Moore's Law, eventually came up
and ended up starting Intel. So the story starts with William Shockley, who is one of the three scientists who invented the transistor in 1947. And Shockley was a brilliant theoretical physicist, but he was a horrible manager. And although he wanted to become a wealthy business person, he abjectly failed in this task. And Shockley couldn't figure out how to commercialize the product he invented. And because he was a horrible manager, no one else wanted to work with him.
And And so eight of his smartest young engineers abandoned his business in the 1950s and set out to found their own company, Fairchild Semiconductor. And although these eight individuals hadn't played a role in theorizing the transistor or inventing it, they played a fundamental role in turning it into a valuable product. And I think this story here is a great underlining of the huge difference between scientific invention and commercialization. And the semiconductor industry has relied on all sorts of scientific inventions and Nobel Prize winning research, but it wouldn't exist in the way it does if it weren't for the commercialization step.
And that's what Bob Noyce, one of the founders of Fairchild, was extraordinarily good at, was matching new science with commercially viable production. And he, in pursuit of this goal, played a major role in co-inventing the integrated circuits, the first piece of silicon or germanium that had several transistors on it and set the semiconductor industry in motion from that point. And Noyce realized that in the early days, his primary customer would be the military and his first big sales were to the military.
But he also realized from the very earliest stages that the military was going to be a limited customer in the long run for a couple of reasons. One is because the military wanted a lot of interference in the specific products that Fairchild was producing. And two, because the military was willing to pay top dollar for small volume production runs, but was never going to buy millions and millions of semiconductors. And so Noyce tried to capitalize on the fact that he had the military as a customer willing to pay high prices.
But then you use that to springboard to a much broader civilian market. And that was his vision really from day one. And so Fairchild grew quite rapidly, not primarily thanks to its military customers, although it was important, but because it was the first to realize that there was a vast civilian market out there and found a way to serve it. And Noyce built Fairchild along with Gordon Moore and others for about a decade. But eventually became frustrated with the fact that the company that had ceded the funds refused to give him a large enough stake, refused to give him stock options, and so abandoned Fairchild along with Gordon Moore, founded Intel in the late 1960s with the vision of producing
chips primarily for the mass civilian market. And Intel's initial product that it focused on was DRAM memory chips, which are the most widely produced chip since then in the history of semiconductors. And from that point, Noyce proved that actually the big market was in chips for civilians, even though margins were lower, even though the price per chip was lower, the volumes were exponentially higher. And that set the industry on its civilian focus, which persists to this day.
And also Bob Noyce is the
person who eventually became given the nickname as the mayor of semiconductors, sorry, the mayor of Silicon Valley, and then subsequently became the mentor of the Steve Jobs and all the subsequent entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley and jumpstarted that. But I think one interesting thing that I've really learned from the book, which I didn't appreciate was the reason why Russia didn't evolved the same way as the US in the military or even in developing other systems that's very related to semiconductors.
And how did the semiconductor industry actually eventually end up with consumer electronics? And because of the origins of this, so focused onto the military and the space race that the Russians couldn't replicate that? Yeah, the Russians were from the
very early stages aware that chips would have military uses and they invested heavily, put a into the chip industry and sent many of the best scientists to work in the chip industry and had leading physicists who actually won Nobel Prizes in science related to semiconductors. And in addition to that, I spent a lot of effort trying to acquire semiconductors and semiconductor production equipment from other countries, primarily from Europe and the United States. But the Soviets failed to develop a sustainable industry in the long run.
They had a small industry focused on military production, but it was always far behind for a couple of reasons. One was that they didn't have the civilian market at home with nearly as much scale. And so they were always producing at far smaller production runs than in the US or Europe or eventually Japan, which could serve the rest of the world. And the Soviets were producing for themselves and for a small number of militaries in Central and Eastern Europe.
So that was one issue. The second issue, which was equally significant, was that the Soviet Union never adopted a outsourcing model for assembly and testing. And so whereas U.S., Japanese, and European firms very early on turned to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines as a place to find cheaper labor for assembly, the Soviet Union didn't do that. And so costs were always higher. The third factor was that because the Soviet Union was focused on copying and catching up without any exposure to world markets that would force companies to be efficient, produce products that markets wanted, there was always a copying mentality in Soviet semiconductors that never produced any sort of durable, innovative structures or R &D processes that really
worked. And these three factors combined to produce an industry that existed for a long time, was able to produce decent chips, but never to produce anything close to the cutting edge. And ultimately ended up failing the Soviet military because it remained so far behind with lower quality levels and lower production run than what the US military get access via Silicon Valley.
And this is interesting because if you think about it in parallel today for China, they have brought the chips from the US and they never developed the capability. And I think one of the big major differences is that the Chinese has an open economy and at the same time was actually able to have the economy to actually develop semiconductors, which they didn't. They also built on top of it. But we'll come to the China story a little bit later because I want to trace the story because it tells the story of the rise of Asia across that.
So the interesting part is history doesn't repeat itself, but actually it seems to rhyme. So can you talk about the rise of Japan and how it actually displays Intel in the process? And then, of course, the very famous story that was told by Andy Grove, the CEO, Only the Paranoid Survived, that it forced the company to pivot to microprocessors in the 1980s.
So Japan was a player in the chip industry from pretty early days, and the Japanese government tried hard to incubate successful semiconductor firms. And as the chip industry began focusing on DRAM memory chips in the 1970s and into the 1980s, it opened up space for other countries to really compete in an active way. And the reason was that DRAM chips from the 70s up to the present have basically been passing along the same trajectory. and it was pretty clear what the trajectory would be, more advanced types of DRAM on a pretty regular product schedule.
And so if you compare DRAM chips between different countries, companies, it mattered less whose DRAM you were buying because they were all kind of the same. What mattered is who could get out the next generation the fastest and being a couple of months in advance made a difference and who could produce them at the lowest cost, the highest quality. And those were parameters that were less about thinking creatively about the markets you were serving or designing new products and more about effective execution, plus the cost of capital investment and new willingness to invest capital.
And those were criteria in which Japanese firms were able to outcompete US firms in the late 1970s and throughout most of the 1980s. In terms of quality, Japanese firms, because they realized to a much greater extent than US firms in this time period that semiconductor production, especially DRM production, was a manufacturing problem rather than an innovation problem. They focused on manufacturing quality to agree that most American firms in the 70s and early 80s didn't. And as a result, their quality rate was far higher.
They had fewer defects than American firms. And then secondly, because the DRAM business was a race to get to the next generation fastest, and if you didn't get to the next generation fastest, your generation would produce a lot less money for you because your competitors would be able to outcompete you for that generation. The ability to invest at low interest rates for a longer period of time was a huge advantage. And that's where economic differences between the U.S.
and Japan played a major role, in part because in the 1980s, U.S. interest rates were high as the U.S. was trying to fight inflation, also in part because U.S. firms had access capital markets, which generally charged higher interest rates than Japanese firms who were accessing bank loans from banks that were often closely tied to the companies themselves. And so Japanese firms faced lower interest rates, could invest more, and won a lot of market share over time as a result.
Now, they didn't actually make a lot of money over time as a result because Japanese firms were probably overinvesting and competing with themselves in the end for market share. And so it wasn't a very profitable strategy, but it was a great strategy for winning market share. And it challenged a lot of US firms at the time, which had to exit the DRAM business in most cases and focus on other markets. And many firms failed to make that transition.
somewhat bankrupt, but Intel did not fail. And Andy Grove, the CEO of Intel at the time, abandoned the DRAM business, which was the product around which Intel was founded, to create a new product called a microprocessor, which was at the time a very niche type of good, but it was growing rapidly. And it was being put in a product called the personal computer, which at the time was small, but growing in importance. And because of that pivot from DRAM to microprocessors, Intel was the company that played the dominant role in producing the chips for PCs that defined the industry from the 1990s all the way through the end of the 2000s.
And so the Japanese chip maker strategy in general actually didn't serve them very well. They had market share in the 80s and into the early 90s, but profitability was low. and they specialized in a type of chip that was more commoditized in its production and therefore more vulnerable to other competitors. And in the 1990s, 2000s, Korean firms out-competed them. And so today, Japanese firms don't play much of a role at all in D-RM production.
And Korea is the biggest player in the sphere.
And of course, with the history of Intel, because of the Japanese experience, they became vertically integrated. That is also the problem that they are facing now in order that they need to transform as well because everybody has sort of outsourced that manufacturing to someone else to do, which they don't. And that's where Intel has been having trouble in the last couple of years. But I think one interesting part of the Japanese story, which I want to shine a little bit light on, is what was done by the US government to constrain the Japanese so that they don't take over the US enterprise?
Because I think there was a part of the story from your book that there was an alliance between Intel and the other chip makers to try to contain Japan's rice as well.
Yeah, there were both industrial efforts and also government efforts. The government efforts, I would say, didn't really work. The U.S. government threatened tariffs on Japanese chip exports to the U.S. and eventually Japan, in order to avoid tariffs, imposed voluntary export quotas, which drove up DRAM prices but actually benefited Korean producers, not American producers. So that was, I think, a failed trade policy. It might have, you can argue, might have hurt Japan on the margin, but it certainly didn't help the US.
The US also funded a research organization called Sumatec, which was designed to boost R &D in the US. And here, too, the picture is mixed at best. I think the US debate in the 1980s was fixated on the collaborative R &D between the Japanese government and Japanese firms, which the mainstream view in the U.S. was that that explained Japan's success. And it's probably not true, but that was the mainstream view. And so the U.S.
tried to replicate that via Semitech. And Semitech, too, had a mixed record at best. Its efforts to save U.S. lithography firms totally failed. Its efforts to help metrology and inspection tools were at best a mixed story. And the deposition space companies involved say that Semitech played no role. So it's hard to argue that Summit Tech was really a major player in the turnaround, I think. Maybe it helped on the margin, I'm not sure. And then the US industry, not all, but many players in the US industry, as they exited DRAM, as many firms did, wanted to make sure that they had competitive DRAM suppliers.
And there was fear, probably not all that justified, but there was fear in the US industry that Japanese firms might collude and drive up prices. And so there was a desire to work with DRAM producers in other countries. And this was just as in the late 1980s that a couple of Korean firms, Samsung, most importantly, were beginning to move from the assembly and test work they'd done previously to actual fabrication of chips. And so there was a fair amount of technology transfer from the US to South Korean firms, which might not otherwise have happened, but US firms were more comfortable with because DRAM was something that the Japanese were doing better out than they were and B, seemed to be
more of a commodity in which technology transfer was less problematic. And so you did have a sort of tacit alliance between some big US firms and some rising Korean firms to try to ensure that there was plenty of competition in the DRAM market, which for US firms by the late 1980s was seen as a good thing because so many of them had already exited the DRAM business. They wanted a more competitive DRAM market with
both Japanese and Korean suppliers. And this is interesting because the 80s, we talk about the rise of Japan and then US got to come back and then Japan start to fall. And then in the 90s, the Koreans came. How did South Korea manage to enter into the semiconductor race with Samsung? Because today, Samsung's semiconductor business is still one of the best in the world. Of course, with their solid state drives and their OLED screens as well.
Yeah, I think Samsung is one
of the most extraordinary cases of going from a tiny role to playing a major role. It began in the chip industry already in the 1970s. It had some role in assembly and tests and a bit of fabrication. But it really wasn't until the late 1980s where the company really bet a lot of forces on building out its chip industry. And partly it was due to the fact that the company really made a big bet, a big gamble, put a lot of resources to it.
Partly it was due to the fact that the South Korean government educational system had spent a lot of resources learning about semiconductors, sending students abroad to study semiconductors, attracting professors to South Korea to teach about semiconductors. There's a lot of knowledge transfer that benefited the entire country, but Samsung, I think, in particular. And Samsung also had an R &D facility in Silicon Valley as well, which is part of that knowledge process. Partly it was due to the fact that the Korean government identified semiconductors as a priority and so encouraged banks, for example, to lend to semiconductor-focused businesses.
And then partly it was because Samsung really had an extraordinary vision for how the business could be run and understood the DRAM market as well as anyone. And it was able to combine the fact that it had cheap access to capital with an understanding of the DRAM business that let it really edge out its Japanese competitors, which were its main competitors in the late 80s and especially in the early 1990s. And It benefited a bit from the fact that just as it was rising, Japan faced its financial crisis, which dramatically changed the landscape for Japanese firms.
They had to start focusing on profitability the way they hadn't previously. And so that was a major help to Samsung. But there was a lot of competition that Samsung faced from Taiwanese firms, from Micron in the US, and Samsung out-competed them all. So I think you've got to look both at the structural factors, but also at the fact that Samsung executed very, very well and really has over most of the past 30 years.
And this is where in the 1990s, another story happened, which is Taiwan's turn to build their own semiconductor's expertise. I think one of the underappreciated facts was about the story of Maurice Chang, which is actually, I think he's the number three from Texas Instrument. And he would have become the CEO, but then of course it was given to someone else. And he came to Taiwan. Can you talk about the story where, how did he come to work with the Taiwanese government and essentially built TSMC?
So I think Morris Chang is one of the most interesting entrepreneurs of the last hundred years and someone who is dramatically underappreciated. He's a name that most people outside of Taiwan don't know, but I think ought to. He was born in China before the revolution, spent the wartime years fleeing the Japanese armies in Hong Kong and in Chongqing. And then the communists took power. And so he fled again, enrolled at Harvard right afterwards, becoming the only Chinese student in his class.
And then eventually gave up on his study of Shakespeare at Harvard to do something more useful. He thought and transferred to MIT and became involved in the semiconductor industry in the very earliest days and was hired by Texas Instruments, which is one of the kind of hot startups, if you will, of the late 1950s, and played a really fundamental role in learning and teaching the rest of TI how to produce chips effectively. And at the time, manufacturing chips was an extraordinarily complicated business.
Quality was very low, and he played a really major role there. And over the course of his work at TI, he helped TI begin to establish offshored assembly and packaging facilities. And one of the places that he urged Texas Instruments to look was Taiwan. He had a couple of classmates when he did his PhD at Stanford who were from Taiwan. told him the conditions that were good. And so he'd never been to Taiwan before, but visited in 1968 as part of TI's effort to scout out the best facilities in the region.
The other competing location was Singapore, where TI eventually also opened up a facility, but they chose Taiwan first. And from that, Chang developed a relationship with several of the key leaders in Taiwan, a number of the leaders that played a really major role in Taiwan's overall economic development strategy, people like KTE and YS. And he got to know quite well. They visited him whenever they were in the United States. He visited them occasionally when he was in Taiwan.
And so when he was passed over for the CEO job, and what must be one of the great errors of business history in the 20th century, he was looking for something new to do. And he'd already been a really high-level executive. So there weren't that many other jobs that would have appealed to him. But the Taiwanese government came to him and said, would you like essentially a blank check to build up a chip industry from almost from scratch in Taiwan.
And he said, that sounded like an interesting idea. So he moved to Taiwan, where he'd only previously been on business trips in the mid-1980s. In 1987, founded TSMC with a brand new business model in mind, which was rather than integrated designing chips, manufacturing them, would be only to manufacture chips for any customers who were willing to design them. And this business model has, as you alluded to earlier, revolutionized the chip industry.
I can add a little bit of anecdote that why Singapore wasn't chosen. And part of the reason was because the Singapore government in the 1980s didn't put a lot of emphasis on research and development in the semiconductors. And that was why Taiwan got chosen as well. It's not just about the infrastructure side, but also in the research and development piece. So coming back to the Taiwan story then, how did TSMC disrupt the vertically integrated model from Intel with the Fungri model?
So when Morris Chang founded TSMC, there really weren't very many companies that only designed ships. There were a small number, but they were really quite small. And at the time, if you wanted to design ships and have someone else manufacture them, you had to go to a company that had its own in-house ship designers and essentially compete with the in-house team to get space in their production line. And so companies would always preference their in-house design team.
And so you'd never know when you could get capacity because it depended on who had spare capacity at different times. And you were always worried about whatever company you went to stealing your designs because they were designing their own ships too. And you always had horrible customer service because you were a small share of their production lines and their production processes were designed for their in-house team rather than for outsiders. And so it was a really tough business model to only design ships and have someone else manufacture them.
But Morris Chang realized that the economics of chip fabrication were such that the more chips you produce, the more economies of scale you could reap. And so there was a lot of rationale for having a smaller number of bigger chip manufacturers than existed at the time. And so he bet very heavily on the idea that if you built a facility that only manufactured chips, you would have more design firms emerging over time and that they could be your customers.
And that didn't exist when he started the company, but after he started TSMC and proved that they could produce with effective levels of technology at reasonable cost, provide excellent customer service, more and more companies began to enter the design-only space, the fabless space. And you also had a trend later on of companies divesting their manufacturing facilities and just turning to design-only firms because they could count on TSMC to do the manufacturing for them and focus only on design.
And so margins were often higher as a result. And it proved to be such an extraordinary business that today TSMC is now the world's biggest chipmaker. It's reaped extraordinary economies of scale from that, and it's used those economies of scale to invest in what's now the most advanced process technology for logic chips.
And I think economies of scale is one of the factors that made TSMC successful. But also there are other factors, like for example, its partnership with ASML and the talent bench, it has to execute through production for major customers for NVIDIA and Apple as well. Are there any other factors as well?
I think you're right that the ASML relationship has been crucial and it's existed now in a really deep partnership for three decades. One of the initial steps in the founding of TSMC was that TSMC licensed production technology from Philips, the Dutch semiconductor producer, which ASML was spun out of. So there was a natural fit between ASML and TSMC in the earliest days. I think that the relationship between TSMC's customers and TSMC is also really important because although TSMC serves a lot of customers, it's got a couple of key customers that have been with it for some time.
Apple, its largest customer, is very important in terms of providing TSMC the guaranteed funding every year to know that it can invest very heavily. Other major customers are Qualcomm, NVIDIA, AMD, which have really given TSMC the scale that's been necessary to expand the way it has over the past decade and a half. And so you couldn't have TSMC without the small number of pretty massive customers. and so there is a deep relationship between TSMC and Silicon Valley as a result.
I still remember that famous video. I think a lot of people don't know about it and I'm going to repeat this for the third time here. It's when Maurice Chang, I think, about to retire and he invited Jeff Williams, who is the CEO of Apple and the CEOs of NVIDIA, Qualcomm, and everyone on stage for two hours. I literally watched that entire video for two hours and I learned everything about semiconductors or the future in that two hours.
I think that's the best YouTube video. And I've just really do not understand why nobody go there and watch. Because I think you can learn a lot about semiconductors on that. But I want to come back to the discussion on, if we look at the semiconductor supply chain today, it's extremely specialized. I think Taiwan produced the chips. The Netherlands built the ASML machines for the EUV lithography that's required. and UK has the ARM architecture, which is now a low power chips that powers most of our mobile phones from Android to the Apple iPhones.
And then you have Japan and Korea also with their own expertise. I think Samsung most well-known for their own solid state drives and screens. Does it make it very difficult for any country to be able to do it all? And I think you know who I'm alluded to. I'm talking about China here.
Yeah, no, it's impossible today for any country to do it all on their own. And even if you looked at the United States, which is still the biggest player in the supply chain by far, it's still the case that the U.S. can't do it all on its own. As you mentioned, it imports lithography equipment from the Netherlands. It imports chemicals and materials from Japan. And then the most advanced fabrication of processor chips is in Taiwan.
So no country can do it alone. And really, no country is even close. The U.S. is closest, but it's got those gaps that I just mentioned. And every other country is far, far less close. Taiwan, for example, the most advanced producer of logic chips, but using machinery and software and chip designs and chemicals that are all imported. So Taiwan is far from self-sufficient, quite the opposite. If you look at China, the reality is that China plays even less of a role in the supply chain than Taiwan or Korea or Japan, which are themselves very reliant on imported tools and designs and chemicals.
So today, China is investing very heavily. It's trying very hard to play a bigger role over time. It's trying hard to produce, if not a completely domesticated supply chain, at least a de-Americanized supply chain, I think is a more plausible goal. But the reality is that goal is still a very, very long way away. And so for now, China remains, like the rest of the world, dependent on imports for key parts of its chip supply chain.
And for China, that's, of course, a problem because as tensions with the U.S. have escalated over the past decade, the U.S. has imposed more restrictions on the types of equipment and software that
China is able to. So the, which has now come to the major part of this conversation is about China, right? The early origins of semiconductors are meant for the military. I guess the reason why the Russians couldn't replicate it was because of the supply chain and also the fact that the US have turned semiconductor for civilian use and it spurred a lot of technology innovation as such. I guess, why is it then China is so severely limited by this choke point technology then?
Well, I think the reality is that if you want to make an advanced ship, you need equipment and software and chemicals from countries that are, for China, geopolitical competitors, if not rivals. whether it's Japan, whether it's the US, whether it's the Netherlands, which has defined China as a strategic competitor. Because China's relations with so many of its neighbors and so many technological leaders in the world are so bad that there's a whole set of restrictions on what China can import.
And the Chinese government realizes this limitation, but there's no easy way around it because the immense specialization in the semiconductor supply chain, the immense complexity evolved in producing the tools and designs and software means that you can't just catch up in a couple of years. And it also means that capital investment, which is the thing that China is really good at, is not on its own panacea. You need to invest a lot. And the Chinese government has been investing a lot, but there's a lot more that you need to do.
You need to develop firms that are deeply integrated into supply chains to understand what the market needs and learn from the best in the business. And the incentives inside of China's system are no longer to integrate with supply chains, but actually the opposite, to pursue more domestic development, more self-sufficiency. And that's exactly the opposite of what Samsung did when it was catching up or what TSMC has done. And so I think actually, kind of ironically, the more China tries to have this catch-up strategy play the dominant feature in its semiconductor industry, the more it's actually diverging from what TSMC or Samsung or other firms did to catch up.
And that's a paradox that's, I think, driven as much by China's domestic politics as it is by the chip industry. I suspect that most of the players in China's private sector tech industry understand this is not the best strategy for technological purposes, but that's the strategy they have given the political context.
Also, always when I talk to my friends and then when they talk about why the US is fattling China's rise, then I will always draw them back to the lessons of Japan and Korea, Japan in the 80s and then Korea in the 90s. I guess China's rise is a bit different from Japan and Korea. I think first, it's not a democracy. And second, it's starting to decouple from the supply chain with its own version of the GPS system, Beidou.
And then third, they also have a 1.4 billion population, which actually constitute the largest market in the world, which means they have their own domestic market as compared to, say, Japan and Korea, which is not a very big population on there. Then the question now would become, even with all the blocking that's coming from the US, will it still be able to replicate the semiconductor chain? I think there's YMTC now, there's SMIC from China, but I think they are still playing the catching up game.
From just looking at today's world, do you think they can actually end up replicating what is coming from the US? Yeah.
Yeah, I think the answer is not anytime soon. Maybe in a decade's time, they will catch up on key parameters, but it's going to be a long way away, I think, for a couple of reasons. I think, first, if you compare China today versus Korea and Japan in the 80s and 90s, there are some similarities for sure. And there have been some similarities for a long time. If you look at specific firms, you can find a lot of comparison points.
But if you look at the political context, it's really quite different. The U.S. right now has made it clear that it doesn't want to see China catch up technologically, whereas the U.S. was never concerned about Korea's technological advances. And it was only concerned really in very specific instances for a short period of time about Japanese technological advances. And even then, there was extraordinary cooperation scientifically between the U.S. and Japan that was ongoing. Whereas now there's, as you say, a sort of selective decoupling underway between the U.S.
and Chinese tech sectors. And it's not just the U.S., partly due to U.S. regulations, but also partly due to other countries' perception of their interests. You know, Japan has passed a series of new regulations and legislation that's going to begin to reduce the science and technology cooperation with China. So there's a lot less cooperation we're going to see going forward between China and other key tech powers than we saw between the U.S. and Japan or the U.S.
and Korea. So that's a big difference, I think. The second big difference is that on the one hand, it's true that China's got this vast domestic market, which Japan and especially Korea didn't have. On the other hand, I don't know if that's a good thing because the Chinese domestic market is still a lot smaller than the world market. And if Chinese firms or the Chinese government think that they're going to be able to sell primarily or solely to the domestic market and thereby give up the world market, they're going to end up with a market that is 20 % of the size of the world market.
And so if you've got one supply chain selling to a market that's four times as large as the Chinese supply chain, well, the economies of scale that we've talked about benefit the larger supply chain. And so I wouldn't want to be in a position of focusing solely on China's domestic market, big though it is. I'd want to focus on the world market. And so I think that that's a risk to China as well, that it might make it seem to Chinese policymakers or some corporate leaders that they can only focus domestically.
But the reality is that that's, I don't think, a great strategy given just the importance of these massive economies of scale that we've discussed.
But the global South actually now has to contend with two systems. I mean, I living in Southeast Asia, I don't have to deal with just the US technology companies. I also have to deal with the Chinese technology companies in the same. And to do business with either, you end up becoming like a router of two systems. And because of the decoupling supply chain, right?
I think that's true. But I think it's also true that so long as the economies of scale that we've discussed persist, my sense is that TSMC is going to stay far ahead and they'll be able to provide better products at lower prices than competitors in China. And so there are other markets where that's not the case, where Chinese firms and Taiwanese firms will produce comparable goods or Chinese firms and other countries firms will produce comparable goods.
But in semiconductors, I don't think that's going to be the case. And so I think it'll be very hard for China to compete in third markets in Southeast Asia, for example, if in fact the chips it's producing have orders of magnitude less transistors on them. And if you're three generations behind in semiconductor production because of Moore's law, you're miles behind because you're exponentially behind each generation. And so long as that dynamic persists, so long as economies of scale produce better technology, and so long as better technology is exponentially better because of Moore's law, I think China faces real difficulties if it focuses largely on its domestic market, just because the dollars are much more focused in terms of sales than
in the rest of the global economy. And so it's going to be difficult to win primarily focusing domestically.
or unless it leapfrogged and take on something like a quantum computer if it develops that. But of course, that today is not possible from being a realistic point of view. I want to dial on this question and I'm going to take history back to the 1938s or the 1940s, just around the World War II timing. I think given that you're a historian, I think if we start from the present and then dial into Graham Allison's book, Destined for War, about the two cities trap, I guess in how Japan ended up attacking the United States on Pearl Harbor was because of the tough sanctions of oil as a final straw.
And if I pick the different words, I replace China with Japan and then oil with semiconductors. What's the likelihood of China attacking Taiwan with the recent conclusion of the 20th Party Congress then?
Well, I think first off, we should recognize that when Chinese leaders think about Taiwan, they don't primarily think about semiconductors. the CCP leadership has wanted to assert control over Taiwan since 1949, well before the semiconductor was first invented. And if you listen to the language that they use or used in the party Congress, for example, it's not semiconductor focused, nor is it different than what we heard a decade ago. So we shouldn't say that because Taiwan is important because of the chips it produces, therefore China wants control over Taiwan because the chips it produces, because China has always wanted control over Taiwan since 1949.
So for people like you and me who are interested in semiconductors, I think it's easy to overestimate the importance of semiconductors in Chinese like me. But I think you're right to say that there is some danger that if the Chinese leadership believes that the new controls will be so damaging to its position in the long run, that they're better off acting in the short run. Now, I think the comparison to Japan in 1941 has some similarities and some differences.
The differences are, A, oil was a lot more important to Japan's economy writ large than cutting-edge chips and chip-making equipment are today. The U.S. hasn't banned the sale of all chips to China, quite the contrary. Almost all chips that could be sold to China last month can be sold to China this month. It's just a small segment of ultra-cutting-edge GPU chips for data centers. So that's 1 % of the chips that are going into China are being cut off.
Whereas the oil embargo on Japan before World War II was far larger. So that's different. The second thing that's different is that it was clear to Japanese leaders right after the oil embargo that this was going to be devastating to them both in the short run and the long run. So they had to act. It's not immediately clear to me that Chinese leaders believe that this will be so problematic to them because they may believe that they can get around it or they can domestically produce their way out of it.
And while I think that's probably the wrong judgment, there's uncertainty around that. And so if you're sitting in Chinese leadership meetings, you could, I think, pretty easily tell yourself, well, this will be damaging in a couple of years, but we'll find our way around it. And so I think that introduces enough uncertainty where for China, the optimal strategy is to wait and to try to see if you can get your way around it. Maybe you can, maybe you can't.
But that compared to an attack on Taiwan that could well produce a disastrous war for China and the whole world seems like a better strategy. Now, is there uncertainty around that? Yes. Am I more worried about a Chinese attack on Taiwan than I was several years ago? No doubt. as the military balance continues to swing in China's favor, as it has over the past several decades, does my worry increase? I think it inevitably does. But do I think that the move to export control certain ships and shipmaking technology is really the same as an oil embargo in Japan?
No, I think it really is fundamentally different because we're not saying no ships into China. We're saying a tiny share of the most advanced chips and shipmaking tools can't go into China. And that's different than saying a economy can't have any oil.
And I think the chips that we are talking about also limits their military capability development as well in the same line of thinking as well. So I really appreciate getting a historian point of view on this. So I'm going to ask this last question. I think it's more a perspective question. If we fast forward to the next decade, what would be the history? What would be the story of semiconductors in the future?
Well, I think we've got a pretty clear pathway through 2030 of advances in chips that will keep Moore's Law going, at least for the end of the decade. We're going to see semiconductors applied to even more types of devices. And the two big growth markets, I think, will be in autos, which have always had chips inside of them for a long time, but will have more and more and more advanced chips inside of them. And the second growth market will be for high performance computing and AI in data centers primarily.
And that is a market that has grown a lot, will grow dramatically over the next couple of years. And as we see more demands for AI across different parts of the economy, that will create massive demand for more chips. And so I think these are the two growth markets. In terms of the industry's structure, one of the big trends that is emerging right now and will continue is that more and more big companies are designing their own chips.
Today, it's Google and Amazon, but I think we're going to see more companies deciding to design their own chips because they can get more performance out of chips that are optimized to the specific processes they want to run on them. And so this will be a ongoing trend that will benefit foundries like TSMC and other companies that are trying to set up foundries because Amazon and Google Art, I don't think ever going to run their own manufacturing facilities, but they will, I think, keep designing their own ships.
And so they'll need to outsource fabrication of these ships to someone else. And this is going to be another industry trend that's already started, but will continue, I think, through the decade.
But then what about the Chips Act with now the $52 billion that's given to the U.S. industry? Will Intel get a comeback as a result of that?
Well, this is a big question. I think whether or not Intel comes back won't depend on the Chips Act because Intel's challenge has not been a lack of money. Its challenge has been getting its technology to work and getting its business model to work. And so there's a turnaround underway right now at Intel. Whether or not it succeeds in turning it around remains unclear. but the comparatively small amount of money that the CHIPS Act will give to Intel because the funding will be divided between a number of different companies, that alone won't make the difference in Intel.
I think much more important is can they get their business model to work? Can they get their technology to catch up
or at least get closer to where TSMC is? Chris, many thanks for coming on the show and share the story of Asia with the rise of semiconductors through your book, Chip War, which I highly recommend my audience to go and take a read. In fact, actually, the technology audience have been very curious about your book. And that's why I thought I should initiate this interview. So in closing, I've had two very quick questions. My number one question, any recommendations that have inspired you recently?
Well, the best book that I recently
read is a book by a historian at American University called Joseph Terygian on elite politics in China and the Soviet Union. And he's got an extraordinary deep analysis of the post Mao Zedong succession in China based on extraordinary archival works. And so it's a sort of a minute by minute account of the succession struggle after Mao Zedong's death, which I highly recommend. Thank you for the recommendation. I'm going to check it out.
How do my audience find you? I'm on Twitter at crmiller1. My website is christophermiller.net. And you can find us in any podcast platform and definitely tweet to us if you have any feedback or give us a five-star rating on Apple Podcasts. Chris, many thanks for coming on the show. And I look forward to speak to you again sometime in the future. Great, thanks for having me.