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Inside the Strategy Room

119. Voices of CEO Excellence: James Gorman, Morgan Stanley. Part 1.

2 Jun 2022 · 22m · James Gorman, Vic Malhotra, Sean Brown · 17 quoted facts

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In brief

James Gorman argues that Morgan Stanley's post-crisis strategy rested on a few firmly held beliefs about industry structure. Wealth and asset management would supply stable 'ballast', the investment bank would be cleaned up rather than abandoned, and catastrophic risk, mainly liquidity risk, would be taken off the table. Everything else is delegated to the experts who run each business.

The central tension is between conviction and humility. Gorman says corporate strategy is not a democracy and he overrode many critics, yet he assumes business heads know more than he does and steps in only on underperformance. His poker image ties it together: be very conservative on catastrophic downside and very aggressive where the firm has real strengths.

Key insights

  1. Crisis survival forced Morgan Stanley's strategic reset

    Gorman says strategy reflects current condition: with the industry wiped out and Morgan Stanley now a regulated bank, there was a compelling need to act. Firms with no such pressure tend to just operate better rather than change strategy.

  2. Wealth management serves as ballast against volatile trading

    Gorman saw institutional trading and underwriting as so volatile they were at times uninvestable. He wanted wealth and asset management large enough, roughly 50-50 with the investment bank, to steady the firm in rough seas.

  3. Strategy was additive, not a swap to wealth

    Gorman says people misread the plan as becoming a wealth firm instead of an investment bank. Both grew: the investment bank to about $30 billion in revenue from about $15 billion, and wealth and asset management from $6–7 billion to $30 billion.

  4. Be conservative on catastrophe, aggressive on strengths

    Using a poker analogy, Gorman says to remove firm-ending risk, which in banking is mostly liquidity risk, then bet big where the odds favor you. He notes most people lean optimistic or pessimistic and find holding both hard.

  5. Delegate to experts, intervene only on underperformance

    Gorman assumes business heads know more than he does and tests them with worst-case loss and probability questions rather than answers. If they dislike his proposal, he makes them find a better one, which pushes them to work harder.

Questions

What did James Gorman mean by calling Morgan Stanley an aircraft carrier with ballast?

Gorman said the firm is built to stay steady when markets get rough, because wealth and asset management provide stable weight ('ballast'). The tradeoff is that others may be faster in good times because they are not dragging that ballast.

Did Morgan Stanley replace investment banking with wealth management?

No. Gorman says that was a common misunderstanding: the plan was to clean up the investment bank and add wealth management on top. He says revenue is now about $30 billion in each, roughly a 50-50 split.

How did the financial crisis change Morgan Stanley's position?

Gorman says the crisis effectively wiped out the pure institutional securities industry. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs survived but became regulated banks, which created a strong need to change strategy.

How involved is the CEO in individual business strategies, according to Gorman?

Not very. He assumes the people running each business know more than he does and lets them run it, but he gets more involved when a unit underperforms. He may then propose his own solution to push them to find a better one.

What does poker have to do with how Gorman makes strategy decisions?

Gorman, who plays poker in tournaments, says to be very aggressive when you hold strong cards but never bet everything on a certain win, since someone else may hold a better hand. In business, he means being conservative about catastrophic risk and aggressive where the firm has real strengths.

Facts

Stated by the speakers. Each quote matches the transcript, which shows what was said, not that it is true.

James Gorman, a former McKinsey senior partner, had led Morgan Stanley for about 12 years at the time of this interview.

“James, who's a former McKinsey senior partner, has led the global financial services firm for the past 12 years.”

0:00:17 · Sean Brown · Leadership

Vic Malhotra, a McKinsey senior partner, is co-author of the book CEO Excellence: The Mindsets That Distinguish the Best Leaders from the Rest.

“Vic is our firm's longest tenured partner and is the co-author of the new book, CEO Excellence, The Mindsets That Distinguish the Best Leaders from the Rest.”

0:00:54 · Sean Brown · Book

James Gorman said the financial crisis wiped out most pure institutional securities firms, effectively eliminating that industry.

“the vast majority of pure institutional firms disappeared. In fact, the whole industry disappeared.”

0:03:13 · James Gorman · Financial crisis · 2008

Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs survived the financial crisis by becoming regulated banks, according to James Gorman.

“Now, some of these so-called survivors, us and Goldman Sachs, survived, but in a very different form. We became banks and regulated.”

0:03:51 · James Gorman · Bank conversion · 2008

Vic Malhotra noted that Morgan Stanley's growth in wealth and asset management included acquisitions such as E-Trade and Eaton Vance.

“you've obviously done a number of deals as well with E-Trade, with Eaton Vance.”

0:05:17 · Vic Malhotra · Acquisitions

Vic Malhotra said James Gorman had recently stated a goal of growing client assets from $6.5 trillion to $10 trillion.

“there was a recent public statement you might have made that you wanted to go from 6.5 trillion to 10 trillion in assets.”

0:05:17 · Vic Malhotra · Asset target

James Gorman said Morgan Stanley's investment bank was revered for most of its 85-year history and was always ranked number one or two in the world before slipping.

“which was revered for most of its 85-year history. We were always number one, two in the world.”

0:05:49 · James Gorman · Investment banking

James Gorman said Morgan Stanley's investment bank now generates about $30 billion in revenue, up from roughly $15 billion when he joined.

“So that's now 30 billion in revenue. And when I joined, it was probably, I don't know exactly, 15 or something.”

0:06:23 · James Gorman · Investment bank revenue

James Gorman said Morgan Stanley's wealth and asset management revenue grew from roughly $6–7 billion to about $30 billion during his tenure.

“Wealth management and asset management, when I joined, were probably 7 billion or 6 billion. They're now 30 billion.”

0:06:23 · James Gorman · Wealth management

James Gorman described Morgan Stanley as an aircraft carrier designed to remain stable when markets are rough.

“the concept was Morgan Stanley is an aircraft carrier. When the seas are really rough, we'll be just fine.”

0:06:23 · James Gorman · Strategy metaphor

James Gorman said his rough rule was that wealth and asset management should be about as large as the institutional securities business, roughly a 50-50 split.

“the rough rule of measurement in my mind is about 50-50”

0:07:25 · James Gorman · Business mix

James Gorman said he has held since the mid-1990s that wealth management would not go fully electronic but would use multiple channels.

“I've had a view for 25 years, since the mid-90s, that that was wrong, that there was actually going to be a multi-channel model.”

0:08:45 · James Gorman · Wealth management · 1990s

James Gorman cited Charles Schwab's build-out of its registered investment adviser (RIA) business as an example of the multi-channel wealth model.

“Schwab, for example, in the wealth space, built up the RIA business.”

0:09:16 · James Gorman · Wealth channels

James Gorman said that under CCAR capital rules, trading remained viable if the strategy shifted from balance sheet size to how fast the balance sheet turned over.

“You could do it, but you needed to change the strategy, which wasn't balance sheet size, it was velocity of sheet.”

0:09:16 · James Gorman · Trading strategy

James Gorman said the main catastrophic risk for a bank like Morgan Stanley is liquidity risk, meaning running out of money.

“And in our business, it's almost all liquidity risk, right? You run out of money, you dig.”

0:09:43 · James Gorman · Liquidity risk

James Gorman said he plays poker in tournaments and uses the game as a model for being aggressive when the odds favor him.

“i love playing poker played in tournaments when you got the cards i'm very aggressive”

0:09:43 · James Gorman · Poker

James Gorman said Morgan Stanley's risk organization grew from about 270 people when he started to more than a thousand.

“When I started, I think we had 270 people in our risk organization. I'm sure we've got over a thousand now, right?”

0:18:30 · James Gorman · Risk management

Chapters

  1. 0:02:12Strategy starts with the firm's current condition

    Gorman explains that the financial crisis created a compelling need to change, and that strategy must reflect where a company actually stands.

    “your strategy is a reflection of where you stand at that point in time”
  2. 0:05:49Ballast: building wealth alongside a cleaned-up bank

    Gorman clarifies that the plan added wealth and asset management to the investment bank rather than replacing it, aiming for a rough 50-50 balance.

    “It was an additive strategy, not a replacement strategy.”
  3. 0:08:17Strategy from industry structure, not a vote

    Gorman says corporate strategy comes from firm beliefs about how the industry works. He heard critics but made the final call.

    “It's not a democracy. Not everybody got an equal vote.”
  4. 0:10:26Poker logic: conservative on risk, aggressive on strengths

    Gorman uses poker to describe holding both caution about catastrophe and aggression where the firm has an edge.

    “extremely conservative, managing against catastrophic risk, and extremely aggressive when you've got the cards”
  5. 0:13:05Corporate versus business-unit strategy

    Gorman separates top-level beliefs from detailed unit decisions on analysis, talent and capital, and rejects copying competitors.

    “don't do strategy by envy. Just because somebody else is doing something”
  6. 0:14:02Trusting experts while stepping in on underperformance

    Gorman explains how he stays out of business details when results are strong and gets involved when they are not.

    “people running the business know more about it than I do. Full stop.”
  7. 0:16:54Stress-testing risk with worst-case questions

    Gorman describes how he frames risk with a loss figure, its probability and revenue earned, to judge whether a risk is worth it.

    “mitigate it, insure against it, hedge against it, sell off the position, distribute it”
  8. 0:19:27Allocating resources by upside, downside and digestion

    Gorman weighs probability and size of upside and downside, and avoids across-the-board cuts by not over-committing in the first place.

    “probability of upside, probability of downside, magnitude of upside, magnitude of downside”

Transcript

0:00:02
James Gorman

My working assumption is that people running the business know more about it than I do. Full stop. I have a bigger title. That doesn't mean I have a bigger brain or better experience or knowledge. Let the experts do their job. But if you see underperformance, okay, you get more

0:00:17
Sean Brown

deeply involved. From McKinsey's strategy and corporate finance practice, I'm Sean Brown and welcome to Inside the Strategy Room. That was James Gorman, Chairman and Chief Executive of Morgan Stanley. James, who's a former McKinsey senior partner, has led the global financial services firm for the past 12 years. Today, in the first of a two-part conversation, James shares how he reshaped the organization's strategy following the global financial crisis. He also discusses how being an expert poker player helps him think through resource allocation.

0:00:54

James spoke with Vic Malhotra, a senior partner based in our New York office who chairs our America's region. Vic is our firm's longest tenured partner and is the co-author of the new book, CEO Excellence, The Mindsets That Distinguish the Best Leaders from the Rest. Joining them is Ashit Mehta, a senior partner also based in our New York office who leads our financial services practice in the Americas. Now, here's Vic. Well, James, thank you for agreeing to do

0:01:23
Vic Malhotra

this interview. Really appreciate it.

0:01:25
James Gorman

Great to be here, Vik and Ashti. Thank you. Thank you.

0:01:27
Vic Malhotra

Thank you. So I'm going to start out with a series of questions around setting the direction for Morgan Stanley. And if you kind of look at Morgan Stanley today and compared to 10 years ago, a dozen years ago, even at the point you became CEO, it's a vastly different organization. The emphasis on wealth management, what you've done on asset management, the change of mix of businesses on the wholesale side, and the like and the contrast is quite stark.

0:01:57

How did you think about reimagining what, or imagining what Morgan Stanley was going to be a decade later? Is this something that evolved? How do you think about strategy for this organization?

0:02:09
James Gorman

This could be a long podcast.

0:02:11
Vic Malhotra

It could be a long podcast.

0:02:12
James Gorman

You know, there's sort of several things that help frame it. The most obvious is what is your current condition? because your strategy is a reflection of where you stand at that point in time. You can have the boldest strategy in the world, but if you're struggling to survive, it doesn't matter. Nobody's going to invest behind that. We obviously had just come out of the financial crisis. So that framed, I would say, a compelling need to do stuff.

0:02:40

Whereas many companies face situations where there's no compelling need to do much else but what they keep doing and just do it better. So operationally improved rather than strategically changed. So that was number one. In the particular industry that we're in, the investment banking industry and wealth management, investment management industries, I had had a view for probably back to the late 80s that, one, wealth management businesses were vastly underappreciated, largely because they'd not been very well managed.

0:03:13

And if you could professionally manage them, there were enormous jewels to be polished. And two, institutional businesses, trading, putting your capital to work and supporting transactions, underwriting deals, while very attractive and glamorous, were so volatile by definition, they became at times uninvestable. And the financial crisis actually proved that. the vast majority of pure institutional firms disappeared. In fact, the whole industry disappeared. I don't know if there's ever been an industry in history that gets wiped out by an event.

0:03:51

Now, some of these so-called survivors, us and Goldman Sachs, survived, but in a very different form. We became banks and regulated. So when you confront that reality that a whole industry has effectively been wiped out, you remain in it in a survivor status under a different, suit of clothing, meaning you're a bank now, not just a securities firm. So my sort of feeling around strategy was first, let's take stock of how bad this really is.

0:04:23

We survived, but what would tip us again into catastrophic circumstances, number one. Number two, fundamentally, if we're going to have ballast to what I call the speed of the aircraft carrier, the ballast was from wealth and asset management. They better be big enough to actually give you ballast. And number three, even with that ballast, if you allow the balance sheet intensive market and credit and liquidity risk intensive businesses to continue on their path without constraint, you might still blot.

0:05:00

So it was a combination of compulsion to act, build the ballast, control the extremes, and then sit back and see what you've got. So that was sort of the strategic birth of what we've really done in the last 14 years since the crisis, but 12 years I've

0:05:17
Vic Malhotra

been in the job. It's interesting as you've built out the ballast, you've obviously done a number of deals as well with E-Trade, with Eaton Vance. I think organically you've shown a lot of growth in the ballast. If I'm not mistaken, there was a recent public statement you might have made that you wanted to go from 6.5 trillion to 10 trillion in assets. How have you worked the balance of putting that investment in the ballast versus investing in some of the other parts of

0:05:49
James Gorman

business? Well, a lot of people mistook our strategy of we're going from a global investment make to a global wealth and investment management. We're not. I said what we're doing is cleaning up the global investment banks. So it got back to that which was revered for most of its 85-year history. We were always number one, two in the world. And we'd clearly dropped from that position. And then add to that cleanup. It was an additive strategy, not a replacement strategy.

0:06:23

That's the fundamental misunderstanding. So if the additive strategy is going to work, then the investment bank cleaned up also has to be of size. So that's now 30 billion in revenue. And when I joined, it was probably, I don't know exactly, 15 or something. Wealth management and asset management, when I joined, were probably 7 billion or 6 billion. They're now 30 billion. Right. So you've got 50-50. And years ago, when I was pressed on this, I said, I thought, again, the concept was Morgan Stanley is an aircraft carrier.

0:06:58

When the seas are really rough, we'll be just fine. My strategy is to be fine when it's really ugly. When the seas are great, everybody looks great and we'll be great. Others may be faster because they're not dragging the ballast through the ocean. But because we've got that ballast, I know the seas are going to get rough. The strategy actually outperforms when everybody's underperforming. And it will happen. Right, right. So, and everybody said, well, how big does it have to be?

0:07:25

I said, well, the rough rule of measurement in my mind is about 50-50. Now, you can get there by shrinking one. No, get there by adding the other. And hence, we had to do some deals to accelerate that or we'd be in a very long journey.

0:07:39
Vic Malhotra

So, as you went through this process of building the ballast but continuing to invest in the core or the original core and building them up to this 50-50 place, what's the process that you go through? Is it you work this with your management team? You work this with your board? Do you have a small strategy team you work with?

0:07:59
Speaker 4

But just add to that also, you take over just as the crisis hits. And you have to make these sudden changes in businesses you haven't really led. How do you have the confidence to also make dramatic changes in that instance? I had no fear because the so-called experts hadn't got it right.

0:08:17
James Gorman

I think it's, to me anyway, strategy comes from fundamental beliefs about industry structure. And then you have some guiding principles around it, whether others agree or disagree. It's not a democracy. Not everybody got an equal vote. And I had plenty of people telling me I went wrong. I didn't really care. And in fact, I said to one of them, OK, if I'm wrong, I'll fail. If I fail, I won't need to be kicked out. I'll walk out and maybe they'll tap you on the shoulder and you can run the place and good luck.

0:08:45

But until then, we're doing it my way. So one form of view, hopefully you're right about industry structure and where it's heading. And basic industry behavior. I'll give an example. A lot of people thought the wealth management advisory model was going entirely electronic. And I've had a view for 25 years, since the mid-90s, that that was wrong, that there was actually going to be a multi-channel model. and ultimately that multi-channel model would merge into one institution.

0:09:16

Institutions would have all channels. Schwab, for example, in the wealth space, built up the RIA business. They could see exactly what I could see coming from the opposite direction. So you have to have fundamental views around, for example, with the capital treatment under CCAR, would trading businesses be viable? Could you actually generate enough revenues given the restrictions on balance sheet growth and so on. You could do it, but you needed to change the strategy, which wasn't balance sheet size, it was velocity of sheet.

0:09:43

So there were solutions to a sort of fundamental industry structure. But then what I tried to do was step back and say, where is the catastrophic risk which could do us in if the next crisis comes? And in our business, it's almost all liquidity risk, right? You run out of money, you dig. So solve for that, we solve for that. so it's more forming strategy from industry structure fundamental views you might be wrong you hope you're not take catastrophic risk off the table where you see you have natural strengths get very aggressive it's like playing poker i love playing poker played in tournaments when you got the cards i'm very aggressive but you don't go all in unless you you're

0:10:26

probably you never know if you're going to win somebody else may actually have a pair of twos and they flopped two twos on the table. You're beaten by four twos. But the odds are way in your favor, get very aggressive. So it's a combination of being extremely conservative, managing against catastrophic risk, and extremely aggressive when you've got the cards. And that is very hard for most people to keep in their head. Most people bias towards being optimist or pessimist.

0:10:52

But you have to be able to do both, which is sort of the pragmatist. Now, I love that framing, by the way,

0:10:58
Vic Malhotra

be extremely conservative on the downside race be be incredibly aggressive and be able to do both

0:11:04
James Gorman

at the same time yeah so it's and it's not a natural act for for a lot of people but then once you've sort of established that framework write out your strategy in simple language which we did and anything that comes to you that would take you off that strategy is fine you might take it off move but then change what you're defining your strategy is don't get sloppy don't allow the organization to change without your intention.

0:11:27

Be very intentional about it. And then you bring in the team, you test it. Okay, this is the basic architecture we're trying to pursue. What are the possible paths we could use to get there? Let's put option risk against each. Let's put payoff against each. Let's put time against each. Let's put execution against each. And that's when I tried to bring the team more broadly. But if you bring the team into a fundamental view of industry structure, I think you shouldn't be in the job.

0:11:56

You can be informed. You have conversations. I have conversations with you guys. I have conversations with a lot of people. But behind it is a pretty strongly held belief, which can be, if it can be challenged and turned over, great, because you're wrong. Yeah. So you'll listen, of course. Definitely listen. Yeah. And ask people for their best shot. Right. Right. And I heard a lot of people told us our strategy was wrong when we started on this post-crisis.

0:12:20

And they were very strongly held views. And I listened to them. I appreciated the views, but ultimately made the call.

0:12:27
Vic Malhotra

And it's interesting to me, it feels like it's a little less about deep fundamental analysis. It's a little more of an understanding, as you put it, industry structure, and then some beliefs, and you bring it together.

0:12:40
James Gorman

Yeah, I'd separate corporate strategy from business strategy. I always think about corporate strategy, for example, and we'll get into some of this stuff, how aggressively should we build out our workplace channel, a digital bank or not? How much do you invest in that versus buy it? You know, there are a hundred different, should we be in the middle market M &A space or not? You know, how big is that? What should our relationship with our Japanese partners look like in Japan?

0:13:05

All of those are business unit strategy, which require deep analysis, a rich understanding of capital resource allocation, talent, things of that kind, and are fundamentally guided by another principle I have, which is don't do strategy by envy. Just because somebody else is doing something, I don't care. Some of our competitors have clearly taken different paths from us. I don't think they're right for us. They may be right for them.

0:13:31
Vic Malhotra

Good luck to them. Can we go down the path where you just led us, which is business unit strategy? So I think you've beautifully laid out how you think about corporate strategy. How much do you as a CEO get involved in business unit strategies and all the related aspects of customer segment strategies, product strategies, digital strategies, etc.? Is this something you spend much time on? Is there a lot of time you spend in reviews and the like?

0:13:58

Just kind of intrigued as to how much you personally spend in that time.

0:14:02
James Gorman

Not overly. I mean, through the budget process, through the quarterly performances. But generally, if I have a strong view in a business, my working assumption is that people running the business know more about it than I do. Full stop. I have a bigger title. That doesn't mean I have a bigger brain or better experience or knowledge. Let the experts do their job. But if you see underperformance, okay, you get more deeply involved. If you see strong performance, relative and absolute, you can stand back a bit.

0:14:31

but I'll have a strongly held view I have one right now about one of our business units and I have a solution for them and I said here's my solution and the reaction was terrible you know we don't like basically terrible idea they were polite and said oh that's very interesting get back to you actually think it's a terrible idea I said that's fine I said what's your answer the problem didn't go away and if we don't if you don't have an answer we're doing my answer So that then forces the wheels to more aggressively seek the answer.

0:15:05

And then with that more aggressive answer seeking, they'll come up with it better than I will. Or at least as good and then it's my view versus their view. So I think presuming you have the answers is a real weakness. And the problem with being in these jobs a long time is everybody tells you you have all the answers. And it's very comforting to your ego. And you get sucked into believing it.

0:15:28
Speaker 4

and that's very dangerous. And James, your involvement in business unit strategy over the course of your tenure, new CO2 now, has that changed or was it always your mindset, even early on, to let them run with it and you'll challenge them?

0:15:42
James Gorman

I think it was always my mindset. In the early days, I had a bunch of tutorials from people running businesses I didn't understand or had not been involved with or had no real knowledge of to at least make sure I had a good-ish to sort of solid good level of understanding. I'd never been an expert. So I think you've got to force yourself to get engaged where you can have the conversations. Emerging market risk is something obviously every bank is thinking through their emerging market risk and particularly in the more volatile markets right now.

0:16:17

That ought to be something I have a pretty good understanding of and can ask a series of questions. But then their level of expertise kicks it up a notch, you know, and you can help frame it. You can say, what is the, give me the, you know, one, two, three standard deviation of performance in XYZ country if things go bad. OK, we've got that. Give me the number, which if we wake up tomorrow morning and we've done that to our P &L, where you feel sick in the stomach.

0:16:54

Okay, they give me that number. Give me the probability that that number could happen. One in a thousand, one in 10, one in 42. Okay, you do not want to be the person walking in my office with that number. Your job is to mitigate it, insure against it, hedge against it, sell off the position, distribute it, bring it down a little bit. Now give me the revenues on that piece of the business for the last three years on average.

0:17:21

now give me an assumed return on those revenues. Now, if I look at that return versus that potential risk, now we're getting asymmetric. But you can't even ask those questions if you don't have a basic knowledge. But you never, as a CEO, I mean, we all grew up in different parts of the business and you will never know as much as the real experts.

0:17:42
Vic Malhotra

Yeah, yeah. Excellent. Related topic, resource allocation. So if you kind of think about whether it's capital allocation, expense dollar allocation, talent allocation, at least the conventional wisdom and some of the research we've done would suggest that those are big, important decisions, right? When you bet in a particular business unit or particular area and you kind of go into your point, you're swinging hard where you really sense the opportunity. You're putting 5%, 10 % more every year relative to the prior year and presumably having to starve some others to do that.

0:18:24

How do you think about resource allocation? How involved are you? Do you leave this to your CFO,

0:18:30
James Gorman

others? First, ask the team, what do they need to be successful? You're running risk management. I don't know. When I started, I think we had 270 people in our risk organization. I'm sure we've got over a thousand now, right? Because you can't go from A to Z in one step. Absolutely. So you've got to leg your way into improvement and best in class performance because you could go to Z and bankrupt yourself and then you've got enough.

0:18:53

That's right. Or you bring in too many people, you can't bring in the culture, et cetera. So it's more, I ask them, what do you need to be optimally successful and what do you need to be currently on that path? Then you get the list, whether it's capital, access to balance sheet, resources, financial resources, investments in the business, talent, and so on. Then you add it all up. And you end up with an answer that is sort of priced for perfection.

0:19:27

The assessment I'm always trying to make is probability of upside, probability of downside, magnitude of upside, magnitude of downside. So something could have low probability of upside, but massive payoff. or high probability of downside, but very little damage. So you have to calibrate size and propensity for outcome, probability of outcome. So then when you step back, you can say to the group, listen, the way we've constructed the organisation for the next three years is dependent upon an environment which I think is unlikely, not likely.

0:20:04

Therefore, we're going to have to take some chips off the table. Right. And I'd rather not do it in a simple everybody cut. Let's try and we may get there. Unfortunately, if time isn't your friend, it catches up with you. That's why you see these bloody rifts in organizations. Bloody not a profanity, bloody as in blood on the floor from people having to cut. So let's try and avoid that by not putting ourselves in a position where if something bad happens, we'd really have to.

0:20:34

So it's more at that level of resource allocation. It's like, what can we afford? We're the bank. Come to us and draw down. Everybody's drawing down their money the same day. The bank doesn't have the money sitting there. It's lent it out to somebody else. You know, it's the Jimmy Stewart, the wonderful life thing. Somebody else has got it in their house. We don't have all the money sitting here, Mrs. Smith. Yeah, exactly.

0:20:55
Vic Malhotra

Yeah, yeah. And those must get tough, especially when acquisitions come into the mix and all of that. You've got to kind of play, play, play all of that.

0:21:02
James Gorman

Everybody's got a dream list. And also there's a capacity for how much the organization can absorb, what the state of mind of the board and the regulators and investors are about where you are in your trajectory. You can get too grabby. I mean, it's like a kid going to an ice cream store and having three ice creams. They all look great when you're looking through the window, but you eat them, you don't feel so good. Yeah.

0:21:24

So you've got digestion problems. So my job is to manage sort of the digestion issue and manage the outcomes if things go bad issue and then let people go at it. And I very delegate enormously, let them really go at it until they underperform.

0:21:42
Sean Brown

We hope you enjoyed this first part of our conversation with James Gorman. In the second part of this podcast, James shares his experiences in managing Morgan Stanley's culture and working with the board. He also offers some candid reflections on how he maintains energy in an all-consuming job. As always, we'll share a transcript of this discussion on our Inside the Strategy Room podcast collection page at mckinsey.com slash I-T -S-R, where you can also easily explore our extensive library of previous episodes.

0:22:14

If you'd like to share feedback or an idea for a future podcast, please email us at insidethestrategyroom at mckinsey.com. Finally, if you'd like to receive alerts on our latest insights, you can sign up on our podcast collection page on mckinsey.com slash ITSR. Follow us on Twitter at MCK Strategy, or connect with us on LinkedIn on the McKinsey Strategy and Corporate Finance Practice page. Thanks again for listening. We look forward to having you join us again soon inside the Strategy Room.